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between	1939	and	1945,	as	war	ravaged	europe	and	asa,	J.	edgar	hoover’s	
Federal	 bureau	 of	 investgaton	 (Fbi)	montored	 the	 poltcal	 dssent	 of	
Presdent	 Frankln	 D.	 roosevelt’s	 celebrated	 ant-nterventonst	 foregn	
polcy	crtcs.	Ths	survellance	occurred	as	amercans	popularly	perceved	
a	threat	from	a	naz	“Ffth	Column,”	whch	was	nflamed	by	sensatonal	
stores	of	German	esponage,	leadng	many	otherwse	ratonal	ctzens	and	
government	 offcals	 to	 suspect	 the	motves	 of	 legtmate	 ant-nterven-
tonst	 foregn	polcy	 crtcs.	more	 mportantly,	 the	 btter	 foregn	polcy	
debate	over	amercan	nvolvement	n	war	proved	to	be	an	opportunty	for	
the	bureaucrat	hoover	who,	as	a	conservatve,	dd	not	ft	the	mold	of	the	
left-of-center	roosevelt	admnstraton.	hoover,	 therefore,	skllfully	used	
the	opportunty	to	ngratate	hmself	wth	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	by	
caterng	to	the	presdent’s	poltcal	and	polcy	nterests—n	provdng	hm	
detaled	poltcal	ntellgence	on	foregn	polcy	crtcs—to	demonstrate	hs	
worth	to	the	admnstraton,	retan	hs	tenure	as	Fbi	drector,	and	secure	
ncreased	authorty	and	autonomy	for	hs	bureau.	among	those	crtcs	he	
targeted	were	Charles	lndbergh,	 the	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	notable	
senators	and	congressmen,	elements	of	the	ant-nterventonst	press,	and	
other	 leadng	 fgures	 n	 the	ant-nterventonst	movement.	Throughout,	
roosevelt	valued	these	reports	and	made	no	complants	about	the	mpro-
prety	or	cvl	lbertes	volatons	of	J.	edgar	hoover’s	actons.
	 it	 was	 durng	 ths	 perod,	 moreover,	 when	 hoover’s	 Fbi	 frst	 used	
ts	 resources	 n	 an	 expansve	 way	 to	montor,	 provde	 ntellgence,	 and	
dscredt	an	admnstraton’s	poltcal	opposton.	but	whle	the	Fbi	exten-
svely	 montored	 admnstraton	 opposton	 as	 t	 never	 had	 prevously,	
compared	to	the	Cold	War	era—where	hoover	operated	autonomously—
the	extent	of	 the	Fbi’s	actvty	was	more	defned.	Whereas,	by	1957,	 the	
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Cold	War	Fbi	had	abandoned	prosecutons	 n	 favor	of	secret	and	llegal	
programs	 (the	 COinTelPrOS)	 to	 dsrupt	 and	 contan	 ts	 targets,	 the	
Fbi	durng	the	1939–45	perod	consgned	tself	to	the	collecton	and	ds-
semnaton	of	poltcal	 ntellgence	and	worked	to	slence	admnstraton	
crtcs	by	developng	legal	cases—utlzng	the	Smth	act,	Foregn	agents	
regstraton	act,	conspracy	statutes,	and	(durng	wartme)	the	esponage	
act1—or	by	ntatng	grand	jury	proceedngs	that,	whle	nomnally	secret,	
mght	have	dscredted	opposton	efforts	by	castng	doubt	on	ther	legt-
macy.	Ths	actvty	suggests	that	the	Fbi’s	role	n	the	later	natonal	securty	
state,	 executed	 whle	 amerca	 advocated	 an	 actvst	 foregn	 polcy	 and	
deferred	 to	 executve	 authorty,	 les	 n	 the	 prewar	 foregn	 polcy	 debate	
(the	so-called	Great	Debate)	where	a	hdden	agenda	lay	behnd	nterven-
tonst	polcy	and	where	patterns	of	Fbi	behavor	mrror	those	of	the	Cold	
War	and	natonal	securty	state	perod.
	 Further	hghlghtng	 the	development	 of	 the	Fbi	 as	 a	natonal	 secu-
rty	apparatus,	datng	from	1940	t	establshed	a	formal	relatonshp	wth	
brtsh	 ntellgence.	lke	hoover	and	roosevelt,	 the	brtsh	had	a	vested	
nterest	 n	 the	 poltcal	 actvtes	 of	 the	 ant-nterventonsts.	 Whereas	
hoover	 sought	 to	 develop	 legal	 cases	 aganst	 them,	 collect	 derogatory	
ntellgence,	and	provde	the	Whte	house	wth	poltcal	ntellgence	that	
alluded	to	ts	crtcs’	subversveness,	brtsh	ntellgence	sought	to	hasten	
amercan	entry	nto	the	war	by	dsruptng	and	dscredtng	these	foregn	
polcy	 crtcs.	The	 relatonshp	between	 the	Fbi	and	brtsh	 ntellgence,	
whch	had	exsted	on	an	ad	hoc	bass	datng	 from	 the	Frst	World	War,	
was	made	permanent	from	1940	and	contnued	to	grow,	extendng	nto	the	
Cold	War	years.	Whle	the	exact	scope	and	nature	of	the	two	organzatons’	
relatonshp	cannot	be	ascertaned	fully	owng	to	classfcaton	restrctons	
on	 relevant	 documents,	 nevertheless	 t	 s	 clear	 that	 the	 two	mantaned	
close	 tes.	 The	 closeness,	 orgns,	 and	 development	 of	 the	 relatonshp,	
moreover,	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 Fbi’s	 nternatonal	 role	 n	 the	 later	
natonal	securty	state—where	the	Fbi	cooperated	ntmately	wth	alled	
foregn	ntellgence	agences—had	ts	orgns	durng	the	Great	Debate	of	
1940–41.
	 That	hoover	was	lmted	to	the	above	tactcs	durng	the	Great	Debate	
can	be	understood	 f	we	 recognze	 that	 he	dd	not	 yet	 have	 the	 level	 of	
	 1.	The	 Smth	 act	 of	 28	 June	 1940	 prohbted	 any	 ndvdual	 or	 organzaton	 from	
advocatng	 the	volent	overthrow	of	 the	Unted	States	government	or	membershp	wth	a	
group	advocatng	such	an	acton.		The	1940	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act	(amended	from	
the	1938	verson)	requred	all	foregn-controlled	groups	to	regster	wth	the	Justce	Depart-
ment.
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autonomy	 that	 he	 would	 durng	 the	 Cold	 War,	 though	 he	 dd	 have	 a	
greater	 level	 of	 autonomy	 than	 at	 any	 prevous	 tme.	Wthout	 complete	
assurance	 that	 ntrusve	programs	would	never	 be	dscovered,	 and	untl	
hs	poston	as	Fbi	drector	was	frmly	rooted	wth	deologcal	alles	n	the	
Whte	house	or	Congress—somethng	hoover	dd	not	develop	untl	 the	
Cold	War—hoover	 refused	 to	 employ	 such	methods,	 rememberng	 the	
effects	wrought	 on	 the	 bureau	 of	 investgaton	 from	 dscovery	 of	 other	
llegal	 tactcs	 employed	 durng	 the	 1919–20	 red	 Scare.	 These	 concerns	
were	 reflected	 n	hoover’s	 repeated	 efforts	 to	 counter	any	 crtcsm	 that	
Fbi	agents	were	nvolved	n	llegal	actvty	and	hs	publc	denals	that	the	
Fbi	collected	noncrmnal	nformaton	durng	the	Great	Debate.	The	fact	
of	 the	 matter,	 however,	 s	 that	 Fbi	 agents	 had	 ndeed	 employed	 llegal	
survellance	 tactcs	 and	 actvely	 sought	 noncrmnal	 ntellgence	 on	 the	
ant-nterventonsts	for	bureaucratc	and	poltcal	purposes.
—■■■■■■■—
Further	 characterzng	 ths	 perod,	 the	 Fbi	 drector	 demonstrated	 that	
he	was,	 above	 all,	 a	 pragmatc	 bureaucrat.	begnnng	wth	 the	Cooldge	
admnstraton	n	1924,	hoover	made	hmself	valuable	to	each	succeedng	
admnstraton	by	provdng	nformaton	he	thought	each	would	fnd	use-
ful.	hoover	was	successful	nasmuch	as	he	held	onto	hs	hgh	poston	n	
government	longer	than	any	comparable	fgure	n	amercan	hstory—he	
was	Fbi	drector	from	1924	untl	hs	death	n	1972,	nearly	ffty	years.	Ths	
pragmatsm	s	sgnfcant	when	one	examnes	the	bureau	n	the	context	of	
the	new	Deal	era.	Generally	regarded	as	a	watershed	n	the	development	
of	 the	welfare	 state,	 the	new	Deal	 reflected	 the	 precept	 of	 “bg	 govern-
ment”	 staffed	 by	 left-of-center	 poltcans	 seekng	 proactve	 leadershp	
n	Washngton.	Whle	on	the	surface	t	seems	the	poltcal	vews	of	new	
Dealers	and	 J.	edgar	hoover	would	be	at	odds,	 the	Fbi	drector	 thrved	
durng	the	roosevelt	admnstraton.	he	succeeded	n	cultvatng	a	close	
relatonshp	 wth	 roosevelt	 by	 usng	 hs	 pragmatsm	 to	manpulate	 the	
relatonshp	 between	 the	 presdent	 and	 the	 Fbi.	 hoover	 became	 a	 val-
ued	source	of	 nformaton	on	roosevelt’s	poltcal	enemes	and	useful	 n	
occasonal	 attempts	 to	 undermne	 them.	 For	 roosevelt’s	 part,	 hs	 long	
personal	nterest	n	secret	ntellgence,	n	part,	explans	hs	receptveness	
to	hoover’s	poltcal	ntellgence	reports.2
	 2.	On	 roosevelt’s	 fascnaton	 wth	 ntellgence	 see	 Davd	 Stafford,	 Roosevelt and 
Churchill: Men of Secrets	(london:	lttle,	brown,	and	Co.,	1999),	3–12.
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	 hoover’s	pragmatsm	durng	 ths	perod,	however,	must	also	be	ana-
lyzed	wthn	the	framework	of	the	correlaton	between	nternatonal	crss	
and	growth	of	power.	hoover’s	 ablty	 to	 ncrease	Fbi	 authorty	has,	 for	
the	most	part,	been	assocated	wth	some	concomtant	nternatonal	crss.	
more	bascally,	 the	 charged	atmosphere	 created	by	varous	 nternatonal	
crses	resulted	n	fears	of	domestc	unrest,	whether	durng	the	Frst	World	
War,	red	Scare,	Great	Depresson,	Second	World	War,	Cold	War,	or	War	
on	 Terrorsm.	 in	 each	 perod,	 the	 Fbi’s	 power	 and	 authorty	 ncreased,	
for	dfferent	reasons,	to	deal	wth	a	perceved	domestc	threat.	Durng	the	
Great	Debate	of	1940–41,	 foregn	polcy	 ssues	provded	the	 mpetus	 for	
extensve	Fbi	montorng	of	Whte	house	foregn	polcy	crtcs	who	were	
popularly	regarded	as	subversve.3	Ths	all	 took	place	 n	the	context	of	a	
charged	nternatonal	stuaton	that	permtted	hoover	to	cater	to	Presdent	
roosevelt’s	domestc	poltcal	 concerns	 about	overcomng	hs	 ant-nter-
ventonst	opposton.	Throughout	the	perod,	hoover	garnered	ncreased	
authorty	and	autonomy	for	hs	Fbi.	From	ths	bass,	the	Cold	War	Fbi	was	
able	to	evolve	nto	an	even	more	ntrusve	national securty	apparatus.
—■■■■■■■—
Contemporares	and	hstorans	have	popularly	dubbed	roosevelt’s	foregn	
polcy	 crtcs	durng	 ths	perod	 “solatonsts.”	The	 term	“ant-nterven-
tonst,”	however,	wll	be	employed	throughout	ths	study.	The	word	“so-
latonst”	 s	 too	narrow	a	descrptor	 to	 be	 appled	 to	roosevelt’s	 foregn	
polcy	crtcs	who	dd	not	advocate	solaton	from	foregn	affars	but	un-
lateralsm	 n	amercan	 foregn	 relatons.	moreover,	 ant-nterventonsts	
themselves	 never	 used	 the	 word	 “solatonst,”	 preferrng	 nstead	 “ant-
nterventonst”	or	“nonnterventonst.”	it	was	roosevelt’s	nterventonst	
alles	who	propagated—successfully—the	derogatory	and	naccurate	term	
“solatonst.”
	 Whle	Frankln	roosevelt’s	ant-nterventonst	foregn	polcy	oppos-
ton	 ncluded	 elements	 from	both	 ends	of	 the	poltcal	 spectrum—from	
the	mostly	conservatve	amerca	Frst	Commttee	to	the	leftst	amercan	
league	for	Peace	and	Democracy—ths	study	focuses	on	hs	mostly	con-
servatve	and	promnent	crtcs	who	were	assocated	wth	amerca	Frst.	
(it	 also	 does	 not	 address	 those	 amercans	 who	 were	 caught	 up	 n	 Fbi	
	 3.	On	the	nterventonst	percepton	of	ant-nterventonsts	as	subversves	see	mark	
lncoln	Chadwn,	The Hawks of World War II	(Chapel	hll:	Unversty	of	north	Carolna	
Press,	1968).
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survellance	actvtes	even	though	they	were	not	ant-nterventonsts,	as	
other	 hstorans	 have	 already	 documented.)	 Some	 nonconservatves	 are	
ncluded	but	only	nasmuch	as	they	opposed	the	centralzaton	of	power	
n	the	presdency	and	alled	themselves	wth	amerca	Frst.	ant-nterven-
tonsts	from	other	ponts	on	the	poltcal	spectrum	are	excluded	prmarly	
for	three	reasons.	Frst,	those	assocated	wth	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
were	 best	 organzed	 and	 posed	 the	 most	 sgnfcant	 poltcal	 threat	 to	
admnstraton	foregn	polcy.	Second,	after	the	naz	nvason	of	the	Sovet	
Unon	 n	 June	 1941,	amercan	 leftsts	 and	Communsts	wholeheartedly	
joned	 the	 nterventonst	 cause;	 thereafter	 amerca	 Frst	 remaned	 the	
only	 serous	 threat	 to	 admnstraton	 poltcal	 nterests.4	 Thrd,	 hoover	
was	a	fervent	ant-Communst	wth	conservatve	poltcal	and	socal	cre-
dentals,	and	hs	wllngness	to	montor	those	of	smlar	poltcal	lk	for	the	
left-of-center	roosevelt	admnstraton	reveals	hs	bureaucratc	astuteness.	
ever	the	master	bureaucrat,	hoover	realzed	hs	poston	n	the	roosevelt	
admnstraton	was	tenuous	and	sought	to	preserve	and	expand	t	by	cater-
ng	 to	 the	Whte	house’s	poltcal	and	polcy	 nterests	vs-à-vs	 the	ant-
nterventonsts.
	 as	hoover	was	of	the	poltcal	rght5—lke	many	ant-nterventonsts,	
partcularly	those	assocated	wth	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee—the	ques-
ton	arses	whether	he	consdered	hmself	an	nterventonst.	Whle	he	dd	
not	publcly	advocate	amercan	nterventon	n	the	war,	there	s	some	ev-
dence	demonstratng	hs	nterventonst	credentals.	but	more	mportant	
than	whether	hoover	was	an	nterventonst	was	hs	pragmatc	character,	
a	man	who	worked	to	effect	roosevelt’s	poltcal	nterests.	hoover,	more-
over,	 would	 lkely	 have	 regarded	 ant-nterventonsts	 as	 “subversves”	
or	“un-amercan”	 n	part	because	of	 the	popular	assocatons	many	had	
made	between	ant-nterventonsts	 and	 radcal	or	 fascst	 elements.	Ths	
followed	a	popular	outlook	datng	from	the	1930s,	and	extendng	nto	the	
early	Cold	War,	that	 dentfed	Stalnsm	and	nazsm	as	essentally	sm-
lar	 totaltaran	 regmes.	hoover	may	have	held	 such	vews	 and,	 coupled	
wth	popular	perceptons	of	ant-nterventonsts	as	wttng	or	unwttng	
	 4.	The	wartme	allance	between	the	Unted	States	and	the	Sovet	Unon	dd	not	end	n	
any	way	Fbi	survellance	of	domestc	communst	and	leftst	actvty.		On	the	Fbi’s	contnued	
efforts	n	ths	area	see	athan	Theohars,	Chasing Spies: How the FBI Failed in Counterintelli-
gence But Promoted the Politics of McCarthyism in the Cold War Years	(Chcago:	ivan	r.	Dee,	
2002),	34–78.
	 5.	hoover	was	conservatve	both	poltcally	(though	he	never	joned	a	poltcal	party)	
and	socally.		he	was	a	strong	ant-Communst	and	had	the	support	of	a	large	conservatve	
consttuency	who,	by	the	Cold	War	perod,	sought	to	dsmantle	the	trappngs	of	roosevelt’s	
new	Deal.	he	was	also	a	racst,	sexst,	and	ntolerant	of	homosexualty.
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naz	dupes,	he	may	have	regarded	some	fellow	conservatves	as	domestc	
threats.	hs	derogatory	poltcal	reports	to	the	Whte	house	only	served	to	
bolster	ths	percepton.6
—■■■■■■■—
Ths	 book	makes	 use	 of	 prevously	 classfed	 Fbi	 fles.	Only	 n	 the	 last	
few	 years	 have	 the	 Fbi	 fles	 of	 Charles	 lndbergh,	 the	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee,	and	other	promnent	ant-nterventonsts,	for	example,	been	
avalable	for	research.	as	a	result,	prevous	dscourses	about	the	bureau’s	
poltcal	 survellance	durng	 ths	perod	have	been	 tentatve	 and	 ncom-
plete.	hstorans	 of	 ant-nterventonsm,	 furthermore,	 have	 ether	 been	
only	tangentally	nterested	n	Fbi	actvty	or	have	been	unaware	of	ntr-
cate	Fbi	programs,	flng	procedures,	and	vested	Fbi	nterests.	hstorans	
of	the	Fbi,	whle	not	unaware	of	other	perods,	have	been	dsproporton-
ately	nterested	n	the	agency’s	red	Scare	days	(1919–20)	or	ts	Cold	War	
actvtes.	much	 has	 been	mssed	 through	 these	 oversghts,	 partcularly	
new	 nformaton	 that	 reveals	 the	 true	 extent	 of	 Fbi	 survellance	 actv-
ty	from	1939	to	1945	and	the	orgns	of	 the	Fbi’s	 ntmate	 nternatonal	
ntellgence	relatonshps.	as	a	result,	Fbi	poltcal	survellance	durng	ths	
mportant	perod	has	never	receved	the	full	treatment	t	deserves.
	 Fbi	fles	are	the	sngle	most	mportant	source	of	nformaton	for	ths	
study.	all	bureau	fles	created	snce	1924	have	been	retaned	by	the	Fbi	and	
are	not	deposted	n	the	natonal	archves	except	for	the	J.	edgar	hoover	
Offcal	 and	 Confdental	 fle	 n	 2005.	 For	 over	 seventy	 years,	 Fbi	 fles	
have	remaned	the	preserve	of	Fbi	offcals	who	have	opened	them	to	only	
a	 select	number	of	 “frendly”	 journalsts.7	Only	when	amendments	were	
made	n	1974	to	the	Freedom	of	informaton	act	(FOia)	dd	researchers	
have	access	to	these	mportant	documents,	but	wth	access	comes	restrc-
ton.	 exemptons	 to	 the	 FOia	 nclude	 classfed	materal,	 prvacy-rghts	
related	 nformaton,	 and	 anythng	 revealng	 Fbi	 sources	 and	 methods.	
Wth	Fbi	employees’	 subjectve	use	of	 the	black	 felt	 tp	pen,	 researchers	
are	presented	wth	sometmes	heavly	censored	documents.	in	addton,	t	
	 6.	 See	Thomas	r.	maddux,	“red	Fascsm,	brown	bolshevsm:	The	amercan	image	
of	Totaltaransm	n	the	1930s,”	Historian	40	(november	1977):	85–103;	les	K.	adler	and	
Thomas	G.	Paterson,	“red	Fascsm:	The	merger	of	naz	Germany	and	Sovet	russa	n	the	
amercan	 image	 of	 Totaltaransm,	 1930s–1950s,”	American Historical Review	 75	 (aprl	
1970):	1046–64.
	 7.	 See	for	example,	Kenneth	O’relly,	“Frendly	Journalsts’	access	to	Fbi	Fles,”	USA 
Today	109	(September	1980):	29–31.
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s	the	responsblty	of	the	requester	to	pay	processng	costs	(at	ten	cents	
per	page	for	fles	that	can	be	thousands	of	pages	long),	whch	can	become	
very	 expensve.	moreover,	 Fbi	 understaffng	 and	 budgetary	 restrctons	
have	 created	very	 long	delays	 n	 the	processng	of	 requests	 (n	1996	 the	
bureau	averaged	ffty	requests	per	day).	it	s	not	uncommon	to	wat	years	
for	a	sngle	FOia	request	to	be	fnalzed.	nevertheless,	Fbi	records	are	a	
vtal	 and	 mportant,	 f	 sometmes	 frustratng	 and	 tantalzng,	 source	 of	
nformaton.	8
—■■■■■■■—
Ths	book	makes	hstorographcal	 contrbutons	 n	 three	areas:	 the	hs-
tory	 of	 Fbi	 poltcal	 survellance,	 the	 hstory	 of	 the	 ant-nterventon-
st/nterventonst	foregn	polcy	debate,	and	the	hstory	of	the	rse	of	the	
amercan	natonal	securty	state.	most	hstorans	of	the	Fbi	have	focused	
ether	on	ts	abuses	durng	the	red	Scare	of	1919–209	or	ts	poltcal	ntel-
lgence	 actvtes	 durng	 the	 Cold	War	 era.10	 Some	 Fbi	 hstorans	 have	
examned	the	Fbi’s	poltcal	survellance	of	roosevelt’s	ant-nterventon-
st	foregn	polcy	crtcs,	but	only	as	a	small	part	of	larger	studes.	athan	
Theohars	 brefly	 mentoned	 the	 Fbi’s	 montorng	 of	 ant-nterventon-
sts	 n	 hs	 broad	 study	Spying on Americans	 (1978), n	 hs	 bography	 of	
Fbi	Drector	hoover,	The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American 
	 8.	 it	lterally	takes	years	to	wn	access	to	Fbi	fles.		FOia	requests	are	taken	on	a	frst-
come,	frst-served	bass.		as	of	march	1999	(when	my	research	was	carred	out),	the	Fbi	had	
a	total	of	8,500	requests	pendng,	whch	requred	the	revew	(and	redacton)	of	an	estmated	
1.8	mllon	pages.		letter,	John	m.	Kelso	Jr.,	Fbi	FOia	Secton	Chef,	to	Douglas	m.	Charles,	
14	may	1999.
	 9.	robert	K.	murray,	Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920	(mnneapo-
ls:	Unversty	of	mnnesota	Press,	1955);	Wllam	Preston	Jr.,	 Aliens and Dissenters: Federal 
Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933,	2nd	ed.	(Chcago:	Unversty	of	Chcago	Press,	1994);	
Davd	Wllams,	“‘Wthout	Understandng’:	The	Fbi	and	Poltcal	Survellance,	1908–1941”	
(Ph.D.	dss.,	Unversty	of	new	hampshre,	1981),	2.		See	also	Davd	Wllams,	“The	bureau	
of	 investgaton	and	its	Crtcs,	1919–1921:	The	Orgns	of	Federal	Poltcal	Survellance,”	  
Journal of American History	68	(December	1981):	560–79.
	 10.	athan	 Theohars,	 Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to the 
Huston Plan	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1978);	Frank	J.	Donner,	The Age of Sur-
veillance: The Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System	(new	york:	Knopf,	
1980);	Kenneth	O’relly,	Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Men-
ace	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1983);	John	ellff,	The Reform of FBI Intelligence 
Operations	(Prnceton,	nJ:	Prnceton	Unversty	Press,	1979);	Davd	Garrow,	The FBI and 
Martin Luther King, Jr.: From Memphis to “Solo”	(new	york:	norton,	1981);		Wllam	Keller,	
The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State	(Prnceton,	nJ:	
Prnceton	Unversty	Press,	1989).
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Inquisition	 (1988),	and	n	hs	The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief 
Critical History	(2004).11	lkewse,	both	rchard	Powers	and	Curt	Gentry	
n	ther	books	mentoned	but	only	n	passng	that	the	Fbi	had	montored	
roosevelt’s	crtcs.12
	 Some	hstorans	of	ant-nterventonsm	and	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy	
also	have	only	sketchly	examned	the	Fbi’s	survellance	of	ant-nterven-
tonsts.	 Ther	 nterests	 have	 concentrated	 on	 the	 poltcs	 of	 ant-nter-
ventonsm,	 and	 whle	 recognzng	 Fbi	 poltcal	 survellance	 perhaps	
have	 neglected	 t	 through	 a	 lack	 of	 documentaton.	Wayne	 S.	 Cole	 has	
studed	ant-nterventonsts	more	 than	anyone	 else	 and	 n	hs	magnum	
opus,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists	(1983),	only	brefly	surveyed	the	Fbi’s	
survellance.13	in	hs	book	Storm on the Horizon	(2000),	Justus	Doenecke	
brefly	noted	the	Fbi’s	efforts.14	robert	Dallek’s	broad	survey	of	roosevelt’s	
foregn	polcy,	smlar	to	Cole’s	and	Doenecke’s,	offered	only	one	passng	
reference	to	the	Fbi.15
	 a	few	hstorans,	nevertheless,	have	examned	the	Fbi’s	poltcal	sur-
vellance	of	the	ant-nterventonsts	more	drectly	than	these	broad	stud-
es.	rchard	W.	Steele	n	hs	artcle	“Frankln	D.	roosevelt	and	hs	Foregn	
Polcy	Crtcs”	(1979)	attempted	fuller	coverage	of	Fbi	nvestgatons	nto	
the	ant-nterventonsts,	but	was	lmted	by	the	naccessblty	(at	the	tme)	
of	Fbi	records.	Steele	focused	on	Presdent	roosevelt	and	argued	that	he	
ntentonally	drected	hoover,	ctng	hs	1934	and	1936	drectves,	to	nves-
tgate	hs	ant-nterventonst	opponents	n	an	effort	to	destroy	them.	as	
Steele’s	argument	was	based	on	only	a	lmted	number	of	Fbi	documents,	
roosevelt	papers,	and	congressonal	reports,	he	placed	too	much	emphass	
on	roosevelt’s	machnatons	as	dstnct	from	J.	edgar	hoover’s	own	pror-
tes.	Steele	dd	not	wdely	examne	Fbi	montorng	of	ant-nterventonsts	
	 11.	Theohars,	Spying on Americans,	158–59;	athan	Theohars	and	John	Cox,	The Boss: 
J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	
1988),	 149;	athan	Theohars,	The FBI and American Democracy: A Brief Critical History	
(lawrence:	Unversty	Press	of	Kansas,	2004)..
	 12.	rchard	Gd	Powers,	Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover	(new	york:	Free	
Press,	1987);	Powers,	Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the FBI (new	york:	
Free	Press,	2004);	Curt	Gentry,	J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets	(new	york:	norton,	
1991).
	 13.	Wayne	 S.	 Cole,	 Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45	 (lncoln:	 Unversty	 of	
nebraska	Press,	1983),	484–87,	530–33.
	 14.	 Justus	D.	Doenecke,	Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 
1939–1941	(lanham,	mD:	rowman	&	lttlefeld,	2000),	276.
	 15.	robert	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945	(new	
york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1979),	289–90.
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and,	 because	 hs	 documentaton	 was	 lmted,	 he	 focused	 more	 on	 the	
Whte	house	than	the	Fbi.16
	 Charles	Croog	has	analyzed	the	Fbi’s	poltcal	survellance	of	ant-nter-
ventonsts	 n	 hs	 artcle	 “Fbi	Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 isolatonst-
interventonst	Debate,	1939–1941”	(1992).	Croog	argued	that	roosevelt	
and	hoover	fully	agreed	upon	the	natonal	securty	msson	of	the	Fbi	and	
that	the	Fbi’s	nvestgaton	of	ant-nterventonsts	was	lmted.	in	makng	
ths	argument,	Croog	stated	 that	Fbi	“resources	were	never	sgnfcantly	
moblzed	 aganst	 roosevelt’s	 law-abdng	 opponents.”	 yet	 Croog’s	 pece	
suffered	 from	one	major	weakness.	 lke	 Steele,	Croog	 employed	 only	 a	
lmted	 base	 of	 evdence	 to	 support	 hs	 conclusons:	 hs	 footnotes	 show	
that	he	used	only	a	porton	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	Fbi	fle,	con-
gressonal	hearngs,	and	reports.	Croog	thereby	vastly	underestmated	the	
true	extent	and	nature	of	Fbi	poltcal	survellance.17
	 Kenneth	O’relly	examned	the	Fbi’s	poltcal	survellance	of	roosevelt’s	
foregn	polcy	opponents	n	the	context	of	the	agency’s	new	Deal	expan-
son	n	hs	“a	new	Deal	for	the	Fbi:	The	roosevelt	admnstraton,	Crme	
Control,	 and	 natonal	 Securty”	 (1982).	 O’relly	 examned	 Fbi	 nsttu-
tonal	 changes	made	durng	 the	new	Deal	 n	 the	areas	of	 crme	control	
and	 natonal	 securty.	 Whle	 he	 used	 a	 broader	 base	 of	 evdence	 than	
prevous	hstorans,	when	analyzng	the	Fbi’s	montorng	of	foregn	polcy	
crtcs	he	nevertheless	 concluded,	 contrary	 to	Steele,	 that	 “the	roosevelt	
admnstraton’s	purposes	were	essentally	benevolent.”	18
	 athan	Theohars	examned	an	aspect	of	the	Fbi’s	survellance	of	the	ant-
nterventonst	press	n	hs	artcle	“The	Fbi,	the	roosevelt	admnstraton,	
and	the	‘Subversve’	Press”	(1993).	makng	more	extensve	use	of	Fbi	fles,	
Theohars	 analyzed	 the	 Fbi’s	montorng	 of	 promnent	members	 of	 the	
ant-nterventonst	press	and	the	roosevelt	admnstraton’s	desre	to	settle	
scores	wth	 them	 after	 the	amercan	 entry	 nto	 the	 Second	World	War.	
Theohars	concluded	that	a	complete	understandng	of	the	epsode	could	
not	be	ascertaned	untl	further	documentaton	was	declassfed.19
	 16.	rchard	W.	Steele,	“Frankln	D.	roosevelt	and	hs	Foregn	Polcy	Crtcs,”	Political 
Science Quarterly	 94	 (Sprng	1979):	15–32.	 	arthur	Schlesnger	 Jr.	 commented	on	Steele’s	
pece,	argung	that	he	had	made	overstatements,	and	clamed	Steele’s	artcle	read	more	lke	a	
prosecutoral	bref	than	a	hstorcal	assessment.		See	hs	“a	Comment	on	‘roosevelt	and	hs	
Foregn	Polcy	Crtcs,’”	Political Science Quarterly	94	(Sprng	1979):	33–35.
	 17.	Charles	 F.	 Croog,	 “Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 isolatonst-interventonst	
Debate,	1939–1941,”	Historian	54	(Sprng	1992):	441–58.
	 18.	Kenneth	O’relly,	“a	new	Deal	for	the	Fbi:	The	roosevelt	admnstraton,	Crme	
Control,	and	natonal	Securty,”	Journal of American History	69	(December	1982):	638–58.
	 19.	athan	 Theohars,	 “The	 Fbi,	 the	 roosevelt	 admnstraton,	 and	 the	 ‘Subversve’	
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	 my	own	artcles	on	the	Fbi	and	the	ant-nterventonsts,	early	results	of	
my	research,	examned	lmted	aspects	of	the	Fbi’s	poltcal	survellance.	in	
“Fbi	Poltcal	Survellance	and	the	Charles	lndbergh	investgaton,	1939–
1944”	(1997),	i	argued	that	the	Fbi’s	nvestgatve	efforts	aganst	ant-nter-
ventonsts,	 n	 partcular	Charles	 lndbergh,	were	 greater	 than	prevous	
hstorans	had	argued.	Then,	n	“informng	FDr:	Fbi	Poltcal	Survellance	
and	 the	 isolatonst-interventonst	 Foregn	 Polcy	 Debate,	 1939–1945”	
(2000),	i	furthered	my	argument	by	examnng	the	Fbi’s	montorng	of	the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee,	lndbergh,	and	fve	wretap	targets.	i	concluded	
that	secret	Fbi	poltcal	 reports	 to	 the	Whte	house	helped	roosevelt	 to	
advance	 hs	 concepton	 of	 the	 naton’s	 natonal	 securty	 nterests.20	and	
n	“Frankln	D.	roosevelt,	J.	edgar	hoover,	and	Fbi	Poltcal	Survellance”	
(1999),	i	argued	for	a	lay	audence	that	t	was	hoover	and	not	roosevelt	
who	 ntated	Fbi	montorng	of	 ant-nterventonsts,	 yet	roosevelt	had	
made	no	complants.	These	early	conclusons	were	lmted	and	served	as	a	
bass	on	whch	ths	present	study	was	launched.	Some	aspects	of	my	early	
work	are	expanded	upon	heren	and	more	closely	scrutnzed.21
	 Other	studes	deal	wth	the	Fbi	and	poltcal	survellance	durng	ths	
perod	 n	 ndrect	ways.	roy	Turnbaugh	argued	 n	 “The	Fbi	 and	harry	
elmer	 barnes”	 (1980)	 that	 the	 bureau	 targeted	 the	 ant-nterventonst	
barnes	 n	 an	 effort	 to	 exact	 vengeance	 for	 crtcal	 comments	 the	 noted	
hstoran	had	made	about	the	Fbi	pror	to	the	Great	Debate.	he	dd	not	
analyze	 the	Fbi’s	montorng	 of	barnes	 as	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 effort	 aganst	
ant-nterventonsts.22	 Francs	 macDonnell,	 n	 hs	 book	 Insidious Foes: 
Press,”	Journalism History	19	(Sprng	1993):	3–10.
	 20.	Warren	Kmball	was	solcted	to	comment	on	my	artcle	for	h-Dplo,	the	dplomatc	
hstory	internet	dscusson	lst.		he	prased	my	pont	that	the	orgns	of	llegal	survellance	
for	the	Whte	house	date	back	to	FDr	and	not	nxon.		he	crtczed	me,	however,	for	not	
adequately	 provng	my	 contenton	 that	 Fbi	 poltcal	 reports	 permtted	 roosevelt	 to	 not	
worry	about	hs	domestc	opponents	as	he	had	kept	tabs	on	them.		i	may	have	overstated	my	
case,	but	i	was	also	not	clear	n	my	argument.		i	should	have	stated	that	roosevelt	gathered	
senstve	 poltcal	 ntellgence	wthout	 hs	 crtcs	 knowng	 about	 t,	 and	 ths	 nformaton,	
n	part,	allowed	hm	to	mplement	hs	concepton	of	the	country’s	natonal	securty	needs.	
Warren	F.	Kmball,	revew	of	Douglas	m.	Charles,	 “informng	FDr”	(19	aprl	2000),	h-
Dplo	dscusson	lst,	http://www.h-net.msu.edu.
	 21.	Douglas	m.	 Charles	 and	 John	 ross,	 “Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 Charles	
lndbergh	 investgaton,	 1939–1944,”	Historian	 59	 (Summer	 1997):	 831–47;	 Douglas	m.	
Charles,	 “informng	 FDr:	 Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 isolatonst-interventonst	
Foregn	Polcy	Debate,	1939–1945,”	Diplomatic History	24	(Sprng	2000):	211–32;	Charles,	
“Frankln	D.	roosevelt,	 J.	 edgar	hoover,	 and	 Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance,”	USA Today	 128	
(September	1999):	74–76.
	 22.	roy	Turnbaugh,	“The	Fbi	and	harry	elmer	barnes:	1936–1944,”	Historian	42	(may	
1980):	385–98.
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The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front	 (1995),	 analyzed	
the	Fbi’s	 actvty	durng	 ths	 perod	but	 only	 nsofar	 as	 t	 related	 to	 the	
perceved	Ffth	Column	 threat.23	barton	bernsten	 surveyed	very	brefly	
roosevelt’s	nterest	n	Fbi	reports	about	hs	crtcs,	but	n	the	larger	context	
of	the	abuse	of	executve	authorty	datng	from	1940.24	and	John	F.	berens	
noted	roosevelt’s	 empowerment	 of	 the	 Fbi	 but	 overlooked	 ts	montor-
ng	of	 ant-nterventonsts	 n	hs	broad	and	concse	 survey	artcle	 “The	
Fbi	 and	 Cvl	 lbertes	 from	 Frankln	 roosevelt	 to	 Jmmy	 Carter—an	
hstorcal	Overvew”	(1980).25
	 Ths	book	further	makes	a	contrbuton	to	the	hstorography,	n	terms	
of	 the	 Fbi	 at	 least,	 surroundng	 the	 orgns	 of	 the	 amercan	 natonal	
securty	state.	if	the	natonal	securty	state	s	defned	as	the	country	plac-
ng	tself	on	a	permanent	wartme	footng	gven	global	threats	to	natonal	
securty	(nuclear	weapons,	Cold	War,	terrorsm)	and	the	loss	of	geographc	
securty	 (the	 atlantc	 and	 Pacfc	 Oceans,	 the	 Pearl	 harbor	 attack,	 and	
9/11),	the	steppng	stone	to	that	was	found	durng	the	prewar	survellance	
of,	n	part,	the	ant-nterventonsts.	moreover,	the	natonal	securty	state	
can	be	understood,	wrote	Danel	yergn,	as	“a	unfed	pattern	of	atttudes,	
polces,	and	nsttutons.”26	Whle	the	atttudes	and	polces	that	made	up	
what	we	would	 consder	 the	natonal	 securty	 state	 developed	prmarly	
wth	the	onset	of	the	Cold	War	from	1947	(contanment	and	a	belef	that	
to	secure	the	Unted	States	the	country	must	be	proactve	nternatonally),	
the	nsttutons—specfcally	the	Fbi—clearly	began	to	develop	a	system-
atic	 securty	 conscousness	 nvolvng	 ntellgence	 nvestgatons	 aganst	
both	radcals	and	legtmate	foregn	polcy	crtcs	durng	the	perod	before	
the	amercan	entrance	nto	the	Second	World	War.	even	hstoran	Davd	
reynolds,	 n	 hs	 mportant	 book	From Munich to Pearl Harbor	 (2001),	
whle	not	at	all	examnng	the	Fbi,	does	conclude	that	by	“the	end	of	1941	
many	features	of	what	would	emerge	as	the	 ‘natonal	securty	state’	were	
already	 apparent	 n	 embryo,	 albet	 appled	 to	 a	 very	 dfferent	 enemy.”27	
	 23.	 Francs	macDonnell,	Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home 
Front	(new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1995),	157–83.
	 24.	barton	J.	bernsten,	“The	road	to	Watergate	and	beyond:	The	Growth	and	abuse	of	
executve	authorty	snce	1940,”	Law and Contemporary Problems	40	(Sprng	1976):	58–76.
	 25.	 John	 F.	 berens,	 “The	 Fbi	 and	Cvl	 lbertes	 from	 Frankln	 roosevelt	 to	 Jmmy	
Carter—an	hstorcal	Overvew,”	Michigan Academician	13	(1980):	131–44.
	 26.	Danel	yergn,	Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security 
State	(boston:	houghton,	mffln,	1977),	5.
	 27.	Davd	reynolds,	From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of 
the Second World War	(Chcago:	ivan	r.	Dee,	2001),	5.	in	terms	of	the	embryonc	aspects	of	the	
natonal	securty	state,	reynolds	dentfes	amerca’s	“new	global	perspectve	on	nternatonal	
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Therefore,	 i	 have	 termed	 ths	 perod	 the	 domestc	 securty	 state—the	
pont	 at	 whch	 the	 Fbi	 developed	 ts	 domestc	 ntellgence	 apparatus	
and	nternatonal	ntellgence	lason	to	the	degree	that	t	operated	sem-
autonomously	and	was	on	a	sold	 footng	 toward	evolvng	 nto	 the	 later,	
Cold	War–era	natonal	 securty	 state	once	 the	 country	 adopted	 ts	Cold	
War	atttudes	and	polces.
	 Whereas	durng	the	natonal	securty	state	era	the	Fbi	was	part	of,	and	
concerned	wth,	 ensurng	 the	 naton’s	 securty	 from	 communst	 subver-
son	 that	was	beleved	 to	be	 a	 global	 effort	drected	 from	moscow,	dur-
ng	the	domestc	securty	state	perod	the	Fbi	was	more	concerned	wth	
preservng	the	naton’s	domestc	securty	from	perceved	nternal	threats.	
Those	threats	were	dentfed	n	fascst	and	communst	“subversves,”	but	
also,	sgnfcantly,	n	legtmate	foregn	polcy	crtcs	who	were	systemat-
cally	montored	under	a	domestc	securty	ratonale.	even	the	Fbi’s	own	
jargon	dfferentated	between	the	Great	Debate	perod	and	the	Cold	War:	
durng	 the	 former	 they	 nvestgated	 threats	 to	 “domestc	 securty”	whle	
durng	the	Cold	War	that	changed	to	“natonal	securty.”	but	the	pattern	
of	Fbi	survellance	and	ts	 justfcaton	remaned	the	same,	whle	durng	
the	Cold	War	 the	bureau	developed	a	greater	degree	of	autonomy,	more	
ntrusve	nvestgatve	technques,	and	llegal	dsrupton	programs.
	 in	hs	book	Shattered Peace	(1977),	Danel	yergn	traced	the	orgns	of	
the	natonal	securty	state	back	to	Woodrow	Wlson	and	hs	concepton	of	
amercan	 nternatonalsm.	yergn	 argued	 that	amercan	polcy	makers	
conceptualzed	securty	concerns	at	ths	tme	n	lght	of	a	perceved	expan-
sonst	and	deologcal	Sovet	russa.28	Frank	J.	Donner	smlarly	dentfed	
the	federalzaton	of	domestc	ntellgence	n	the	Frst	World	War	era	and	
the	perod	of	the	russan	revoluton.	it	was	at	ths	tme,	he	argued,	that	the	
Fbi	nvolved	tself	n	large-scale	nvestgatons	of	prmarly	left-wng	ds-
senters,	yet	he	argued	that	the	natonal	securty	state	s	best	demonstrated	
durng	 the	Cold	War.	and	athan	Theohars	 has	 examned	 the	 natonal	
securty	state	n	terms	of	mcCarthysm,	datng	ts	orgns	to	the	Cold	War,	
whch,	he	argued,	along	wth	Presdent	Truman’s	rhetorc	and	poor	leader-
shp,	permtted	such	abuses	to	be	wrought.	he	furthered	hs	argument	n	
Spying on Americans	(1978)	where	he	argued	that	t	was	durng	the	Cold	
War	when	 the	Congress	deferred	 to	 the	executve	 n	matters	of	natonal	
securty	and	tolerated	secrecy	as	necessary	to	effect	securty	polcy.29
relatons”	wth	a	concomtant	expanson	of	U.S.	securty	n	terms	of	geography	and	“the	asser-
ton	of	U.S.	prncples	of	lberal,	captalst	democracy.”
	 28.	yergn,	Shattered Peace.
	 29.	 See	Donner,	The Age of Surveillance; athan	Theohars,	Seeds of Repression: Harry S. 
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	 Ths	study	hopes	to	complement	the	work	of	Fbi,	ant-nterventonst,	
and	natonal	 securty	hstorans	by	examnng	 the	Fbi’s	poltcal	 survel-
lance	 of	roosevelt’s	 ant-nterventonst	 foregn	 polcy	 crtcs	 from	1939	
to	1945.	Fbi	poltcal	survellance	durng	ths	perod	was	extensve,	wde-
spread,	and	sought	to	be	responsve	to	roosevelt’s	poltcal	nterests.	The	
extent	of	the	bureau’s	efforts,	moreover,	closely	mrrors	later	Cold	War	pat-
terns	of	Fbi	behavor.	Ths	s	sgnfcant	nasmuch	as	prevous	hstorans	
have	 dentfed	 the	natonal	securty	state	as	beng	 nextrcably	 lnked	to	
fears	of	communst	subverson	and	the	spread	of	bolshevsm.	Ths	study,	
and	contemporary	events	 nvolvng	 nternatonal	 terrorsm,	demonstrate	
that	the	natonal	securty	state	extends	beyond	natonal	and	nternatonal	
concerns	wth	communsm,	even	f	communsm	was	the	prmary	focus	of	
natonal	securty	bureaucrats	durng	the	Cold	War.	The	Great	Debate	llus-
trates	well	that	most	any	perceved	threat	durng	a	crss	perod—whether	
ferce	 ant-nterventonst	 opposton	 to	 foregn	 polcy	 or	 acts	 of	 terror-
sm—that	eventually	lead	polcymakers	to	develop	the	atttudes,	polces,	
and	nsttutons	consumed	wth	securty	concerns	would	morph	nto	the	
natonal	securty	state.
—■■■■■■■—
The	 terrorst	 attacks	 n	 new	 york	 Cty	 and	 Washngton,	 D.C.,	 on	 11	
September	2001	and	subsequent	government	reacton	have	brought	new	
sgnfcance	to	ths	study.	in	reacton	to	these	events,	n	an	effort	to	safe-
guard	 the	 naton	 from	 further	 terrorst	 ncdents,	 the	 bush	 admnstra-
ton	sought	to	suspend	nvestgatve	restrctons	placed	on	the	Fbi	n	the	
1970s.	Followng	hoover’s	death	n	1972,	and	revelatons	of	ntrusve	Fbi	
domestc	survellance	actvtes,	Fbi	nvestgatons	were	formally	restrcted	
to	prevent	the	bureau	from	nvestgatng	poltcally	orented	groups.	Some	
n	the	bush	admnstraton,	however,	beleved	these	restrctons	mpeded	
Fbi	counterterrorsm	efforts	by	preventng	the	employment	of	undercover	
agents	to	montor,	wthout	probable	cause,	relgous	and	poltcal	groups.
	 Testfyng	 before	 the	 Senate	 Judcary	 Commttee,	 attorney	 General	
John	ashcroft	defended	the	bush	admnstraton’s	antterrorsm	plan,	whch	
ncluded	a	broad	expanson	of	Fbi	wretappng	and	nvestgatve	authorty.	
he	 dened	 that	 amercan	 ctzens’	 cvl	 lbertes	 would	 be	 restrcted	 but	
added:	“To	those	[crtcs]	who	scare	peace-lovng	people	wth	phantoms	of	
Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism	(Chcago:	Quadrangle,	1970);	Theohars,	Spying on 
Americans, 3–12.
14 Introduction
lost	lberty,	my	message	s	ths:	your	tactcs	only	ad	terrorsts	for	they	erode	
our	natonal	unty	and	dmnsh	our	resolve.”30
	 Whle	 the	 attorney	 general	 mght	 have	 clamed	 ndvdual	 lbertes	
would	not	be	volated	as	n	the	past,	the	bush	admnstraton’s	“PaTriOT	
act”	has	created	the	potental	for	the	Fbi	to	resume	a	poltcal	survellance	
role.	in	the	current	atmosphere,	past	fears	of	the	nfluence	of	“subversve	
actvtes”	on	amercan	natonal	securty	have	been	replaced	wth	concerns	
over	terrorst	actvtes.	Wth	ncreased	Fbi	nvestgatve	authorty,	and	a	
concomtant	 ncrease	 n	 government	 secrecy	 (.e.,	 a	 tghtenng	 of	 FOia	
standards,	 restrctons	 on	 access	 to	presdental	 records,	 secret	meetngs	
wth	corporate	executves	to	develop	natonal	polces,	and	the	creaton	of	
secret	nSa	and	Cia	survellance	programs),31	a	revval	of	the	Fbi’s	nter-
est	n	domestc	poltcal	survellance	s	possble	f	not	probable.	indeed,	by	
november	2003	the	Congress	sought	to	expand	sgnfcantly	Fbi	powers	
to	examne	fnancal	records	of	varous	knds	wthout	a	 judge’s	approval.	
also	n	that	month,	the	New York Times	reported	that	the	Fbi	had	begun	
to	collect	“extensve	nformaton	on	the	tactcs,	tranng	and	organzaton	
of	 ant-war	 [iraq	War]	 demonstrators.”	 and	 by	 December	 the	 Fbi	 had	
elmnated	 dstnctons	 between	 crmnal	 and	 ntellgence	 nvestgaton	
classfcatons.32
	 by	2005,	moreover,	after	the	presdental	electon,	the	effort	to	ncrease	
the	Fbi’s	unchecked	 freedom	 n	 conductng	 nvestgatons	 grew.	Durng	
may,	Senate	republcans	and	the	bush	admnstraton	advocated	expand-
ng	Fbi	powers	to	permt	agents	“to	subpoena	records	from	busnesses	and	
other	 nsttutons	wthout	a	 judge’s	 sgn-off	 f	 they	declared	 the	materal	
was	needed	as	part	of	a	foregn	ntellgence	nvestgaton.”	later	that	year,	
	 30.	 “ashcroft	appears	before	Senate	to	Defend	Tactcs,”	New York Times,	6	December	
2001;	nel	a.	lews,	“ashcroft	Defends	ant-terror	Plan	and	Says	Crtcsm	may	ad	Foes,”	
New York Times, 7	December	2001.
	 31.	Douglas	Jehl,	“bush	to	Create	new	Unt	 n	Fbi	for	intellgence,”	New York Times, 
30	 June	2005;	 “Cheatng	hstory,”	New York Times, 15	november	2001;	 “Crtcs	 Say	new	
rule	 lmts	access	 to	records,”	New York Times, 27	February	 2002;	 	Dana	mlbank	 and	
Justn	blum,	 “Document	Says	Ol	Chefs	met	wth	Cheney	Task	Force,”	Washington Post, 
16	november	2005;	James	rsen,	“bush	lets	US	Spy	on	Callers	wthout	Courts,”	New York 
Times,	 16	 December	 2005;	 Dana	 Prest,	 “Covert	 Cia	 Program	Wthstands	 new	 Furor,”	
Washington Post,	30	December	2005.
	 32.	 “ashcroft	Urges	Cauton	wth	FOia	requests,”	Washington Post,	17	October	2001;	
ellen	nakashma,	“bush	vew	of	Secrecy	is	Strrng	Frustraton,”	Washington Post, 3	march	
2002;	 athan	 Theohars	 to	Douglas	m.	 Charles,	 6	november	 2001;	 erc	 lchtblau,	 “Fbi’s	
reach	nto	records	is	Set	to	Grow,”	New York Times,	12	november	2003;	erc	lchtblau,	“Fbi	
Scrutnzes	antwar	ralles,”	New York Times, 23	november	2003;	Dan	eggen,	“Fbi	apples	
new	rules	to	Survellance,”	Washington Post, 13	December	2003.
15Introduction
the	 Washington Post	 reported	 that	 the	 Fbi	 had	 nvestgated	 “hundreds	
of	 potental	 volatons	 related	 to	 ts	 use	 of	 secret	 operatons,”	 volatons	
that	were	“largely	hdden	from	publc	vew.”	more	specfcally,	Fbi	agents	
conducted	 survellance	of	U.S.	 resdents	 for	over	a	year	 “wthout	proper	
paperwork	or	oversght.”	as	part	of	ths	effort,	Fbi	agents	sezed	e-mals	
and	 bank	 records	 wthout	 proper	 warrants	 and	 conducted	 at	 least	 one	
“unconsented	physcal	search.”	in	response,	Fbi	offcals	called	the	vola-
tons	“admnstratve	errors.”33
	 in	 november	 of	 2005,	 t	 was	 further	 reported	 that	 Fbi	 agents	 were	
frequently	usng	natonal	securty	letters	“to	scrutnze	U.S.	resdents	and	
vstors	 who	 are	 not	 alleged	 to	 be	 terrorsts	 or	 spes.”	 natonal	 securty	
letters	were	an	 nnovaton	of	 the	1970s	 to	assst	Fbi	agents	 n	esponage	
and	terrorsm	cases,	but	the	PaTriOT	act	and	the	bush	admnstraton’s	
gudelnes	have	extended	ther	use.	accordng	to	the	Washington Post,	Fbi	
agents	ssue	more	than	thrty	thousand	natonal	securty	letters	each	year	
and	none	of	them	requre	the	oversght	of	a	judge	and	receve	no	external	
revew	afterward.34
	 by	December	of	 2005,	 t	was	 also	 reported	 that	 someone	 n	 the	Fbi	
altered	the	dates	on	documents	to	cover	up	the	employment	of	an	llegal	
wretap,	 and	 one	 agent	was	 blackballed	 from	 undercover	 nvestgatons	
after	 he	 crtczed	 Fbi	 volatons	 nternally.	 later	 that	 month,	 t	 was	
further	 reported	 that	Fbi	 agents	workng	 n	 counterterrorsm	cases	had	
montored	 a	 “vegan	 Communty	 Project,”	 a	 Catholc	 Workers	 group,	
Greenpeace,	and	the	anmal	advocacy	group	People	for	the	ethcal	Treat-
ment	of	anmals.35
	 evdence	 advanced	 n	 ths	 book	demonstrates	 that	 the	 roots	 of	 such	
Fbi	actvty	are	to	be	found	durng	the	ant-nterventonst	foregn	polcy	
debate	 when	 legtmate	 admnstraton	 crtcs	 were	 regarded	 as	 wttng	
or	unwttng	dupes	of	fascsts	and	nvestgated	under	a	domestc	securty	
classfcaton.	 it	 was	 durng	 ths	 crtcal	 perod	 (a	 tme	 of	 nternatonal	
crss)	 that	 Fbi	 offcals	 acqured	 ncreased	 nvestgatve	 authorty	 and	
resorted	to	senstve	nvestgatve	technques,	lke	wretappng,	and	volated	
	 33.	erc	lchtblau,	“Plan	Would	broaden	Fbi’s	Terror	role,” New York Times, 19	may	
2005;	Dan	eggen,	“Fbi	Papers	indcate	intellgence	volatons,	Secret	Survellance	lacked	
Oversght,”	Washington Post, 24	October	2005.
	 34.	 “Patrot	 act	 Prmer,”	Washington Post,	 3	 november	 2005;	 barton	 Gelman,	 “The	
Fbi’s	Secret	Scrutny,	in	hunt	for	Terrorsts,	bureau	examnes	records	of	Ordnary	amer-
cans,”	Washington Post,	6	november	2005.
	 35.	erc	lchtblau,	“report	Fnds	Cover-Up	n	an	Fbi	Terror	Case,”	New York Times, 4	
December	2005;	lchtblau,	“Fbi	Watched	actvst	Groups,	new	Fles	Show,”	New York Times,	
20	December	2005.
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nvestgatve	 restrctons—all	 n	 the	 name	 of	 combatng	 “subversve	
actvty,”	but	too	often,	n	realty,	wth	the	prme	objectve	and	end	result	
beng	the	montorng	of	domestc	poltcal	actvty	whle	volatng	the	cvl	
lbertes	of	foregn	polcy	crtcs.
Background
The	 orgns	 of	 the	 Federal	 bureau	 of	 investgaton	 date	 back	 to	 the	
Progressve	era	and	the	admnstraton	of	the	frst	Progressve	presdent,	
Theodore	 roosevelt.	 after	 roosevelt’s	 ascendance	 to	 the	 presdency	
n	 1901,	 the	 Justce	 Department’s	 responsbltes	 ncreased	 dramat-
cally.	belevng	n	the	Progressve	deal	of	an	assertve	executve,	roosevelt	
sought	 to	use	 the	 federal	government	 to	regulate	 the	burgeonng	corpo-
rate	economy	n	order	to	save	t.	he	therefore	renvgorated	the	Sherman	
anttrust	act	 of	 1890	 and	drected	 the	 Justce	Department	 to	 prosecute	
those	corporatons	he	regarded	as	“bad	trusts.”	Followng	sut,	department	
attorneys	pursued	frst	the	northern	Securtes	Company—a	gant	ralroad	
monopoly	operated	by	 James	 J.	hll	 and	 J.	 P.	morgan—before	prosecut-
ng	the	Chcago	meat	packers,	Standard	Ol,	and	the	sugar	refners	all	for	
llegal	restrant	of	trade.	but	the	government	soon	experenced	dffcultes.	
its	problems	stemmed	from	the	department	attorneys’	ncreased	workload	
and	the	fact	that	the	Justce	Department	dd	not	have	ts	own	nvestgatve	
unt—and	could	not	hre	prvate	detectves	because	of	the	1892	Pnkerton	
act	bannng	 such	 actvty—forcng	 t	 to	 rely	upon	Secret	 Servce	 agents	
who	were	provded	on	loan.	not	satsfed	wth	the	stuaton,	and	reflectng	
Progressves’	concern	for	effcency,	roosevelt	decded	t	was	tme	to	cre-
ate	an	nvestgatve	agency—the	bureau	of	investgaton	(bi)—wthn	the	
Justce	Department.1
	 1.	athan	Theohars,	“a	bref	hstory	of	the	Fbi’s	role	and	Powers,”	n	athan	Theohars	
et	al.,	The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide	(Phoenx,	aZ:	Oryx	Press,	1999),	3;	John	
mlton	Cooper	 Jr.,	The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt	
(Cambrdge,	ma:	belknap	Press,	1983),	77;	John	morton	blum,	The Republican Roosevelt,	
2nd	ed.	(Cambrdge,	ma:	harvard	Unversty	Press,	1977),	74–75,	85–87.	
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	 Congress	hestated	and	had	concerns	about	establshng	another	nves-
tgatve	 agency.	 members	 of	 Congress	 were	 worred	 prmarly	 because	
the	Justce	Department	had	used	Secret	Servce	agents	to	nvestgate	(and	
eventually	convct)	a	congressman	and	senator	from	Oregon	for	conspr-
acy	 to	defraud	 the	U.S.	government	 n	an	 ssue	 nvolvng	western	 lands.	
Gven	the	stuaton,	n	lght	of	roosevelt’s	desre	to	create	the	bi,	Congress	
held	hearngs	nto	the	loanng	of	Secret	Servce	agents.	members	beleved	
the	Secret	Servce	had	overstepped	ts	legal	authorty	by	loanng	agents	to	
the	Justce	Department,	and	 n	an	effort	 to	ratonalze	agent	 loanng	the	
assstant	chef	of	the	Secret	Servce,	Wllam	moran,	argued	that	Treasury	
Department	funds	were	not	spent	whle	Justce	Department	funds	were.2
Outraged	 over	 ths	 lberal	 nterpretaton	 of	 the	 Secret	 Servce’s	 charter,	
and	concerned	wth	the	possble	evoluton	of	an	amercan	secret	polce,	
Congress	 amended	 ts	 budgetary	 appropratons	 to	 ban	 the	 loanng	 of	
Secret	 Servce	 agents.	 in	 so	 dong,	 Congress	 had	 effectvely	 rendered	
Justce	Department	 nvestgatons	 mpotent	 snce	 they	 had	 reled	 exclu-
svely	upon	the	use	of	Secret	Servce	agents.	Congress,	meanwhle,	decded	
nothng	regardng	attorney	General	Charles	bonaparte’s	request	for	funds	
to	establsh	the	bi.3
	 Congress’s	nacton	dd	not	daunt	the	roosevelt	admnstraton,	howev-
er.	Durng	the	summer	of	1908,	whle	Congress	was	adjourned,	bonaparte	
used	roosevelt’s	executve	mandate	to	establsh	the	bureau	of	investgaton	
anyway	(the	bi	was	renamed	the	Federal	bureau	of	investgaton	n	1935).	
an	 outraged	Congress	 demanded	 answers,	 but	 through	 assurances	 that	
the	 bi	 agents	 were	 professonals	 and	 would	 not	 engage	 n	 noncrmnal	
nvestgatons	 because	 of	 the	 attorney	 general’s	 personal	 oversght,	 t	
acquesced.	examned	dfferently,	Congress	was	assuaged	wth	bonaparte’s	
appeals	to	the	Progressve	deals	of	professonalsm,	effcency,	and	raton-
alty.	Sgnfcantly,	however,	the	bi	was	not	charted	by	Congress	and	as	ts	
	 2.	Davd	 Wllams,	 “‘Wthout	 Understandng’:	 The	 Fbi	 and	 Poltcal	 Survellance,	
1908–1941”	(Ph.D.	dss.,	Unversty	of	new	hampshre,	1981),	30–31.	For	a	detaled	account	
of	the	land	fraud	see	rchard	Gd	Powers,	Broken: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future 
of the FBI	(new	york:	Free	Press,	2004),	28–38;	Don	Whtehead,	The FBI Story: A Report to 
the People	(new	york:	random	house,	1956),	17–18;	Wllams,	“‘Wthout	Understandng,’”	
32–34.	The	Congress’s	concern	was	also	rooted	n	ther	prevous	domnance	n	the	federal	
government	that	dated	from	1865	and	whch	was	now	wanng	wth	the	rse	of	Progressvsm	
and	ts	characterstc	assertve	executve.	Congress	was	strugglng	wth	the	newly	nvgorated	
presdency.
	 3.	Wllams,	“‘Wthout	Understandng,’”	34–37;	athan	Theohars	and	John	Cox,	The 
Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	
Press,	1988),	43.
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responsbltes	ncreased,	the	ablty	of	the	attorney	general	to	montor	ts	
actvtes	dmnshed.4
	 The	growth	of	bi	responsbltes,	and	concomtant	reducton	of	over-
sght,	occurred	rapdly.	in	1910,	Congress	passed	the	Whte	Slave	Traffc	
act	 (the	mann	 act)	 that	 outlawed	 the	 transportaton	 of	 women	 across	
state	 lnes	for	“mmoral”	purposes.	Whle	the	 law	was	 ntended	to	target	
prosttuton	rngs,	t	was	nterpreted	to	permt	the	government	to	regulate	
perceved	 mmoralty	among	the	publc.	Then,	 n	1919,	Congress	passed	
another	law	that	ncreased	the	bi’s	law	enforcement	role.	When	automoble	
sales	skyrocketed	after	1916,	Congress	passed	the	motor	vehcle	Theft	act	
(Dyer	act)	makng	the	transportaton	of	stolen	vehcles	across	state	lnes	
a	federal	crme	and	thereby	empowerng	the	bi	to	nvestgate.	it	was	ths	
law,	for	example,	that	brought	the	bureau	and	ts	resources	nto	the	hunt	for	
John	Dllnger	durng	1933.	The	natonal	character	of	both	peces	of	legsla-
ton,	moreover,	necesstated	an	expanson	of	the	bi	outsde	of	Washngton	
to	ensure	effectve	nvestgatons,	makng	the	bureau	a	truly	natonal	polce	
force.	The	 long-term	effects	of	both	 laws	 led	 to	other	developments:	 the	
bureau	began	to	accumulate	derogatory	nformaton	on	the	prvate	lves	of	
ctzens	both	common	and	promnent,	t	helped	to	natonalze	and	popu-
larze	the	bi,	and	t	dmnshed	the	attorney	general’s	oversght.5
	 Wth	 the	advent	of	 the	Frst	World	War,	 the	bureau’s	 responsbltes	
moved	nto	the	area	of	domestc	securty,	ncreasng	even	more	ts	natonal	
polcng	role.	most	pressng	at	 ths	 tme	were	 fears	of	 foregn	 nfluences	
upon	amercan	 socety.	 These	 natvst	 concerns	 stemmed	 not	 from	 the	
war	but	 from	 the	depressed	amercan	 economy	 n	1914,	 and	 they	were	
only	heghtened	after	varous	German	attempts	at	 sabotage	were	uncov-
ered.	 Presdent	 Woodrow	 Wlson	 dd	 not	 allevate	 these	 natvst	 fears	
when	he	sngled	out	“hyphenated	amercans”	as	the	source	of	amerca’s	
domestc	trouble	and	he	called	upon	Congress	to	enact	sedton	legslaton.	
Whle	Congress	dd	not	act	on	Wlson’s	wshes,	 the	 tone	of	hs	wartme	
preparedness	campagn	nevertheless	encouraged	an	atmosphere	whereby	
perceved	dsloyalty	was	harshly	repressed.6
	 4.	Wllams,	 “‘Wthout	Understandng,’”	 38,	 39–41,	 44–47;	 Theohars	 and	Cox,	The 
Boss,	43;	lowenthal,	The Federal Bureau of Investigation,	10–11;	John	Whteclay	Chambers	
ii,	The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1890–1920,	2nd	ed.	(new	york:	St.	
martn’s,	1992),	140.
	 5.	Theohars,	“a	bref	hstory	of	the	Fbi’s	role	and	Powers,”	6–7;	rchard	Gd	Powers,	
Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover	(new	york:	Free	Press,	1987),	189;	Curt	Gen-
try,	J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets	(new	york:	norton,	1991),	114–15;	lowenthal,	
The Federal Bureau of Investigation,	14–15;	Cook,	The FBI Nobody Knows,	60.
	 6.	 John	hgham,	Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925, 2nd	
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	 after	 several	 ncdents	 of	 successful	 and	 attempted	 sabotage	 were	
dscovered	between	1915	and	1917,	Congress	responded	wth	tough	leg-
slaton.	The	esponage	act	of	1917	made	t	a	crme	to	nterfere	wth	the	
draft,	to	foment	dsrupton	n	the	mltary,	or	to	steal	government	secrets	
wth	the	ntent	to	ad	the	enemy	durng	wartme.	later,	the	Sabotage	and	
Sedton	acts	of	1918—stronger	measures	yet—forbade	publc	opposton	
to	the	government	and	war	effort.	Government	offcals	also	used	the	1918	
alen	Deportaton	act	 to	deport	nonctzens	who	 advocated	 the	 volent	
overthrow	of	the	U.S.	government.7
	 These	 varous	 laws	 ncreased	 the	 Justce	 Department’s	 responsbl-
tes	 n	 the	 realm	of	 nternal	 securty.	 in	1918,	 therefore,	 the	department	
formed	 the	 alen	 enemy	 regstraton	 Secton,	 known	 popularly	 as	 the	
alen	enemy	bureau.	Ths	 agency	 focused	on	 the	 actvtes	 of	Germans	
and	other	foregn	natonals,	radcals,	anarchsts,	afrcan	amercans,	and	
all	manner	of	perceved	“subversves.”	it	was	n	ths	secton,	sgnfcantly,	
that	 a	 young	 J.	edgar	hoover	began	hs	 career	 and	where	he	 learned	 to	
use	 admnstratve	 procedures	 to	 bypass	 legal	 restrants.	 hoover	 would	
later	employ	what	he	learned	here	when	he	took	the	rens	of	the	bureau	
of	investgaton	n	1924.8	natvst	fears	were	then	heghtened	n	amerca	
ed.	(new	brunswck,	nJ:	rutgers	Unversty	Press,	1994),	183–84;	mchael	J.	heale,	Ameri-
can Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830–1970	(baltmore:	Johns	hopkns	
Unversty	Press,	1990),	10,	14;	Francs	macDonnell,	Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column 
and the American Home Front	(new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1995),	11–15,	23;	Wl-
lams,	“‘Wthout	Understandng,’”	80.	See	also	harry	Scheber,	The Wilson Administration 
and Civil Liberties, 1917–1921	(ithaca,	ny:	Cornell	Unversty	Press,	1960).	Kendrck	Cle-
ments	argues	that	Wlson	merely	followed	publc	opnon	when	supportng	repressve	mea-
sures	n	Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman,	rev.	ed.	(Chcago:	ivan	r.	Dee,	1999),	176.	
	 7.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	44–45;	macDonnell,	Insidious Foes,	16–25.
	 8.	Theohars	 and	Cox,	The Boss,	 48;	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	 55;	Gentry,	 J. Edgar 
Hoover,	69–73;	Joan	m.	Jensen,	The Price of Vigilance	(Chcago:	rand	mcnally,	1968),	17–26,	
188–218;	Cook,	The FBI Nobody Knows,	62–63,	67.	army	ntellgence	also	took	an	nterest	n	
many	of	these	same	targets	durng	the	Frst	World	War	perod.	See	roy	Talbert,	Negative Intel-
ligence: The Army and the American Left, 1917–1941	(Jackson:	Unversty	Press	of	msssspp,	
1991);	lowenthal,	The Federal Bureau of Investigation,	36–47;	Theohars,	“a	bref	hstory	of	
the	Fbi’s	role	and	Powers,”	7.	Paul	l.	murphy	argues	that	cvl	lbertes	frst	appeared	as	an	
ssue	n	publc	polcy	datng	from	WWi	n	hs	World War I and the Origin of Civil Liberties 
in the United States	(new	york:	norton,	1979);	Kenneth	O’relly,	“Racial Matters”: The FBI’s 
Secret File on Black America, 1960–1972	(new	york:	Free	Press,	1989),	9–17.	See	also	mark	
ells,	“‘Closng	ranks’	and	‘Seekng	honors’:	W.	e.	b.	Dubos	n	World	War	i,”	Journal of Amer-
ican History	79	(June	1992):	96–124;	mark	ells,	“J.	edgar	hoover	and	the	‘red	Summer’	of	
1919,”	Journal of American Studies	28	(January	1994):	39–59;	and	ells,	Race, War, and Surveil-
lance: African Americans and the United States Government during World War I	(bloomngton:	
indana	Unversty	Press,	2001).	For	a	general	hstory	of	the	race	rots	see	Wllam	m.	Tuttle,	
Race Riot: Chicago in the Red Summer of 1919	(new	york:	atheneum,	1970).	See	also	Theodore	
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when,	 n	1917,	 the	bolshevks	 sezed	power	 n	russa.	Durng	 the	 years	
mmedately	 followng	 the	concluson	of	 the	Frst	World	War	 (1919	and	
1920),	concern	that	a	smlar	mnorty	was	fomentng	communst	revolu-
ton	n	amerca	ncreased	when	shpyard	workers	(and	ther	sympathz-
ers)	struck	n	Seattle,	Washngton.	afterward,	the	country	experenced	a	
seres	of	strkes	durng	1919	that	seemed	to	confrm	communst	nfluence	
among	 workers—a	 fear	 that	 management	 delberately	 manpulated	 to	
crush	 the	 labor	 strkes.	 The	 country	 then	 experenced	 a	 seres	 of	mal-
bomb	plots	and	other	bombngs	(sgnfcantly	at	the	resdence	of	attorney	
General	a.	mtchell	Palmer),	whch,	 n	 lght	of	 the	bolshevk	revoluton	
and	labor	unrest,	prompted	mtchell	to	purge	the	naton	of	radcal	nflu-
ences.9
	 What	followed	was	a	natonal	effort	to	root	out	radcalsm	that	resulted	
n	mass	volatons	of	many	people’s	cvl	lbertes.	Palmer	created	a	radcal	
bureau—later	 renamed	 the	 General	 intellgence	 Dvson—that	 was	
headed	by	J.	edgar	hoover.	The	problem	for	Palmer	and	the	bi	was	that	
to	prosecute	 radcals	under	 federal	 law,	 offcals	had	 to	 ether	prove	 the	
radcals’	membershp	n	radcal	organzatons	or	persuade	them	to	admt	
to	membershp.	 Fndng	 ths	 goal	 nsurmountable,	 government	 offcals	
decded	nstead	to	deport	the	radcals	and	thereby	elmnate	the	nfluence	
of	foregn	deas.	To	do	ths,	the	bi	entered	nto	cooperaton	wth	the	labor	
Department’s	immgraton	bureau,	whose	agents,	by	alterng	regulatons	
to	 keep	 radcals	 from	 consultng	 lawyers,	 could	 coerce	 confessons	 and	
therefore	make	them	lable	for	deportaton.	it	was	these	means	that	under-
pnned	 the	 so-called	Palmer	rads,	 n	whch	some	10,000	 suspects	were	
arrested	natonwde	but	only	556	were	deported.10
Kornwebel,	Investigate Everything: Federal Efforts to Compel Black Loyalty during World War 
I	(bloomngton:	indana	Unversty	Press,	2002);	Kornwebel,	Seeing Red: Federal Campaigns 
against Black Militancy, 1919–1925	(bloomngton:	indana	Unversty	Press,	1998).
	 9.	robert	K.	murray,	Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920	(mnneapo-
ls:	Unversty	of	mnnesota	Press,	1955),	58–68.	See	also	robert	l.	Fredhem,	The Seattle 
General Strike	(Seattle:	Unversty	of	Washngton	Press,	1964);	murray,	Red Scare,	69–71.	a	
thorough	bography	of	attorney	General	Palmer	s	Stanley	Coben,	A. Mitchell Palmer: Politi-
cian (new	york:	Columba	Unversty	Press,	1963).
	 10.	murray,	Red Scare,	193–94;	Theohars,	“a	bref	hstory	of	the	Fbi’s	role	and	Pow-
ers,”	8;	Wllam	Preston	Jr.,	Aliens and Dissenters: Federal Suppression of Radicals, 1903–1933,	
2nd	ed.	(Chcago:	Unversty	of	illnos	Press,	1994),	208–12,	216–17;	lowenthal,	The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation,	184,	199,	211–17;	Preston,	Aliens and Dissenters,	222–24.	See	also	
lous	 F.	 Post,	The Deportations Delirium of Nineteen-Twenty: A Personal Narrative of an 
Historic Official Experience (new	york:	Da	Capo	Press,	1970);	Davd	Wllams,	“The	bureau	
of	 investgaton	and	its	Crtcs,	1919–1921:	The	Orgns	of	Federal	Poltcal	Survellance,”	
Journal of American History	68	(December	1981):	563,	567–79.
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	 The	 bi’s	 partcpaton	 n	 the	 Palmer	 rads	 was	 just	 one	 example	 of	
questonable	actvty	 that	plagued	 the	bureau	of	 the	early	1920s.	Durng	
the	 presdency	 of	Warren	 G.	 hardng,	 an	 admnstraton	 notorous	 for	
ts	 abuses,	 the	 Teapot	Dome	 scandal	marked	 the	 heght	 of	 such	 nefar-
ous	 actvty.	 The	 scandal	 centered	 on	 ol	 deposts	 located	 n	Wyomng	
and	Calforna	that	were	set	asde	as	naval	reserves	but	placed	under	the	
control	of	 the	 interor	Department	 and	 ts	 secretary,	albert	b.	Fall.	The	
secretary	had	lost	hs	personal	fortune	n	a	bad	mexcan	mnng	venture,	
leadng	 hm	 to	 sgn	 contracts	 to	 permt	 two	 ol	 companes	 to	 tap	 the	
government’s	reserves	n	exchange	for	$400,000	n	“loans.”11
	 by	1923,	montana	Senators	Thomas	Walsh	and	burton	K.	Wheeler—
later	 a	 promnent	 ant-nterventonst—exposed	 Fall’s	 corrupton	 and	
ntated	 a	 Senate	 nvestgaton.	 but	 n	 an	 attempt	 to	 quash	 t,	attorney	
General	harry	Daugherty	and	bi	Chef	Wllam	J.	burns	dspatched	agents	
to	nvestgate	Walsh	and	Wheeler	to	uncover	anythng	wth	whch	to	ds-
credt	them.	in	these	efforts,	bi	agents	ntercepted	ther	mal,	tapped	ther	
telephones,	and	broke	nto	ther	offces.	in	the	end,	Daugherty	and	burns	
were	able	to	concoct	an	ndctment	aganst	Wheeler	for	alleged	msuse	of	
hs	offce	to	obtan	gas	and	ol	leases.	The	charges	were	bogus	and,	at	tral,	
Walsh—servng	as	Wheeler’s	defense	attorney—was	able	to	demonstrate	as	
much.	When	t	was	all	over,	the	bi’s	crmes	were	uncovered	and	the	publc	
became	outraged	at	government	abuses.12
	 hardng	 ded	 before	 any	 of	 ths	 became	 publc,	 however,	 and	 hs	
successor—Calvn	 Cooldge—successfully	 dstanced	 hmself	 from	 the	
scandals	and	apponted	a	reformst	attorney	general	 to	clean	house.	The	
new	attorney	general,	harlan	Fske	Stone,	beleved	men	of	hgh	moral	and	
professonal	 standards	 would	 brng	 order	 to	 the	 corrupted	 department.	
Followng	a	cabnet	meetng	n	may	1924,	Stone	dscussed	hs	plan	wth	
Commerce	Secretary	herbert	hoover,	who	recommended	J.	edgar	hoover	
as	 a	 possble	 replacement	 for	 the	 recently	 fred	burns.	Despte	hoover’s	
partcpaton	n	the	Palmer	rads,	whch	seemed	to	have	gone	unnotced,	
and	wth	recommendatons	from	such	esteemed	fgures	as	the	commerce	
secretary,	Stone	offered	hoover	the	job.13
	 11.	On	the	Teapot	Dome	scandal	see	burl	noggle,	Teapot Dome: Oil and Politics in the 
1920s	(baton	rouge:	lousana	State	Unversty	Press,	1962);	and	J.	leonard	bates,	Senator 
Thomas J. Walsh of Montana: Law and Public Affairs, from TR to FDR	(Urbana:	Unversty	of	
illnos	Press,	1999),	212–39.
	 12.	Gentry,	 J. Edgar Hoover,	118–21;	Cook,	The FBI Nobody Knows,	129–33,	133–35;	
burton	K.	Wheeler	and	Paul	F.	healy,	Yankee from the West	(Garden	Cty,	ny:	Doubleday,	
1962),	213–45.	
	 13.	Whtehead,	The FBI Story,	66–67;	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	84;	Cook,	The FBI 
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	 intally	workng	wthn	the	new	nvestgatve	gudelnes	lad	down	by	
Stone,	hoover	publcly	dsbanded	the	now-controversal	radcal	bureau,	
ended	the	use	of	wretaps,	and	nvestgated	only	volatons	of	federal	crm-
nal	statutes.	Publcly	supportng	the	attorney	general’s	gudelnes,	hoover	
assured	amercans	that	the	bureau	would	not	collect	poltcal	ntellgence.	
Stone,	 belevng	 that	 professonalsm	 and	 hgh	 moral	 standards	 would	
ensure	 no	 abuses,	 trusted	 the	 new	 drector	 and,	 at	 every	 turn,	 hoover	
sought	to	demonstrate	hs	loyalty.14
	 irrespectve	of	the	gudelnes	and	hoover’s	promses	to	abde	by	them,	
he	 and	 the	 bureau	 contnued	 to	montor	 “radcal”	 actvtes,	 as	 hoover	
defned	 them.	 Whle	 ths	 montorng	 dd	 not	 reach	 prevous	 levels,	 t	
nevertheless	 occurred.	 To	 gather	 ths	 ntellgence	wthout	 beng	 dscov-
ered,	hoover	devsed	specal	procedures	 to	ensure	confdentalty.	These	
ncluded	 the	 clppng	of	press	 stores,	 complng	unsolcted	materal	 on	
radcal	actvtes,	usng	euphemsms	to	conceal	llct	sources	(“confden-
tal	 source”),	 and	workng	 closely	wth	 local	 polce	 forces	 that	 regularly	
montored	radcals	and	then	“volunteered”	ther	data	to	bureau	agents.15
	 hoover	 then	 devsed	 a	 specal	 procedure	 that	 would	 relay	 senstve	
ntellgence	about	the	personal	and	poltcal	lves	of	promnent	amercans	
not	nto	the	bureau’s	central	records	system	but	drectly	to	hs	desk.	Such	
reports	 were	 labeled	 “personal	 and	 confdental”	 and	 permtted	 bureau	
agents	 to	contnue	 to	montor	poltcal	actvty	 (nvestgatng	 the	aClU,	
trade	unonst	Wllam	Foster,	and	other	leftst	groups)	whle	publcly	the	
bureau	demonstrated	ts	adherence	to	the	new	department	gudelnes.16
	 Durng	the	presdency	of	herbert	hoover,	the	bureau	of	investgaton	
began	 to	 servce,	 but	 only	 on	 an	 ad	 hoc	 bass,	 Whte	 house	 requests	
for	 poltcal	 ntellgence.17	and	 by	Presdent	hoover’s	 last	 year	 n	 offce,	
Drector	hoover	helped	hm	n	dealng	wth	the	bonus	marchers.	Feelng	
desperate	 durng	 the	 Great	 Depresson,	 thousands	 of	 unemployed	 Frst	
World	War	veterans	marched	on	Washngton,	D.C.,	demandng	payment	
of	 ther	 promsed	 cash	 bonus	 of	 $1,000.	Whle	 the	 payment	 was	 to	 be	
Nobody Knows,	136–38.
	 14.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	84–87.
	 15.	 ibd.,	93–94.
	 16.	Ths	flng	procedure	s	dscussed	n	athan	Theohars,	ed.,	From the Secret Files of 
J. Edgar Hoover	(Chcago:	ivan	r.	Dee,	1991),	2–4;	Davd	Wllams,	“‘They	never	Stopped	
Watchng	 Us’:	 Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance,	 1924–1936,”	UCLA Historical Journal	 2	 (1981):	
7–14;	Frank	 J.	Donner,	Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban 
America	(berkeley:	Unversty	of	Calforna	Press,	1990).
	 17.	Kenneth	O’relly,	“herbert	hoover	and	the	Fbi,”	Annals of Iowa	47	(Summer	1983):	
49–57.
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dspersed	only	n	1945,	gven	the	veterans’	economc	plght,	they	beleved	
the	 bonus	 should	 be	 pad	 mmedately.	 They	 resolved,	 therefore,	 not	 to	
leave	the	captal	untl	ther	demands	were	met.18
	 Fearful	 of	 economc-orented	 protest,	 some	 government	 offcals	
beleved	that	communsts	were	responsble	for	the	bonus	protest.	Jonng	
wth	army	Chef	of	Staff	Douglas	macarthur,	hoover	convnced	the	pres-
dent	that	the	march	was	a	communst	plot.	Trustng	n	hs	subordnates,	
Presdent	hoover	 ordered	 the	 army	 to	 dsperse	 the	 veterans.	 Ths	 only	
worked	 aganst	 the	 presdent	 durng	 an	 electon	 year,	 however.	 he	 was	
roundly	 crtczed	 for	 the	harsh	 treatment	 the	veterans	 receved,	 leadng	
the	presdent	to	order	the	bureau	to	prove	communst	lnks.	bureau	agents	
attended	protest	ralles,	montored	bonus	marcher	actvty,	and,	wth	the	
help	 of	 local	 red	 squads,	 nvestgated	 veterans	 groups	 to	 determne	 the	
extent	of	communst	nfltraton.	agents	dscovered	none.19
	 Out	 of	 Progressve-era	 deals	 of	 ratonal	 and	 effcent	 government,	
the	 bureau	 of	 investgaton	 was	 born	 durng	 the	 Theodore	 roosevelt	
admnstraton.	 as	 ts	 responsbltes	 grew	 over	 tme,	 the	 ablty	 of	 the	
attorney	general	to	oversee	ts	actvtes	dmnshed.	Ths	led	to	an	abuse	
of	 power	 that	 only	 grew	wth	 ncreased	 responsbltes,	wartme	 neces-
sty,	and	a	postwar	red	Scare.	eventually,	those	abuses	became	publc	and	
admnstratve	reforms	were	created	to	deal	wth	them.	instead	of	endng	
the	bureau’s	ablty	to	montor	poltcal	actvty,	the	reforms	only	lessened	
them.	even	stll,	 the	bureau	of	the	1920s	was	small	and	not	a	sgnfcant	
nvestgatve	force,	but	ths	would	change	wth	the	rse	of	another	global	
emergency	and	another	presdent	named	roosevelt.
—■■■■■■■—
When	 Frankln	 roosevelt	 acceded	 to	 the	 presdency	 n	 1933,	 J.	 edgar	
hoover,	for	the	frst	tme	snce	takng	over	the	bureau	n	1924,	was	part	of	
a	poltcally	left-of-center	admnstraton.	One	mght	thnk	at	frst	glance	
that	roosevelt	would	have	no	room	n	hs	admnstraton	for	a	conservatve	
fgure	lke	hoover;	yet	despte	ther	contrastng	poltcal	denttes,	the	Fbi	
drector	 developed	 an	 ntmate	workng	 relatonshp	wth	 the	 presdent.	
hoover	then	saw	over	the	next	twelve	years	an	ncremental	expanson	of	
	 18.	 See	Donald	J.	lso,	The President and Protest: Hoover, Conspiracy, and the Bonus 
Riot	(Columba:	Unversty	of	mssour	Press,	1974).
	 19.	Wllams,	“‘They	never	Stopped	Watchng	Us,’”	15;	O’relly,	“herbert	hoover	and	
the	Fbi,”	57–58;	lso,	The President and Protest,	238–50;	Wllams,	“‘They	never	Stopped	
Watchng	Us,’”	15–16.
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Fbi	authorty.	Ths	amcable	relatonshp	was	not	evdent,	however,	from	
the	outset,	but	hoover	worked	hard	to	serve	the	presdent	and	hs	goals,	
at	least	as	the	Fbi	drector	perceved	them.	Frst,	by	assstng	the	attorney	
general	 wth	 hs	 Crme	 Control	 Program—by	 combatng	 the	 perceved	
rse	n	crme	durng	the	Depresson—and	then	by	provdng	the	presdent	
wth	poltcal	 ntellgence	on	hs	foregn	polcy	crtcs,	hoover	rose	from	
obsequous	bureaucrat	to	natonal	celebrty.	Over	tme	he	became	pract-
cally	ndspensable	to	the	presdent,	whle	hs	bureau	was	transformed	nto	
a	more	powerful	and	greatly	expanded	agency.
	 because	hoover	was	a	republcan	appontee	(of	the	Cooldge	admn-
straton)	and	snce	hs	 job	was	not	protected	by	 the	cvl	 servce,	 t	was	
lkely	that	a	Democratc	admnstraton	would	replace	hm.	it	was	wdely	
beleved,	moreover,	that	ths	would	ndeed	happen,	but	hoover—a	master	
bureaucrat—dd	 not	 lack	 the	 ablty	 to	 preserve	 hs	 job.	 he	 had	 advo-
cates	 n	 varous	 government	posts	who	advocated	hs	 retenton,	 such	 as	
Supreme	Court	Justce	harlan	Fske	Stone	and	former	assstant	attorney	
General	Francs	Garvan.	The	drector,	furthermore,	lobbed	conservatve	
Democrats	and	apponted	over	one	hundred	Fbi	agents	from	the	South—
roosevelt	reled	upon	southern	Democrats	for	new	Deal	support.20
	 irrespectve	 of	 these	 efforts,	hoover’s	 poston	was	 threatened	when	
roosevelt	 announced	 n	February	1933	hs	 choce	 to	oversee	 the	 Justce	
Department:	Thomas	Walsh.	hoover	could	have	faced	no	more	threaten-
ng	a	nomnee	than	Walsh.	The	frebrand	senator	from	montana	had	led	
nvestgatons	nto	the	Palmer	rads	and	Teapot	Dome	scandal,	and	he	was	
a	longtme	crtc	of	the	Fbi	and	hoover.	Complcatng	matters	for	hoover,	
on	28	February	Walsh	announced	hs	ntenton	to	reorganze	the	depart-
ment	 through	 sgnfcant	 personnel	 changes,	 and	 then	 hoover	 learned	
that	numerous	ndvduals	had	lobbed	Senator	burton	Wheeler	to	oppose	
hoover’s	 reappontment.	 hoover’s	 prospects	 for	 contnung	 as	 bureau	
drector	seemed	dm	at	best.21
	 accordng	 to	Wheeler’s	 account,	 hoover	 “got	 wnd	 of	 ths	 talk	 and	
came	to	see	me”	to	deny	any	nvolvement	“n	the	[Teapot	Dome	era]	repr-
sals	aganst	me.”	it	seems	clear	that	hoover	sought	to	mend	poltcal	fences	
n	order	to	save	hs	job,	but,	roncally	enough,	the	effort	was	fleetng.	On	
2	march	1933,	whle	honeymoonng	n	north	Carolna,	attorney	General–
	 20.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	111–12.	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	182.
	 21.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	112–13;	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	180.	Though	he	
overlooks	the	Fbi,	on	Walsh’s	appontment	see	J.	leonard	bates,	Senator Thomas J. Walsh 
of Montana: Law and Public Affairs, from TR to FDR (Urbana:	Unversty	of	illnos	Press,	
1999),	325–31.
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desgnate	Walsh	ded	of	a	massve	coronary.	Whle	the	threat	that	Walsh	
had	 posed	 dsspated,	hoover	 nevertheless	 took	 steps	 to	 ensure	 that	 no	
questons	were	rased	over	the	tmng	of	hs	death.	hoover	sent	agents	to	
escort	mrs.	Walsh	back	to	Washngton	and	made	sure	that	a	thorough	and	
documented	medcal	examnaton	was	conducted	on	Walsh’s	remans.22
	 roosevelt’s	new	choce	for	attorney	general	was	not	a	threat	to	hoover’s	
tenure	 as	 bureau	 drector.	homer	Cummngs,	 an	 avd	new	Dealer,	was	
far	less	concerned	wth	hoover’s	past	than	Walsh	had	been.	nevertheless,	
hoover	 contnued	 to	 lobby	 frends	 and	 alles—sgnfcantly	 roosevelt	
ades	edwn	Watson	and	Stephen	early—to	ensure	hs	contnuance	n	gov-
ernment.	and	when	Cummngs	was	sworn	n	as	attorney	general,	hoover	
contnued	to	ngratate	hmself	wth	hs	superor.	The	way	hoover	dd	ths	
was	by	supportng	the	actvst	Cummngs’s	crme-control	program.23
	 Crme	had	become	a	popular	ssue	durng	the	Great	Depresson,	a	tme	
when	many	amercans	perceved	a	breakdown	n	law	and	order.	Whether	
t	 nvolved	 celebrty	 kdnappngs,	 bank	 robberes,	 or	 the	 adventures	 of	
varous	gangsters,	many	people	beleved	that	the	crme	ssue	had	ts	roots	
n	the	nablty	of	local	polce	forces	to	deal	wth	sophstcated	(.e.,	nter-
state)	 and	organzed	 crmnals.	new	Dealers,	 lke	Cummngs,	 sought	 to	
use	the	popularty	of	the	ssue	to	nvolve	the	federal	government	n	an	area	
that	prevously	had	been	the	responsblty	of	local	and	state	authortes.	To	
naugurate	hs	crusade	aganst	crme,	the	attorney	general	frst	ncreased	
the	bureau	of	investgaton’s	legal	authorty.24
	 To	 expand	 the	 federal	 polce	 force,	 Presdent	 roosevelt	 ssued	 an	
executve	order	n	June	1933	that	combned	the	Prohbton	bureau	(now	
defunct	 wth	 the	 repeal	 of	 the	 eghteenth	 amendment),	 the	 bureau	 of	
identfcaton	 (already	 under	 hoover’s	 supervson),	 and	 the	 bureau	 of	
investgaton.	 The	 newly	 combned	 organzaton	was	 then	 renamed	 the	
Dvson	of	investgaton	and	by	late	summer	hoover	controlled	all	of	t.	
The	organzaton	would	see	one	further	name	change	when	n	July	1935	t	
became,	permanently,	the	Federal	bureau	of	investgaton—a	desgnaton	
reflectng	ts	more	mportant	role	n	the	country.25
	 22.	burton	 K.	Wheeler	 and	 Paul	 F.	 healy,	Yankee from the West	 (Garden	 Cty,	 ny:	
Double	Day,	1962),	243;	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	113.
	 23.	 Fred	J.	Cook,	The FBI Nobody Knows (new	york:	macmllan,	1964),	150–51;	Theo-
hars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	114–16.	On	Cummngs	as	attorney	general	see	rchard	W.	Steele,	
Free Speech in the Good War	(new	york:	St.	martn’s	Press,	1999),	20,	31–32.
	 24.	Wllam	e.	leuchtenburg,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932–1940	(new	
york:	harper	&	row,	1963),	334;	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	121.
	 25.	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	182–83.
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	 before	Cummngs	delvered	hs	crme	program—a	total	of	twelve	blls	
that	 would	 dramatcally	 alter	 the	 federal	 government’s	 role	 n	 natonal	
polcng—he	ntated	a	publc-relatons	campagn	to	generate	mass	sup-
port	 and	 promote	 the	 newly	 expanded	 Fbi.	 For	 the	 frst	 two	 years	 of	
the	effort,	publc	attenton	was	 focused	on	Cummngs’s	 antcrme	work	
whle	hoover	went	 largely	 unnotced.	among	Cummngs’s	 nnovatons	
was	a	natonal	 “Publc	enemes”	 lst	 that	 took	advantage	of	 the	publc’s	
fascnaton	wth	gangsters.	it	was	the	Fbi’s	nteracton	wth	these	popular	
crmnals,	moreover,	that	helped	the	publc-relatons	effort	gan	real	trac-
ton.26
	 Cummngs	used	varous	ncdents—the	Kansas	Cty	massacre,	the	kd-
nappng	of	Charles	Urschel,	and	the	pursut	of	Charles	“Pretty	boy”	Floyd,	
lester	 “baby	 Face”	 nelson,	 alvn	 “Old	 Creepy”	 Karps,	 Clyde	 barrow,	
and	 bonne	 Parker—to	 promote	 hs	 program	 to	 wn	 acceptance	 for	 an	
expanded	federal	role	n	law	enforcement.	but	one	case	n	partcular,	that	
of	John	Dllnger,	dd	more	than	any	other	to	assst	Cummngs.27
	 Durng	 the	 sprng	 and	 fall	 of	 1933,	 career-crmnal	 John	 Dllnger	
robbed	ten	banks	and	commtted	varous	msdemeanors.	he	was	arrested	
twce	and	both	tmes	escaped,	but	t	was	the	second	escape	that	brought	
the	Fbi	 n	on	 the	 case.	Upon	breakng	out	of	 jal,	Dllnger	 audacously	
stole	 hs	 jaler’s	 car	 and	 drove	 t	 from	 indana	 nto	 illnos	 and	 thereby	
volated	 the	 Dyer	 act	 of	 1919.	 Cummngs	made	 poltcal	 captal	 of	 the	
event,	specfcally	snglng	out	Dllnger	as	a	reason	why	the	federal	govern-
ment	needed	ncreased	polcng	powers.	The	resultant	publcty	Dllnger	
offered	created	publc	support	for	the	crme	bll.	indeed,	on	6	may	1934,	
somebody	purportng	to	be	Dllnger	wrote	carmaker	henry	Ford	to	thank	
hm	“for	buldng	the	Ford	v-8	as	fast	and	as	sturdy	a	car	as	you	dd,	other-
wse	 i	would	not	have	gotten	away	 from	 the	coppers	 n	 that	Wsconsn,	
mnnesota	case.”28
	 26.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	122;	Powers,	Secrecy and Power,	186.
	 27.	 For	a	hstory	of	these	efforts	see	bryan	burrough,	Public Enemies: America’s Great-
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	 Few	poltcans	n	ths	atmosphere	could	oppose	the	federalzaton	of	
crme	control;	ther	states’	rghts	arguments	carred	lttle	weght	n	such	a	
poltcal	dynamc.	in	the	meantme,	Cummngs	worked	behnd	the	scenes	
to	 lne	 up	 conservatves	 and	new	Dealers	wth	 hs	 proposals	 and,	 after	
the	presdent	publcly	announced	hs	support,	the	crme-bll	package	was	
sent	to	the	house.	On	19	may	1934,	Congress	passed	the	frst	sx	blls	of	
Cummngs’s	program	and,	by	 June,	 t	passed	 three	more.	Thereafter	 the	
Fbi	was	granted	full	arrest	powers,	was	permtted	to	carry	frearms,	had	
ts	 jursdcton	 expanded	 to	 nclude	 apprehendng	 escaped	 felons	 who	
crossed	state	lnes,	and	t	could	automatcally	enter	kdnappng	cases	after	
a	 perod	 of	 seven	 days.	 addtonally,	 nterstate	 racketeerng	 (by	 phone	
or	mal)	became	a	felony	and	the	Fbi	was	authorzed	to	nvestgate	bank	
robberes	 f	 the	 bank	was	 a	member	 of	 the	 Federal	reserve.	These	new	
laws,	 and	 others,	 n	 addton	 to	 the	 publcty	 generated	 by	 Cummngs’s	
crme-control	 program,	 helped	 to	make	 the	 Fbi	 a	 natonal	 polce	 force	
and,	among	amercans,	a	revered	government	agency.29
	 havng	acheved	success	wth	the	antcrme	crusade	and	thereby	hav-
ng	ts	powers	and	jursdcton	expanded,	by	1934–35	the	Fbi	was	ready	
to	 assume	 new	 responsbltes	 when	 foregn	 threats	 ncreasngly	 drew	
the	attenton	of	Presdent	roosevelt.	Wth	fascst	and	mltary	aggresson	
spreadng	 n	europe,	afrca,	 and	asa,	roosevelt	became	more	 senstve	
to	the	domestc	threat	those	forces	mght	sow	n	the	Unted	States.	as	the	
world	moved	closer	to	global	war,	and	as	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy	ncreas-
ngly	assumed	a	more	nternatonalst	perspectve	between	1934	and	1941,	
the	Fbi’s	authorty	and	powers	n	domestc	securty	cases	ncreased.	The	
bureau’s	growth	as	a	domestc	ntellgence	agency,	n	fact,	can	be	charted	
alongsde	amerca’s	 ncreasng	 preoccupaton	wth	 foregn	 polcy	 ssues	
durng	the	1930s.
—■■■■■■■—
Frankln	 D.	 roosevelt	 by	 nature	 and	 experence	 was	 an	 nternatonal-
st	man.	he	was	 born	 nto	 a	wealthy,	 arstocratc	 famly	wth	whom	he	
enjoyed	 summers	 n	 europe.	 he	 began	 hs	 formal	 educaton	 at	 elte	
nsttutons	such	as	the	Groton	School,	and	then	harvard	and	Columba,	
where	he	debated	the	lvely	nternatonal	ssues	of	the	late	nneteenth	and	
early	 twenteth	 centures.	The	 future	presdent’s	upbrngng,	 travels,	 and	
educaton	nstlled	n	hm	a	serous	commtment	to	nternatonalsm.	Ths	
	 29.	O’relly,	“a	new	Deal	for	the	Fbi,”	643.
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commtment	was	reflected	n	hs	servce	as	Presdent	Woodrow	Wlson’s	
assstant	secretary	of	the	navy	from	1913	to	1920,	a	poston	from	whch	he	
advocated	an	expanson	of	amercan	naval	power.	Then,	as	the	Democratc	
vce-presdental	canddate	n	1920,	roosevelt	champoned	passage	of	the	
versalles	 Treaty	 and	 amercan	 membershp	 n	 the	 league	 of	 natons.	
hs	commtment	to	nternatonalsm	notwthstandng,	roosevelt	was	also	
a	man	of	hs	tme	who	abhorred	war,	beleved	that	peace	and	prosperty	
were	nextrcably	lnked,	and	advocated	a	free	hand	for	amerca	n	nter-
natonal	relatons.30
	 yet	beyond	hs	nternatonalst	tendences,	roosevelt	was	also	a	talent-
ed	and	savvy	poltcan.	Understandng	the	country’s	desre	to	turn	nward	
followng	the	onset	of	the	Great	Depresson,	roosevelt	decded—for	polt-
cal	reasons—not	to	ssue	any	knd	of	publc	statements	on	foregn	polcy.	
later,	 as	 a	presdental	 canddate,	 he	 even	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	dsavow	hs	
prevous	 support	 for	amercan	entry	 nto	 the	league	of	natons	and	he	
made	no	mportant	foregn	polcy	pronouncements	durng	hs	campagn.	
roosevelt	knew	that	gven	the	severty	of	the	domestc	economy,	he	would	
never	 be	 elected	 presdent	 as	 an	 nternatonalst;	 moreover,	 roosevelt	
beleved	that	before	amerca	could	agan	lead	n	world	affars	t	frst	had	
to	effect	relef	at	home.	in	part,	because	he	made	no	ssue	of	foregn	affars,	
roosevelt	won	 the	 support	of	 a	majorty	of	 later	 ant-nterventonsts	 n	
1932,	such	as	Senators	burton	K.	Wheeler	and	Gerald	nye.31
	 Upon	assumng	 the	presdency,	roosevelt	 focused	almost	exclusvely	
on	domestc	affars	whle	renderng	foregn	relatons	of	secondary	mpor-
tance.	 Ths	 s	 not	 surprsng	 nasmuch	 as	 the	 devastatng	 mpact	 of	 the	
Great	Depresson	 n	amerca	necesstated	 the	 presdent’s	 prortes.	The	
gross	natonal	product	had	dropped	from	$87	bllon	n	1929	to	$41	bl-
lon	by	1933,	whle	 the	 jobless	 rate	had	 exceeded	15	mllon.	Therefore,	
roosevelt	 the	 nternatonalst	 acted	 as	 a	 natonalst	 between	 1932	 and	
1934.32
	 roosevelt’s	 prortes	were,	 ndeed,	 reflected	 n	 how	 he	 handled	 for-
egn	 polcy.	hs	 foregn	 polcy	 team	 espoused	 both	 nternatonalst	 and	
	 30.	alan	brnkley,	Liberalism and Its Discontents	 (Cambrdge,	ma:	harvard	Unver-
sty	Press,	1998),	1–16;	robert	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 
1932–1945	(new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1979),	3–18;	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt and 
the Isolationists, 1932–1945	(lncoln:	Unversty	of	nebraska	Press,	1983),	3–5.
	 31.	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,	18–20;	Cole,	Roosevelt 
and the Isolationists, 17–27.
	 32.	Gerald	D.	nash,	The Great Depression and World War II: Organizing America, 1933–
1945	(new	york:	St.	martn’s,	1979),	7.
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natonalst	vewponts,	placng	them	n	constant	conflct.	hs	secretary	of	
state,	Cordell	hull,	was	an	nternatonalst	who	was	fercely	dedcated	to	
recprocal	trade	agreements,	but	he	was	chosen	more	to	satsfy	Democratc	
poltcs	 than	 for	hs	worldvew.	On	 the	other	hand,	roosevelt’s	 assstant	
secretary	of	 state,	raymond	moley,	advocated	“a	consderable	 nsulaton	
of	our	natonal	economy	from	the	rest	of	the	world.”	in	short,	roosevelt	
created	an	nconsstent	foregn	polcy	apparatus	where	major	polcy	dec-
sons	were	centralzed	n	the	Whte	house	so	as	to	not	dsturb	hs	domestc	
poltcal	agenda,	whch	was	hs	prorty.	Such	an	approach	was	apparent	
n	 hs	 handlng	 of	 both	 the	 1933	 london	economc	Conference,	where	
amercan	polcy	was	unclear	and	neffectual,	and	the	World	Dsarmament	
Conference	n	Geneva,	where	roosevelt	faled	to	make	any	serous	effort	
other	than	endorsng	the	dea	of	dsarmament.33
—■■■■■■■—
by	1938,	wth	no	major	new	Deal	 legslaton	beng	ntroduced	and	wth	
roosevelt’s	domestc	nfluence	curtaled	as	a	result	of	the	“court	packng”	
scheme,	he	began	to	focus	more	on	world	affars.	The	expanson	of	naz	
power	and	the	spread	of	 fascsm	and	mltarsm	across	 the	globe	durng	
the	md-	 to	 late	1930s	 led	 some	admnstraton	offcals	 to	became	con-
cerned	over	the	rse	of	fascst	elements	wthn	the	Unted	States.	indeed,	
extreme	rght-wngers	n	amerca,	lke	the	vocal	German	amercan	bund,	
denounced	roosevelt	 and	 the	new	Deal	 as	 communstc.	Whle	 on	 the	
surface	t	mght	have	appeared	there	were	tes	between	naz	Germany	and	
the	small	but	hghly	vsble	 fascst	groups	 n	 the	Unted	States,	 n	realty	
those	 lnks	 were	 mnmal.	 nevertheless,	 there	 was	 a	 strong	 percepton	
that	a	domestc	fascst	threat	exsted.	in	1934	and	1935,	for	example,	sev-
eral	books	were	publshed	examnng	the	popularty	of	amercan	fascsm,	
such	as	Carmen	hader’s	Do We Want Fascism?	(1934),	norman	Thomas’s	
The Choice Before Us	 (1934),	 raymond	 Gram	 Swng’s	 The Forerunners 
of American Fascism	 (1935),	 and	 Snclar	 lews’s	 popular	 novel	 It Can’t 
Happen Here	(1935).34
	 33.	Dallek,	Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy,	23–34;	irwn	F.	Gellman,	
Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull, and Sumner Welles	(baltmore:	Johns	hopkns	
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	 Concern	 led	roosevelt	 to	 call	 a	 conference	 on	 8	may	 1934	wth	 the	
attorney	 general,	 treasury	 secretary,	 labor	 secretary,	 and	 Fbi	 and	 Secret	
Servce	chefs	 to	dscuss	 the	 stuaton.	Durng	 the	conference,	 the	pres-
dent	ordered	the	Fbi	to	montor	amercan	nazs	and	ther	sympathzers	
and	to	determne	the	extent	to	whch	Germany	had	nfluenced	domestc	
groups.	Over	 the	 next	 two	 years	 the	Whte	house	 receved	 regular	 Fbi	
reports	on	rght-wng	elements	as	well	as	other	sundry	reports	on	admn-
straton	crtcs.	Ths	was	the	frst	nstance	of	an	ncrease	n	Fbi	authorty	
n	domestc	securty	matters	durng	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	that	had	
at	 ts	orgn	 a	 concern	wth	 the	 effects	of	 foregn	 nfluence	on	domestc	
affars,	and	n	tme	ths	authorty	would	only	ncrease.35
	 in	 the	meantme,	 by	 1934,	 Congress	 had	 assumed	 a	 promnent	 role	
n	foregn	polcy	and	was	assertng	tself	n	ths	area	whle	not	automat-
cally	deferrng	to	the	chef	executve.	its	prmary	concern	was	how	to	deal	
wth	an	expansonst	Germany	and	Japan	n	relaton	to	U.S.	strategc	and	
economc	 nterests	 wthout	 becomng	 entangled	 n	 anythng	 that	mght	
lead	to	war,	wth	the	Frst	World	War	beng	the	best	example.	Ths	reas-
serton	 of	 congressonal	 prerogatve	 n	 foregn	 polcy	 stemmed	 from	 a	
wdespread	postwar	dsllusonment	 over	 the	purpose	 and	 effects	 of	 the	
Frst	World	War.	hghlghtng	and	contrbutng	to	these	concerns	was	the	
publcaton	of	varous	books	on	the	subject,	such	as	harry	elmer	barnes’s	
Genesis of the World War	 (1926)	 and	 helmuth	 engelbrecht	 and	 Frank	
hangen’s	Merchants of Death	(1934).	Ths	was	followed	by	the	formaton	
of	a	Senate	commttee,	led	by	north	Dakota	Senator	Gerald	nye,	to	study	
the	nfluence	muntons	manufacturers	and	nternatonal	bankers	had	n	
brngng	the	country	to	war.	Whle	the	nye	Commttee	(1934–36)	found	
no	evdence	that	specal	nterests	had	nfluenced	amercan	partcpaton	
n	war,	 t	 nevertheless	 popularzed	 the	 ssue	 and	 fed	amercan	 postwar	
dsllusonment.36
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	 a	 drect	 result	 of	 the	 ntense	 dsllusonment	 over	 the	 war	 was	
Congress’s	passng	of	legslaton	desgned	to	prevent	amercan	partcpa-
ton	n	another	Great	War.	The	frst	of	these	laws,	over	whch	the	Whte	
house	and	Congress	debated	the	amount	of	dscreton	t	would	permt	the	
presdent,	concerned	the	sale	of	arms	to	countres	at	war.	Congressonal	
ant-nterventonsts	 sought	a	mandatory	arms	embargo	whle	roosevelt	
wanted	a	dscretonary	one,	leadng	both	sdes	to	stalemate	n	the	summer	
of	1935.	Only	wth	the	threat	of	a	flbuster	dd	congressonal	leaders	agree	
to	a	compromse	whereby	an	arms	embargo	would	go	nto	effect	wth	the	
presdent’s	 declaraton	 of	 the	 exstence	 of	 hostltes.	 Furthermore,	 the	
bll	excluded	bellgerent	submarnes	from	amercan	ports	and	permtted	
amercans	to	travel	on	bellgerent	vessels	but	at	ther	own	rsk.	roosevelt,	
sensng	the	country’s	mood,	agreed	to	the	measure	and	sgned	t	nto	law	
on	31	august	1935,	but	warned	that	the	law’s	“nflexble	provsons”	mght	
yet	drag	the	country	nto	war.37
	 The	 provsons	 of	 the	 neutralty	 act	 were	 tested	 two	 months	 later	
when,	on	3	October	1935,	Fascst	italy	nvaded	ethopa,	thereby	ntatng	
the	start	of	global	(.e.,	Japanese	and	european)	fascst	mltary	aggresson.	
Two	days	later	roosevelt	declared	the	exstence	of	war,	whch,	accordng	
to	the	neutralty	act,	mandated	an	arms	embargo	on	all	bellgerents.	The	
embargo,	however,	had	neglgble	effects	on	italy’s	attack	and	so	was	largely	
symbolc.	 moreover,	 because	 afrca	 was	 outsde	 of	 amerca’s	 natonal	
nterests,	the	government	was	not	prepared	to	take	the	steps	necessary,	n	
terms	of	a	collectve	nternatonal	embargo	as	proposed	by	the	league	of	
natons,	to	affect	serously	italy’s	war	effort.	at	the	tme,	amercan	com-
panes	mantaned	a	$25,000	monthly	export	average	wth	italy	that,	by	the	
followng	year,	 ncreased	 to	$583,000.	nevertheless,	 ant-nterventonsts	
were	pleased	wth	the	neutralty	act	and	pleased	that	the	conflct	n	afrca	
promoted	further	debate	on	how	to	mprove	the	measure.38
	 Wth	 the	 neutralty	 act	 to	 expre	 n	 early	 1936,	 Congress	 debated	
whether	 to	 extend	 the	 law’s	 provsons.	 ant-nterventonsts	 looked	 to	
the	italo-ethopan	War	as	evdence	for	ncreased	use	of	embargos	whle	
roosevelt	and	hs	supporters	sought	greater	executve	lattude	n	declarng	
neutralty.	Gven	the	country’s	mood,	the	presdent’s	efforts	were	fleetng,	
and	n	February	Congress	extended	the	provsons	of	the	1935	neutralty	
act	and	added	a	ban	on	 the	extenson	of	 loans	 to	countres	at	war.	The	
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new	 provsons,	 n	 realty,	 were	 redundant	 snce	 the	 1934	 Johnson	 act	
prohbted	the	extenson	of	loans	to	countres	that	had	defaulted	on	ther	
Great	War	debts.	but	 they	can	be	understood	 n	 the	 context	of	 the	day:	
legslators	used	the	only	example	they	had	at	hand—how	the	Unted	States	
became	nvolved	n	the	Great	War—n	order	to	avod	becomng	entangled	
n	anythng	smlar.39
	 increased	 nternatonal	 tensons	 n	 1936	 rased	 even	 further	 ssues	
concernng	 neutralty	 and	 domestc	 securty.	 in	 1936	 Span	 fell	 nto	 a	
three-year	cvl	war.	rght-wng	natonalst	forces	led	by	General	Francsco	
Franco	 (aded	 by	naz	Germany	 and	 Fascst	 italy)	 battled	 the	 so-called	
loyalsts	 who	 were	 fghtng	 to	 preserve	 Span’s	 republcan	 government	
(supported	by	Communst	russa).	yet	n	ths	stuaton	Presdent	roosevelt	
refused	to	recognze	bellgerency,	makng	a	dstncton	between	a	cvl	war	
and	an	nternatonal	war,	and	thereby	prevented	the	neutralty	act	from	
gong	nto	effect.	but	n	accord	wth	other	european	powers,	roosevelt	dd	
agree	to	a	moral	embargo	on	arms	shpments	to	ether	sde	n	the	conflct.	
irrespectvely,	some	dealstc	amercans	on	the	poltcal	left	saw	the	war	
as	 mportant	 toward	 stoppng	 the	 spread	 of	 fascsm	 and,	 by	 1937,	 had	
organzed	volunteer	unts	 to	ad	 the	loyalst	 forces.	Gven	external	 sup-
port	from	Germany	and	italy,	the	Spansh	loyalst	effort	was	doomed	to	
falure,	but	another	contrbuton	to	the	success	of	Franco’s	forces	was	the	
advent	of	the	Ffth	Column.	in	September	1936,	General	emlo	de	mola,	
one	of	Franco’s	leutenants,	announced	by	rado	that	four	mltary	columns	
had	advanced	on	madrd	whle	a	ffth	column	of	nsurgents	operated	from	
wthn	 the	 cty.	 Thereafter,	 many	 amercans	 ncreasngly	 grew	 worred	
that	foregn	agents	mght	attempt	to	dsrupt	and	soften	up	amercan	soc-
ety	from	wthn.
—■■■■■■■—
Worred	about	the	domestc	ramfcatons	of	growng	naz	and	communst	
nfluence,	as	demonstrated	wth	domestc	fascsts	and	heady	amercan	left-
sts	who	were	concerned	about	the	course	of	the	Spansh	Cvl	War,	on	24	
august	1936	Presdent	roosevelt	called	Fbi	Drector	hoover	to	the	Whte	
house	for	a	meetng.	accordng	to	hoover,	the	presdent	“was	desrous	of	
dscussng	the	queston	of	subversve	actvtes	 n	 the	Unted	States,	par-
tcularly	Fascsm	and	Communsm.”	roosevelt	nformed	hoover	that	“he	
had	been	consderably	concerned”	about	the	actvtes	of	these	groups	and	
	 39.	Kennedy,	Freedom from Fear,	397;	Jonas,	Isolationism in America,	176–79.
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that	he	wanted	the	Fbi	drector	to	provde	hm	wth	“a	broad	pcture	of	the	
general	movement	and	ts	actvtes	as	may	affect	the	economc	and	polt-
cal	lfe	of	the	country	as	a	whole.”	hoover	related	to	roosevelt	that	there	
was	no	such	avalable	nformaton	from	any	government	agency,	but	that	
the	Fbi’s	 1916	 appropratons	 statute	 “contans	 a	provson	 that	 t	mght	
nvestgate	any	matters	referred	to	t	by	the	Department	of	State.”	Pqued	
by	hoover’s	suggeston,	but	fearful	of	the	plan	beng	leaked	from	the	State	
Department,	roosevelt	asked	hoover	to	meet	wth	hm	and	Secretary	of	
State	hull	the	followng	day.40
	 On	the	afternoon	of	25	august,	hoover	met	wth	roosevelt	and	hull	
at	 the	Whte	 house.	 The	 presdent	 stated	 hs	 concerns	 to	 hull,	 notng	
that	 “t	was	 a	matter	whch	 fell	 wthn	 the	 scope	 of	 foregn	 affars	 over	
whch	the	State	Department	would	have	a	rght	 to	request	an	 nqury	to	
be	made.”	Complyng	wth	roosevelt’s	wshes,	hull	asked	f	the	presdent	
wanted	the	request	to	be	put	nto	wrtng,	but	roosevelt	dsagreed,	statng	
that	he	wanted	“the	matter	to	be	handled	qute	confdentally.”	Presdent	
roosevelt’s	 drectve	 steppng	 up	 Fbi	 ntellgence	 actvty,	 therefore,	
remaned	an	oral	one.41
	 When	hoover	mplemented	roosevelt’s	order,	however,	he	nterpreted	
roosevelt’s	 words	 to	 ntate	 not	 a	 lmted	 nvestgaton	 but	 an	 exten-
sve	 one.	 Fbi	 agents,	 thereafter,	montored	 the	 actvtes	 of	 alleged	Ffth	
Columnsts,	pro-nazs,	and	communsts	and	then	reported	ths	nforma-
ton	to	the	Whte	house.	Ths	was	an	mportant	watershed	n	the	hstory	
of	the	Fbi	because	t	was	from	ths	pont	onward	that	the	Fbi	focused	more	
on	“subversve”	actvtes	utlzng	“ntellgence”	nvestgatons	rather	than	
the	more	lmtng	crmnal	nvestgatons.	Presdent	roosevelt,	moreover,	
came	to	value	the	reports	that	hoover	volunteered	to	the	admnstraton,	
reports	detalng	 the	actvtes	of	communsts	but	also	rght-wngers	 lke	
the	German	amercan	bund,	the	Slver	Shrts,	Gerald	l.	K.	Smth,	Gerald	
Wnrod,	and	Wllam	Dudley	Pelley.42
	 40.	Confdental	memorandum,	Fbi	Drector	J.	edgar	hoover,	24	august	1936,	Folder	
136,	Offcal	and	Confdental	fles	of	J.	edgar	hoover,	FOia	readng	room,	Fbi	headquar-
ters,	Washngton,	D.C.	(hereafter	cted	as	hoover	O&C).
	 41.	Confdental	memorandum,	hoover,	25	august	1936,	Folder	136,	hoover	O&C.	See	
also	athan	Theohars,	“The	Fbi’s	Stretchng	of	Presdental	Drectves,	1936–1953,”	Political 
Science Quarterly	91	(Wnter	1976–77):	649–72.
	 42.	 leo	rbuffo,	The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Great Depres-
sion to the Cold War	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1983),	184–87.	On	the	sgnf-
cance	of	the	1936	meetng	and	order	see	athan	Theohars,	The FBI and American Democ-
racy: A Brief Critical History	(lawrence:	Unversty	Press	of	Kansas,	2004),	44–47.
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Wth	nternatonal	events	becomng	ncreasngly	perlous—Fascst	italy’s	
vctory	over	ethopa,	the	Sno-Japanese	War,	htler’s	reoccupaton	of	the	
rhneland,	 and	 the	 Spansh	 Cvl	 War—amercan	 ant-nterventonsts	
sought	 to	make	 permanent	 the	 prevously	 temporary	 neutralty	 legsla-
ton.	 as	 wth	 the	 prevous	 neutralty	 acts,	 roosevelt	 sought	 dscreton	
n	applyng	the	law’s	provsons,	but	domestc	poltcal	events,	such	as	the	
faled	Judcal	reform	bll	and	the	economc	recesson	of	1937,	prevented	
the	presdent	from	assertng	the	nfluence	that	mght	have	shaped	the	leg-
slaton.	but	roosevelt’s	nfluence	was	not	entrely	curbed.	What	Congress	
enacted	when	makng	the	neutralty	act	permanent	n	1937	was	the	cash-
and-carry	 provson	 whereby	 bellgerents	 could	 buy	 nonmltary	 goods	
from	the	Unted	States	f	they	pad	for	them	wth	hard	currency	and	trans-
ported	the	goods	themselves.	The	law	only	delayed	the	nevtable,	however,	
as	 t	 ndrectly	 encouraged	 the	axs	 powers	 nasmuch	 as	 they	 knew	 the	
Unted	States	would	not	ntervene	drectly	n	european	events.43
	 Other	events	durng	1937	and	1938	further	demonstrated	the	nfluence	
ant-nterventonsts	 had	 n	 determnng	 the	 shape	 of	amercan	 foregn	
polcy.	in	October	roosevelt	delvered	hs	so-called	quarantne	speech	n	
whch	he	chose	hs	words	carefully	by	statng:	“War	s	a	contagon,	whether	
t	be	declared	or	undeclared.”	reporters	pressed	the	presdent	 to	explan	
what	he	meant,	but	he	refused.	The	result	was	that	the	speech	seemed	to	
please	both	sdes	of	the	foregn	polcy	debate	nasmuch	as	nterventonsts	
regarded	t	as	callng	for	an	actvst	foregn	polcy	whle	ant-nterventon-
sts	saw	t	as	roosevelt	seekng	to	avod	war.44
	 Then,	n	1938,	indana	representatve	lous	ludlow	proposed	a	con-
sttutonal	 amendment	 that	 would	 have	 placed	 the	 country’s	 war-mak-
ng	 power	 drectly	wth	 the	 people	 va	 referendum.	Whle	 the	 ntatve	
ultmately	faled,	t	nevertheless	demonstrated	the	popularty	of	the	ant-
nterventonsts	at	ths	pont.	meanwhle,	Fascst	aggresson	contnued	wth	
the	 annexaton	 of	 austra	 nto	 the	 greater	 German	 rech	 and	 then	 the	
munch	Crss,	where	roosevelt’s	actons	agan	reflected	the	strength	of	the	
ant-nterventonsts	when	he	appealed	 to	european	powers	 to	negotate	
the	fate	of	the	Sudetenland.	amercan	opnon	started	to	change,	but	ever	
so	hestatngly,	after	Germany	acqured	the	Sudetenland	and	as	Japanese	
	 43.	Kennedy,	Freedom from Fear,	 400–1;	Doenecke	 and	Wlz,	From Isolation to War,	
63–64;	Jonas,	Isolationism in America,	198–99.
	 44.	Kennedy,	Freedom from Fear,	 405–6;	Doenecke	 and	Wlz,	From Isolation to War,	
69–70.
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aggresson	 advanced	 n	 Chna.	 Ths	 led	 roosevelt	 to	 begn	 to	 buld	 up	
amercan	 defenses	 n	 1938	 and	 to	 recall	 the	 amercan	 ambassador	 to	
Germany	followng	the	Krstallnacht	persecuton	of	Jews.45
	 Domestcally	n	1938,	amercans	became	ncreasngly	concerned	wth	
apparent	German	attempts	at	nternal	subverson.	in	February,	Fbi	agents	
uncovered	an	extensve	German	esponage	rng	n	new	york	Cty	that	had	
extended	tself	nto	the	armed	forces	and	defense	ndustres.	The	spy	rng	
was	undermned,	however,	as	a	result	of	one	of	 ts	 ncompetent	German	
amercan	members,	Guenther	rumrch.	a	ne’er-do-well	who	habtually	
found	hmself	 n	 trouble,	rumrch	was	 enamored	wth	Frst	World	War	
German	 esponage	 actvty.	after	wrtng	 to	 the	Völkischer Beobachter—
the	 naz	 party’s	 newspaper—offerng	 to	 provde	 ntellgence	 about	 the	
amercan	army,	rumrch	was	recruted	as	a	spy.	in	hs	esponage	efforts,	
rumrch	only	managed	to	collect	relatvely	nnocuous	nformaton	such	as	
venereal	dsease	rates	among	amercan	solders,	but	 t	was	a	connecton	
he	had	to	Scotland	that	led	to	hs	capture	and	the	eventual	exposure	of	the	
new	york	spy	rng.46
	 rumrch	mantaned	contact	wth	hs	German	handlers	through	corre-
spondence.	he	was	nstructed	to	wrte	a	ffty-one-year-old	woman	named	
Jesse	 Jordan	 n	Dundee,	 Scotland,	who	worked	as	 a	 screen	 for	German	
ntellgence.	in	1937,	the	brtsh	Securty	Servce	(mi-5)	obtaned	a	war-
rant	to	ntercept	her	mal,	whch	led	them	to	establsh	her	dentty.	after	
tracng	 the	 source	 of	 her	 correspondence	 to	 the	 Unted	 States,	 mi-5	
offcals	 alerted	 the	Fbi	 and,	 n	due	 course,	 Fbi	 agents	 determned	 that	
rumrch	was	one	of	Jordan’s	correspondents.	he	was	placed	under	survel-
lance	but	only	arrested	n	February	1938	after	he	attempted	to	obtan	blank	
passports	 from	 the	State	Department.	Upon	hs	 arrest	rumrch	decded	
to	cooperate	wth	hs	captors,	 resultng	 n	 the	exposure	of	hs	esponage	
rng.	Despte	 the	fact	 that	 the	spy	rng	was,	 for	all	 ntents	and	purposes,	
rather	nept,	the	case	receved	front-page	headlnes	n	the	amercan	press	
and	helped	 to	 foster	 the	belef	 that	Ffth	Columnsts	had	permeated	 the	
country.	 The	 cooperaton	 wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence,	moreover,	 helped	 to	
lay	a	frm	bass	on	whch	the	Fbi	would	later	develop	an	ntmate	workng	
relatonshp.47
	 45.	Kennedy,	Freedom from Fear,	418–20.
	 46.	 Secret	World	War	ii	esponage	Summary,	no	date,	Fbi	65–37193–332,	pp.	25–34.
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Wth	 both	 the	 nternatonal	 and	 domestc	 stuaton	 developng	 as	
they	 dd	 n	 1938,	 the	 Fbi	 acqured	 yet	 more	 nvestgatve	 autonomy.	
interested	 n	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 “so-called	 esponage	 stuaton,”	 Presdent	
roosevelt	 drected	 attorney	 General	 Cummngs	 n	 October	 to	 survey	
the	 government’s	 nvestgatve	 actvty.	When	 reportng	 the	 Fbi’s	 work	
to	 Cummngs,	 hoover	 made	 no	 attempt	 to	 hde	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Fbi	
had	nvestgated	poltcal	actvty,	and,	n	fact,	he	urged	an	expanson	of	
the	Fbi’s	nvestgatve	role.	hoover	warned	Cummngs,	however,	aganst	
seekng	legslatve	authorty	for	such	an	expanson,	observng	that	a	law	
mght	draw	crtcsm	from	people	who,	n	hoover’s	vew,	dd	not	under-
stand	 the	 counteresponage	 character	of	Fbi	 nvestgatons	 (after	1936).	
The	Fbi	drector	preferred	to	nvestgate	under	the	bureau’s	1916	appro-
pratons	statute.48
	 Presdent	 roosevelt,	 apparently,	 was	 not	 dsturbed	 by	 the	 poltcal	
nature	of	some	Fbi	nvestgatons.	Ths	s	not	altogether	surprsng	gven	
hs	 leadershp	 style	whereby	 the	 charsmatc	 chef	 executve	 beleved	 he	
could	 control	 hs	 subordnates	 or	 play	 one	 off	 aganst	 another.	 Gven	
hoover’s	development	of	separate	flng	procedures	and	hs	resort	to	lle-
gal	nvestgatve	methods,	he	effectvely	negated	the	presdent’s	ablty	to	
hold	a	tght	ren	on	the	Fbi’s	actvtes.	at	the	same	tme,	however,	hoover	
dd	not	yet	feel	secure	enough	n	hs	poston	to	assert	the	Fbi’s	nfluence	to	
the	extent	that	he	later	would	durng	the	Cold	War.	nevertheless,	hoover	
was	 able	 to	 nvestgate	matters	wth	 and	wthout	 roosevelt’s	 knowledge	
whle	employng	extralegal	nvestgatve	technques.49
	 hoover	took	one	more	step	n	1939	to	ensure	the	Fbi’s	sole	authorty	
to	montor	domestc	subversve	actvty.	Upon	learnng	of	a	plan	to	coor-
dnate	 domestc	 survellance	 through	 an	 nterdepartmental	 commttee,	
hoover	moved	 to	 dsable	 the	 proposal.	 he	 mpressed	 upon	 the	 attorney	
general	that	such	a	plan	would	cause	nterdepartmental	chaos.	remndng	
attorney	General	Frank	murphy	(Cummngs’s	successor)	of	the	wdespread	
cvl	lbertes	abuses	durng	the	Frst	World	War,	hoover	argued	that	cen-
tralzng	domestc	nvestgatons	wthn	the	Fbi	could	avod	the	mstakes	
of	the	past.	Ths	clever	cvl	lbertaran	argument	worked	and	resulted	n	
roosevelt’s	 secret	 order	 of	 26	 June	 1939	 placng	 all	 domestc	 nvestga-
tons	 under	 the	 Fbi,	mltary	 intellgence	Dvson,	 and	Offce	 of	naval	
	 48.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	152–53.
	 49.	 ibd.,	153.
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intellgence.	 more	 mportantly,	 all	 domestc	 nformaton	 collected	 by	
these	agences	was	to	be	coordnated	wth	the	Fbi.	Ths	coordnaton	later	
extended	 publcly	 to	 local	 polce	 unts	 n	 September.	 hoover	 now	 had	
almost	 exclusve	 control	 over	 domestc	 survellance,	 and	 hs	 power	 and	
nfluence	would	ncrease	as	the	Second	World	War	developed.50
	 50.	Theohars	and	Cox,	The Boss,	154;	Press	release,	Fbi	Drector	J.	edgar	hoover	to	
all	law	enforcement	Offcals,	6	September	1939,	reprnted	n	athan	Theohars,	ed.,	From 
the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover	(Chcago:	ivan	r.	Dee,	1991),	184.	On	attorney	General	
murphy’s	concept	of	cvl	lbertes	protectons,	see	rchard	W.	Steele,	Free Speech in the Good 
War	(new	york:	St.	martn’s	Press,	1999),	21,	24,	26,	38,	48.
Beginnings
War, Phony War, and Election
1939–1940
Wth	ar,	sea,	and	land	forces	moblzed	just	before	dawn	on	1	September	
1939,	the	German	mltary	burst	across	the	Polsh	fronter	employng	the	
tactc	 of	 the	 blitzkrieg.	Whle	 fghtng	 bravely,	 the	 Polsh	 defense	 forces	
were	utterly	unprepared	for	the	overwhelmng	nvason	and	had	no	chance	
of	 successfully	 defendng	 ther	 homeland.	 For	 Germany,	 however,	 the	
mltary	campagn—at	least—was	a	successful	part	of	adolf	htler’s	ncre-
mental	plan	to	unte	all	German-speakng	peoples	 nto	a	sngle	German	
Reich,	 whle	 dsmantlng	 the	 provsons	 of	 the	 versalles	 “diktat.”	 but	
after	a	year	of	appeasng	naz	Germany	all	to	avod	another	costly	war	n	
europe,	brtan	and	France	refused	to	offer	htler	any	further	concessons.	
in	london,	Prme	mnster	nevlle	Chamberlan	then	announced	before	
Parlament	an	ultmatum	for	Germany	to	wthdraw	ts	forces	mmedately	
or	 face	 the	 consequences.	 When	 Germany	 rebuffed	 the	 demand,	 both	
brtan	and	France,	adherng	to	ther	mutual	pledge	to	assst	Poland	n	the	
event	of	German	aggresson,	declared	war	on	3	September.
	 in	 the	 Unted	 States,	 Presdent	 Frankln	 roosevelt	 sought	 to	 move	
cautously	f	delberately.	before	the	German	nvason	of	Poland,	between	
1934	 and	1939,	roosevelt’s	 foregn	polcy	was	 restrctonst	 and	 focused	
upon	dealng	wth	 the	 threat	 of	 an	 expansonst	Germany	 n	 relaton	 to	
U.S.	strategc	and	economc	nterests.	now	that	war	was	present,	roosevelt	
was	forced	to	deal	wth	an	expansonst	and	aggressve	Germany	as	realty.	
roosevelt’s	 foregn	polcy	at	 ths	pont	changed.	Whle	offcally	neutral,	
the	 Unted	 States	 was	 n	 realty	 clearly	 ant-axs,	 sgnfcantly	 no	 lon-
ger	 restrctonst,	 and	 predsposed	 to	 favor	 an	alled	 vctory.	 roosevelt,	
utlzng	 hs	 fnely	 honed	 leadershp	 sklls	 and	 wth	 a	 new	 percepton	
of	Germany	 as	 an	 aggressor,	was	 able	 from	 ths	 pont	 forward	 to	 shape	
amercan	 foregn	 polcy	 ncrementally	 toward	 ad	 short	 of	 war.	 in	 the	
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words	of	hstoran	Wayne	Cole,	roosevelt	by	1939	became	the	“supreme	
poltcal	master”	n	gudng	amercan	foregn	polcy.1
	 The	presdent,	however,	stll	faced	a	powerful	and	vocal	ant-nterven-
tonst	 bloc.	 Some	of	 them	had	 sympathy	 for	 the	Poles,	 such	 as	Oswald	
Garrson	vllard	and	the	Chicago Tribune,	both	of	whom	regarded	htler	
as	an	aggressor.	Other	ant-nterventonsts	expressed	 lttle	 sympathy	 for	
the	Poles	because,	as	hstoran	Justus	Doenecke	has	observed,	they	beleved	
Germany	had	a	legtmate	clam	to	the	free	cty	of	Danzg	and	the	Polsh	
Corrdor.	Promnent	ant-nterventonst	Congressman	hamlton	Fsh,	for	
example,	beleved	the	Poles	(and	by	proxy	the	French	and	brtsh)	foolsh	
for	 not	 negotatng	 wth	 htler.	 Fsh	 wrote	 n	 hs	 memor	 that	 because	
Danzg	was	overwhelmngly	populated	wth	Germans	and	had	voted	n	a	
plebscte	for	reunfcaton	wth	Germany,	that	“Polsh	control	of	ths	cty	
was	not	.	.	.	an	ssue	for	whch	t	was	worth	plungng	the	world	nto	war.”	
Fsh	 further	 beleved—navely—that	had	 the	Poles	negotated,	Germany	
would	have	sgned	“a	treaty	guaranteeng	the	ndependence	and	ntegrty	
of	Poland.”	Senator	burton	K.	Wheeler,	alternatvely,	had	lttle	sympathy	for	
Poland	because	that	country,	he	sad,	had	the	hghest	level	of	Jewsh	persecu-
tons	n	europe;	whle	hstoran	harry	elmer	barnes	argued	that	a	majorty	
of	Poles	detested	ther	own	government	anyway.	Charles	lndbergh—lke	
others—was	at	a	loss	understandng	why	brtan	and	France	would	wage	
war	over	Poland,	but	unlke	some	of	hs	other	ant-nterventonst	brethren	
he	beleved	blame	was	equally	weghted	to	both	sdes.2
	 by	the	evenng	of	3	September,	Presdent	roosevelt	delvered	one	of	hs	
notable	fresde	chats	to	the	amercan	publc	to	proclam	amercan	neu-
tralty.	in	hs	speech,	however,	the	presdent	refused	to	ask	amercans	to	
be	neutral	n	thought	as	well	as	acton,	such	as	Woodrow	Wlson	had	asked	
some	twenty-fve	years	earler.	and	despte	hs	call	for	neutralty,	roosevelt	
wated	two	full	days	before	nvokng	the	neutralty	act.	by	movng	slowly,	
he	had	permtted	the	alles	precous	tme	to	purchase	vtal	war	matérel.	
roosevelt	 then	 called	Congress	 nto	 specal	 sesson	on	 13	 September	 to	
consder	 revson	 of	 the	 neutralty	 act—to	 abandon	 the	 embargo	 and	
permt	the	use	of	cash-and-carry	for	mltary	goods.3
	 1.	Wayne	 S.	 Cole,	 Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45	 (lncoln:	 Unversty	 of	
nebraska	Press,	1983),	320.
	 2.	 Justus	D.	Doenecke,	Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 
1939–1941	(lanham:	rowman	&	lttlefeld,	2000),	9–10,	14;	hamlton	Fsh,	Memoir of an 
American Patriot	 (Washngton,	DC:	regnery,	1991),	91;	Charles	lndbergh,	The Wartime 
Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh	(new	york:	harcourt	brace	Jovanovch,	1970),	250.
	 3.	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	320–21.
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	 Ths	prompted	the	famed	avator	Charles	lndbergh	to	respond	to	the	
presdent,	leadng	hm	to	become	one	of	the	most	popular	challengers	to	
roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy	and	a	prmary	target	of	Fbi	offcals.	lndbergh	
confded	 to	 hs	 journal	 after	 roosevelt’s	 rado	 talk	 that	 he	 wshed	 he	
“trusted	 hm	more.”	 eventually,	 by	 7	 September,	 after	wrtng	 an	 artcle	
opposng	amercan	nvolvement,	lndbergh	decded	he	could	not	“stand	
by	and	see	ths	country	pushed	nto	war	f	t	s	not	absolutely	essental	to	
the	future	welfare	of	the	naton.”	The	avator	decded	to	take	an	actve	part	
n	poltcs—whch	he	clamed	to	dslke—“to	stop	the	trend	whch	s	now	
gong	on	n	ths	country.”4
	 lndbergh	 was	 asssted	 n	 hs	 endeavor	 by	Wllam	 Castle—former	
undersecretary	of	state	 n	 the	hoover	admnstraton—to	have	hs	vews	
broadcast	natonally	on	the	rado.	On	the	evenng	of	15	September,	from	a	
hotel	n	Washngton,	D.C.,	lndbergh	delvered	a	speech	enttled	“amerca	
and	european	Wars.”	he	advocated	nsulatng	the	Unted	States	from	war	
and	warned	that	“by	 fghtng	 for	democracy	abroad	we	may	end	by	 los-
ng	t	at	home.”	The	war	had	the	potental,	he	argued,	to	destroy	Western	
cvlzaton	 as	 t	was	 then	 known.	Ths	 speech	 thus	marked	 the	 start	 of	
lndbergh’s	concerted	effort	to	undermne	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy,	and	
from	ths	pont	forward—wthout	promptng	from	the	Whte	house—Fbi	
offcals	would	take	an	ncreasng	nterest	n	the	popular	avator’s	poltcal	
dssent.5
	 lndbergh	 contnued	 to	 advocate	 nonnterventon	 through	 further	
rado	broadcasts.	hs	 second	one	ared	on	13	October,	 ttled	“neutralty	
and	War,”	and	a	thrd	n	1940	concernng	“The	ar	Defense	of	amerca”	
n	whch	he	argued	that	arpower	would	protect	the	country	from	attack.	
he	 also	 publshed	 varous	 artcles	 n	 Reader’s Digest,	 Atlantic Monthly,	
and	Collier’s between	1939	and	the	sprng	of	1941	that,	whle	provng	to	
be	 controversal,	 sparked	 great	 publc	 nterest.	 lndbergh’s	 newly	 found	
poltcal	actvsm—whch	so	passonately	opposed	the	roosevelt	admns-
traton—almost	mmedately	caught	the	attenton	of	Fbi	offcals.6
	 The	 bureau’s	 ntal	 nvestgaton	 of	 lndbergh,	 datng	 broadly	 from	
September	1939	to	aprl	1941	when	he	joned	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	
	 4.	 lndbergh,	Wartime Journals,	251–52.
	 5.	 ibd.;	Wartime Journals,	253–56;	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle 
against American Intervention in World War II	 (new	 york:	 harcourt	 brace	 Jovanovch,	
1974),	70–72;	“lndbergh’s	appeal	for	isolaton,”	New York Times,	16	September	1939,	9.
	 6.	Charles	a.	lndbergh,	“avaton,	Geography,	and	race,”	Reader’s Digest,	november	
1939,	64–67;	lndbergh,	“What	Substtute	for	War?”	Atlantic Monthly,	march	1940,	305–7;	
lndbergh,	“a	letter	to	amercans,”	Colliers, 29	march	1941,	75–77.
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conssted	prmarly	of	the	collecton	of	relatvely	nnocuous,	publc	source	
materal.	 Fbi	 agents	 scoured	 the	 publc	 press	 for	 artcles	 about	 and	 by	
lndbergh	and	 revewed	books	 that	mentoned	hm.	by	clppng	 several	
hundred	press	stores,	Fbi	agents	were	able,	early	on,	to	construct	a	dosser	
that	enabled	them	to	dentfy	lndbergh’s	assocates	as	possble	nvestga-
tve	 targets.	 Searchng	 all	 avalable	 publc	 avenues,	 Fbi	 agents	 perused	
the	 country’s	manstream	 and	 extremst	 presses	 for	 any	 and	 all	 data	 on	
lndbergh.	 and	 despte	 the	 fact	 that	 lndbergh’s	 publc	 statements	 and	
assocatons	went,	at	ths	pont,	no	further	than	advocatng	neutralty,	to	
Fbi	offcals	ths	was	of	nterest	because	hs	“numerous	remarks	.	.	.	bear	
upon	hs	foregn	or	natonalstc	sympathes.”7
	 Fbi	agents	dd	not	restrct	ther	nterest	to	lndbergh	after	1	September	
1939.	Durng	the	debate	over	revsng	the	neutralty	act,	Senator	Gerald	
nye—who	cut	short	a	speakng	tour	n	the	mdwest	to	play	a	leadng	role	
n	 the	controversy—sad	 that	by	usng	cash-and-carry	 to	 trade	 n	mun-
tons,	the	Unted	States	could	become	economcally	dependent	upon	the	
war.	he	also	advocated	replacng	roosevelt’s	cash-and-carry	proposal	wth	
one	 that	 mposed	 an	 absolute	 embargo	on	bellgerents,	 argung	 that	 the	
defct	n	trade	would	be	made	up	n	latn	amerca.	nye	warned,	more-
over,	that	f	cash-and-carry	were	adopted,	roosevelt	would	only	then	ask	
to	 repeal	 the	 cash	 provson	 followed	 by	 the	 carry	 provson,	 ultmately	
leadng	the	country	to	war.	When	the	actual	votes	were	cast,	nye	opposed	
roosevelt’s	cash-and-carry	proposal.8
	 Fbi	agents	took	an	nterest	n	nye	n	October	1939,	just	weeks	before	
the	Senate	voted	on	the	neutralty	act.	at	that	tme,	the	Fbi’s	los	angeles	
feld	offce	receved	unsolcted	 nformaton	suggestng	that	nye	was	“n	
the	pay	of	 the	German	government”	 and	a	 spy.	Ths	 type	of	 sensatonal	
accusaton	 was	 leveled	 aganst	 varous	 promnent	 ant-nterventonsts,	
and	 t	 was	 one	 that	 stemmed	 purely	 from	 ther	 publc	 opposton	 to	
roosevelt’s	 foregn	 polcy.	 in	nye’s	 case,	 however,	 hs	 unnamed	 accuser	
beleved	 the	 content	 of	 nye’s	 poltcal	 speeches	 confrmed	 that	 he	 was	
pro-naz	and,	 n	 the	opnon	of	a	San	Francsco	chropractor,	a	German	
agent.	irrespectve	of	the	absurdty	of	such	a	complant,	an	Fbi	agent	was	
dspatched	 to	 ntervew	 the	 nformant	 (not	 always	 a	 routne	 procedure)	
and	only	then	dd	Fbi	offcals	deem	the	charge	baseless.	Whle	Fbi	agents	
	 7.	blnd	memorandum	re	Charles	a.	lndbergh,	no	date,	Fbi	65–1149–152.	On	the	use	
of	publc	source	materal	to	dentfy	targets,	see	Frank	J.	Donner,	The Age of Surveillance: The 
Aims and Methods of America’s Political Intelligence System	(new	york:	Knopf,	1980),	129.
	 8.	Doenecke,	Storm on the Horizon,	62,	64;	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	327–
28,	329.
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developed	nothng	wth	ths	frst	accusaton	aganst	nye,	later,	as	the	nter-
ventonst–ant-nterventonst	 debate	 ntensfed,	 they	 would	 scrutnze	
other	serous	charges	rased	aganst	hm.9
—■■■■■■■—
Wth	the	neutralty	act	revsed	n	the	autumn	of	1939,	and	Poland	fnally	
crushed	wth	 the	Sovet	 nvason	of	 that	 country	 n	md-September,	 the	
war	 n	 europe	 suddenly—and	 temporarly—became	 quet.	 htler	 had	
hoped	the	alles,	facng	the	realty	of	a	defeated	Poland,	would	recognze	
that	he	had	no	desgns	on	 ether	French	or	brtsh	 terrtory	 and	would,	
therefore,	cease	hostltes.	hs	wsh	was	fancful,	f	at	all	serous.	For	ther	
part,	 the	alles	 saw	 no	 reason	 to	 seek	 reconclaton.	 They	 beleved	 the	
French	 border	 fortfcatons	 were	 adequate,	 and	 they	 thought	 the	 thck	
ardennes	Forest	would	prevent	the	German	army	from	enterng	France.	
To	 the	alles,	 the	 only	 possblty	 for	 a	German	westward	 nvason	was	
through	the	low	Countres	where	t	would	be	countered	by	the	combned	
brtsh	 and	 French	 mltares	 and	 the	 defense	 forces	 of	 those	 nvaded	
natons.	The	resultant	nactvty	over	the	wnter	of	1939–40	was	dubbed,	n	
the	words	of	ant-nterventonst	Senator	Wllam	borah,	the	“phony	war.”
	 irrespectve	of	 nternatonal	events,	Fbi	agents	contnued	to	montor	
ant-nterventonst	 actvty,	 prmarly	 by	 collectng	 varous	 newspaper	
clppngs.	 They	 were	 also	 nterested	 n	 correspondence	 amercans	 sent	
to	the	Whte	house,	but	partcularly	that	concernng	Charles	lndbergh.	
Worred	 ctzens	 wrote	 ther	 government	 to	 express	 concern	 about	
lndbergh	 or	 to	 provde	 nformaton	 they	 beleved	 would	 nterest	 gov-
ernment	 offcals.	no	matter	who	 n	 the	 government	 receved	 these	 let-
ters,	much	of	the	correspondence	nvarably	found	ts	way	to	the	Fbi.	as	
lndbergh’s	poltcal	efforts	ncreased,	so,	too,	dd	the	bureau’s	correspon-
dence	 fle.	 reflectng	 lndbergh’s	 ncreasng	 promnence	 n	 the	 foregn	
polcy	 debate—where	 hs	 poltcal	 actvty	 and	 past	 tours	 of	 Germany	
between	1936	and	1938	(where	he	was	awarded	a	medal)	were	called	nto	
queston—many	amercans	 expressed	 concern	 over	 the	 avator’s	 loyalty	
and	patrotsm.	One	ctzen	wrote:	“i	don’t	understand	why	your	depart-
ment	 doesn’t	 bnd	 and	 gag	 that	 man	 Charles	 a.	 lndbergh.”	 another	
warned	the	Fbi:	“[i]f	he	was	nvestgated	he	would	be	found	to	be	a	5th	
columnst	and	perhaps	one	of	the	world’s	hghest	pad	spes.”10
	 9.	 letter,	SaC	los	angeles	to	hoover,	10	October	1939,	Fbi	65–6030–1.
	 10.	 letter,	(deleted)	to	Frankln	D.	roosevelt,	22	may	1940,	Fbi	65–11449–2x;	(deleted)	
to	 J.	edgar	hoover,	4	august	1940,	Fbi	65–11449–6;	 letter,	anonymous	 to	Fbi,	6	august	
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	 letters	wrtten	n	opposton	to	Presdent	roosevelt’s	polcy,	or	n	sup-
port	of	lndbergh,	proved	to	have	greater	sgnfcance,	especally	n	pro-
pellng	 forward	 the	 Fbi’s	 already	 unauthorzed—f	 passve—montorng	
of	 the	ant-nterventonsts.	On	9	aprl	1940,	however,	 the	 	“phony	war”	  
came	 to	 an	 end.	Germany	 nvaded	Denmark,	 leadng	 to	 the	 subsequent	
conquests	 of	 norway,	 belgum,	 holland,	 and	 France.	 in	 reacton,	 lead-
ng	 ant-nterventonsts—lke	 lndbergh—spoke	 out	 aganst	 amercan	
nvolvement.	 Then,	 n	 may	 1940,	 at	 roosevelt’s	 request,	 Presdental	
Secretary	Stephen	early	forwarded	to	hoover	“a	number	of	telegrams”	that	
were	“n	opposton	to	natonal	defense.”	The	Whte	house	had	receved	
the	 telegrams	 followng	 roosevelt’s	 recent	 speech	 on	 natonal	 defense	
and	 the	 threat	 to	amerca	by	 foregn	 ar	 forces.	early	 nformed	hoover	
that	 “the	Presdent	 thought	you	mght	 lke	 to	 look	 them	over	noting the 
names and addresses of	 the	 senders.” The	 followng	month,	 for	a	 second	
tme,	early	forwarded	to	hoover	thrty-sx	telegrams	receved	“expressng	
approval	 of	Col.	 lndbergh’s	 [rado]	 address”	 that	month	on	 “Our	Drft	
Towards	War.”11
	 instead	of	merely	“notng	the	names	and	addresses”	of	the	correspon-
dents,	hoover	 exceeded	 the	 presdent’s	 nterest	 and	 ordered	 a	 search	 of	
the	Fbi’s	 fles	 for	 any	 nformaton	on	 the	wrters.	Ths	 nformaton	was	
then	 compled	 and	 forwarded	 to	 the	Whte	house	 for	 ts	 “convenence	
and	 reference.”	 Presdent	 roosevelt	 had	 not	 requested	 ths	 nformaton.	
rather,	 on	 hs	 own	 authorty,	hoover	 offered	 t	 but	 roosevelt	made	 no	
complants.	hs	lack	of	concern	can	best	be	understood	wthn	the	context	
of	two	comments	the	presdent	made	n	may	to	Treasury	Secretary	henry	
morgenthau	and	Secretary	of	War	Stmson.	accordng	to	morgenthau,	the	
presdent	 told	hm	over	 lunch:	 “if	 i	 should	de	 tomorrow,	 i	want	you	 to	
know	ths.	i	am	absolutely	convnced	that	lndbergh	s	a	naz.”	roosevelt	
also	wrote	Stmson:	 “When	 i	 read	lndbergh’s	 speech	 [of	 20	may]	 i	 felt	
that	t	could	not	have	been	better	put	f	t	had	been	wrtten	by	Goebbels	
hmself.	What	 a	 pty	 that	 ths	 youngster	 has	 completely	 abandoned	 hs	
belef	n	our	form	of	government	and	has	accepted	naz	methods	because	
apparently	they	are	effcent.”12
1940,	Fbi	65–11449–21;	letter,	(deleted)	to	attorney	General	robert	Jackson,	5	august	1940,	
Fbi	65–11449–36.
	 11.	memorandum,	Frankln	D.	roosevelt	to	Stephen	early,	21	may	1940,	Offcal	Fle	
10-b,	Frankln	D.	roosevelt	lbrary	(FDrl),	hyde	Park,	new	york;	memorandum,	Stephen	
early	 to	J.	edgar	hoover,	21	may	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	memorandum,	early	 to	
hoover,	17	June	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	memorandum,	17	June	1940,	Offcal	Fle	
92,	Charles	lndbergh,	FDrl.	emphass	added	n	quote.
	 12.	Personal	 and	 confdental	 letter,	 J.	edgar	hoover	 to	 Stephen	early,	 26	 June	1940,	
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	 hoover’s	 decson	 to	 bref	 the	Whte	house	 on	 ts	 ant-nterventon-
st	 crtcs	 marked	 a	 sgnfcant	 development	 n	 the	 hoover-roosevelt	
relatonshp,	 trggerng	 an	 ongong	 and	 ntensfed	 survellance	 of	 the	
ant-nterventonst	 movement.	 Ths	 was	 the	 frst	 tme	 that	 hoover,	 of	
hs	own	accord,	provded	the	Whte	house	wth	poltcal	 ntellgence	on	
the	presdent’s	ant-nterventonst	crtcs.	hoover	exploted	the	opportu-
nty	of	roosevelt’s	forwardng	of	telegrams	to	report	back	to	hm	poltcal	
nformaton	he	thought	roosevelt	would	fnd	of	nterest.	The	provdng	of	
ntellgence	on	roosevelt’s	ant-nterventonst	crtcs	only	ncreased	as	the	
debate	ntensfed.
	 as	 lndbergh’s	 partcpaton	 n	 the	 so-called	Great	Debate	 escalated	
over	1940,	so,	too,	dd	Fbi	montorng	efforts.	as	the	avator’s	comments	
became	 ncreasngly	 more	 controversal,	 hs	 popularty	 and	 nfluence	
among	the	publc	ncreased.	in	hs	1939	artcle	“avaton,	Geography,	and	
race,”	 the	 fler’s	contentous	and	racst	 statements	 led	many	 to	conclude	
he	 was	 pro-naz.	 lndbergh	 had	 descrbed	 the	 european	 war	 as	 one	
“wthn	our	own	famly	of	natons,	a	war	whch	wll	reduce	the	strength	
and	destroy	the	treasures	of	the	Whte	race.”	he	further	wrote	that	survval	
depended	on	“a	Western	wall	of	race	and	arms	whch	can	hold	back	ether	
a	 Genghs	 Khan	 or	 the	 nfltraton	 of	 nferor	 blood.”	 (years	 later,	 well	
after	the	concluson	of	the	war,	lndbergh	elaborated	on	these	comments,	
clamng	he	was	not	a	 racst.	he	dd	admt,	however,	 to	belevng	 n	 the	
superorty	of	races	based	upon	achevements	n	culture	and	technology.)	
Snce	lndbergh	beleved	a	war	among	Western	natons	would	be	a	dsas-
ter	 for	cvlzaton	 n	general,	by	allowng	asan	elements	(.e.,	russans/
communsts)	to	domnate	the	contnent,	he	advocated	a	negotated	peace.	
not	 surprsngly,	 such	 deas	 led	many,	 ncludng	offcals	 n	 the	 govern-
ment,	to	regard	the	fler	as	a	naz	sympathzer.	no	matter	how	odous	hs	
vews,	 lndbergh’s	 opnons	dd	not,	 however,	 consttute	 grounds	 for	 an	
Fbi	nvestgaton.13
	 lndbergh’s	goal	durng	1940	was	to	promote	the	dea	that	the	Unted	
States	 should	 reman	 solated	 from	 the	 european	 conflct	 and,	 nstead,	
concentrate	on	ts	own	defenses.	he	called	for	a	clear	defense	polcy,	one	
that,	he	argued,	roosevelt	had	never	artculated.	by	buldng	a	powerful	and	
Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	personal	and	confdental	letter,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	Stephen	early,	
2	august	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	entry	for	20	may	1940,	henry	morgenthau	Pres-
dental	Dares,	p.	563,	FDrl;	letter,	Frankln	D.	roosevelt	to	henry	Stmson,	21	may	1940,	
henry	Stmson	Papers	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	101),	manuscrpts	and	archves,	yale	Unversty,	
new	haven,	CT.
	 13.	Cole,	Charles A. Lindbergh,	80–82.	For	lndbergh’s	ant-Semtsm	see	also	a.	Scott	
berg,	Charles A. Lindbergh	(new	york:	Putnam,	1998),	361,	385–86.
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modern	ar	force	wth	amercan	ar	bases	along	the	eastern	and	western	
approaches	 to	 the	Western	hemsphere,	 lndbergh	 clamed	 the	 country	
would	be	mpregnable	to	enemy	attack.	“Wth	a	frm	and	clear-cut	polcy,”	
he	 told	amercans	 n	 a	 natonal	 rado	 broadcast	 n	may	 1940,	 “we	 can	
buld	an	ar	defense	for	amerca	that	wll	stand	above	these	shftng	sands	
of	 war.”	 hs	 argument	 resonated	 wth	 amercans	 n	 general	 and	 ant-
nterventonsts	n	partcular.	hs	government	work	and	multple	tours	of	
foregn	ar	forces,	furthermore,	led	many	to	see	hm	as	an	authorty	on	ar	
power	who	could	effectvely	counter	roosevelt.14
	 Datng	 from	1940,	 Fbi	 agents	 began	 to	pursue	 leads	 suggestng	 that	
lndbergh	mght	 have	 been	 nvolved	wth	 fascst	 organzatons.	 To	 Fbi	
offcals	 these	 alleged	 connectons	 assumed	 partcular	 sgnfcance	 after	
Congress	 passed	 the	 Smth	 act	 of	 1940	 that	 authorzed	 prosecuton	 of	
those	 who	 advocated	 the	 volent	 overthrow	 of	 the	 U.S.	 government.	 in	
February	1940,	for	example,	Fbi	agents	learned	that	lndbergh	was	alleg-
edly	assocated	wth	the	fascst	group	the	new	World	movement.	The	Fbi’s	
nformer	clamed	that	ths	group	had	“chosen	Colonel	lndbergh	as	ther	
world	leader	because	of	hs	youth,	hs	promnence	and	other	characters-
tcs.”	The	avator	was	also	rumored	to	be	connected	wth	an	organzaton	
called	 the	 James	 True	assocates—an	 ant-Communst	 and	 ant-Semtc	
group—whose	 leaders	 reportedly	 “referred	 to	 lndbergh	 as	 ther	 leader	
and	a	good	man	for	the	presdency.”	by	august	1940,	another	Fbi	source	
reported	 that	 the	 German	 propagandst	 Dr.	 Frederch	 ernst	 auhagen,	
who	had	been	convcted	for	falng	to	regster	wth	the	Justce	Department	
as	an	agent	of	a	 foregn-controlled	organzaton,	clamed	that	lndbergh	
was	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Steerng	 Commttee	 of	 the	 amercan	 Fellowshp	
Forum.	 accordng	 to	 auhagen,	 the	 amercan	 Fellowshp	 Forum	 was	 a	
“German	propaganda	unt”	that	“advocated	a	Fascst	form	of	government	
and	one	whch	would	cooperate	wth	the	naz	regme.”15
	 lndbergh	 was	 allegedly	 lnked	 to	 other	 groups	 lke	 the	 natonal	
Copperheads,	led	by	ells	Jones	(who	was	convcted	for	sedton	n	1942)	
and	robert	hoble,	who	“supported	the	polces	and	prncples	of	Charles	
a.	 lndbergh.”	 Fbi	 offcals	 also	 montored	 Joseph	 mcWllams	 and	
Gerald	l.	K.	Smth,	who	regarded	the	avator	as	a	potental	leader	of	ther	
	 14.	Charles	a.	lndbergh,	“The	ar	Defense	of	amerca”	rado	address	of	19	may	1940	
n	Congressional Record,	20	may	1940,	3034–35.	See	also	lndbergh,	“What	Substtute	for	
War?”	307–8;	“Text	of	lndbergh	address,	‘a	Plea	for	amercan	independence,”	New York 
Times,	15	October	1940.
	 15.	 Summary	memorandum	re	Charles	a.	lndbergh,	by	D.	mlton	ladd,	21	august	
1942,	pp.	8–11,	Fbi	65–11449–154.
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followers.	 Despte	 lndbergh’s	 beng	 popularly	 assocated	 wth	 “numer-
ous”	subversve	organzatons,	Fbi	offcals	nevertheless	admtted	that	“no	
charge	could	be	made	 that	he	has	had	any	drect	 connecton	wth	 these	
organzatons	or	groups.”	and,	 ndeed,	lndbergh	dd	not	have	any	con-
nectons	to	any	of	these	radcal	groups,	but	that	dd	not	stop	agents	from	
checkng.16
—■■■■■■■—
Durng	January	and	February	1940,	and	before	the	end	of	the	“phony	war,”	
Fbi	agents	agan	focused	on	Senator	nye	n	terms	of	esponage.	That	nye	
fell	under	Fbi	scrutny	for	a	second	tme	s	probably	not	unusual	snce	t	
concded	wth	hs	 elevaton,	upon	 the	death	of	 Senator	Wllam	borah,	
to	 the	 powerful	 Senate	 Foregn	 relatons	 Commttee,	 whch	made	 hm	
an	even	more	nfluental	crtc.	in	ths	nstance,	a	lawyer	from	moorhead,	
mnnesota,	named	James	Wtherow,	wrote	hoover	on	two	separate	occa-
sons	urgng	hm	to	assgn	agents	to	ntervew	two	men.	Wtherow	clamed	
that	 these	 two	men—D.	 h.	mcarthur	 and	 John	 andrews—worked	 for	
nye	and	had	“very	ntmate	knowledge”	of	German	and	Japanese	naton-
als	who	had	vsted	the	senator.	he	even	clamed	that	a	secretary	from	the	
German	embassy	had	specal	access,	at	one	pont,	to	the	senator’s	fles.	To	
lend	credence	to	hs	clams,	Wtherow	nformed	hoover	that	durng	the	
Frst	World	War	he	had	worked	wth	“the	amercan	ntellgence	servces,”	
helpng	them	to	uncover	domestc	German	esponage.	Then,	clamng	he	
was	 famlar	 wth	 German	 clandestne	 technques,	 Wtherow	 reterated	
that	the	Germans	typcally	used	a	target’s	poltcal	opposton	aganst	hm.	
To	Wtherow,	then,	ths	explaned	why	Senator	nye	had	become	so	vocal	
whle	charng	the	nye	Commttee	from	1934	to	1936	and	why	he	contn-
ued	to	speak	out	aganst	admnstraton	foregn	polcy.17
	 Unlke	 the	 prevous	 esponage	 charge	 aganst	nye,	hoover	 took	 ths	
one	 more	 serously.	 The	 reason	 for	 ths	 probably	 stems	 from	 the	 fact	
that	Wtherow	was	 a	 lawyer	 and	 clamed	 to	have	prevously	 engaged	 n	
ntellgence	work,	 thereby	makng	hm	 n	hoover’s	 eyes	a	more	credble	
nformant.	hoover	referred	Wtherow’s	letter	to	the	Justce	Department	for	
drecton.	alexander	holtzoff	responded	to	hoover	that	“t	s	the	defnte	
	 16.	 Summary	memorandum	re	Charles	a.	lndbergh,	by	D.	mlton	ladd,	21	august	
1942,	pp.	18–21,	Fbi	65–11449–154.
	 17.	 letter,	 James	m.	Wtherow	 to	hoover,	 31	 January	 1940,	 Fbi	 65–8799–2X;	 letter,	
Wtherow	to	hoover,	24	February	1940,	Fbi	65–8799–2X;	 letter,	hoover	 to	Wtherow,	14	
march	1940,	Fbi	65–8799–2X.
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opnon	that	no	nvestgaton	should	be	conducted	of	Senator	nye	on	the	
bass	of	that	letter.”	holtzoff,	however,	dd	not	prevent	any	probng	of	nye’s	
actvtes.	 because	Wtherow	 had	 mentoned	 alleged	 German	 access	 to	
nye’s	Senate	fles,	holtzoff	suggested,	and	senor	Fbi	offcals	agreed,	that	
a	copy	of	Wtherow’s	letter	be	sent	to	the	State	Department	for	any	acton	
they	deemed	approprate.18
	 irrespectve	 of	 ther	 uncorroborated	 or	 fantastc	 nature,	 hoover	
typcally	 referred	unsolcted	 letters	 to	hs	 Justce	Department	 superors.	
hoover	ether	truly	beleved	the	letters	merted	acton	(almost	always	the	
department	ordered	no	nvestgaton),	or	he	knew	they	would	feed	already	
held	suspcons	of	ant-nterventonsts	and	thereby	demonstrate	hs	use-
fulness	to	ther	ends.	moreover,	hoover	never	ntated	an	Fbi	probe	of	a	
congressman	wthout	 admnstraton	 approval.	 if	 any	 unauthorzed	 Fbi	
nvestgaton	became	publc,	the	onus	for	t	would	be	on	hoover	alone.
	 Ths	 dchotomy	 between	 unsolcted	 allegatons	 and	 admnstra-
ton	 requests	 for	 nvestgatons	 s	 exemplfed	 n	 a	Whte	house	 request	
of	 June	 1940	 to	 nvestgate	 a	matter	 concernng	nye	 and	 hs	 assocates.	
The	 request	 came	 the	 same	month	 that	nye	unsuccessfully	opposed	 the	
appontments	of	henry	Stmson	and	Frank	Knox	to	the	presdent’s	cabnet,	
after	the	burke-Wadsworth	conscrpton	bll	was	ntroduced,	and	at	a	tme	
when	nye	publcly	demanded	roosevelt’s	resgnaton.	On	18	June,	Smth	
brookhart—a	retred	republcan	senator	from	iowa—advsed	early	that	a	
Washngton,	D.C.,	prvate	detectve	and	poltcal	operatve	named	henry	
Grunewald	was	“n	cahoots”	wth	Senator	nye.	Grunewald	allegedly	had	
delvered	two	checks	totalng	some	$8,000	to	nye	that	 the	outgong	sec-
retary	 of	 war—and	 ant-nterventonst—henry	Woodrng	 had	 wrtten.	
What	so	concerned	the	Whte	house	and	Fbi	offcals	was	the	unsubstan-
tated	clam	made	by	army	ntellgence	that	Grunewald	was	 n	charge	of	
German	ntellgence	n	Washngton.19
	 because	 the	 Whte	 house	 had	 requested	 ths	 nvestgaton,	 hoover	
ordered	that	 t	be	gven	“contnuous	and	preferred	attenton.”	Fbi	agents	
ntervewed	 Senator	brookhart,	nye’s	 former	 secretary	D.	h.	mcarthur,	
and	major	Thomas	C.	mcDonald—brookhart’s	 frend	who	had	 clamed	
	 18.	 letter,	 James	m.	Wtherow	 to	hoover,	 31	 January	 1940,	 Fbi	 65–8799–2X;	 letter,	
Wtherow	to	hoover,	24	February	1940,	Fbi	65–8799–2X;	memorandum,	edward	a.	Tamm	
to	hoover,	18	march	1940,	Fbi	65–8799–2X.
	 19.	memorandum,	 early	 to	hoover,	 18	 June	 1940,	 Offcal	 Fle	 10-b,	 146-a,	 FDrl;	
memorandum,	mrs.	 John	Frece	 to	 early,	 18	 June	 1940,	Offcal	 Fle	 10-b,	 146-a,	 FDrl;	
memorandum,	C.	m.	busbee,	miD,	 to	actng	Chef	of	 Staff,	G-2,	 25	 June	1940,	Fbi	87–
2755–287.
49Beginnings: 1939–1940
Grunewald	 was	 a	 spy.	 because	 brookhart’s	 statement	 was	 hearsay,	 Fbi	
agents	 focused	 upon	mcarthur	 and	mcDonald.	 The	 former	 confrmed	
that	 Grunewald	 had	 regularly	 vsted	 nye’s	 offce	 “to	 pck	 up	 peces	 of	
nformaton	whch	he	could	captalze	on,”	and	that	he	had	delvered	cash	
to	nye.	mcDonald,	moreover,	beleved	that	Grunewald’s	secretve	nature	
ndcated	that	he	mght	be	nvolved	n	German	esponage.	To	underscore	
hs	clam,	mcDonald	sad	he	wtnessed	a	conversaton	spoken	n	German	
between	 Grunewald	 and	 Colonel	 edwn	 emerson,	 whom	 mcDonald	
clamed	was	a	Frst	World	War	German	agent.	Fbi	agents	then	sought	to	
confrm	 these	 suspcons	 and	whether	Grunewald	 had	 lased	wth	nye	
and	Woodrng	to	take	advantage	of	ther	nfluence.20
	 Of	more	nterest	to	Fbi	offcals,	however,	was	the	fact	that	Grunewald	
was	a	poltcal	operatve.	On	a	regular	bass	he	provded	hoover	wth	nsde	
poltcal	nformaton.	Ths	relatonshp	proved	to	be	serendptous	for	Fbi	
agents’	 probe	 of	 Grunewald	 because,	 n	 June,	 Grunewald—unaware	 of	
the	nvestgaton—asked	Fbi	agents	to	examne	hs	telephone	to	ascertan	
f	 t	 had	been	 tapped.	 “belevng	 ths	was	 a	 good	opportunty	 to	 closely	
scrutnze	Grunewald’s	 apartment,”	 Fbi	 offcals	 dspatched	 agents	 there	
on	2	July	1940.	The	Fbi	agents	reported,	however,	that	they	had	observed	
nothng	“whch	would	ndcate	that	he	was	pro-German	or	ant-amercan	
n	any	manner	n	hs	sympathes.”21
	 The	 Fbi’s	 nvestgatons	 of	 Grunewald,	Woodrng,	 and	 nye	 had,	 n	
the	words	of	one	agent,	“faled	to	develop	any	substantaton	of	any	of	the	
charges	made.”	nevertheless,	hoover	noted	that	the	nformaton	Fbi	agents	
“developed	relatng	not	only	to	Senator	nye	but	to	mr.	Woodrng	and	mr.	
Grunewald,	has	been	of	a	negatve	nature.”	The	Fbi	drector	then	reported	
ths	 “negatve”	 nformaton	 about	 Grunewald,	 nye,	 and	 Woodrng	 not	
only	to	early—who	had	requested	the	nvestgaton—but	to	the	attorney	
general	and	hs	assstant,	as	well	as	Treasury	Secretary	henry	morgenthau.	
Clearly,	 t	 only	 renforced	 ther	negatve	 opnons	 of	roosevelt’s	 oppos-
ton.22
	 20.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	early,	27	June	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	
146-a;	 affdavt	 of	 D.	h.	mcarthur,	 27	 June	 1940,	 Fbi	 65–6165-?.	Whle	 the	 document	
number	s	unreadable,	t	can	be	found	n	Wayne	S.	Cole’s	papers	at	the	hhl.	memorandum,	
hoover	 to	early,	 8	 July	 1940,	Offcal	Fle	 10-b,	 146-a,	FDrl;	memorandum,	hoover	 to	
attorney	general,	9	July	1940,	Fbi	65–6165–12;	memorandum,	hoover	to	mcGure,	9	July	
1940,	Fbi	65–6165–12.
	 21.	memorandum,	hoover	to	early,	8	July	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	146-a,	FDrl.
	 22.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	early,	9	July	1940,	wth	attached	memo-
randum,	8	July	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	146-a,	FDrl;	memorandum,	hoover	to	attorney	
general,	9	July	1940,	Fbi	65–6165–12	(wth	attached	8	July	memo);	memorandum,	hoover	
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	 The	sgnfcance	of	ths	epsode,	however,	les	n	Grunewald.	From	the	
nvestgaton	 and	 Grunewald’s	 unsolcted	 sharng	 of	 nformaton	 wth	
the	Fbi,	hoover	realzed	the	value	of	Grunewald	as	a	source	of	poltcal	
ntellgence.	a	connected	Washngton	poltcal	operatve,	Grunewald	had	
connectons	 to	 promnent	 personaltes	 lke	 Senator	nye,	 former	Whte	
house	ade	Thomas	Corcoran,	and	the	conservatve	and	poltcally	actve	
busnessman	henry	marsh.	When	Grunewald	 shared	 poltcal	 nforma-
ton	wth	the	Fbi,	hoover	accepted	t	wthout	hestaton.	and	as	the	Great	
Debate	ntensfed	n	1941,	mltary	intellgence	Dvson	(miD)	offcals	
agan	warned	the	Fbi	that	Grunewald	“was	the	pay-off	man	for	German	
agents	n	the	Unted	States”	and	that	he	was	ther	lason	to	varous	peace	
and	 subversve	 groups.	 Sgnfcantly,	 however,	 Fbi	assstant	Drector	D.	
mlton	ladd	determned	that	miD	“was	merely	resurrectng	old	nforma-
ton”	 already	put	 to	 rest.	yet,	 anxous	 to	 captalze	 on	Grunewald’s	 con-
nectons,	 hoover	 nevertheless	 used	 ths	 rehashed	 army	 nformaton	 as	
the	bass	for	authorzng	a	wretap	on	Grunewald’s	telephone.	The	wretap	
remaned	n	place	between	4	June	and	3	September	1941	and	yelded	valu-
able	poltcal	ntellgence.23
	 Wretappng	 was	 not	 a	 legal	 survellance	 method.	 Snce	 passage	 n	
1934	 of	 the	 Federal	Communcatons	act,	 and	 untl	 the	 1968	Omnbus	
Crme	Control	and	Safe	Streets	act	permtted	wretappng	wth	a	warrant,	
the	 ntercepton	of	wre	or	rado	communcatons	by	anyone	was	 llegal.	
Ths	 law	was	 even	upheld	by	 two	companon	Supreme	Court	decsons,	
Nardone v. U.S.	 (1937	and	1939),	 and	attorney	General	robert	 Jackson,	
who	 n	 march	 1940,	 publcly	 announced	 that	 the	 Justce	 Department	
would	not	sancton	wretappng.	he	ponted	out	that	the	Fbi	was	not	an	
OGPU—forerunner	of	the	Sovet	nKvD	and	KGb.	in	may	1940,	however,	
wth	 the	 war	 crss	 mountng,	 Presdent	 roosevelt	 secretly	 authorzed	
the	 use	 of	wretaps	 to	 avert	 “sabotage,	 assassnatons,	 and	 ‘ffth	 column’	
actvtes”	but	only	n	cases	concernng	“natonal	defense”	and	“of	persons	
suspected	of	 subversve	 actvtes	 aganst	 the	Government	 of	 the	Unted	
to	mcGure,	9	July	1940,	Fbi	65–6165–12	(wth	attached	8	July	memo);	letter,	morgenthau	
to	hoover,	17	 July	1940,	and	personal	and	confdental	 letter	wth	attached	8	 July	memo,	
hoover	to	morgenthau,	9	July	1940,	henry	morgenthau	Dares,	vol.	283,	pp.	188–97,	FDrl.	
On	nye’s	reservatons	about	the	Stmson	and	Knox	appontments	see	Doenecke,	Storm on 
the Horizon,	103–4.
	 23.	memorandum,	ladd	to	hoover,	7	February	1945,	Fbi	87–2755–287.	it	s	also	nter-
estng	to	note	that	Grunewald	was	agan	wretapped	n	1945–46.	Do	not	Fle	memorandum,	
Spear	 to	 Foxworth,	 17	may	 1941,	 Fbi	 62–116758;	Do	not	 Fle	memorandum,	 Tmm	 to	
Foxworth,	6	June	1941,	Fbi	62–116758;	Do	not	Fle	memorandum,	Ftch	to	Foxworth,	25	
July	1941,	Fbi	62–116758.
51Beginnings: 1939–1940
States,	ncludng	spes.”	roosevelt	furthermore	wanted	to	lmt	ths	actvty	
by	keepng	t	to	a	“mnmum”	and	lmted	“nsofar	as	possble	to	alens.”	
he	authorzed	the	attorney	general	to	revew	and	approve	all	proposed	Fbi	
wretaps.24
	 attorney	General	 Jackson,	 however,	wanted	hoover	 to	mantan	 the	
record	of	these	wretaps.	hoover	dd	ths	by	mantanng	a	“memorandum	
book”	 of	 attorney	 general–authorzed	 wretaps	 n	 hs	 offce.	 by	 placng	
ths	 responsblty	wth	hoover,	 Jackson	 effectvely	dmnshed	hs	 over-
sght	role	because	he	knew	only	of	those	wretaps	that	hoover	reported	to	
hm.	in	fact,	Fbi	offcals	could,	and	dd,	authorze	wretaps	on	ther	own	
authorty	wthout	nformng	the	attorney	general.25
	 The	exact	number	of	wretaps	authorzed	by	Fbi	offcals	s	not	known,	
but	some	can	be	documented.	Wretaps	 that	were	not	authorzed	by	 the	
attorney	 general	 were	 not	 recorded	 n	 hoover’s	 memorandum	 book;	
nstead	 they	were	recorded	on	authorzaton	cards	 that	were	mantaned	
n	the	secret	offce	fles	of	hoover’s	leutenants.	in	1954,	for	reasons	that	
are	unknown,	ffteen	wretap-authorzaton	cards	from	the	1940s	that	had	
been	fled	n	Fbi	assstant	Drector	ladd’s	offce	were	transferred	to	the	
secret	 fle	 of	 assstant	 Drector	 lous	 nchols.	 even	 more	 curous,	 the	
Fbi	 mantaned	 as	 standard	 polcy	 that	 wretap-authorzaton	 cards	 be	
destroyed	every	sx	months,	yet	these	cards	somehow	escaped	destructon.	
Whatever	 happened,	 the	 cards	 nevertheless	 document	 the	 fact	 that	 Fbi	
offcals	had	developed	a	not	nsgnfcant	level	of	nvestgatve	autonomy	
and	dd	employ	llegal	wretaps	on	ther	own	durng	ths	perod.26
	 Through	the	Grunewald	wretap,	Fbi	agents	developed	no	nformaton	
substantatng	the	esponage	charge	aganst	the	prvate	detectve.	instead,	
they	 recorded	 crtcal	 and	 poltcally	 charged	 comments	 that	 varous	
promnent	 ndvduals	 had	 made	 to	 Grunewald	 over	 the	 telephone.	 in	
September	1941,	for	example,	Grunewald	had	a	conversaton	wth	former	
	 24.	 Federal	Communcatons	act,	47	U.S.C.	605	(1934);	majorty	Opnon,	U.S.	Supreme	
Court	Justce	Owen	J.	roberts,	Nardone v. United States,	302	U.S.	397	(20	December	1937);	
majorty	Opnon,	U.S.	Supreme	Court	Justce	Felx	Frankfurter,	Nardone v. United States,	
308	U.S.	338	(11	December	1939);	 “Justce	Department	bans	Wre	Tappng;	 Jackson	acts	
on	hoover	recommendaton,”	New York Times,	18	march	1940;	“Fbi	is	no	OGPU,	Jackson	
asserts,”	New York Times,	31	march	1940,	19;	confdental	memorandum,	Frankln	D.	roos-
evelt	to	attorney	General	robert	Jackson,	21	may	1940,	Presdent’s	Secretary’s	Fle,	Justce	
Department,	FDrl.
	 25.	athan	Theohars,	“Fbi	Wretappng:	a	Case	Study	of	bureaucratc	autonomy,”	Polit-
ical Science Quarterly	107	(1992):	106.
	 26.	 ibd.;	 ffteen	wretap	authorzaton	cards,	Wretappng	Folder,	Offcal	and	Conf-
dental	Fle	of	Fbi	assstant	Drector	lous	nchols,	Fbi	hQ,	Washngton,	DC.
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Whte	house	ade	Thomas	Corcoran	durng	whch	Corcoran	referred	to	
navy	 Secretary	 Knox	 as	 an	 “ncompetent	 four-flusher,”	 and	 dsmssed	
naval	 ntellgence	 offcers	 as	 an	 “awfully	 snooty	 bunch.”	 Corcoran	 also	
commented	 to	 Grunewald	 that	 he	 beleved	 roosevelt	 only	 surrounded	
hmself	 wth	 “stuffed	 shrt”	 ndvduals.	 Fbi	 agents	 also	 ntercepted	 a	
conversaton	 Grunewald	 had	 wth	 Woodrng	 concernng	 hs	 desre	 to	
work	wth	the	prcng	commsson.	These	examples	demonstrate	that	the	
Grunewald	 wretap,	 nstead	 of	 revealng	 Grunewald’s	 alleged	 esponage	
contacts,	served	nstead	as	a	unque	source	of	poltcal	ntellgence,	and	one	
that	pqued	hoover’s	 nterest.	yet	beyond	gatherng	poltcal	 ntellgence	
from	the	Grunewald	wretap,	hoover	also	receved	poltcal	 nformaton	
drectly	 from	the	man	hmself.	When	 the	 foregn	polcy	debate	between	
ant-nterventonsts	and	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	became	more	hos-
tle	n	1941,	the	Grunewald	source	would	prove	useful	n	hoover’s	bd	to	
ngratate	hmself	wth	the	Whte	house.27
—■■■■■■■—
Fbi	Drector	hoover	dd	not	only	employ	llegal	wretaps	when	collectng	
senstve	nformaton	about	ant-nterventonsts,	he	also	used	specal	fl-
ng	procedures	to	ensure	that	senstve	Fbi	records	would	not	be	dsclosed	
publcly.	 hoover’s	 “personal	 and	 confdental”	 letter	 system—dscussed	
n	chapter	1—was	certanly	used,	but	by	1940	he	devsed	further	creatve	
flng	methods.	On	 11	aprl	 1940,	hoover	 nsttuted	 the	 “Do	not	 Fle”	
procedure	whereby	 specally	marked	memoranda	were	not	 ndexed	 and	
seralzed	n	the	Fbi’s	central	records	system.	instead	they	were	mantaned	
by	assstant	Fbi	Drector	ladd’s	Domestc	 intellgence	Dvson	permt-
tng	Fbi	offcals	to	employ	senstve	nvestgatve	technques,	such	as	lle-
gal	break-ns	and	wretaps	(note	the	Grunewald	footnotes),	and	to	create	
wrtten	records	about	them	that	would	be	secure.28
—■■■■■■■—
Fbi	 offcals	 were	 nterested	 n	 the	 poltcal	 actvtes	 of	 varous	 ant-	
nterventonsts,	 but	 partcularly	 nterested	 n	 them	 f	 ther	 poltcs	
nvolved	 crtcsm	of	 the	Fbi.	 in	 ths	 regard,	 Fbi	 offcals	 found	 Senator	
	 27.	Personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	(deleted)	to	Tamm,	3	September	1941,	Fbi	
65–6165–42.
	 28.	athan	Theohars,	The FBI and American Democracy	(lawrence:	Unversty	Press	of	
Kansas,	2004),	108–9.
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burton	Wheeler	of	partcular	nterest.	as	a	long	crtc	of	the	bureau,	datng	
back	to	the	Teapot	Dome	perod,	Fbi	offcals	consdered	Wheeler’s	vews	
of	 the	Fbi	suspcous.	 in	 terms	of	 the	 foregn	polcy	debate,	Fbi	offcals	
focused	 on	Wheeler’s	 publc	 statements	made	 n	may	 of	 1940	 when	 he	
crtczed	 the	 Fbi	 n	 the	Philadelphia Inquirer.	 in	 reacton	 to	roosevelt’s	
proposal	 to	 transfer	 the	 immgraton	 bureau	 to	 the	 Justce	 Department	
after	the	“phony	war,”	Senator	Wheeler	sad	the	dea	was	terrble	because	
another	 Justce	 Department	 agency—the	 Fbi—was	 staffed	 by	 “a	 lot	 of	
cheap	two-by-four	detectves.”	Then,	 n	June,	the	Fbi’s	Seattle	feld	offce	
reported	 that	 an	 anonymous	 nformant	 clamed	 that	Wheeler	 had	 agan	
publcly	crtczed	the	Fbi.	(incdentally,	at	the	tme	Wheeler	was	crtczng	
the	Stmson	and	Knox	appontments.)	The	nformant	clamed	to	have	the	
ablty	to	“shut	Wheeler	up”	and	nqured	as	to	the	bureau’s	nterest	n	ths.	
Whle	the	dentty	of	the	nformant	was	never	establshed,	hs	call	was	con-
sdered	mportant	enough	to	report	to	hoover.	Whle	hoover	always	took	a	
personal	nterest	n	hs	crtcs,	those	who	crtczed	hm	whle	also	crtcz-
ng	the	polcy	of	the	roosevelt	Whte	house	receved	specal	attenton.29
	 in	September	1940,	amd	ferce	ant-nterventonst	opposton	to	con-
scrpton	and	the	destroyers-for-bases	deal,	hoover	receved	nformaton	
that	by	1941	evolved	nto	a	far-reachng	nvestgaton	nto	the	actvtes	of	
Senators	Wheeler	and	nye	and	Congressman	hamlton	Fsh.	The	epsode	
ganed	lfe	when	the	new	york	feld	offce	reported	that	drect	mal	adver-
tser	henry	hoke—publsher	of	the Reporter of Direct Mail Advertising—
had	 accused	 varous	 senators	 and	 congressmen	 of	 llegally	 dstrbutng	
franked	 envelopes.	 (Congressmen	 have	 the	 rght	 to	 mal	 speeches	 and	
other	 nformaton	 to	 consttuents	 postage-free.)	These	 envelopes,	whch	
contaned	 ant-nterventonst	 lterature,	 allegedly	 were	 sent	 to	 German	
amercans	 who	 subsequently	 maled	 them	 en	 masse	 to	 amercans	 n	
an	 attempt	 to	 nfluence	 popular	 opnon.	hoke	 sngled	 out	 Farm-labor	
Senator	ernest	lundeen	of	mnnesota,	Democratc	Senator	rush	holt	of	
West	vrgna,	 Senator	nye,	 republcan	representatve	 J.	 Thorkelson	 of	
montana,	 and	representatve	 Fsh	 for	 usng	 ther	 frank	 n	 ths	manner.	
hoover	forwarded	ths	nformaton	to	the	Justce	Department’s	neutralty	
law	Unt,	and	whle	at	ths	tme	t	generated	no	concern,	by	1941	t	would	
evolve	 nto	 a	 controversy	 that	 for	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 congressmen	
suggested—by	assocaton—that	they	had	foregn	lnks.30
	 29.	 “Wheeler	 Denounces	 Fbi	 as	 ‘2-by-4’	 Detectves,”	 Philadelphia Inquirer, 31	 may	
1940,	n	Wheeler	Fbi	fle,	number	unreadable;	memorandum,	r.	P.	Kramer	to	Clegg,	1	June	
1940,	Fbi	62–55261–3;	Doenecke,	Storm on the Horizon,	103,	104.
	 30.	Personal	 and	 confdental	 letter,	 SaC	 new	 york	 to	 hoover,	 7	 September	 1940,	
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	 The	 followng	 month,	 hoover	 receved	 further	 nformaton	 about	
congressonal	franks,	but	ths	tme	t	sngled	out	Senator	Wheeler.	at	the	
tme,	Wheeler	was	publcly	crtczng	the	conscrpton	bll—callng	t	dan-
gerous—and	opposng	the	destroyers-for-bases	deal.	The	matter	nvolved	
two	dozen	peces	of	mal	bearng	Senator	Wheeler’s	 frank	that	had	been	
delvered	to	a	post	offce	 n	manchester,	Connectcut.	Ths	 franked	mal	
reportedly	 contaned	 ant-nterventonst	 lterature	 addressed	 to	persons	
of	German	descent,	and	at	least	one	franked	envelope	was	addressed	to	the	
leader	of	the	local	bund	organzaton.	hoover	reported	ths	ncdent	to	the	
Justce	Department	“n	vew	of	the	fact	that	ths	nformaton	was	offcally	
reported	to	a	representatve	of	ths	bureau.”	The	Fbi	dd	not	have	jursdc-
ton	to	nvestgate	a	matter	nvolvng	the	U.S.	mal,	yet	hoover’s	reportng	
of	t	llustrates	hs	nterest	n	reportng	to	the	admnstraton	any	deroga-
tory	nformaton,	even	f	unsubstantated,	about	roosevelt’s	crtcs.31
	 The	frankng	ssue	was	not	the	only	tme	nformaton	surfaced	to	sug-
gest	Senator	Wheeler	may	have	had	 foregn	 lnks.	hoover	also	obtaned	
unsubstantated	 nformaton	 n	 December	 1940,	 whch	 he	 shared	 wth	
the	Whte	house,	Treasury	Department,	and	State	Department,	 that	 the	
wfe	 of	 a	 former	 German	 embassy	 counselor	 agreed	 to	 prepare	 a	 sum-
mary	of	 nformaton	on	adolf	htler	and	dsarmament	 for	Wheeler	and	
Democratc	Senator	mllard	Tydngs.	The	nformaton	also	ndcated	that	
the	woman	clamed	 to	be	“workng	wth	mrs.	Wheeler	on	 ths	 ‘amerca	
Frst’	 organzaton.”	 (The	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 became	 a	 natonal	
organzaton	 n	December	 1940.)	 Ths	 nformaton,	 though	 uncorrobo-
rated,	suggested	to	senor	admnstraton	offcals	that	Wheeler	and	other	
ant-nterventonst	 crtcs	 had	 tes	 wth	 naz	 Germany.	 Such	 nforma-
ton	 lent	credence	 to	popular	perceptons	 that	ant-nterventonsts	were	
“subversves”	and	undoubtedly	bolstered	ths	vew	among	offcals	n	the	
Whte	house.	by	provdng	such	unsubstantated	nformaton,	hoover	was	
placed	n	good	stead	wth	the	admnstraton.32
	 There	 s	 evdence	 that	 the	 Whte	 house	 valued	 hoover’s	 poltcal	
Fbi	65–6030–21;	memorandum,	hoover	to	lawrence	m.	C.	Smth,	Chef,	neutralty	law	
Unt,	16	October	1940,	Fbi	65–6030–21;	personal	and	confdental	letter,	SaC	new	york	to	
hoover,	15	august	1940,	Fbi	(number	llegble,	but	n	nye	Fbi	fle).
	 31.	memorandum,	hoover	to	attorney	general,	18	October	1940,	Fbi	65–6030–3;	per-
sonal	and	confdental	memorandum,	hoover	to	assstant	to	the	attorney	General	matthew	
F.	mcGure,	30	October	1940,	Fbi	146–7–3963;	letter,	SaC	new	haven	to	hoover,	10	Octo-
ber	1940,	Fbi	65–6030–4.
	 32.	blnd	memorandum,	 31	December	 1940,	 Fbi	 65–28688–115X1	 attached	 to:	 per-
sonal	 and	 confdental	 letters,	 hoover	 to	 edwn	m.	Watson,	 Secretary	 to	 the	 Presdent,	
Treasury	Secretary,	and	adolf	a.	berle,	31	December	1940,	Fbi	65–28688–115X1.	
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ntellgence	reports.	On	14	June	1940,	Presdent	roosevelt	wrote	a	short	
note	to	the	Fbi	drector	to	thank	hm	“for	the	many	nterestng	and	valu-
able	reports	that	you	have	made	to	me	regardng	the	last	few	months.”	The	
presdent	thought	hoover	had	“done	and	are	dong	a	wonderful	job,	and	i	
want	you	to	know	of	my	gratfcaton	and	apprecaton.”	hoover’s	response	
to	roosevelt’s	bref	note	llustrates	hs	repeated	efforts	to	ngratate	hmself	
wth	the	chef	executve.	hoover	expounded:
The	personal	note	whch	you	drected	to	me	on	June,	14,	1940,	s	one	of	
the	most	nsprng	messages	whch	i	have	ever	been	prvleged	to	receve;	
and,	ndeed,	i	look	upon	t	as	rather	a	symbol	of	the	prncples	for	whch	
our	naton	stands.	When	the	Presdent	of	our	country,	bearng	the	weght	
of	untold	burdens,	takes	the	tme	to	so	express	hmself	to	one	of	hs	bureau	
heads,	there	s	mplanted	n	the	hearts	of	the	recpents	a	renewed	strength	
and	vgor	to	carry	on	ther	tasks.
in	notng	the	vast	contrast	between	the	leader	of	our	naton	and	those	
of	other	less	fortunate	natons,	i	feel	deeply	thankful	that	we	have	at	the	
head	 of	 our	Government	 one	who	 possesses	 such	 sterlng,	 sncere,	 and	
altogether	human	qualtes.33
Wth	such	approval	comng	from	the	Whte	house	n	1940,	t	was	perhaps	
wth	 lttle	 surprse	 that	 durng	 the	 followng	 year	 the	 Fbi’s	 survellance	
efforts	ncreased.
—■■■■■■■—
a	sgnfcant	development	 n	1940	that	underscores	 the	evoluton	of	 the	
domestc	 securty	 state,	 and	 the	 specal	 focus	 ant-nterventonst	 crtcs	
receved,	was	the	formaton	of	ntmate	tes	between	the	Fbi,	brtsh	ntel-
lgence,	and	Canada’s	royal	Canadan	mounted	Polce.	if	close	tes	among	
Western	natons’	ntellgence	agences	was	a	hallmark	of	the	Cold	War–era	
natonal	Securty	State,	the	orgns	of	those	tes	certanly	demonstrate	the	
	 33.	 letter,	roosevelt	to	hoover,	14	June	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	letter,	hoover	
to	roosevelt,	18	June	1940,	Presdent’s	Personal	Fle	4819,	FDrl.	hoover	also	sent	roosevelt	
a	smlarly	ngratatng	letter	n	1942	when	the	country	was	at	war	and	after	the	presdent	
wrote	a	letter	that	was	to	be	read	to	the	graduates	of	the	natonal	Polce	academy.	hoover	
was	careful	to	pont	out	that	he	“would	be	remss	n	my	dutes	f	i	dd	not	tell	you	that	the	last	
several	years	under	your	admnstraton	have	been	some	of	the	happest	years	of	my	lfe.	.	.	.”	
letter,	hoover	to	roosevelt,	25	July	1942,	J.	edgar	hoover	Folder,	Offcal	and	Confdental	
Fles	of	J.	edgar	hoover.
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prmacy	of	the	domestc	securty	state	to	ts	development.	more	narrowly,	
both	the	Fbi	and	brtsh	ntellgence—n	the	form	of	the	brtsh	Securty	
Coordnaton	(bSC)—had	a	parallel	nterest	n	montorng	and,	f	possble,	
dscredtng	roosevelt’s	ant-nterventonst	crtcs.	Fbi	Drector	hoover’s	
nterest	 was	 prmarly	 bureaucratc—as	 a	 conservatve	 operatng	 n	 the	
roosevelt	admnstraton—whereas	the	bSC’s	nterest	was	n	brngng	the	
Unted	States	nto	the	european	war	on	the	alled	sde.
	 Whle	 the	Fbi-bSC	relatonshp	 formed	only	 n	1940,	 the	Fbi’s	 rela-
tonshp	wth	brtsh	ntellgence,	n	fact,	dates	back	to	the	era	of	the	Frst	
World	War.	at	that	tme	the	bureau	of	investgaton	mantaned	a	lason	
wth	Sr	Wllam	Wseman,	who	served	as	brtan’s	ntellgence	represen-
tatve	 n	amerca.	after	 the	war	 there	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 lttle	 or	 no	
contact	between	offcals	of	the	Fbi	and	brtsh	ntellgence.	nevertheless,	
datng	from	1937	the	Fbi	began	to	mantan	lmted	and	unoffcal	contact	
startng	wth	brtsh	Passport	Control	Offcer	Captan	Sr	 James	Paget—
the	usual	cover	 for	brtsh	 ntellgence—and	wth	 the	brtsh	Purchasng	
Commsson.	by	1939,	furthermore,	hoover	reported	to	the	Whte	house	
that	 the	 Fbi	 had	 enjoyed	 “for	 the	 past	 several	 years”	 an	 offcal	 lason	
wth	 the	royal	Canadan	mounted	Polce	 “n	 the	 felds	 of	 plant	 protec-
ton,	esponage	and	sabotage,”	whch	yelded	valuable	nformaton	for	the	
bureau.	 it	was	 not	 untl	 1940,	 however,	 that	 the	 Fbi	would	 establsh	 an	
offcal	 relatonshp	 wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence	 when	Wllam	 Stephenson	
arrved	n	the	Unted	States	to	organze	the	bSC.34
	 Wllam	Stephenson	was	a	Canadan	ctzen	who	dstngushed	hmself	
durng	the	Frst	World	War	not	only	as	a	plot	but	as	an	amateur	lghtweght	
boxng	champon.	(it	would	be	hs	boxng	connectons	that,	roncally,	pro-
vded	Stephenson	wth	a	way	to	meet	Fbi	Drector	hoover.)	more	mpor-
tantly,	 Stephenson	 became	 a	 hghly	 successful	 busnessman	 n	 europe	
durng	the	nterwar	perod,	whch	made	hm	an	nvaluable	asset	not	only	
to	brtsh	ntellgence—because	he	could	provde	them	wth	nformaton	
	 34.	Douglas	m.	Charles,	“‘before	the	Colonel	arrved’:	hoover,	Donovan,	roosevelt	and	
the	Orgns	of	amercan	Central	 ntellgence,”	 Intelligence and National Security	 20	 (June	
2005):	226.	hoover	relayed	some	ntellgence,	about	the	securty	of	Greenland,	gleaned	from	
Paget	to	roosevelt:	see	personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Watson,	23	aprl	1940,	
Offcal	Fle	 10-b,	FDrl.	 (Ths	 nformaton,	whch	roosevelt	 read	personally,	 apparently	
mpressed	the	Canadan	prme	mnster,	mackenze	Kng,	n	terms	of	the	presdent’s	ntel-
lgence	 sources	when	roosevelt	 shared	 t	wth	hm.	 See:	 personal	 and	 confdental	 letter,	
hoover	to	Watson,	14	June	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.)	On	the	Fbi-rCmP	connecton	
see	personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Watson,	2	December	1939;	letter,	S.	T.	Wood,	
Commssoner	 of	 the	rCmP,	 to	hoover,	 21	november	 1939;	 letter,	Watson	 to	hoover,	 7	
December	1939	all	n	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
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about	German	muntons	manufacturng—but	to	Wnston	Churchll,	who	
used	Stephenson	as	a	source	of	nformaton	snce	he	was	out	of	favor	dur-
ng	 these	 “wlderness	 years.”	after	Churchll	 rose	 to	 the	 offce	 of	 prme	
mnster	n	may	of	1940,	because	of	hs	ntmate	and	hgh-level	contacts	n	
the	Unted	States,	brtsh	ntellgence	recruted	Stephenson	to	be	ts	ntel-
lgence	representatve	there.35
	 before	Stephenson	could	set	up	shop	n	the	Unted	States,	however,	t	
was	 mperatve	 that	he	 frst	make	contact	wth	 J.	edgar	hoover	and	 the	
Fbi.	Ths	he	was	able	to	do	through	a	mutual	frend,	the	celebrated	boxer	
Gene	Tunney,	who	had	defeated	Jack	Dempsey	for	the	heavyweght	box-
ng	 champonshp	 n	 the	 1920s.	 but	hoover	 refused	 to	 effect	 a	 formal	
and	ntmate	lason	wth	a	foregn	ntellgence	organzaton	that	was	to	
operate	on	amercan	sol	wthout	the	approval	of	the	presdent.	Further	
complcatng	thngs	for	Stephenson	was	the	fact	that	assstant	Secretary	of	
State	adolf	berle,	head	of	the	interdepartmental	intellgence	Conference,	
opposed	 strongly	 any	 ntmate	 relatonshp	 wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence.	
because	of	ths	obstacle,	Stephenson	obtaned	roosevelt’s	assent	through	
a	mutual	frend	he	had	wth	the	presdent,	the	wealthy	new	york	arstocrat	
vncent	astor.	Presdent	roosevelt	 then	endorsed	a	 lason	between	 the	
Fbi	and	brtsh	ntellgence,	hopng	that	the	two	would	work	very	closely	
together.36
	 reportedly,	 Stephenson	 then	 negotated	 the	 detals	 of	 lason	 wth	
hoover,	sharng	wth	hm	brtsh	nformaton	regardng	the	forthcomng	
italan	declaraton	of	war	on	the	alles	n	1940	whch	hoover	forwarded	
to	 the	Whte	house.	 Stephenson	 then	 traveled	 to	london	 to	 coordnate	
wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence	 authortes,	 and	 returned	 to	new	york	Cty	 on	
21	 June	1940	 to	organze	what	would	be	named,	 by	hoover,	 the	brtsh	
Securty	 Coordnaton.	 located	 on	 Ffth	 avenue	 wthn	 rockefeller	
Center,	 Stephenson	 peced	 together	 the	 bSC	 by	 hrng	 ffteen	 securty	
offcers	 and	 forty-fve	 support	 personnel	 whle	mantanng	 close	 com-
muncatons	wth	hoover.	Stephenson’s	msson,	however,	was	 threefold:	
to	protect	brtsh	property	 n	amerca	 (especally	after	 the	 formaton	of	
	 35.	Charles,	 “‘before	 the	 Colonel	 arrved,’”	 226–27;	 anthony	 Cave	 brown,	 “C”: The 
Secret Life of Sir Stewart Menzies, Spymaster to Winston Churchill	 (new	york:	macmllan,	
1987),	262.
	 36.	Thomas	Troy,	Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA	
(new	haven,	CT:	yale	Unversty	Press,	1996),	39;	h.	montgomery	hyde,	Secret Intelligence 
Agent	 (new	york:	St.	martn’s,	1982),	82;	Charles,	“‘before	 the	Colonel	arrved,’”	227.	On	
amercan	anglophoba	see	John	e.	moser,	Twisting the Lion’s Tail: American Anglophobia 
between the World Wars	(new	york:	new	york	Unversty	Press,	1999).
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lend-lease	n	1941),	to	montor	enemy	actvty,	and	to	promote	amercan	
nterventon	n	the	european	war.37
—■■■■■■■—
The	 Fbi’s	 montorng	 of	 ant-nterventonsts	 between	 September	 1939	
and	December	1940	conssted	prmarly	of	passve	ntellgence	gatherng,	
forwardng	of	complants	made	aganst	 them	to	 the	 Justce	Department,	
and	takng	acton	on	admnstraton	nterest	n	ant-nterventonst	actv-
ty.	but	n	each	nstance	hoover’s	prmary	motvaton	s	clear.	he	was	care-
ful	to	develop	any	nformaton	or	sources	of	nformaton	that	mght	yeld	
not	 corroboraton	 or	 verfed	 evdence	 of	 a	 crme	 but	 valuable	 poltcal	
nformaton.	Wth	such	nformaton	at	hand,	the	conservatve	Fbi	drector	
could	placate	the	desres	of	the	lberal	roosevelt	to	ensure	hs	bureaucratc	
poston	and	ncrease	the	nfluence	and	power	of	the	Fbi.	When	the	debate	
over	amercan	 nvolvement	 n	 the	european	war	 ncreased	dramatcally	
by	1941,	a	tme	when	ant-nterventonsts	moved	beyond	advocatng	neu-
tralty	 to	 drectly	 crtczng	 roosevelt’s	 foregn	 polcy,	 Fbi	 nvestgatve	
efforts	ncreased	sgnfcantly.
	 37.	Charles,	“‘before	the	Colonel	arrved,’”	228.	On	the	italan	nformaton	see	personal	
and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Watson,	31	may	1940,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.	memoran-
dum,	Wnthrop	Crane	to	adolf	berle,	29	november	1941,	State	Department	Central	Fles,	
record	 Group	 59,	 800.01b11	 regstraton/1140,	 natonal	 archves	 and	 records	 admn-
straton	 (nara);	 letter	 and	 lst	of	bSC	employees,	Crane	 to	Gordon,	12	February	1941,	
rG	59,	800.01b11	regstraton/1209,	nara;	 letter,	r.	l.	bannerman	to	Clark,	6	February	
1941,	rG	59,	841.01b11/191,	nara;	letter,	berle	to	Sumner	Welles,	31	march	1941,	rG	59,	
841.20211/23,	nara;	British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence 
in the Americas, 1940–45	(london:	St.	ermn’s	Press,	1998),	xxv–xxv.
Intensification
The Lend-Lease Debate, America First, and Its Allies
December 1940 to Summer 1941
The	 debate	 between	 nterventonsts	 and	 so-called	 solatonsts	 changed	
n	late	1940	and	extendng	nto	1941.	Durng	the	1940	electon	cycle,	the	
debate	centered	on	the	need	to	ensure	neutralty	and	amercan	defense,	
although	 each	 sde	 held	 dfferent	 postons.	 both	 sdes	 dffered,	 for	
example,	over	conscrpton,	yet	the	controversal	measure	was	passed	nto	
law	when	framed	as	good	for	amercan	defense.	The	destroyers-for-bases	
deal,	too,	was	a	controversal	proposal,	but	when	presented	as	benefcal	to	
amercan	securty	the	amercan	publc	largely	accepted	t.	in	the	autumn	
of	 1940,	 however,	 after	 the	 concluson	 of	 the	battle	 of	 brtan	 and	 after	
Great	brtan	had	experenced	massve	shppng	losses	due	to	German	U-
boats,	brtsh	Prme	mnster	Wnston	Churchll	nformed	roosevelt	that	
brtsh	dollar	reserves	were	exhausted.	no	longer,	Churchll	warned,	could	
hs	country	pay	cash	to	buy	amercan	supples	as	stpulated	n	the	revsed	
neutralty	act	of	1939,	popularly	known	as	cash-and-carry.	Complcatng	
the	brtsh	poston	was	the	1934	Johnson	act	that	prevented	amercans	
from	extendng	loans	to	countres	that	had	defaulted	on	ther	Frst	World	
War	debt.1
	 in	order	to	ensure	brtsh	access	to	amercan	supples,	whle	avodng	
volatng	 the	 letter	 of	 the	 law	 as	 defned	 n	 the	neutralty	 and	 Johnson	
acts,	 on	 17	December	 1940	 Presdent	 roosevelt	 announced	 a	 new	 and	
nnovatve	 polcy.	 To	 ensure	 contnued	 brtsh	 access	 to	 war	 matérel,	
roosevelt	 proposed	 to	 “elmnate	 the	 dollar	 sgn”	 from	 further	 orders.	
The	presdent	called	hs	 dea	“lend-lease”	and,	to	smplfy	the	matter	for	
	 1.	 See	Garry	J.	Clfford	and	Samuel	r.	Spencer	Jr.,	The First Peacetime Draft	(lawrence:	
Unversty	of	Kansas	Press,	1986);	Wllam	l.	langer	and	everett	S.	Gleason,	The Challenge 
to Isolation, 1937–1940	(new	york:	harper,	1952);	manfred	Jonas,	Isolationism in America, 
1935–1941, 2nd	ed.		(Chcago:	imprnt	Publcatons,	1990).
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publc	 consumpton,	 employed	 the	 analogy	 of	 lendng	 a	 garden	hose	 to	
one’s	neghbor	to	extngush	hs	house	fre.	Just	as	he	had	done	wth	con-
scrpton	and	destroyers-for-bases,	roosevelt	argued	that	the	proposal	was	
n	the	nterests	of	amercan	defense	because	the	securty	of	Great	brtan	
drectly	 affected	 U.S.	 nterests,	 partcularly	 as	 ts	 support	 would	 ensure	
that	amerca	would	avod	another	devastatng	war.	Then,	n	January	1941,	
when	delverng	hs	State	of	the	Unon	address,	roosevelt	further	couched	
lend-lease	as	a	polcy	move	that	was	ntended	to	ensure	the	preservaton	
of	the	four	human	freedoms:	freedom	of	speech	and	expresson,	freedom	
from	want,	freedom	of	worshp,	and	freedom	from	fear.2
	 ant-nterventonsts	moblzed	 n	 opposton	 to	 the	 presdent’s	 pro-
posal.	lend-lease,	n	partcular,	became	a	focal	pont	for	those	who	sought	
to	 avod	amercan	 nvolvement	 n	war.	no	 longer	 advocatng	neutralty	
n	european	affars,	as	they	had	prevously,	ant-nterventonsts	changed	
tactcs	 to	drectly	crtcze	admnstraton	polcy.	Sgnfcantly,	 the	stakes	
were	thereby	rased	because	now	they	pontedly	challenged	the	presdent’s	
leadershp	and	polcy,	rasng	themselves	to	the	level	of	a	serous	poltcal	
threat.	Concern	over	the	consequences	of	roosevelt’s	new	polcy	proposal,	
moreover,	 provded	 momentum	 for	 ant-nterventonsts	 to	 organze	
natonally	and	gave	rse	to	the	emergence	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
as	 the	 most	 sgnfcant,	 and	 best-funded,	 ant-nterventonst	 pressure	
group.
	 Whle	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	became	natonally	promnent	only	
by	 late	1940,	 ts	orgns	date	 from	earler	 that	year	when	yale	Unversty	
law	student	r.	Douglas	Stuart	Jr.	formed	the	group	as	a	student	organza-
ton.	Troubled	by	 the	events	of	 early	1940,	he	 sought	 the	backng	of	hs	
colleagues	who	ncluded	Gerald	r.	Ford	(the	future	presdent)	and	Potter	
Stewart	(the	future	Supreme	Court	justce),	among	others.	by	the	autumn	
he	 had	 persuaded	 a	 number	 of	 mdwestern	 busnessmen	 and	 leadng	
republcan	conservatves	 to	help	organze	hs	group	on	a	natonal	 level,	
n	 part,	 to	 oppose	 the	 nterventonst	 Commttee	 to	 Defend	 amerca	
by	 adng	 the	 alles	 whch	 was	 led	 by	 newspaperman	 Wllam	 allen	
Whte.	Wth	these	goals	n	mnd,	the	so-called	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
announced	 ts	 formaton	 n	September	1940	and	headquartered	 tself	 n	
Chcago.3
	 2.	Wayne	 S.	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1939–1945	 (lncoln:	Unversty	 of	
nebraska	Press,	1983),	411–13.
	 3.	Wayne	S.	Cole,	America First: The Battle against Intervention, 1940–1941 (madson:	
Unversty	of	Wsconsn	Press,	1953),	10–13;	Justus	D.	Doenecke,	ed.,	In Danger Undaunted: 
The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940–1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America 
First Committee	(Stanford,	Ca:	hoover	insttuton	Press,	1990),	7,	87–88.
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	 The	commttee’s	prmary	objectve	was	 to	undermne	publc	 support	
for	 Presdent	 roosevelt’s	 ncreasngly	 nterventonst	 foregn	 polcy.	 To	
promote	 ths	 objectve,	 Stuart	 enlsted	 robert	 e.	 Wood—charman	 of	
Sears,	 roebuck	 and	 Company—to	 serve	 as	 commttee	 charman.	 Over	
tme,	other	promnent	personaltes	joned	the	commttee	as	well,	nclud-
ng	the	wfe	of	Senator	burton	Wheeler,	alce	roosevelt	longworth,	and	
Charles	lndbergh.	not	pacfst,	the	group	had	four	prncpal	ams:
1.	 The	Unted	States	must	buld	an	mpregnable	defense	for	amerca.
2.	 no	foregn	power,	nor	group	of	powers,	can	successfully	attack	a	prepared	
amerca.
3.	 amercan	 democracy	 can	 be	 preserved	 only	 by	 keepng	 out	 of	 the	
european	war.
4.	 “ad	short	of	war”	weakens	natonal	defense	at	home	and	threatens	to	
nvolve	amerca	n	war	abroad.4
after	 gong	 natonal,	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 expanded	 rapdly	
by	 openng	 chapters	 n	 ctes	 and	 towns	 natonwde.	 it	 also	 sponsored	
ant-nterventonst	 speakers	 both	 at	 ralles	 and	 on	 the	 rado,	 publshed	
ant-nterventonst	 lterature,	 and	 suppled	 nformaton	 to	 members	
of	Congress.	as	 a	 result	 of	 such	 actvtes	 the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
became	the	most	nfluental	and	best-organzed	ant-nterventonst	polt-
cal	pressure	group	n	the	country.	When	t	dsbanded	n	December	1941,	
the	commttee	had	450	local	chapters	and	roughly	800,000	members.5
	 Whle	 the	 commttee	 declared	 tself	 to	 be	 nonpartsan,	 ts	member-
shp	 was	 composed	 mostly	 of	 those	 who	 were	 poltcally	 conservatve.	
irrespectve	of	ths	makeup,	varous	radcal	groups	endorsed	smlar	polt-
cal	 platforms	 and	 goals.	 These	 ncluded	 nazs,	 Communsts—untl	 the	
German	nvason	of	the	Sovet	Unon	n	June	1941—and	ant-Semtes.	yet	
despte	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee’s	efforts	to	dstance	tself	from	these	
partcular	elements,	many	amercans	equated	these	radcals	wth	amerca	
Frst.	The	resultng	negatve	popular	percepton	 then	became	one	of	 the	
commttee’s	most	 sgnfcant	 hndrances,	 and	 a	 bass	 on	 whch	 the	 Fbi	
would	focus.6
	 4.	Cole,	America First,	13–15;	amerca	Frst	ams	as	quoted	n	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt 
and the Isolationists, 1932–45	(lncoln:	Unversty	of	nebraska	Press,	1983),	381.	emphass	
n	orgnal.
	 5.	 Justus	 D.	 Doenecke,	 The Battle against Intervention, 1939–1941	 (malabar,	 Fl:	
Kreger	Press,	1997),	9.
	 6.	Doenecke,	In Danger Undaunted,	16–17.	For	the	commttee’s	effort	to	dstance	tself	
from	“nazs,	bundsts,	Fascsts,	Slver	Shrts,	Chrstan	Frontsts,	et	cetera,”	see	letter	robert	
 Chapter 3
	 Fbi	offcals	shared	the	belef	that	the	aFC’s	membershp	ether	held	
fascst	sympathes	or	were	dupes	of	the	nazs	and	they	helped	to	sustan	
such	vews	by	submttng	negatve	reports	about	them	to	the	Whte	house.	
They	most	lkely	held	ths	vew—percevng	ant-nterventonsts	as	“sub-
versves”	 or	 “un-amercan”—n	 part	 because	 of	 the	 assocatons	 many	
had	made	between	ant-nterventonsts	and	radcal/fascst	elements.	Ths	
followed	a	popular	outlook	datng	from	the	1930s,	and	extendng	nto	the	
early	Cold	War,	that	dentfed	Stalnsm	and	nazsm	as	essentally	dent-
cal	 totaltaran	 regmes.	hoover	 and	 other	 Fbi	 offcals	 apparently	 held	
such	vews	and,	coupled	wth	popular	perceptons	of	ant-nterventonsts	
as	wttng	or	unwttng	naz	dupes,	may	have	regarded	some	fellow	con-
servatves—foregn	polcy	crtcs	of	roosevelt—as	domestc	threats.7
	 as	Fbi	agents	accumulated	ncreasng	amounts	of	 nformaton	about	
the	 aFC’s	 alleged	 fascst	 leanngs—all	 of	 t	 unsubstantated—Fbi	 off-
cals	ether	beleved	 these	allegatons	or	 found	 t	poltcally	expedent	 to	
forward	ntellgence	to	the	admnstraton	that	suggested	ts	crtcs	were,	
ndeed,	 “subversve.”	 in	 short,	 Fbi	Drector	hoover	 played	 to	 Presdent	
roosevelt’s	poltcal	nterests.	but	at	the	start	of	ther	probe,	at	least,	nto	
amerca	Frst,	Fbi	agents	found	very	lttle	evdence	to	suggest	the	group	
had	 subversve	 connectons.	 Throughout	 the	 entre	 course	 of	 the	 Fbi’s	
nvestgaton,	moreover,	agents	gathered	 nformaton	accurately	showng	
that	the	aFC	sought	to	exclude	extreme	elements	from	ts	ranks,	but	ths	
nformaton	 was	 subordnated	 to	 negatve	 nformaton,	 much	 of	 whch	
was	shared	wth	the	admnstraton.	as	the	foregn	polcy	debate	ntens-
fed,	and	as	nterventonst	groups	and	advocates	ncreased	ther	nvectve	
toward	 ant-nterventonsts,	 the	 Fbi’s	 accumulaton	 of	 unsubstantated	
materal	 suggestng	 aFC	 fascst	 lnks	multpled.	 Ths	 changng	 vew	 s	
evdent	 n	 Fbi	 records.	 a	 1942	 summary	 report	 on	 the	 aFC	 concedes	
that	the	group’s	orgns	were	“totally	respectable”	but,	through	tme,	t	had	
evolved	nto	a	haven	for	fascsts.8
e.	Wood	to	edgar	b.	Stern,	17	June	1941,	robert	e.	Wood	Papers,	herbert	hoover	Presden-
tal	lbrary	[hhl],	West	branch,	ia.	an	example	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee’s	conser-
vatve	character	can	be	found	n:	letter,	henry	regnery	to	roy	Cullen,	19	march	1953,	robert	
e.	Wood	Papers,	hhl.
	 7.	 See	Thomas	r.	maddux,	“red	Fascsm,	brown	bolshevsm:	The	amercan	image	
of	Totaltaransm	n	the	1930s,”	Historian	40	(november	1977):	85–103;	les	K.	adler	and	
Thomas	G.	Paterson,	“red	Fascsm:	The	merger	of	naz	Germany	and	Sovet	russa	n	the	
amercan	 image	 of	 Totaltaransm,	 1930s–1950s,”	American Historical Review	 75	 (aprl	
1970):	1046–64.
	 8.	report,	SaC	Washngton,	DC,	to	Fbi	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–384.
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	 Fbi	agents	frst	took	notce	of	the	aFC’s	poltcal	actvtes	and	susp-
cous	 connectons	 on	 9	november	 1940.	On	 that	 date	 the	brmngham,	
alabama,	 specal	 agent	 n	 charge	 (SaC)	 reported	 to	 hoover	 that	 an	
nformer	had	alerted	hm	to	a	rado	program,	sponsored	by	amerca	Frst,	
ared	 to	dscuss	 the	war	stuaton.	The	 nformant	beleved	 the	program’s	
content	 “ndcated	 to	hm	 that	 t	was	 a	naz	 nspred	program	 [that]	he	
thought	mght	 be	 part	 of	 German	 propaganda.”	 The	 brmngham	 SaC	
forwarded	ths	nformaton	“n	the	event	the	bureau	desres	the	Chcago	
offce	to	make	an	nqury.”	no	further	nvestgaton	was	ordered,	but	the	
report	llustrates	that	because	of	popular	perceptons,	even	early	on,	agents	
focused	not	on	clear	and	present	threats	but	on	unsubstantated	charges	of	
llct	connectons.9
	 by	December	1940,	Fbi	offcals	began	to	receve	on	a	relatvely	lmted	
bass	further	ntellgence	on	amerca	Frst.	Ths	nformaton,	whch	pre-
dated	 the	 forthcomng	 vocferous	 lend-lease	 debate,	 accurately	 reflected	
the	aFC’s	poltcal	poston.	On	16	December,	for	example,	Fbi	assstant	
Drector	 lous	 nchols—the	 head	 of	 the	 Fbi’s	 Crme	 records	 Dvson	
and	n	ths	capacty	hoover’s	formal	lason	to	the	meda	and	Congress—
authored	a	 revew	of	news	 reports	 that	 ndcated	 that	 the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	was	“n	favor	of	mantanng	a	strct	cash	and	carry	polcy,	a	
strct	polcy	of	neutralty,	buldng	adequate	defenses	and	that	they	would 
not tolerate any Communists or Fascists	n	the	group.”10
	 Unsurprsngly,	Fbi	agents	at	ths	pont	had	not	developed	sgnfcant	
quanttes	 of	 nformaton	 on	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.	 The	 reason	
for	the	paucty	of	the	nformaton	les	n	the	fact	that	the	group	had	only	
just	 been	 formed	 and	 t	 devoted	 ts	 resources	 to	 organzng	 tself	 whle	
opposng	 the	 nterventonst	 Commttee	 to	 Defend	 amerca	 by	 adng	
the	alles.	 but	when	Presdent	roosevelt	 announced	 n	December	 1940	
hs	ntenton	to	create	a	new	method	to	extend	assstance	to	Great	brtan,	
whch	became	hs	lend-lease	polcy,	the	bureau’s	nterest	n	the	commttee	
markedly	deepened,	owng	to	the	commttee’s	vgorous	opposton	to	the	
presdent’s	 ntatve.	The	 frst	 summary	memorandum	on	amerca	Frst	
was	created	on	29	 January	1941	 for	assstant	 to	 the	Drector	edward	a.	
Tamm.	 Ths	 summary	 outlned	 the	 commttee’s	membershp	 and	 noted	
partcularly	ts	poltcal	opposton	to	admnstraton	polces	rangng	from	
conscrpton,	ad	to	brtan,	and—most	mportantly—the	lend-lease	bll.11
	 9.	 letter,	e.	P.	Gunane	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	9	november	1940,	Fbi	100–4712–1.
	 10.	memorandum,	lous	nchols	to	Clyde	Tolson,	16	December	1940,	Fbi	100–4712–3.	
emphass	added.
	 11.	memorandum	re	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	J.	b.	O’leary	to	edward	a.	Tamm,	29	
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	 For	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	and	other	ant-nterventonsts,	the	
lend-lease	bll	became	a	focal	pont	on	whch	t	would	devote	ts	resources.	
Commttee	charman	robert	e.	Wood	publcly	vowed	that	hs	organza-
ton	 would	 oppose	 the	 presdental	 ntatve	 “wth	 all	 the	 vgor	 t	 can	
exert,”	 and	 he	 moblzed	 commttee	 resources	 natonwde.12	 reflectng	
the	acrmony	surroundng	the	debate,	Senator	Wheeler—ally	to	the	aFC	
and	the	most	aggressve	ant-nterventonst	senator	n	1941—referred	to	
lend-lease	as	“the	new	Deal’s	trple	a	foregn	polcy—t	wll	plow	under	
every	fourth	amercan	boy.”	(The	presdent	responded	to	Wheeler	sayng	
that	 hs	 remark	 was	 the	 “rottenest,”	 most	 “dastardly,”	 and	 “unpatrotc”	
thng	he	had	ever	heard.)	after	the	bll	was	ntroduced	n	Congress,	Wood,	
former	Undersecretary	 of	 State	Wllam	Castle,	 and	 leadng	 republcan	
hanford	macnder—all	promnent	amerca	Frst	members—were	nvted	
by	Congressman	hamlton	Fsh	to	testfy	before	Congress	n	opposton	to	
the	measure.	The	commttee’s	 tactc	was	to	moblze	publc	sentment	to	
persuade	congressmen	to	vote	t	down.	accordngly,	the	commttee	spon-
sored	 hundreds	 of	 meetngs,	 dstrbuted	 newsletters	 and	 pettons,	 and	
pad	for	poston	papers	n	major	newspapers,	whch	were	then	reprnted	
n	 the	Congressional Record,	 urgng	 opposton.	 by	 the	 end	 of	 February	
1941,	at	the	heght	of	the	lend-lease	debate,	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
had	organzed	some	648	“embryonc	chapters”	across	the	naton.13
	 vgorous	 ant-nterventonst	 opposton	notwthstandng,	 the	house	
voted	n	favor	of	the	lend-lease	bll	on	8	February	by	the	comfortable	mar-
gn	of	260	to	165.	The	debate	then	shfted	to	the	Senate	where	the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee	redoubled	ts	opposton	efforts.	The	Senate	debate	lasted	
through	march	and	was	one	of	 the	most	heated	 n	amercan	hstory.	 in	
the	 nterm,	Fbi	Drector	hoover,	despte	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Whte	house	
was	 recevng	 poltcal	 updates	 from	 ts	 congressonal	 floor	 managers,	
provded	 the	 admnstraton	wth	 advance	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 on	 both	
the	Senate	debate	and	 the	 nfluence	amerca	Frst	had	durng	 t.	On	21	
February,	hoover	nformed	Presdental	Secretary	edwn	Watson	that	he	
had	 learned	 through	 a	 “strctly	 confdental	 source”	 that	 “the	 debate	 n	
January	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–6.	The	 bureau	 followed	 ths	memorandum	up	wth	 a	more	
detaled,	yet	stll	lmted,	descrpton	of	amerca	Frst	and	ts	leaders.	See	memorandum	re	
amerca	Frst	Commttee,	7	February	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–10.
	 12.	robert	Wood	quoted	n	Doenecke,	In Danger Undaunted,	22.
	 13.	Doenecke,	In Danger Undaunted,	23;	amerca	Frst	Commttee	Washngton	news	
letter	 #1,	 31	 January	 1941,	 reprnted	 n	 Doenecke,	 In Danger Undaunted,	 226–27.	 On	
Wheeler’s	status	as	an	ant-nterventonst	see	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 
1932–45	(lncoln:	Unversty	of	nebraska	Press,	1983),	458.
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the	 Senate	 on	 the	lend-lease	bll	wll	 last	 for	 about	 two	weeks	 longer.”	
eleven	senators,	hoover	also	reported,	planned	to	flbuster	the	measure	
n	an	attempt	 to	undermne	 ts	passage.	hs	effort	 to	keep	 the	presdent	
nformed	on	poltcal	matters	nvolvng	promnent	polcy	crtcs	reflected	
hoover’s	 larger	 nterest	 n	promotng	 the	 nterests	of	 the	admnstraton	
for	the	betterment	of	hs	own,	and	the	Fbi’s,	poston.14
—■■■■■■■—
When	 Charles	 lndbergh	 joned	 wth	 amerca	 Frst	 n	 opposton	 to	
lend-lease,	Fbi	agents	redoubled	ther	efforts	n	montorng	hs	actvtes.	
he	receved	specal	Fbi	attenton	at	ths	pont	because	he	had	assumed	a	
promnent	role	n	the	debate.	lndbergh	was	nvted	to	testfy	before	the	
house	 Commttee	 on	 Foregn	affars	 and	 the	 Senate	 Foregn	 relatons	
Commttee	 who	 were	 consderng	 the	 presdent’s	 bll.	 (The	 lend-lease	
bll	 had	 been	 submtted	 to	 both	 houses	 of	 Congress	 smultaneously.)	
lndbergh’s	 appearances	 at	 these	 hearngs	 were	 a	 popular	 draw.	 lend-
lease,	 he	 argued,	 would	 weaken	 amercan	 defenses	 by	 sendng	 needed	
supples	to	brtan	whch	would	only	lead	to	war	and	create	“condtons	n	
our	own	country	as	bad	or	worse	than	those	we	now	desre	to	overthrow	n	
naz	Germany.”	hs	testmony	and	resultant	lobbyng	efforts	were	closely	
reported	by	the	press,	leadng	even	some	ant-nterventonsts	to	regard	hs	
vews	as	too	controversal.15
	 Durng	 the	debate,	moreover,	Charles	lndbergh	 shfted	hs	poltcal	
tactcs	to	drectly	crtcze	n	sworn	testmony	the	admnstraton’s	polcy.	
Then,	n	aprl,	the	avator	joned	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	to	oppose	
roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy.	reflectng	the	ntensty	of	sentment	about	the	
naton’s	foregn	polcy	course,	Presdent	roosevelt	made	a	cursory	remark	
at	a	press	conference	equatng	lndbergh	wth	the	Cvl	War	copperhead	
Clement	 vallandgham—a	 northerner	 wth	 pro-southern	 sympathes	
who	was	 crtcal	 of	 Presdent	abraham	lncoln.	an	 nsulted	 lndbergh	
then	sent	to	roosevelt	a	publc	letter	announcng	hs	resgnaton	from	the	
army	ar	Corps	reserve.	in	the	mdst	of	these	tensons,	Fbi	montorng	of	
lndbergh	only	ntensfed.	now	that	lndbergh,	already	the	most	popular	
ant-nterventonst,	 had	 joned	 the	most	 nfluental	 and	 powerful	 ant-
	 14.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	edwn	m.	Watson,	21	February	
1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	Frankln	D.	roosevelt	lbrary	(FDrl),	hyde	Park,	ny.
	 15.	as	quoted	n	Cole,	Charles A. Lindbergh,	92–93.	The	best	account	of	the	lend-lease	
act	s	Warren	F.	Kmball,	The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939–1941	(baltmore:	Johns	
hopkns	Press,	1969).
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nterventonst	pressure	group—the	amerca	Frst	Commttee—provdng	
roosevelt	wth	poltcal	 ntellgence	or	workng	 to	undermne	 ths	 crtc	
became	ncreasngly	more	mportant	to	Fbi	offcals.16
	 Whle	roosevelt	mght	have	compared	lndbergh	to	the	Cvl	War–era	
copperheads,	others	lkened	the	avator	to	abraham	lncoln.	Fbi	offcals	
took	an	nterest	n	ths	comparson	n	relaton	to	the	presdent’s	lend-lease	
bll	and	who	compared	lndbergh	to	lncoln:	rght-wng	extremsts	 lke	
Gerald	Wnrod.	Fbi	agents	abstracted	a	story	from	the	rght-wng	Kansas	
newspaper	Publicity	 that	 lkened	 “Colonel	Charles	a.	 lndbergh,	 by	 hs	
courageous	 stand	aganst	1776	 [the	 lend-lease	bll]	may	prove	 to	be	 ths	
naton’s	man	on	a	whte	horse.	Just	the	ndvdual	to	rde	roughshod	nto	
the	naton’s	captol	n	1944	[an	electon	year].”	Seemngly	confrmng	ther	
vew	of	lndbergh	 as	 sympathetc	 to	 these	 elements,	 Fbi	offcals	noted	
“that	to	date,	Col.	lndbergh	has	not	objected	to	such	use	of	hs	name.”17
—■■■■■■■—
Fbi	offcals	took	advantage	of	every	opportunty	to	collect	poltcal	ntel-
lgence	on	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.	in	February	1941—although	ths	
was	 not	 reported	 to	 Fbi	 headquarters	 untl	 June—the	head	 of	 the	 Fbi’s	
Kansas	Cty,	mssour,	feld	offce	obtaned	permsson	from	the	edtor	of	
the	Kansas City Star	to	search	that	newspaper’s	fles	for	nformaton	relat-
ng	 to	amerca	Frst.	Ths	 revew	uncovered	 the	 followng	 controversal	
poltcal	 comments	 made	 by	 leadng	 ant-nterventonsts.	 Commttee	
Charman	robert	Wood	reportedly	sad:	“Democracy	s	not	gong	to	work	
unless	men	 stand	up	 for	 ther	 convctons.”	ant-nterventonst	 John	T.	
Flynn,	 a	 journalst	 who	 wrote	 about	 fnancal	 affars	 and	 who	 “btterly	
opposed	the	admnstratve	[sic]	polcy,”	reportedly	sad	 the	admnstra-
ton	was	proactvely	pushng	the	country	toward	war.	Fnally,	a	member	of	
the	local	amerca	Frst	chapter	reportedly	sad:	“nazsm	and	Democracy	
could	 lve	 sde	 by	 sde”	 and	 sad	 nothng	 else	 “except	 n	 crtcsm	 of	
Presdent	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy.”18
	 The	 bureau’s	 best	 opportunty	 to	 gather	 ntellgence	 on	 the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee	came,	however,	durng	the	frst	half	of	1941	from	none	
other	 than	 the	commttee	 tself.	 in	 January	and	 then	agan	 n	march,	 n	
	 16.	 ibd.
	 17.	blnd	memorandum	re	Col.	Charles	lndbergh,	2	may	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–64.
	 18.	report,	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	by	SaC	Kansas	Cty,	mssour,	18	June	1941,	Fbi	
100–4712–75.	On	Flynn	see	ronald	radosh,	Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative 
Critics of American Globalism	(new	york:	Smon	and	Schuster,	1975),	197–273.
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an	effort	to	assuage	the	popular	noton	that	t	was	a	subversve	organza-
ton,	the	Chcago	chapter	nvted	Fbi	agents	to	examne	ts	fles.	Chester	
bowles,	an	ant-nterventonst	new	york	advertsng	executve,	suggested	
that	every	local	chapter	request	Fbi	checks	of	ther	fles	to	“keep	ts	skrts	
completely	clean	so	far	as	ant-Semtsm	and	Fascsm,	ether	domestc	or	
foregn,	are	concerned.”	Whle	perfectly	wllng	to	have	Fbi	agents	collect	
ntellgence	on	 the	 commttee	 n	 confdence,	 as	 n	 the	opportunty	wth	
the	Kansas City Star,	hoover	hestated	to	have	Fbi	agents	publcly	examne	
the	 fles	 of	 a	 poltcal	 group	 that	 opposed	 the	roosevelt	 admnstraton.	
accordng	to	hstoran	Justus	Doenecke,	however,	the	Fbi	eventually	dd	
examne	the	Chcago	chapter’s	fles	(n	June)	but	refused	to	peruse	other	
chapters’	 records.	 Word	 then	 spread	 of	 the	 Chcago	 chapter’s	 request	
whch	 resulted	 n	 at	 least	 one	 government	 agency—the	 Offce	 of	 Prce	
management—askng	hoover	for	a	copy	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee’s	
membershp	lst	so	t	could	check	the	names	aganst	those	of	new	appl-
cants.	hoover,	accordng	to	Fbi	documents,	told	the	OPm	offcal	that	hs	
bureau	had	no	such	lsts.19
	 meanwhle,	on	26	and	27	February,	hoover	forwarded	to	the	admn-
straton	 dfferent	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 regardng	 John	Wheeler,	 the	 son	
of	 the	 promnent	 ant-nterventonst	 senator	 and	 charman	 of	 the	 los	
angeles	 branch	 of	 amerca	 Frst.	 The	 Fbi	 drector	 reported	 that	 John	
Wheeler’s	wfe—also	 a	 leadng	member	of	amerca	Frst—sad	 n	 refer-
ence	to	lend-lease:	“the	only	way	we	can	be	safe	s	to	see	the	pns	knocked	
	 19.	 letter,	Chester	bowles	 to	r.	Douglas	 Stuart	 Jr.,	 28	november	1941	 n	Doenecke,	
In Danger Undaunted,	 107–8;	 Justus	D.	Doenecke,	 Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge 
to American Intervention, 1939–1941	 (new	york:	rowman	&	lttlefeld,	2000),	276;	Cole,	
America First,	 117–18;	 letter,	a.	h.	 Johnson	 to	hoover,	 4	 June	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–411;	
memorandum,	D.	m.	ladd	to	hoover,	27	September	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–179;	memoran-
dum,	D.	m.	ladd	to	e.	a.	Tamm,	17	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–202;	memorandum,	Clyde	
Tolson	to	hoover,	24	September	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–165;	memorandum,	lous	nchols	to	
Tolson,	1	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–175.	it	should	be	noted	that	hoover	made	a	practce	
of	offcally	denyng	access	to	Fbi	fles	and	creatng	a	record	sayng	as	much,	whle	at	the	
same	 tme	provdng	 these	 fles	 to	 trusted	 recpents.	by	 late	 1942,	wth	amerca	 already	
mltarly	nvolved	n	the	Second	World	War,	Fbi	offcals	were	more	than	wllng	to	share	
nformaton	wth	government	agences.	in	September	a	Treasury	Department	offcal,	Sam-
uel	Klaus,	solcted	any	Fbi	records	concernng	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.	(The	reason	
for	hs	nterest	s	unknown,	as	the	bureau	has	redacted	portons	of	the	document.)	in	ths	
nstance,	under	the	orders	of	Fbi	assstant	Drector	D.	mlton	ladd,	head	of	the	bureau’s	
Domestc	intellgence	Dvson,	an	Fbi	report	was	gven	to	Klaus	that	“had	all	dentfyng	
marks	lnkng	t	wth	the	bureau	oblterated	therefrom.”	From	the	Fbi	document	number	
cted	n	the	Fbi	memorandum,	however,	we	know	that	the	nformaton	had	somethng	to	do	
wth	amerca	Frst	Commttee	records	whch	Fbi	offcals	had	somehow	secured.	memo-
randum,	J.	K.	mumford	to	D.	mlton	ladd,	16	October	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–472.
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out	 from	under	brtan.”	Such	a	statement	suggested	to	Fbi	offcals	 that	
Wheeler’s	wfe	had	“become	mbued	wth	pro-German	sentments	because	
of	her	 assocaton	wth	varous	 ndvduals	 .	 .	 .	 [all	 of]	whom	are	under	
nvestgaton	 by	 ths	 bureau.”	 beyond	 the	 statements	 and	 alleged	 sym-
pathes	 of	mrs.	Wheeler,	 Fbi	 agents	 also	 noted	 that	 John	Wheeler	 had	
accepted	a	$2,000	check	for	the	los	angeles	amerca	Frst	group	from	an	
ndvdual	under	Fbi	scrutny.20
	 The	followng	month,	utlzng	a	blnd	memorandum,	hoover	reported	
further	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 to	 the	 Whte	 house	 concernng	 the	 los	
angeles	 branch	 of	 amerca	 Frst.	 agan,	 he	 noted	 the	 actvtes	 of	 the	
Wheelers,	but	also	those	of	the	revsonst	hstoran	harry	elmer	barnes	
who	 had	 actvely	 campagned	 n	 the	 regon	 aganst	 lend-lease.	 Taken	
together,	the	content	of	the	two	reports	confrm	that	hoover’s	nterest	was	
to	 forward	 not	 nformaton	 concernng	 crmnal	 actvtes	 but	 poltcal	
ntellgence	 to	ether	 sustan	or	create	 the	 mpresson	 that	amerca	Frst	
members	had	lnks	to	questonable—n	effect	subversve—ndvduals.	at	
the	same	tme	that	Fbi	agents	were	collectng	ths	type	of	derogatory	data,	
other	 agents	 were	 collectng	 exculpatory	 nformaton	 that	 ndcated	 the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee	had	no	subversve	lnks	or	that	t	actvely	sought	
to	dstance	tself	from	such	elements—such	as	lous	nchols’s	December	
1940	memorandum	 to	Tolson	 reportng	 as	much.	nevertheless,	hoover	
chose	 not	 to	 forward	 nchols’s	 memorandum	 or	 any	 other	 exculpatory	
data	to	the	Whte	house,	whereas	he	dd	the	other.21
	 Satsfed	wth	hoover’s	 provdng	 of	 unsolcted	 poltcal	 ntellgence	
reports,	by	the	start	of	the	lend-lease	debate	Presdent	roosevelt	eventu-
ally	 requested	 an	 Fbi	 nvestgaton	 of	 the	amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.	 in	
February	 1941,	 the	 presdent	 learned	 of	 an	 amerca	 Frst	 crcular	 cap-
toned:	“are	you	wllng	 to	gve	up	democracy?”	Ths	document	charac-
terzed	lend-lease	as	“a	war	dctatorshp	bll”	that	would	ultmately	bestow	
upon	 the	 presdent	 “absolute	 power.”	 Dsturbed	 by	 ths	 crcular,	 on	 21	
February,	roosevelt	asked	Stephen	early	to	“fnd	out	from	someone—per-
haps	Fbi—who	s	payng	for	ths?”22
	 20.	Personal	and	confdental	letter	and	blnd	memorandum,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	edwn	
Watson,	26	February	1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	personal	and	confdental	 letter	and	
memorandum,	hoover	to	adolf	a.	berle,	27	February	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–7X;	personal	and	
confdental	 letter	and	memorandum,	hoover	 to	matthew	F.	mcGure,	27	February	1941,	
Fbi	100–4712–7X;	personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	J.	edgar	hoover	 to	attorney	
General,	27	February	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–14X.
	 21.	blnd	memorandum	re	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	3	march	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–
17X.
	 22.	amerca	Frst	Commttee	crcular,	Fbi	100–4712–18;	memorandum,	roosevelt	to	
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	 early	passed	roosevelt’s	request	on	to	hoover,	who	ordered	an	mme-
date	 reply.	The	drector	ordered	a	 summary	memorandum	on	amerca	
Frst	 to	be	prepared	 for	 the	Whte	house,	but	 f	 the	presdent’s	 “specfc	
queston	[was]	not	answered,”	to	tell	hm	“t	s	beng	checked	and	he	wll	be	
further	advsed.”	by	1	march,	hoover	had	provded	the	Whte	house	wth	
a	memorandum	that	summarzed	the	aFC’s	leadershp	and	noted	that	the	
group’s	fnancal	sources	stemmed	solely	from	“volunteer	contrbutons	by	
those	nterested	n	the	organzaton.”23
	 roosevelt’s	request	asked	hoover	to	uncover	who	was	“payng	for	ths	
[crcular].”	hoover’s	response,	however,	exceeded	the	lmts	of	roosevelt’s	
orgnal	 nterest;	 and	 nstead	hoover	 launched	 a	 full-scale	 nvestgaton	
nto	 the	 fundng	of	not	 the	 commttee’s	 ant-lend-lease	 campagn	but	of	
the	 entre	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.	 at	 ths	 pont,	 because	 Fbi	 agents	
had	developed	only	a	lmted	amount	of	nformaton	n	ths	area,	hoover	
was	unwllng	to	ntate	a	further	probe	wthout	some	knd	of	tact	Whte	
house	approval.	as	such,	the	Fbi	drector	wrote	early	suggestng	a	course	
he	would	take	n	order	to	satsfy	the	presdent:	“if	t	s	the	presdent’s	wsh	
that	 a	 more	 exhaustve	 nvestgaton	 be	 made	 relatve	 to	 the	 means	 by	
whch	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	s	beng	fnanced,	I hope you will not 
hesitate	 to	 call	 upon	me	 to	 conduct	 such	 an	 nvestgaton.”	early	passed	
on	 hoover’s	 response	 to	 the	 presdent,	 employng	 hoover’s	 nterpreta-
ton	of	roosevelt’s	 request—“source	 of	 funds	 and	organzatonal	 data	 of	
the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee”—to	 descrbe	 the	 nformaton.	 roosevelt	
dd	not	mmedately	respond	to	hoover’s	suggeston,	but	over	subsequent	
months	hoover	contnued	to	volunteer	nformaton	alludng	to	the	ques-
tonable	sources	of	amerca	Frst’s	fundng.24
	 The	lend-lease	debate,	whch	had	breathed	lfe	nto	the	ant-nterven-
tonst	 movement	 and	 n	 partcular	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee,	 was	
settled	when	n	march	the	Senate	approved	the	measure	and	the	presdent	
sgned	 t	 nto	 law.	 The	 end	 of	 the	 sngle	most-debated	 ssue	 durng	 the	
Great	 Debate	 dd	 not,	 however,	 lead	 Fbi	 offcals	 to	 halt	 ther	 survel-
lance	 of	 admnstraton	 crtcs.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 on	 19	march,	 hoover	
volunteered	to	 the	presdent	and	the	attorney	general	what	he	descrbed	
as	 “the	 contemplated	plans	of	 the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.”	accordng	
early,	21	February	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–18.
	 23.	handwrtten	note	on	routng	slp,	hoover	to	K.	r.	mcintre,	26	February	1941,	Fbi	
100–4712–18;	 blnd	 summary	 memorandum	 re	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee,	 no	 date,	 Fbi	
100–4712–18;	memorandum,	early	to	roosevelt,	4	march	1941,	Offcal	Fle	4330,	FDrl.
	 24.	memorandum,	early	 to	roosevelt,	 4	march	 1941,	Offcal	 Fle	 4330,	 FDr;	 letter,	
hoover	to	early,	1	march	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–18.	emphass	added.
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to	hoover	 the	 commttee	planned	 “to	have	Senators,	Congressmen,	 and	
varous	 peace	 and	 patrotc	 organzatons	 travel	 throughout	 the	 Unted	
States	to	reach	all	areas	for	the	purpose	of	opposng	any	plans	the	Presdent	
mght	have	 n	brngng	 ths	country	 nto	war.”	hoover	 further	 nformed	
the	admnstraton	that	“three	Senators	and	several	Congressmen”	would	
assst	amerca	Frst	 n	the	northern	Unted	States	whle	“a	smlar	tran-
load”	would	cover	the	south.	a	thrd	group	would	travel	cross-country	to	
help	spread	the	commttee’s	ant-roosevelt	message.	in	summarzng	the	
plan	for	the	presdent,	hoover	noted	that	t	was	to	be	led	by	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	charman	Wood	and	Senator	Wheeler.25
	 The	 Fbi	 drector’s	 nformaton	was	 accurate	 and,	more	 sgnfcantly,	
confrms	hs	 nterest	 n	 the	 commttee’s	 poltcal	 actvtes	 n	 relaton	 to	
the	presdent’s	foregn	polcy.	Shortly	after	passage	of	the	lend-lease	act,	
despte	 amerca	 Frst	 havng	 suddenly	 found	 tself	 n	 “fnancal	 strats”	
as	a	result	of	ts	publc	opposton	to	the	bll,	Senator	Wheeler	and	others	
ndeed	toured	the	country	to	oppose	roosevelt,	as	reported	by	the	Chicago 
Tribune	n	aprl	1941.	Ths	tour	rased	both	funds	to	contnue	ther	ant-
nterventonst	fght	and	to	spread	further	the	commttee’s	message.26
	 The	roosevelt	admnstraton	showed	nterest—f	somewhat	belatedly—
n	hoover’s	provdng	of	 nformaton	on	amerca	Frst’s	post–lend-lease	
poltcal	efforts.	in	September,	followng	the	snkng	of	the	USS	Greer	and	
roosevelt’s	subsequent	shoot-on-sght	order	and	extenson	of	the	neutral-
ty	zone	to	iceland,	attorney	General	Francs	bddle—one	of	the	recpents	
of	 hoover’s	 report	 on	 amerca	 Frst’s	 “contemplated	 plans”—requested	
that	Fbi	 agents	montor	 an	amerca	Frst	 rally	 n	los	angeles	 at	whch	
Senator	Wheeler	 was	 to	 speak.	 bddle	 was	 nterested	 n	 the	 sze	 of	 the	
crowd	and	how	 t	 reacted	 to	Wheeler’s	 speech.	hoover	reported	back	 to	
bddle—and	 roosevelt—that	 the	 crowd	 numbered	 between	 eght	 and	
eleven	thousand	and	appeared	“very	sympathetc	and	frendly	toward	the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee	and	Senator	Wheeler.”27
	 25.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	edwn	m.	Watson,	19	march	1941,	Off-
cal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	hoover	to	bddle,	19	march	
1941,	Fbi	100–4712–20;	blnd	memorandum,	19	march	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–20.
	 26.	 letter,	robert	e.	Wood	 to	herbert	hoover,	 8	 July	1941,	robert	e.	Wood	Papers,	
hhl;	Chicago Daily Tribune	(21	aprl	1941).	For	an	tnerary	of	some	of	the	tours	see	letter,	
robert	e.	Wood	to	r.	Douglas	Stuart,	16	aprl	1941,	and	robert	l.	blss	to	all	Chapters,	14	
aprl	1941,	amerca	Frst	Commttee	Papers,	box	57,	hoover	insttuton	archves	[hia],	
Stanford	Unversty.
	 27.	memorandum,	 ladd	 to	hoover,	 27	 September	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–170;	 report,	
SaC	los	angeles	 to	hoover,	3	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–158;	memorandum,	hoover	
to	bddle,	8	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–158;	personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	
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	 by	 late	august,	hoover	 receved	 another	 request	 for	 nformaton	on	
amerca	Frst,	but	not	from	the	Whte	house.	Ths	tme,	Senator	Claude	
Pepper,	a	Democrat	from	Florda	and	a	vocferous	crtc	of	the	ant-nter-
ventonsts,	 requested	 nformaton	 about	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	
from	 the	 attorney	 general.	 bddle	 forwarded	 the	 request	 to	 hoover.	
normally	unwllng	to	provde	poltcal	ntellgence	to	congressmen	unless	
they	could	be	trusted	not	to	reveal	the	Fbi	as	ther	source,	hoover	honored	
ths	request.	(he	honored	t	because	the	request	came	va	hs	superor	n	
the	Justce	Department	and	not	drectly	from	Pepper.)	hoover	forwarded	
an	 eleven-page	blnd	memorandum—a	document	wth	no	 letterhead	or	
ndcaton	 of	 the	 sender	 or	 recpent—on	 the	amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	
to	bddle,	who	 subsequently	provded	 t	 to	Pepper.	The	document,	 des-
gnated	 secret,	 examned	 the	 group’s	 orgns	 and	 contaned	bographcal	
sketches	of	ts	leaders	and	promnent	members,	and	other	sundry	poltcal	
ntellgence	on	roosevelt’s	opponents.28
	 The	followng	month,	Secretary	of	the	navy	Frank	Knox—a	frequent	
crtc	of	the	ant-nterventonsts—contacted	Fbi	assstant	Drector	Tamm	
to	 obtan	 nformaton	 about	 amerca	 Frst.	 Knox’s	 concern	 stemmed	
from	hs	 belef	 that	 the	 commttee	was	 tryng	 “to	 frustrate	 the	natonal	
Defense	effort	 through	manpulaton	of	 trade	unons	 n	 brngng	 about	
labor	 dsputes.”29	 Convnced	 that	 subversve	 elements	 had	 contrbuted	
to	 labor	 troubles,	 Knox	 dentfed	 some	 of	 these	 n	 the	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee.	indeed,	he	confded	to	hs	dary	on	28	may	1941:	“One	of	the	
frst	thngs	the	Presdent	must	do	.	.	.	s	to	take	postve	acton	aganst	the	
varous	forms	of	subversve	actvty	whch	are	nterferng	wth	and	nter-
ruptng	and	delayng	our	defense	preparatons.	Unless	hs	fne	words	are	
followed	by	 frm	acton	the	 last	condton	wll	be	worse	 than	the	 frst.”30	
On	3	September,	Tamm	responded	by	forwardng	to	the	navy	secretary	“a	
blnd	memorandum	 contanng	 nformaton	 n	 our	 fles	wth	 respect	 to	
Watson,	13	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–158.
	 28.	Confdental	memorandum,	bddle	to	hoover,	28	august	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–127;	
confdental	memorandum,	hoover	to	bddle,	3	September	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–127;	con-
fdental	and	secret	blnd	summary	memorandum	re	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	29	august	
1941,	Fbi	100–4712–127.
	 29.	memorandum,	assstant	Drector	edward	a.	Tamm	to	hoover,	3	September	1941,	
Fbi	100-4712-132.
	 30.	entry	for	28	may	1941,	Frank	Knox	Dary,	Papers	of	Frank	Knox,	box	1,	lbrary	
of	Congress,	Washngton,	DC.	See	also	Francs	macDonnell,	Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth 
Column and the American Home Front (new	york:	Oxford	Unversty	Press,	1995),	80–81;	
Joan	Jensen,	Army Surveillance in America (new	haven,	CT:	yale	Unversty	Press,	1991),	
217.
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The	amerca	Frst	Commttee.”	Ths	blnd	memorandum	was	smlar	 n	
content	to	that	forwarded	to	Senator	Pepper.31
—■■■■■■■—
as	the	lend-lease	debate	evolved	and	raged	n	Washngton,	D.C.,	the	Fbi’s	
relatonshp	 wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence	 grew	 closer.	 Durng	 the	 wnter	 of	
1940–41,	two	Fbi	representatves—senor	Fbi	offcal	hugh	Clegg	and	Fbi	
agent	lawrence	hnce—traveled	to	london	to	survey	the	varous	brtsh	
ntellgence	apparatuses.	The	Fbi	men	were	granted	access	to	hgh-rankng	
brtsh	ntellgence	offcals	n	both	the	brtsh	domestc	Securty	Servce,	
Secret	intellgence	Servce	(the	brtsh	foregn	 ntellgence	organzaton),	
and	 the	Government	Code	and	Cypher	School	 (the	brtsh	communca-
tons	ntellgence	organzaton).	They	were	also	able	to	report	on	the	vst	
of	harry	hopkns	whom	roosevelt	had	dspatched	to	london	to	foster	a	
closer	 brtsh	 and	amercan	 relatonshp	 before	 the	 enactment	 of	 lend-
lease;	hoover	reported	to	the	presdent	that	hopkns	had	succeeded	well	
n	hs	msson.32
	 in	 march	 1941,	 after	 the	 Fbi	 representatves’	 return	 to	 the	 Unted	
States,	hoover	sent	roosevelt	two	memoranda	detalng	the	organzaton	
and	methods	of	both	the	brtsh	Securty	Servce	and	Secret	intellgence	
Servce,	as	well	as	the	probable	postwar	plans	of	the	brtsh.	hs	purpose	
was	undoubtedly	 to	show	the	Fbi’s	value	 n	 the	 ntellgence	 feld	as	part	
of	a	long	effort	to	cultvate	for	hmself	a	future	role	n	foregn	ntellgence.	
Two	month	 later,	moreover,	 hoover	 sent	 roosevelt	 another	 report	 that	
stemmed	from	the	Fbi	msson	to	london.	Ths	tme,	the	Fbi	drector	out-
lned	for	the	presdent	the	means	of	brtsh	censorshp.	What	Fbi	offcals	
learned	from	the	brtsh	here	became	partcularly	mportant	after	the	Pearl	
harbor	attack,	when	hoover	outlned	for	the	presdent	the	steps	he	took	
n	terms	of	wartme	censorshp.	What	hoover	dd	was	based,	n	part,	on	
what	hs	agents	had	learned	from	the	brtsh	and	reveal—to	us—that	the	
Fbi	obtaned	sgnfcant	nformaton	from	brtsh	and	Canadan	sources.	
moreover,	as	wll	be	seen,	brtsh	ntellgence	worked	to	dscredt	the	same	
	 31.	memorandum,	Kramer	to	Tamm,	3	September	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–154;	personal	
and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Knox,	3	September	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–154;	confdental	
and	secret	blnd	summary	memorandum	re	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	29	august	1941,	Fbi	
100–4712–154;	letter,	Knox	to	hoover,	8	September	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–135.
	 32.	Douglas	m.	Charles,	“‘before	the	Colonel	arrved’:	hoover,	Donovan,	roosevelt	and	
the	Orgns	of	amercan	Central	intellgence,	1940–41,”	Intelligence and National Security	20	
(June	2005):	229–31.
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ant-nterventonst	ndvduals	and	organzatons	that	Fbi	agents	targeted.	
Whether	there	was	any	collaboraton	between	the	Fbi	and	the	bSC	n	ths	
regard	remans	unknown	because	no	records	have	been	released	n	ether	
the	Unted	States	or	the	Unted	Kngdom,	but	gven	the	ntmate	contacts	
between	 the	 two	 groups	 (even	 f	 tense)	 tantalzng	 questons	 are	 rased	
about	the	nature	of	the	Great	Debate	that	to	date	cannot	be	resolved.33
—■■■■■■■—
Three	months	 after	 the	 concluson	of	 the	 lend-lease	 debate,	when	 argu-
ments	shfted	to	the	use	of	convoys	and	“neutralty	patrols,”	Fbi	agents—
stll	very	much	nterested	n	the	actvtes	of	roosevelt’s	promnent	crtcs—
montored	an	amerca	Frst	rally	n	Phladelpha	where	lndbergh	was	the	
prncpal	speaker.	Fbi	agents	were	dspatched	to	the	rally	and,	accordng	
to	ther	own	report,	“crculated	n	the	crowd	wthout	revealng	ther	dent-
tes	to	anyone.”	The	agents	noted	who	spoke	at	the	meetng	and	descrbed	
the	demeanor	of	 the	crowd	as	“orderly,	 though	enthusastc.”	The	agents’	
report	ncluded	a	newspaper	clppng	on	the	rally,	and	concluded	“that	the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee	was	 ganng	 n	 strength	 and	 that	undoubtedly	
there	were	more	people	present	for	the	amerca	Frst	meetng	than	there	
were	for	the	[Forello]	laGuarda	protest	meetng	the	nght	before.”34
	 Fbi	offcals	were	so	nterested	n	lndbergh’s	poltcal	actvty	follow-
ng	lend-lease	that	they	took	advantage	of	nearly	any	opportunty	to	gauge	
“hs	sentments	n	connecton	wth	the	nternatonal	polcy	of	the	Unted	
States	Government.”	in	October	1941,	at	the	start	of	the	debate	over	rev-
son	of	 the	neutralty	act	 to	 arm	merchant	 shps,	 the	head	of	 the	 Fbi’s	
Detrot	 feld	 offce,	 John	bugas,	 obtaned	 from	an	 nformer	 n	 the	Ford	
motor	Company	a	prvate	letter	lndbergh	had	wrtten	to	henry	Ford	that	
suggested	hs	“sentments.”	The	part	of	the	letter	that	most	nterested	Fbi	
offcals	read:
i	 am	contnung	 to	 take	an	actve	part	 n	opposng	 the	propaganda	and	
agtaton	for	war.	The	country	s	stll	opposed	to	our	entry,	but	i	am	not	
	 33.	Charles,	 “‘before	 the	 Colonel	 arrved,’”	 231–32;	 personal	 and	 confdental	 letter	
and	memorandum,	3	may	1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	personal	and	confdental	letter,	
9	December	1941,	and	memorandum	re:	censorshp,	8	December	1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	
FDrl.
	 34.	 letter	and	enclosures,	J.	F.	Sears	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	10	June	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–66.	
la	Guarda	headed	the	Offce	of	Cvlan	Defense,	whch	sought	to	create	amercan	unty	
and	dscredt	ant-nterventonsts.	See	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	12.	
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sure	how	long	the	people	wll	be	able	to	wthstand	the	msnformaton	and	
propaganda	that	flls	our	press,	our	rado,	and	our	moton-pcture	theaters	
each	day.	 it	 s	 dffcult	 to	 see	 how	democracy	 can	 functon	 ntellgently	
or	even	survve	wthout	any	accurate	source	of	nformaton	to	whch	the	
people	can	go,	and	from	whch	they	can	base	ther	decsons.
in	 august	 1942	 Fbi	 offcals	 ncorporated	 ths	 plfered	 letter	 as	 part	 of	
an	 nternal	 summary	memorandum	demonstratng	lndbergh’s	 poltcal	
sympathes.35
	 an	opportunty	to	undermne	lndbergh	drectly,	however,	presented	
tself	to	Fbi	offcals	fve	months	before—on	26	may	1941—when	a	Texas	
man,	 marvn	 e.	 rutherford,	 volunteered	 nformaton	 to	 agents	 at	 the	
bureau’s	Dallas	 feld	offce.	an	engneer	and	nventor,	rutherford	held	a	
varety	of	patents	on	mechancal	devces	and	one	of	hs	nventons	was	at	
the	center	of	hs	complant	to	the	Fbi.	in	1939	the	engneer	had	desgned	
a	bulletproof	self-sealng	avaton	fuel	tank	and	had	forwarded	hs	desgns	
to	Charles	lndbergh,	who,	at	 the	tme,	was	char	of	 the	ar	corps’s	new	
Devce	 Commttee.	 havng	 receved	 no	 acknowledgment	 from	 the	 ar	
corps	about	hs	plans—rutherford	had	sent	them	va	regstered	mal—he	
returned	to	Calforna	to	contnue	hs	work	on	arcraft	mechansms	at	the	
lockheed	laboratory.36
	 Whle	workng	 n	Calforna,	rutherford	read	a	newspaper	artcle	 n	
the	Los Angeles Examiner	wrtten	by	General	henry	arnold	of	the	army	
ar	 Corps	 that	 descrbed,	 n	 detal,	 a	 bulletproof	 self-sealng	 avaton	
fuel	 tank	 that	was	 found	wthn	luftwaffe	arplane	wreckage	 n	england	
durng	 1940.	 Dsturbed	 by	 the	 tmng	 of	 hs	 forwardng	 of	 plans	 to	
lndbergh	 n	1939	and	ths	subsequent	dscovery,	rutherford	concluded	
that	lndbergh—who	after	lend-lease	was	roundly	beng	crtczed	as	pro-
naz—must	have	secretly	passed	hs	plans	to	naz	Germany.	he	told	Fbi	
agents	that	the	desgn,	as	lad	out	n	the	newspaper	artcle,	was	nearly	den-
tcal	to	the	plans	he	had	developed	two	years	before.	he	further	reported	
that	as	of	1941	the	Unted	States	had	only	 just	begun	producton	of	 ths	
type	of	avaton	fuel	tank	and	that	he	had	not	patented	hs	desgns	so	as	
	 35.	 letter,	John	S.	bugas	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	20	October	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–94;	letter,	
Charles	a.	lndbergh	to	henry	Ford,	2	august	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–94;	summary	memo-
randum	re	Charles	a.	lndbergh,	by	D.	mlton	ladd,	21	august	1942,	p.	17,	Fbi	65–11449–
154.
	 36.	 letter,	bernard	h.	Thomas,	U.S.	Department	of	Commerce,	Patent	and	Trademark	
Offce	to	author,	5	november	1993;	letter,	a.	P.	Ktchn	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	27	June	1941,	
Fbi	65–11449–74.
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to	prevent	anyone	else	(.e.,	enemy	agents)	from	copyng	them.	rutherford	
also	 clamed	 that	 undentfed	 persons	 had	 unsuccessfully	 attempted	 to	
steal	other	technologcal	nformaton	from	hs	home.	The	engneer	further	
feared	that	hs	house	was	subjected	to,	what	he	called,	a	“shake	down”	at	
the	tme	he	had	maled	hs	desgns	to	lndbergh.37
	 When	 the	 SaC	of	 the	Dallas	 feld	 offce	 forwarded	 ths	 nformaton	
to	 Fbi	 headquarters,	 hoover	 sought	 the	 Justce	 Department’s	 counsel.	
because	ths	nformaton	was	receved	from	an	unsolcted	source,	hoover	
asked	 the	assstant	 to	 the	attorney	general,	matthew	F.	mcGure,	 “f	you	
would	advse	ths	bureau	what	acton,	 f	any,	should	be	taken.”	mcGure	
n	 turn	 solcted	 the	 response	 of	 the	 head	 of	 the	 department’s	Crmnal	
Dvson,	assstant	attorney	General	Wendell	berge.	berge	responded	that	
“there	 s	no	evdence	of	a	volaton	of	a	Federal	crmnal	statute”	and	he	
“suggested	that	no	further	nvestgaton	be	made	n	ths	matter.”	mcGure	
thereupon	advsed	hoover:	“no	nvestgaton	should,	therefore,	be	made.”	
hoover,	n	turn,	formally	advsed	hs	Dallas	SaC	not	to	nvestgate	“n	the	
premses.”38
	 From	 a	 legal	 standpont,	 the	 ssue	 seemed	 closed.	 The	 Justce	
Department	had	determned	 the	 evdence	dd	not	warrant	 an	 nvestga-
ton	and,	ndeed,	the	esponage	act	only	went	nto	effect	after	a	declara-
ton	of	war.	The	conspracy	statute	possbly	could	have	been	employed,	but	
Justce	Department	attorneys	found	no	actonable	evdence.	Despte	ths,	
however,	the	matter	dd	not	cease	beng	nvestgated.	Whereas	the	Fbi	had	
suspended	 its	offcal	probe	snce	no	prosecuton	was	possble	wth	ther	
evdence,	army	ntellgence	contnued	the	nvestgaton.	hoover,	the	astute	
bureaucrat	 that	 he	 was,	 nformed	 the	 mltary	 intellgence	 Dvson	 of	
the	matter	and	let	them	nvestgate.	in	return,	miD	kept	the	Fbi	drector	
apprased.	hoover	had	exploted	presdental	drectves	of	1936	and	1939	
that	requred	the	Fbi	to	take	charge	of	“esponage,	sabotage,	and	volatons	
of	the	neutralty	regulatons”	and	to	coordnate	ts	ntellgence	wth	miD,	
naval	intellgence,	and	the	State	Department.	The	end	result	was	that	the	
probe	 contnued	 snce	 the	 Fbi	 drector	 succeeded	 n	 bypassng	 Justce	
	 37.	 letter,	a.	P.	Ktchn	 to	 J.	edgar	hoover,	27	 June	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–74.	On	 the	
popular	mage	of	lndbergh	as	a	naz	see	chapter	18,	“is	lndbergh	a	naz?”	n	Cole,	Charles 
A. Lindbergh,	142–53.	Cole	concluded	the	avator	was	many	thngs	but	not	a	naz.
	 38.	memorandum,	 J.	edgar	hoover	 to	assstant	 to	 the	attorney	General	matthew	F.	
mcGure,	18	July	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–74;	memorandum,	assstant	attorney	General	Wen-
dell	berge	to	matthew	F.	mcGure,	26	July	1941,	(FOiaed	document)	Wayne	S.	Cole	Papers,	
hhl;	memorandum,	matthew	F.	mcGure	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	29	July	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–
80;	letter,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	SaC	Dallas,	20	august	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–80.
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Department’s	 restrctons,	 hopng,	 thereby,	 that	miD	 could	 successfully	
develop	the	nformaton.39
	 On	31	October,	brgader	General	Sherman	mles,	head	of	army	ntel-
lgence,	advsed	hoover	that	miD	offcals	had	confrmed	that	rutherford	
had	sent	hs	avaton	fuel	tank	desgns	to	lndbergh	va	the	ar	corps’s	new	
Devce	 Commttee.	 Wth	 the	 assstance	 of	 post	 offce	 nspectors,	 miD	
offcals	had	even	located	the	ndvdual	who	had	receved	the	package.	by	
november,	they	concluded	that	lndbergh	had	“receved	the	plans	but	that	
no	record	s	contaned	at	the	present	tme	n	the	War	Department	fles.”	
Further,	ar	corps	offcals	had	“wrtten	to	lndbergh	requestng	the	plans	
or	an	explanaton	as	to	the	dsposton	of	them.”	Whle	Fbi	documents	do	
not	ndcate	lndbergh’s	response,	the	nvestgaton—apparently	proceed-
ng	nowhere—was	closed.	Ths	ncdent	nevertheless	llustrates	the	lengths	
to	whch	Fbi	Drector	hoover	went,	bypassng	Justce	Department	gude-
lnes,	to	develop	ntellgence	that	could	be	useful	n	dscredtng	one	of	the	
admnstraton’s	most	promnent	and	successful	crtcs.	if	Fbi	agents	could	
have	developed	 a	 case	 aganst	 lndbergh	he	would	have	been	 shown	 to	
be	unpatrotc,	f	not	treasonous,	and	hs	credblty	as	a	crtc	would	have	
been	undermned.	as	t	turned	out,	ths	never	materalzed.40
	 The	rutherford	complant	was	not	unque	to	the	Fbi’s	probe	of	Charles	
lndbergh.	in	February	1942,	the	Fbi’s	San	Francsco	offce	reported	that	
mmgraton	nspector	m.	bertrand	Couch	had	fled	a	complant	smlar	
to	rutherford’s.	in	1930,	Couch	clamed	that	he	had	sent	lndbergh	plans	
for	a	“propellerless	plane”	nvented	by	hs	frend	Jm	alls.	Couch	sent	the	
plans	to	lndbergh,	who	at	the	tme	was	an	advser	to	Trans-World	arlne,	
“for	an	expresson	of	opnon	as	to	practcalty	and	commercal	possbl-
tes.”	in	January	1942,	the	mmgraton	nspector	read	an	artcle	n	the	San 
Francisco Examiner	that	descrbed	a	jet	arcraft	(.e.,	a	propellerless	plane)	
used	n	Fascst	italy	and	he,	lke	rutherford,	came	to	suspect	lndbergh’s	
motves.	 in	ths	 nstance,	however,	wth	the	Unted	States	already	at	war	
and	the	ant-nterventonsts	all	but	dscredted,	the	Fbi	took	no	acton.41
	 beyond	 tryng	 to	 develop	 nformaton	 to	 prosecute	 lndbergh,	 Fbi	
	 39.	 Strctly	confdental	memorandum,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	edward	Tamm,	10	Septem-
ber	1936;	press	release,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	all	law	enforcement	Offcals,	6	September	1939,	
both	reprnted	n	athan	Theohars,	ed.,	From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover	(Chcago:	
ivan	r.	Dee,	1991),	182–84.
	 40.	Confdental	letter	wth	attached	memorandum,	brgader	General	Sherman	mles	
to	lt.	Col.	J.	edgar	hoover,	31	October	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–99;	memorandum,	G.	C.	burton	
to	D.	mlton	ladd,	26	november	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–104.	On	the	army’s	role	n	poltcal	
survellance	see	Joan	m.	Jensen,	Army Surveillance in America, 1775–1980	(new	haven,	CT:	
yale	Unversty	Press,	1991).
	 41.	 letter,	n.	J.	l.	Peper	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	14	February	1942,	Fbi	65–11449–129.
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offcals	also	collected	derogatory	ntellgence	about	hm.	Gatherng	such	
nformaton	had	nothng	to	do	wth	a	volaton	of	federal	statutes.	its	only	
possble	 value	was	 that	 t	 could	be	dssemnated	 to	dscredt	lndbergh.	
Fbi	 agents	 usually	 culled	 such	 nformaton	 from	 bureau	 nformers	 and	
then	 relayed	 t	 to	 Fbi	 headquarters	 n	 a	 secure	 manner,	 such	 as	 wth	
hoover’s	“personal	and	confdental”	letter	system	whereby	senstve	data	
was	 sent	 drectly	 to	 the	 Fbi	 drector’s	 offce	 and	 bypassed	 the	 bureau’s	
central	records	system.	One	example	of	the	collecton	of	such	derogatory	
ntellgence	occurred	n	June	1941	when	W.	G.	banster—the	Fbi’s	specal	
agent	n	charge	at	butte,	montana—advsed	hoover	that	whle	lndbergh	
was	on	a	barnstormng	tour	 n	montana	durng	 the	1920s	he	had	“lved	
n	 the	 home	of	 a	 prosttute	 for	 a	 consderable	 tme	 and	 assocated	wth	
the	prosttute’s	pmp.”	banster	noted	that	a	photograph	exsted	“showng	
lndbergh	wth	ths	woman	and	her	pmp.”	in	addton,	the	SaC	reported,	
lndbergh	had	“tred	to	marry	two	dfferent	grls	who	were	employed	n	a	
laundry.”	and,	worse	yet,	the	avator	reportedly	stll	owed	a	debt	of	thrty-
eght	dollars	to	a	butte	boardnghouse.42
	 banster	was	also	“relably	nformed”	that	durng	Prohbton	lndbergh	
“should	 have	 been	 prosecuted	 on	 two	 dfferent	 charges	 of	 bootleggng	
whskey	from	Canada	to	bllngs,	montana,	by	arplane.”	Despte	the	dated	
character	 of	 ths	 nformaton,	 banster	 beleved	 t	 could	 be	 useful.	 he	
wrote	hoover:	“These	charges,	of	course,	are	now	outlawed	by	the	Statute	
of	lmtatons,	but	i	beleve	that	 t	 s	stll	possble	to	obtan	proof	of	the	
fact	 that	he	dd	bootleg	whskey.”	The	U.S.	attorney	n	bllngs,	banster	
beleved,	 “wll	 furnsh	 t,	 properly	 supported	 by	 affdavts,	 etc.,	 to	 [pro-
roosevelt	newspaper	and	rado	gossp	columnst]	Walter	Wnchell.”43
	 Through	 another	 nformant,	 Fbi	 offcals	 learned	 about	 the	 alleged	
state	of	lndbergh’s	mental	health.	The	data	was	gleaned	from	an	nformer	
who	was	assocated	wth	lndbergh’s	close	frend	and	colleague	(they	had	
coauthored	 a	 book	 together,	The Culture of Organs	 [1938]),	 Dr.	 alexs	
Carrel.	 The	 nformer	 overheard	 part	 of	 a	 conversaton	 between	 Carrel,	
who	opposed	lndbergh’s	poltcs,	and	a	psychologst	over	“the	trend	that	
lndbergh’s	mnd	was	takng.”	Carrel	reportedly	sad	that	“lndbergh	hated	
the	brtsh	and	next	to	them	he	hated	the	Unted	States.”	The	nformer	was	
unable	to	report	on	the	remander	of	the	conversaton,	but	the	nformaton	
gathered	was	drected	straght	to	hoover	va	the	“personal	and	confden-
tal”	system.44
	 42.	Personal	letter,	W.	G.	banster	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	3	June	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–71.
	 43.	 ibd.
	 44.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	Fbi	assstant	Drector	Foxworth	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	
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	 Why	 dd	 Fbi	 agents	 collect	 and	 Fbi	 offcals	 mantan	 ths	 type	 of	
nformaton?	 Clearly,	 none	 of	 the	 reported	 nformaton	 nvolved	 any	
alleged	crmnal	actvty	on	lndbergh’s	part;	even	the	bootleggng	charge,	
f	true,	was	not	prosecutable	due	to	the	statute	of	lmtatons.	The	decson	
to	collect	and	mantan	ths	nformaton	had	a	deterrent	purpose:	to	ds-
credt	Charles	lndbergh’s	character.	Snce	hs	transatlantc	flght	n	1927,	
lndbergh	had	developed	 a	 reputaton	 as	 a	 shy,	 clean-cut,	 all-amercan	
boy.	Such	personally	derogatory	data	could	 tarnsh	 ths	 mage.	and	Fbi	
offcals’	 very	 nterest	 n	 the	 nformaton	 reflects	 ther	 desre	 to	 provde	
the	roosevelt	admnstraton	wth	nformaton	that	could	be	used	aganst	
not	crmnals	but	poltcal	opponents.	extant	Fbi	records	do	not	ndcate	
whether	hoover	shared	ths	nformaton	wth	the	Whte	house.	Gven	the	
metculous	system	the	Fbi	drector	had	devsed	to	dstrbute	senstve	data,	
and	gven	roosevelt’s	 long	practce	not	 to	put	anythng	controversal	on	
paper,	t	remans	possble	that	n	fact	hoover	had	shared	ths	nformaton,	
but	we	may	never	know.	in	any	event,	that	Fbi	offcals	sought	t	reveals	
much	about	ther	motves.
—■■■■■■■—
Whle	 provdng	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 to	 the	Whte	house	 durng	 1941,	
hoover	contnued	to	offer—on	a	perodc	and	unsolcted	bass—reports	
that	ncreasngly	focused	upon	the	fnancal	backng	of	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee.	even	though	roosevelt	dd	not	follow	up	on	hoover’s	ntal	
offer	to	nvestgate	the	commttee’s	fnances,	hoover	nevertheless	contn-
ued	to	pursue	ths	avenue	of	nvestgaton.	On	10	July,	as	ant-nterventon-
sts	ralled	to	oppose	ad	to	russa,	hoover	nformed	the	Whte	house	va	
specal	messenger	that	newspaper	publshers	Joseph	Patterson	and	robert	
mcCormck—of	 the	 conservatve	 New York Daily News	 and	 Chicago 
Tribune	 respectvely—had	 contrbuted	 “a	 lot	 of	money”	 to	 the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee.	moreover,	Patterson	was	sad	to	have	wanted	hs	“large	
sums”	contrbutons	kept	secret.	hoover	added	that	the	commttee,	then,	
proactvely	funded	the	ant-nterventonst	perodcal	Uncensored,	a	copy	
of	whch	he	provded	the	Whte	house.45
	 Two	months	later,	hoover	agan	offered	the	Whte	house	nformaton	
relatve	to	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee’s	fnancal	sources	“to	supplement	
the	prevous	nformaton	concernng	ths	group	.	.	.	n	accordance	wth	hs	
10	February	1942,	Fbi	65–11449–128.
	 45.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Watson,	10	July	1941,	and	blnd	memo-
randum,	10	may	1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
9Intensification: December 1940 to Summer 1941
[roosevelt’s]	request	of	February	21,	1941.”	Despte	hoover’s	characterza-
ton	of	the	nformaton	as	part	of	roosevelt’s	prevous	request—whch	t	
was	not—the	Whte	house	accepted	 the	 nformaton	wth	no	complant	
and	hoover	promsed	to	keep	the	presdent	“currently	advsed	n	matters	
of	ths	knd.”	The	partcular	fnancal	nformaton	hoover	provded	nd-
cated	 that	 a	 large,	 unnamed	 Jewsh	 organzaton	 operatng	 through	 the	
Guggenhem	Foundaton	had	wthdrawn	ts	support	of	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	because	of	 ts	 “ant-roosevelt”	poston,	 ts	efforts	 to	embar-
rass	the	presdent,	and	ts	espousal	of	“ant-Jewsh	propaganda.”	Fbi	agents	
were	 never	 able	 to	 substantate	 these	 allegatons,	 yet	 they	 dd	 jbe	 wth	
popular	notons	about	the	character	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	that	
were	not	always	accurate	but	successfully	propagated	by	pro-alled,	nter-
ventonst	groups.	Further,	ths	type	of	nformaton	also	helped	to	sustan	
the	bases	about	 the	group	held	by	certan	senor	Whte	house	offcals,	
not	the	least	of	whom	was	the	presdent	hmself.46
	 in	 ther	ceaseless	efforts	 to	uncover	 the	 fnancal	 sources	of	amerca	
Frst,	Fbi	agents	pursued	all	possble	 leads.	a	new	opportunty	 arose	 n	
October	 when	 an	 Fbi	 nformer	 provded	 nformaton	 about	 amerca	
Frst’s	partcpaton	n	Wsconsn’s	frst	congressonal	dstrct.	What	caught	
the	attenton	of	Fbi	offcals	was	a	Wsconsn	state	law	that	requred	“all	
organzatons	partcpatng	n	poltcal	campagns	to	fle	a	detaled	expense	
account.”	The	local	amerca	Frst	chapter	had	allegedly	volated	ths	law,	
promptng	Wsconsn	State	attorney	John	martn	to	order	the	local	chap-
ter	to	release	ts	electon	records.	The	ncdent,	moreover,	gave	hope	to	Fbi	
offcals	 that	 they	would	 dscover	 the	 fnancal	 sources	 behnd	amerca	
Frst.	There	s	no	menton	n	Fbi	records,	however,	as	to	the	dsposton	of	
ths	partcular	effort	other	than	a	notaton	that	the	Wsconsn	chapter	“has	
refused	 to	comply	wth	 ths	 law	as	of	 the	present	wrtng.”	nevertheless,	
the	 epsode	 further	 llustrates	 the	 lengths	 to	whch	hoover	would	go	 to	
satsfy	what	he	beleved	to	be	the	poltcal	nterests	of	the	roosevelt	Whte	
house.	 it	 also	 suggests	 that	 Fbi	 offcals	 were	 seekng	 any	 nformaton	
that	mght	serve	as	the	bass	on	whch	the	bureau	could	buld	a	legal	case	
aganst	amerca	Frst	based	upon	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act.	if	
t	could	have	been	proven	that	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	had	receved	
funds	from	a	foregn	group,	the	commttee	could	have	been	prosecuted	as	
an	unregstered	agent	of	a	foregn	power.47
	 46.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Watson,	22	September	1941,	and	blnd	
memorandum,	22	September	1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
	 47.	memorandum,	D.	a.	Flnn	to	mr.	Kramer,	13	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–203.
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another	 nvestgatve	 avenue	 Fbi	 agents	 focused	 upon	 wth	 regard	 to	
the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	was	 ts	 alleged	 lnks	 to	 subversve	groups.	
if	 agents	 could	 verfy	 such	 nformaton	 t	 could	have	 been	 employed	 to	
dscredt	amerca	Frst	or	to	prosecute	ts	members	as	agents	of	a	foregn	
power.	ether	way,	Fbi	offcals	would	have	satsfed	the	poltcal	nterests	
of	 the	presdent.	 ironcally,	 though,	 the	 very	 act	of	hoover’s	 contnually	
passng	on	 to	 the	Whte	house	unsubstantated	 reports	 purportng	 that	
the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 had	 questonable	 assocatons	 helped	 to	
sustan	admnstraton	belefs	that	the	group	was,	ndeed,	subversve.	Wth	
government	offcals	holdng	 such	vews,	 t	 s	no	wonder	 that	 the	Great	
Debate	of	1939–41	was	such	a	btter	one.
	 in	pursng	ths	lne	of	nvestgaton,	Fbi	agents	focused	specfcally	on	
the	amerca	Frst	chapters	n	Washngton,	D.C.,	Chcago,	and	new	york	
Cty.	These	were	the	three	largest	chapters	of	the	organzaton	and	gener-
ated	 for	 nvestgators	 a	 sgnfcant	 amount	 of	 poltcal	 ntellgence.	 The	
prmary	means	by	whch	agents	gathered	ther	 nformaton	was	through	
the	 use	 of	 nformers.	 The	 relance	 on	 nformers	 s	 sgnfcant	 to	 the	
bureau’s	larger	nvestgatve	effort	because,	n	general,	the	relablty	of	the	
nformers	was	questonable	at	best.	but	 n	Fbi	offcals’	quest	 to	provde	
the	Whte	house	wth	derogatory	nformaton	on	polcy	crtcs,	accuracy	
was	not	a	 top	prorty.	and,	 ndeed,	 the	qualty	of	 the	Fbi’s	 nformaton	
on	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	was	often	suspect.	most	often,	except	for	
the	 very	 frst	 reports	 agents	 fled	 on	 the	 commttee,	 Fbi	 offcals	 seem-
ngly	accepted	the	wdely	held	noton	that	amerca	Frst	and	other	ant-
nterventonsts	 were	 fascst	 dupes.	 interventonst	 groups—notably	 the	
Fght	for	Freedom	Commttee—had	successfully	promoted	ths	vew	and,	
clearly,	the	percepton	worked	n	favor	of	the	Fbi.
	 The	 bureau’s	 nformer	 n	 the	 Washngton,	 D.C.,	 area	 reflected	 the	
popular	 vew	 of	 the	 commttee	 as	 a	 subversve	 group.	 The	 undentfed	
nformer	clamed	he	had	ascertaned	 the	valdty	of	 the	aFC’s	queston-
able	connectons	by	 lstng	bogus	membershps	wth	pro-naz	and	other	
subversve	groups	on	hs	membershp	applcaton.	The	aFC’s	reacton	to	
hs	applcaton,	accordng	to	the	nformant,	was	merely	a	smle	and	a	nod.	
From	ths,	the	nformer	concluded	that	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	was	
“deeply	polluted	by	the	Fascst	crowd.”	in	hs	vew,	the	“honest	solaton-
sts”	 n	 the	 commttee	 were	 vastly	 outnumbered	 by	 “ant-admnstra-
ton	 busnessmen	 and	 ndustralsts	wth	 an	 overwhelmng	 followng	 of	
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appeasers,	nazs,	Fascsts,	and	other	enemes	of	the	democratc	way	of	lfe.”	
more	drectly,	he	clamed	amerca	Frst	was	the	nexus	for	a	fascst	revolu-
ton	n	amerca	as	numerous	subversve	groups	and	over	130	congressmen	
were	ether	“openly	or	clandestnely	wth	the	amerca	Frst	movement.”48
	 not	all	Fbi	sources	reported	that	amerca	Frst	was	fascst.	The	SaC	
n	Chcago,	 for	 example,	 reported	 that	 after	 the	dssoluton	of	 the	 com-
mttee,	 “nvestgaton	 to	date	has	 faled	 to	 reveal	 any	 ndcaton	 that	 the	
structure	of	amerca	Frst,	has	n	any	way,	been	used	by	foregn	nterests	
or	 ndvduals	cooperatng	wth	 foregn	 nterests.”	The	agent	also	argued	
that	 “a	 few	 local	 Chapters	 .	 .	 .	 have	 reportedly	made	 avalable	 lsts	 and	
pledged	cooperaton	to	certan	radcal	groups	but	these	have	been	solated	
nstances	 and	 n	 the	opnon	of	persons	 ntervewed,	 represented	only	 a	
mnute	mnorty	of	the	total	membershp.”49
	 The	SaC	of	 the	Fbi’s	new	york	Cty	offce	 took	a	dfferent	vew.	he	
characterzed	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	as	a	naz	tool.	he	summarzed	
the	totalty	of	the	nformaton	collected	by	the	new	york	offce	as	tendng	
“to	prove	support	of,	or	connecton	wth	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	by	
such	known	or	alleged	subversve	organzatons	as	the	German-amercan	
bund,	 Chrstan	 Front,	 Slver	 Shrts,	 Women	 Unted,	 mothers’	 organ-
zatons,	 Chrstan	 moblzers,	 amercan	 Destny	 Party”	 among	 many	
other	 groups	 and	 extremst	 ndvduals.	not	 only	 dd	 the	amerca	 Frst	
Commttee	not	mantan	offcal	 lnks	wth	any	of	 these	groups,	none	of	
the	 nformaton	 n	 the	 SaC’s	 report—such	 as	 newspaper	 and	magazne	
clppngs	from	extremst	publcatons—proved	the	exstence	of	subversve	
connectons.	hs	reportng	reflects	only	an	nterest	n	data	that	suggested	
subversve	 lnks,	 but	 t	 also	 shows	 a	 falure	 by	 Fbi	 agents	 to	 nvestgate	
properly.50
—■■■■■■■—
in	 ts	 offcal	 hstory,	 brtsh	 Securty	 Coordnaton	 clamed	 that	 t	 had	
nvestgated	and	taken	drect	acton	aganst	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.	
To	 reterate,	 because	 no	 sgnfcant	 documentaton	 has	 been	 released	
regardng	 the	 bSC’s	 actvtes	 or	 relatonshp	wth	 the	 Fbi	 n	 ether	 the	
Unted	States	or	brtan,	hstorans	cannot	confrm	the	scope	or	veracty	
of	ths	clam.	nevertheless,	we	have	the	bSC’s	offcal	hstory	and,	f	used	
	 48.	report,	SaC	Washngton,	DC	to	Fbi	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–384.
	 49.	report,	SaC	Chcago	to	Fbi	hQ,	29	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–397.
	 50.	report,	SaC	new	york	to	Fbi	hQ,	11	July	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–443.
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very	carefully,	we	can	at	least	ascertan	a	lkely	f	ncomplete	ndcaton	of	
the	bSC’s	actvtes.
	 What	s	most	obvously	reflected	n	the	bSC	hstory—whch	was	wrt-
ten	secretly	n	1945—are	contemporary	perceptons	of	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee.	Whle	 these	 perceptons	 are	 largely	 counterfactual,	 they	 do	
confrm	a	certan	level	of	honesty	n	the	hstory	tself	because	these	vews	
were	so	wdely	held	at	the	tme.	For	example,	the	bSC	hstory	clams	that	
the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	had	 legtmate	orgns	but,	over	 tme,	had	
degenerated	 nto	 “a	 pro-German	 assocaton.”	 Ths	 vew	 corresponds	 to	
how	 Fbi	 offcals	 vewed	 amerca	 Frst	 durng	 the	 1940s.51	 The	 bSC’s	
assessment	 of	 amerca	 Frst	 also	 ncluded	 the	 clam	 that	 the	 group	
“appealed	 to	 pacfsts,	 haters	 of	 roosevelt,	 haters	 of	 Great	 brtan	 ant-
Communsts,	ant-Semtes,	admrers	of	Germany,	amercan	mperalsts,	
devotees	of	bg	busness,	and	those	who	hated	europe.”	Whle	the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee	ndeed	had	some	members	who	varously	ft	these	crte-
ra,	 t	was	not	a	pacfst	organzaton	and	the	group	made	serous	efforts	
to	exclude	extreme	elements	from	ts	ranks.	yet	the	bSC’s	opnon	of	the	
commttee’s	makeup	corresponds	wth	contemporary	nterventonst	opn-
on	of	amerca	Frst.52
	 Other	 aspects	 about	 the	amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 are	 naccurate	 n	
the	offcal	bSC	hstory	but	reflect	contemporary	assumptons	about	 the	
organzaton.	 accordng	 to	 the	 bSC,	 amerca	 Frst	 had	 seven	 hundred	
chapters	and	nearly	one	mllon	members.	more	recent	scholarly	research	
nto	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	reveals	that	the	group	had	four	hundred	
and	ffty	chapters	and	about	eght	hundred	thousand	members.	The	bSC	
hstory	also	 clams	 that	durng	1941	Charles	lndbergh	had	emerged	as	
the	 commttee’s	 leader.	Whle	 lndbergh	 certanly	was	 the	 group’s	most	
popular	 and	 controversal	 speaker	 and	 member,	 he	 was	 not	 ts	 leader.	
nevertheless,	such	a	vew	was	wdely	beleved	n	the	1940s.	Other	vews	of	
amerca	Frst	n	the	bSC	hstory	nclude	a	belef	that	the	group	had	been	
nfltrated	 by	 German	 agents	 who	 turned	 the	 commttee	 “more	 openly	
ant-brtsh	 and	 pro-German.”	 as	 evdence,	 the	 hstory	 ctes	 a	 speech	
lndbergh	had	gven	just	pror	to	the	Pearl	harbor	attack	where	he	ponted	
	 51.	British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in the Ameri-
cas, 1940–45	(london:	St.	ermn’s	Press,	1998),	71–72.	For	the	Fbi’s	vew	see	report,	SaC	
Washngton,	DC,	to	Fbi	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–384.
	 52.	British Security Coordination,	 72.	 For	 the	 contemporary	 nterventonst	 vew	 of	
amerca	Frst	see	crcular-letter,	henry	W.	hobson,	3	november	1941,	box	1,	Fght	for	Free-
dom	manuscrpts,	Seeley	mudd	lbrary,	Prnceton	Unversty,	Prnceton,	nJ.	See	also	Cole,	
America First: The Battle against Intervention.
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out	three	war-agtatng	groups:	the	brtsh,	the	Jews,	and	the	Whte	house.	
These	examples	agan	llustrate	contemporary	vewponts,	many	of	whch	
were	also	held	by	Fbi	offcals,	and	we	should	not	dsmss	them	so	easly	
as	les	and	dstortons	perpetuated	by	offcal	hstory.53
	 bSC	head	Wllam	Stephenson	was	sad	to	have	“perceved	the	poten-
tal	 menace	 of	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.”	 Gven	 Stephenson’s	 and	
the	bSC’s	unsurprsng	vews	of	 the	group,	he	had	allegedly	 “dspatched	
[agents]	to	each	part	of	the	country	to	attend	ts	meetngs,	to	keep	track	of	
ts	new	members	and	to	ponder	upon	new	and	effectve	ways	of	nstgatng	
counter-propaganda.”54	There	s	no	documentary	evdence	currently	aval-
able	to	confrm	that	bSC	agents,	lke	Fbi	agents,	were	used	to	montor	the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee,	but	there	s	some	reason	to	doubt	t.
	 it	 s	 nconcevable	 that	hoover—a	bureaucrat	 always	 very	 protectve	
of	hs	Fbi’s	 turf	and	always	concerned	about	unwelcome	and	dangerous	
publc	exposure—would	permt	a	foregn	ntellgence	agency	to	run	freely	
about	 the	 country	 nvestgatng	 and	 attemptng	 to	 dscredt	 amercan	
poltcal	groups.	if	the	bSC’s	actvtes	had	been	dscovered,	t	would	have	
reflected	badly	upon	the	Fbi	and	hoover,	showng	hm	to	be	n	league	wth	
the	brtsh	and	not	n	control	of	amercan	securty.	even	the	bSC	hstory	
admts	that	Fbi	offcals	“were	naturally	nclned	to	resent	any	nterference	
n	 ther	 affars	 by	 a	 foregn	 agency.”	moreover,	 by	 the	 early	 summer	 of	
1942,	accordng	to	the	bSC’s	own	hstory,	“all	foregn	ntellgence	agences	
were	prohbted,	 inter alia,	 from	employng	 ther	own	agents	wthn	 the	
Unted	States.”55
	 What	seems	far	more	 lkely	 s	 that	hoover	shared	the	 ntellgence	he	
gathered	about	amerca	Frst	wth	the	bSC,	and,	subsequently,	when	wrt-
ng	ther	organzatonal	hstory,	bSC	offcals	lberally	employed	the	term	
“agent”	when	descrbng	the	work	bSC	personnel	allegedly	conducted.	We	
know	the	Fbi	and	the	bSC	mantaned	a	very	close	relatonshp,	that	they	
exchanged	 ntellgence,	 and	 that	 they	 were	 apparently	 nterested	 n	 the	
very	same	targets;	we	just	do	not	know	the	exact	nature	and	scope	of	ths	
ntellgence	sharng	to	date.
	 in	terms	of	the	bSC	and	ts	clamed	“acton”	aganst	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee,	t	employed	(allegedly)	three	avenues	of	attack.	Frst,	the	bSC	
would	expose	n	the	press	amerca	Frst’s	“close	tes	wth	German	actv-
tes.”	Second,	the	bSC	“approached”	varous	nterventonst	groups	to	plan	
	 53.	British Security Coordination,	72–73;	Doenecke,	The Battle against Intervention, 9.
	 54.	British Security Coordination,	73.
	 55.	 ibd.,	351,	xxx.
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attacks,	“through	them,”	on	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.	and	thrd,	the	
bSC	hstory	clams	wth	no	clarty	that	“efforts	were	made”—by	whom	t	
does	not	say—“to	prove	that	the	socety	was	concerned	wth	llegal,	trea-
sonous	actvtes.”	all	three	avenues,	reportedly,	were	successful.56
	 it	 s	 concevable	 that	 the	 bSC	 may	 have	 had	 access	 to	 sympathetc	
newspapers	or	have	lased	wth	them	through	a	thrd	party,	but	no	drect	
evdence	confrms	ths.	it	has	been	establshed,	however,	that	at	least	one	
nterventonst	group	ndeed	had	access	to	brtsh	offcals,	but	the	extent	
of	the	bSC’s	efforts	to	develop	ncrmnatng	nformaton	aganst	the	aFC	
s	 unknown.	The	Fght	 for	Freedom	Commttee	 sought	 and	mantaned	
a	relatonshp	wth	brtsh	offcals.	(The	bSC	hstory	clams,	unconvnc-
ngly,	 that	 Fght	 for	 Freedom	was,	 n	 realty,	 a	 brtsh	 front.)	When	 the	
Fght	 for	 Freedom	Commttee	was	 formed	 n	 1940,	 one	 of	 ts	 prncpal	
members—Dr.	 henry	 van	 Dusen,	 a	 theology	 professor	 at	 the	 Unon	
Theologcal	 Semnary	 and	 graduate	 of	 ednburgh	 Unversty—sought	
lason	wth	 the	brtsh	embassy.	Wth	 the	assstance	of	aubrey	morgan,	
a	brtsh	informaton	Servce	offcal	 n	new	york	Cty,	van	Dusen	con-
tacted	brtsh	ambassador	lord	lothan.	van	Dusen	and	lothan	agreed	
that	 Fght	 for	 Freedom	 would	 work	 wth	 the	 assstance	 of	 the	 brtsh	
embassy.57
	 hstoran	mark	lncoln	Chadwn	has	found	that	the	Fght	for	Freedom	
Commttee	 acted	 as	 a	 lason	 between	 the	 brtsh	 embassy,	 brtsh	
informaton	Servce,	and	the	amercan	nterventonst	press.	van	Dusen’s	
close	 cooperaton	 wth	 the	 brtsh	 embassy,	 n	 helpng	 t	 to	 dstrbute	
brtsh	 propaganda	 to	 the	 press,	 was	 a	 volaton	 of	 the	 Foregn	 agents	
regstraton	act.	Fght	for	Freedom,	by	the	letter	of	the	law,	had	acted	as	
an	agent	of	a	foregn	power.	Ths	s	not	nsgnfcant	because	laura	ingalls,	
as	wll	be	shown,	was	successfully	prosecuted	under	ths	law	for	acceptng	
money	and	propaganda	from	the	German	embassy.	it	was	unlkely,	how-
ever,	that	Fght	for	Freedom	offcals	would	have	been	prosecuted	as	ther	
nterests	were	n	lne	wth	the	admnstraton’s	foregn	polcy	goals.58
	 Snce	Fght	for	Freedom	served	as	a	lason	between	the	brtsh	infor-
maton	 Servce	 and	 the	 nterventonst	 press,	 t	 s	 possble	 that	 the	bSC	
played	some	ndrect	role.	The	brtsh	informaton	Servce	was	headquar-
tered,	lke	the	bSC,	n	rockefeller	Center,	strongly	suggestng	that	the	two	
organzatons	had	 tes.	 it	 s	at	 least	concevable	 that	 the	bSC	cooperated	
	 56.	British Security Coordination,	73.
	 57.	mark	 lncoln	Chadwn,	The Hawks of World War II	 (Chapel	hll:	Unversty	 of	
north	Carolna	Press,	1968),	41–42.
	 58.	Chadwn,	The Hawks of World War II,	74,	100,	102,	138–39,	143.
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wth	 the	 nformaton	 servce	 to	 forward	 pro-alled	 nformaton	 to	 the	
nterventonst	press	and	 then	 took	 too	much	of	 the	credt	 n	 ts	offcal	
hstory.
	 in	one	ncdent,	the	bSC	hstory	clams	that	bSC	agents	persuaded	Fght	
for	Freedom	to	attend	a	speech	Senator	Gerald	nye	delvered	n	boston	n	
September	1941	where	the	group	dstrbuted	leaflets	accusng	hm	of	beng	
a	naz	appeaser.	The	bSC	also	credted	tself	for	havng	Fght	for	Freedom	
buy	 advertsng	 space	 n	 a	 boston	 newspaper	 also	 labelng	 nye	 a	 naz	
appeaser,	as	well	as	persuadng	local	rado	statons	to	deny	the	senator	ar-
tme.	The	bSC	prompted	Fght	for	Freedom,	accordng	to	the	bSC	hstory,	
to	target	Congressman	Fsh.	Fsh	had	delvered	a	speech	n	mlwaukee	and	
durng	hs	concludng	remarks	somebody	handed	hm	a	note	statng:	“Der	
Fuehrer	thanks	you	for	your	loyalty.”	newspaper	photographers	reportedly	
captured	the	scene	and	then	publshed	t.	These	examples,	accordng	to	the	
bSC	hstory,	were	representatve	of	the	bSC’s	“more	drect	acton”	aganst	
the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	and	ts	speakers.59
	 The	bSC	hstory	recounts	one	faled	attempt	at	“drect	acton,”	however.	
at	a	30	October	1941	amerca	Frst	rally	at	madson	Square	Garden,	bSC	
agents	allegedly	targeted	speaker	Charles	lndbergh.	bSC	agents	suppos-
edly	created	duplcate	tckets	to	fll	the	amerca	Frst	crowd	wth	nterven-
tonsts,	 partcularly	 Fght	 for	 Freedom	members.	 Some	 nterventonsts	
were	 to	 arrve	 early	 and	 others	 later	 to	 dsrupt	 the	 seatng	 of	 legtmate	
amerca	Frst	tcket	holders.	Unfortunately	for	the	bSC,	attendance	at	the	
rally	was	 low	 and	 the	 llegtmate	 attendees	were	 seated	 n	 vacant	 seats,	
thereby	 ncreasng	 the	 rally’s	 already	 low	 attendance.	hstoran	mchele	
Flynn	 Stenehjem	 has	 dscovered	 that	 John	 T.	 Flynn	 of	 the	 new	 york	
amerca	 Frst	 chapter	 drected	 that	 the	 tckets	 for	 the	 rally	 be	 specally	
stamped.	by	stampng	the	tckets	pror	to	ther	dstrbuton,	accordng	to	
Stenehjem,	llegtmate	tcket	holders	were	ushered	to	an	out-of-way	sec-
ton	of	madson	Square	Garden.60
	 There	 s	no	verfable	evdence	 to	prove	 that	 the	bSC	had	persuaded	
or	drected	Fght	for	Freedom	(or	other	nterventonst	groups)	to	dsrupt	
amerca	Frst	Commttee	ralles.	it	s	possble	that	the	bSC	sought	to	nflu-
ence	 ths	 type	of	 behavor,	 but	 t	 s	 equally	 f	 not	more	 lkely	 that	 these	
groups	employed	dsruptve	tactcs	wthout	any	promptng	from	external	
forces.	 in	hs	book	Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the 
	 59.	British Security Coordination,	74.
	 60.	 ibd.,	74–75;	mchele	Flynn	Stenehjem,	An American First: John T. Flynn and the 
America First Committee	(new	rochelle,	ny:	arlngton	house,	1976),	163–64.
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United States, 1939–44 (1998),	 Thomas	 mahl	 clams	 that	 the	 Fght	 for	
Freedom	Commttee	was,	 n	fact,	a	 front	for	the	bSC.	mahl	provdes	no	
verfable	evdence	beyond	speculaton	to	support	hs	contentons	and	too	
easly	accepts	 the	offcal	bSC	 lne,	 reflectng	 the	 long	persstence	of	 the	
mythology	 surroundng	 the	 actvtes	 of	 brtsh	 ntellgence	 n	amerca.	
Fght	for	Freedom	ndeed	had	contacts	wth	brtsh	representatves,	but	t	
does	not	follow	that	they	were	a	front	organzaton.	Untl	verfable	docu-
mentaton	s	avalable,	all	that	can	be	concluded	s	that	the	bSC	played	a	
role—the	scope	as	yet	undefned—n	attemptng	 to	dsrupt	 the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee.61
	 61.	 See	Thomas	e.	mahl,	Desperate Deception: British Covert Operations in the United 
States, 1939–44	(Washngton,	DC:	brassey’s,	1998).
Focus
From Great Debate Stalemate to Wartime Probe
Mid-1941 to Summer 1942
Despte	 the	 nterventonsts	 havng	 won	 the	 battle	 over	 lend-lease,	 the	
Great	Debate	was	n	no	way	settled.	between	the	summer	and	late	autumn	
of	1941,	the	two	factons	found	themselves	deadlocked	over	further	rev-
son	of	 the	neutralty	act,	whether	to	arm	amercan	merchant	shps.	in	
ths	heated	clmate,	Fbi	offcals	ncreasngly	focused	upon	ant-nterven-
tonsts	n	Congress—such	as	Senators	burton	Wheeler,	Gerald	nye,	and	
Davd	Walsh	and	Congressman	hamlton	Fsh—and	they	stepped	up	ther	
efforts	 to	unearth	derogatory	data	on	 the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	and	
others	 that	mght	 be	 used	 ether	 to	 prosecute	 or	 dscredt	 them.	 These	
efforts	 extended	 nto	 1942	 and,	 n	 some	 cases,	wth	 the	 country	 at	war,	
ntensfed.
—■■■■■■■—
by	 early	 1941	 Senator	 Wheeler	 agan	 surfaced	 n	 connecton	 wth	 the	
frankng	 ssue,	 but	 ths	 tme	 wth	 far-reachng	 poltcal	 mplcatons.	
The	 serousness	 of	 the	 affar	 revolved	 around	 the	 fact	 that	 the	German	
government	had,	n	fact,	ntated	a	propaganda	scheme—albet	neffectu-
al—n	the	Unted	States,	utlzng	the	congressonal	frank,	n	an	attempt	to	
ncrease	ant-nterventonst	sentment.	Whle	the	Fbi	dd	not	have	jurs-
dcton	n	matters	nvolvng	the	frank	(t	was	an	ssue	for	the	post	offce	
nspectors),	Fbi	agents	nevertheless	collected	nformaton	and	forwarded	
t	to	the	Justce	Department.	The	Fbi’s	nterest	began	wth	Wheeler,	shfted	
to	Senator	nye,	and,	more	mportant,	came	to	focus	upon	Congressman	
hamlton	Fsh.
	 Whle	the	frankng	ssue	had	begun	n	1940	wth	Senator	Wheeler—
who	 was	 an	 aggressve	 ant-nterventonst	 legslator—t	 only	 became	 a	
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natonal	ssue	durng	1941.	in	February	of	that	year,	the	senator	decded	
to	dscover	who	had	msused	hs	frank,	whch,	nevtably,	led	hm	to	Fbi	
Drector	hoover.	Wheeler	told	hoover	that	he	had	dscovered	the	abuse	
after	the	post	offce	returned	a	msaddressed	franked	letter	to	hs	Senate	
offce.	The	letter	orgnated	from	an	organzaton	callng	tself	amercan	
Defenders.	 The	 senator	 told	 hoover	 that	 he	 was	 “extremely	 anxous	 to	
ascertan	whether	 someone	 s	 usng	my	 franked	 envelopes	 llegally,	 and	
whether	someone	s	usng	my	name	n	ths	connecton.”1
	 hoover	forwarded	Wheeler’s	complant	to	lawrence	Smth,	an	offcal	
n	the	Justce	Department’s	neutralty	laws	Unt.	Smth	reterated	the	Fbi’s	
lack	of	jursdcton	even	f,	he	noted,	the	senator’s	envelopes	had	been	sto-
len	from	hs	offce.	if	that	had	happened,	Smth	sad,	the	affar	would	then	
be	 a	matter	 for	 the	Washngton	metropoltan	 polce.	hoover	 forwarded	
these	detals	to	Wheeler	wth	no	follow-up	nvestgaton.	nevertheless,	n	
subsequent	weeks	the	senator’s	name	agan	surfaced	n	terms	of	the	frank-
ng	ssue.2
	 accordng	 to	 the	 Fbi’s	 specal	 agent	 n	 charge	 n	 el	 Paso,	 a	 local	
resdent	allegedly	had	receved	from	Wheeler	a	 large	package	contanng	
unaddressed,	 franked	 envelopes.	 The	 SaC	 reported	 that	 each	 envelope	
contaned	a	prnted	speech	and	letter	sgned	by	Wheeler	that	denounced	
the	lend-lease	bll	whle	suggestng	roosevelt	was	seekng	dctatoral	pow-
ers.	When	reportng	 ths	event	 to	 the	Fbi,	 the	Texas	resdent	demanded	
an	 nvestgaton	 because,	 n	 hs	 vew,	 the	 lterature	 from	Wheeler	 was	
“un-amercan.”	Despte	beng	told	the	Fbi	had	no	jursdcton,	the	Texan	
threatened	 to	wrte	Senator	Carol	hatch	 (Democrat	 from	new	mexco),	
who	was	a	member	of	the	judcary	commttee.	Wth	hatch’s	name	nvoked,	
hoover	reported	the	event	to	the	Justce	Department.	What	happened	next	
s	unclear,	but,	 agan,	Senator	Wheeler	was	assocated	wth	questonable	
actvty	n	offcal	Fbi	reports	that,	n	sum,	reaffrmed	negatve	admns-
traton	vews	about	hm.3
	 by	 the	 late	 sprng	 and	early	 summer,	 as	 ssues	over	 convoys	 and	ad	
to	russa	were	hotly	debated,	the	frankng	ssue	evolved	from	an	solated	
	 1.	 letter,	Wheeler	 to	hoover,	4	February	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–6;	 letter,	The	German	
Frend	Socety	of	houston	to	Senator	burton	K.	Wheeler,	20	January	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–6.
	 2.	memorandum,	matthew	 F.	mcGure,	 the	 assstant	 to	 the	 attorney	 general,	 to	 l.	
m.	 C.	 Smth,	neutralty	 laws	Unt,	 17	 February	 1941,	 Fbi	 62–55261–9X;	 letter,	hoover	
to	 burton	 K.	Wheeler,	 10	 February	 1941,	 Fbi	 62–55261–6;	 letter,	 hoover	 to	 burton	 K.	
Wheeler,	6	march	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–9X;	letter,	hoover	to	SaC	houston,	6	march	1941,	
Fbi	62–55261–11.
	 3.	 letter,	SaC	el	Paso	to	hoover,	20	march	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–12;	memorandum,	
hoover	to	mcGure,	27	march	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–12.
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event	 to	 a	 sensatonal	 natonal	 ssue.	 Ths	 developed	 after	 a	 drect-mal	
advertser	named	henry	hoke	wrote	Wheeler	accusng	hm	of	msusng	
hs	frank.	hoke	charged	the	senator	wth	“adng	the	naz	plan	by	allow-
ng	the	use	of	[the]	frankng	prvlege	for	the	dssemnaton	of	dsruptve	
propaganda.”	Wheeler	responded	wth	a	denal	that	he	had	done	anythng	
wrong	and	questoned	why	hoke	had	gnored	the	nterventonsts’	smlar	
use	of	the	frank.4
	 hoke	rebutted	Wheeler’s	comments	n	a	second	letter,	and	then	pub-
lshed	a	publc	 condemnaton	of	 the	 senator	and	hs	 alleged	abuses	 n	a	
July	 artcle	 ttled	 “War	 n	 the	mals.”	When	 the	 nterventonst	Fght	 for	
Freedom	Commttee	learned	of	hoke’s	charges,	they	also	attacked	Wheeler	
whle	 askng	 the	 postmaster	 general	 to	 lmt	 Congress’s	 frankng	 prv-
lege.5
	 The	 sensatonal	 nature	 of	 the	 now	 publc	 charge	 aganst	 Wheeler	
prompted	 reporter	 blar	moody,	 of	 the	Detroit News,	 to	 telephone	 Fbi	
headquarters	 to	 ascertan	 whether	 the	 Fbi	 had	 nvestgated	 the	 charge.	
Concerned	wth	the	publc	nature	of	the	charge,	especally	snce	the	bureau	
had	 no	 jursdcton,	 Fbi	 assocate	 Drector	 Clyde	 Tolson	 reported	 to	
hoover	“that	i	could	very	defntely	tell	hm	that	no	such	nvestgaton	s	
beng	made	by	ths	bureau.”	Techncally,	Tolson’s	clam	was	accurate	nas-
much	as	the	Fbi	was	collectng	nformaton	about	the	frankng	ssue	whle	
not	offcally	nvestgatng	t.6
	 The	event	became	more	acrmonous	when,	on	24	July,	Secretary	of	War	
henry	Stmson	learned	that	several	actve-duty	solders	had	receved	post-
cards	from	Senator	Wheeler	urgng	them	to	wrte	the	presdent	demand-
ng	he	avod	war.	The	revelaton	came	as	 the	Senate	debated	whether	 to	
extend	draftees’	mltary	servce.	after	consultng	roosevelt,	Stmson	then	
publcly	announced	that	Wheeler	had	come	“very	near	the	lne	of	subver-
sve	 actvtes	 aganst	 the	Unted	 States,	 f	 not	 treason.”	Wheeler	 repled	
that	he	had	made	no	attempt	to	nfluence	the	solders	and	explaned	that	
	 4.	The	 Fbi	 obtaned	 copes	 of	 the	Wheeler/hoke	 correspondence	 from	 an	 unsolc-
ted	 source	 n	 Pttsburgh,	 Pennsylvana.	 The	 Fbi	 has	wthheld	 ths	 person’s	 name	 under	
provsons	of	the	FOia.	letter,	[deleted]	to	hoover,	28	July	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–26;	letter,	
Wheeler	to	a.	h.	becker,	7	July	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–26;	letter,	henry	hoke	to	Wheeler,	16	
July	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–26.
	 5.	henry	hoke	news	release,	24	July	1941;	henry	hoke,	“War	n	the	mals:	an	expla-
naton	of	 the	most	Ggantc	Drect	mal	 Fraud	 n	 the	hstory	of	advertsng”;	 all	 n	Fbi	
62–55261–26;	mark	lncoln	Chadwn,	The Hawks of World War II	(Chapel	hll:	Unversty	
of	north	Carolna	Press,	1968),	213.
	 6.	memorandum,	assstant	Drector	Clyde	Tolson	to	hoover,	10	June	1941,	Fbi	62–
55261–21.
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only	three	postcards,	out	of	over	one	mllon	that	had	been	maled	through	
a	commercal	lst,	were	mstakenly	sent	to	the	solders.	Upon	realzng	hs	
error,	Stmson—ever	the	gentleman—publcly	apologzed	to	Wheeler	but	
the	controversy	dd	not	end.7
	 in	late	July	1941,	for	example,	after	Wheeler’s	alleged	part	n	the	frank-
ng	 controversy	 had	 been	 revealed,	 the	Women’s	 roosevelt	 Democratc	
Club	of	los	angeles	wrote	hoover	accusng	 the	senator	of	havng	 taken	
a	$100,000	brbe	when	he	worked	as	a	U.S.	Dstrct	attorney	n	montana	
after	the	Frst	World	War.	resurrectng	the	charges	drummed	up	aganst	
hm	 amd	 the	 acrmony	 of	 the	 1920s	 Teapot	 Dome	 scandal,	 the	 group	
clamed	 that	Wheeler	 had	 accepted	 the	 brbe	 n	 return	 for	 dsmssng	 a	
whte	 slave	 traffckng	 charge.	not	 content	 n	 sharng	 ther	 nformaton	
only	wth	the	Fbi,	the	women’s	group	also	sent	a	telegram	to	the	attorney	
general	demandng	a	prosecuton	of	Wheeler	because	hs	“propaganda	to	
our	solders	foments	a	dangerous	and	mproper	atttude	n	our	armed	forc-
es,	 mperlng	morale.”	irrespectve	of	the	dated	charge,	and	the	fact	that	
the	matter	had	been	resolved	two	decades	before,	hoover	forwarded	the	
women’s	complant	 to	 the	Justce	Department	 for	drecton.	 in	response,	
assstant	to	the	attorney	General	matthew	mcGure	wrote:	“in	vew	of	the	
fact	that	the	[brbery]	charge	would	be	barred	by	the	Statute	of	lmtatons,	
no	nvestgaton	of	the	matter	should	be	undertaken.”8
	 The	focus	on	Wheeler	mght	have	ended,	but	the	frankng-abuse	ssue	
shfted	 to	Senator	Gerald	nye	and	Congressman	hamlton	Fsh.	Durng	
October,	amd	debate	on	neutralty	revson,	Fbi	agents	receved	nforma-
ton	from	two	nformants	concernng	Senator	nye	and	the	congressonal	
frank.	The	frst	nformant—poltcal	operatve	henry	Grunewald—report-
ed	 Senator	 nye’s	 belef	 that	 the	 msuse	 of	 the	 frank	 was	 “wdespread”	
and	 “perfectly	 regular.”	 Grunewald	 also	 reported	 nye’s	 percepton	 that	
roosevelt	had	a	“determnaton	.	 .	 .	 to	get	nto	war.”	Due	to	the	senstv-
ty	of	Grunwald	as	a	 source,	Fbi	assstant	Drector	edward	Tamm	con-
cluded	that	“ths	nfo	should	not	be	transmtted	outsde	[of	the]	bureau,”	
confrmng	ndrectly	that	Fbi	offcals	sought	and	dssemnated	poltcal	
	 7.	 Stmson	as	quoted	n	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45	(ln-
coln:	Unversty	of	nebraska	Press,	1983),	470–71.
	 8.	 letter,	emly	Denson,	Presdent	Women’s	roosevelt	Democratc	Club	to	hoover,	
28	July	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–25;	telegram,	Women’s	roosevelt	Democratc	Club	to	attorney	
general,	25	July	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–25;	letter,	hoover	to	Denson,	2	august	1941,	Fbi	62–
55261–25;	memorandum,	hoover	to	assstant	to	the	attorney	General	matthew	F.	mcGure,	
2	august	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–25;	memorandum,	mcGure	to	hoover,	11	august	1941,	Fbi	
62–55261–28.
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ntellgence.	 (if	 released,	 the	 specfc	 nature	 of	 the	 comment	 probably	
could	have	been	traced	back	to	Grunewald	and	then	to	the	Fbi.)	instead,	
Fbi	 offcals	 fled	 t	 n	hoover’s	 secret	 offce	 fle	 usng	 the	Do	not	 Fle	
procedure.9	The	second	undentfed	nformant	clamed	nye	regularly	sent	
a	great	deal	of	franked	mal	to	people	outsde	of	hs	state.	in	lght	of	the	
developng	 frankng-abuse	 story,	 hoover	 forwarded	 this	 nformaton	 to	
the	Justce	Department.10
	 Tme	and	agan,	nterventonsts	accused	certan	congressmen	of	ms-
usng	 ther	 frankng	prvlege.	Such	charges	were	 strongly	dened	by	 the	
accused,	 but	German	propagandsts	were,	 n	 fact,	 behnd	 the	brouhaha.	
On	29	July	1941,	the	German	chargé	d’affares	n	Washngton	reported	to	
the	German	Foregn	mnstry	that:
in	 recent	months	 the	mass	 dspatch	 of	 postcards	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 par-
tcularly	effectve	as	a	propaganda	acton	whch	can	be	carred	out	very	
quckly	and	 suddenly	and	whch	 s	 to	be	drected	at	 as	 large	a	group	of	
persons	as	possble	who	do	not	have	much	ntellectual	tranng.	Therefore	
through	the	agency	of	the	[embassy]	press	offcer	the	malng	of	about	a	
dozen	cards,	each	n	100,000—n	words	a	hundred	thousand—to	a	mllon	
copes	has	been	organzed	and	fnanced.	They	contaned	sarcastc	attacks	
on	 roosevelt	 and	 the	 warmongerng	members	 of	 hs	 Cabnet,	 remnd-
ers	of	hs	 campagn	promse	 to	keep	amerca	out	of	war,	 a	 reference	 to	
the	amercan	blood	sacrfces	 n	the	World	War,	an	appeal	to	amercan	
mothers,	and	they	asked	recpents	 to	wrte	or	 telegraph	 n	 ths	 sense	 to	
ther	representatves	n	Congress	and	the	Whte	house.	as	all	of	the	post-
cards	had	the	letterhead	of	the	amercan	Congress	or	of	the	members	of	
Congress	concerned	and	contaned	manly	materal	whch	was	taken	from	
purely	amercan	sources	and	also	appeared	 n	one	 form	or	other	 n	 the	
offcal	“Congressional Record,”	our	hand	was	not	n	any	way	recognzable.	
alarmed	by	the	success	of	ths	campagn	of	postcards,	the	nterventonst	
press	s	already	startng	to	attack	ther	beng	sent	through	Congress,	but	
so	far	wthout	success.11
	 9.	Do	not	Fle	memorandum,	helen	Gandy	to	hoover,	8	October	1941,	Offcal	and	
Confdental	Fles	of	J.	edgar	hoover	(hereafter	hoover	O&C),	Folder	80,	henry	Grunewald,	
Fbi	hQ,	Washngton,	DC.
	 10.	memorandum,	hoover	to	attorney	general,	13	October	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–207.
	 11.	Telegram,	chargé	d’affares	German	embassy	Washngton	to	German	Foregn	mn-
stry,	 29	 July	 1941,	 n	Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945,	 seres	D,	 vol.	 13	
(london:	her	majesty’s	Statonary	Offce,	1964),	234.
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The	 chargé	 d’affares	 further	 reported	 that	 Senator	 Wheeler	 had	 been	
targeted	 and,	 he	 clamed,	 the	 publc	 dffcultes	 between	 Wheeler	 and	
Stmson	reflected	the	successful	cultvaton	of	nfghtng.12
	 leadng	the	German	black	propaganda13	operaton	was	George	Sylvester	
vereck,	who	was	born	n	Germany	but	naturalzed	as	an	amercan	ctzen	
n	1901.	nevertheless,	he	retaned	strong	Teutonc	sympathes.	Durng	the	
Frst	World	War,	for	example,	he	dstrbuted	pro-German	propaganda	n	
the	Unted	States,	and	wth	the	advent	of	the	Second	World	War	he	reg-
stered	hmself	wth	the	State	Department	as	a	pad	agent	of	the	German	
government.	vereck	then	receved	fnancal	support	for	hs	actvtes	from	
the	German	lbrary	of	informaton—the	German	government’s	propagan-
da	agency—and	he	edted	ths	organzaton’s	perodcal,	Facts in Review.14
movng	from	new	york	Cty	to	Washngton	n	early	1940,	vereck	took	a	
job	wrtng	speeches	for	the	ant-nterventonst	Senator	ernest	lundeen.	
after	 the	 senator	ded	 n	an	untmely	plane	crash	 later	 that	year,	vereck	
found	a	job	n	the	offce	of	new	york	representatve	hamlton	Fsh.	it	was	
from	ths	poston	that	he	was	able	to	manpulate	the	congressonal	frank.15
	 approachng	George	hll—a	forty-fve-year-old	clerk	n	Fsh’s	offce—
vereck	asked	to	use	Fsh’s	 frank	to	dstrbute	one	of	lundeen’s	speeches	
because	the	deceased	senator’s	staff	was	unable	to	cope	wth	volumnous	
reprnts.	it	was	from	ths	ntal	recrutment	of	hll	that	vereck	began	to	
manpulate	Fsh’s	 offce	 to	 effect	 a	wde	dstrbuton—more	 so	 than	 any	
lone	 senator	 or	 congressman	 would	 have	 done—of	 ant-nterventonst	
lterature.	 To	 keep	 the	 operaton	 secret,	 vereck	 used	 a	 thrd	 party	 (an	
ant-nterventonst	publcst	named	Prescott	Dennett)	to	mantan	contact	
wth	hll.16
	 vereck	 gathered	 ant-nterventonst	 lterature	 and	 forwarded	 t	 to	
Dennett’s	offce	wheren	he	sent	t	to	George	hll.	hll	then	had	Fsh	nsert	
the	 materal	 nto	 the	 Congressional Record	 whereby	 hll	 would	 order	
thousands	 of	 reprnts	 and	 then	 send	 these	 back	 to	 Dennett	 n	 franked	
envelopes.	Dennett	was	then	able	to	mal	the	lterature	out	to	whomever	he	
wshed,	and	among	the	organzatons	that	unwttngly	helped	to	dstrbute	
vereck’s	propaganda	was	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.17
	 12.	 ibd.,	234n2.
	 13.	black	propaganda	purports	to	be	from	one	source	but	s,	n	realty,	from	another.	in	
ths	nstance,	the	Germans	attempted	to	use	the	Senate	to	cover	ther	own	efforts.
	 14.	mchael	Sayers	and	albert	e.	Kahn,	Sabotage! The Secret War against America	(new	
york:	harper	&	brothers,	1942),	168–73.
	 15.	 ibd.,	181–84.
	 16.	 ibd.,	186–87.
	 17.	 ibd.,	187–88;	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	472;	“mal	bags	lnked	to	no-
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	 Whle	the	German	propaganda	effort	was	certanly	creatve,	ts	effcacy	
was	 neglgble.	 all	 vereck	 managed	 to	 accomplsh	 was	 a	 wder	 dstr-
buton	 of	 ant-nterventonst	 lterature	 that,	 n	 any	 event,	 dd	 not	 lead	
amercans	to	reassess	ther	vew	of	the	alles.	besdes,	snce	late	1940	the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee	had	already	been	conductng	a	much	larger	and	
well-organzed	effort	 to	prevent	amercan	 nterventon	 n	 the	european	
war.	The	revelaton	of	a	 lnk	between	German	propagandsts	 (not	 spes)	
and	 leadng	 ant-nterventonsts,	 no	 matter	 f	 the	 ant-nterventonsts	
were	unsuspectng,	was	a	boon	to	nterventonst	partsans	lke	the	Fght	
for	 Freedom	 Commttee.	 Such	 groups	 used	 the	 event	 to	 dscredt	 the	
ant-nterventonsts	by	accusng	 them	of	beng	naz	dupes,	and	 thereby	
confrmed	to	some	ther	status	as	subversves.
	 in	 September	 1941,	 a	 federal	 grand	 jury	 led	 by	 prosecutor	Wllam	
maloney	began	 to	 consder	 evdence	of	German	propaganda	and	 “other	
subversve	 elements”	 n	 the	 Unted	 States.	 Smultaneously,	 Washington 
Post	reporter	Dllard	Stokes	took	up	the	frankng	matter.	he	revealed	the	
lnk	between	Dennett’s	and	Fsh’s	offces	as	well	as	the	fact	that	amerca	
Frst	 was	 tangentally	 nvolved.	 The	 ncreased	 publcty	 led	 the	 polce	
to	 seze	 franked	 mal	 from	 amerca	 Frst’s	 Washngton	 chapter	 on	 25	
September.	 Thereafter,	 the	 propaganda	machne	 created	 by	vereck	was	
exposed	publcly.18
	 both	George	hll	and	George	vereck	were	called	to	testfy	before	the	
grand	jury,	where	hll	perjured	hmself	when	answerng	a	queston	about	
hs	connecton	to	vereck.	in	early	1942,	hll	was	successfully	prosecuted	
for	 perjury	 and	 receved	 a	 jal	 sentence	 of	 between	 two	 and	 sx	 years.	
vereck	was	 convcted	 for	 volatng	 the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act	
nasmuch	as	he	faled	to	reveal	the	full	extent	of	hs	actvtes	to	the	govern-
ment.	When	asked,	Congressman	Fsh	refused	to	testfy	before	the	grand	
jury,	 leadng	 the	prosecutor	 to	 subpoena	hm.	Fsh’s	hestancy	proved	 to	
be	a	further	boon	to	the	nterventonsts	who	publcly	questoned	why	the	
congressman	refused	to	cooperate,	alludng	n	ther	remarks	that	he	must	
have	somethng	to	hde.	but	when	he	fnally	dd	testfy,	Fsh	revealed	noth-
ng	sgnfcant	except	hs	gnorance	of	what	was	gong	on	n	hs	congres-
sonal	offce.	at	one	pont,	however,	hs	behavor	made	for	good	headlnes	
when	he	shouted	at	the	prosecutor	for	suggestng	hs	vews	were	smlar	to	
War	Groups	are	investgated,”	New York Times,	27	September	1941.
	 18.	memorandum,	assstant	attorney	General	Wendell	berge	to	hoover,	26	may	1942,	
FOiaed	document,	Justce	Department	n	Wayne	S.	Cole	Papers,	herbert	hoover	Presden-
tal	lbrary	(hereafter	hhl),	West	branch,	ia;	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	471–72;	
Chadwn,	The Hawks of World War II,	214–15.
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those	of	vereck’s.	Whle	the	Fbi	had	no	jursdcton,	t	dd	closely	montor	
the	grand	jury	nvestgaton.	The	Justce	Department,	moreover,	requested	
that	 hoover	 provde	 prosecutor	 maloney	 nformaton	 about	 hamlton	
Fsh.19
	 Whle	 one	 mght	 assume—gven	 hoover’s	 caterng	 to	 roosevelt’s	
poltcal	 nterests—that	he	would	have	happly	asssted	maloney,	the	Fbi	
drector	dd	not.	The	facts	are	not	entrely	clear,	but	hoover	had	personal	
dfferences	 wth	 maloney	 that	 orgnated	 from	 a	 crtcal	 comment	 the	
prosecutor	had	made	about	hoover	not	 takng	a	more	proactve	 role	 n	
the	case.	(Gven	hs	provdng	of	poltcal	ntellgence	to	roosevelt,	hoover	
would	 never	 have	 nvolved	 hmself	 publcly	 n	 such	 a	 case.)	 The	 Fbi	
drector	resented	maloney’s	crtcsm,	whch	newsmen	Drew	Pearson	and	
George	allen	repeated	n	a	natonwde	broadcast,	and	t	was	ths	that	led	
hm	to	refuse	helpng	the	prosecutor	even	after	maloney	tred	to	repar	the	
damage.	hoover’s	only	reply	was	to	“make	certan	that	we	do	everythng	
proper	to	thoroughly	handle	all	aspects	of	ths	case	so	as	not	to	gve	ths	
whelp	any	real	bass	for	howlng.”20
—■■■■■■■—
Wllam	Stephenson	and	the	bSC	were	also	nterested	n	the	congressonal	
frankng	controversy.	The	only	accessble	source	of	nformaton,	however,	
about	 the	 bSC’s	 possble	 nvolvement	 s	 ts	 offcal	 hstory.	 Snce	 none	
of	 the	 book’s	 nformaton	 can	 be	 confrmed	 t	must	 be	 used	 wth	 care.	
nevertheless,	t	s	possble	that	the	bSC	was	nvolved,	but	t	must	be	kept	
n	mnd	that	 the	offcal	hstory	purposefully—and	for	bureaucratc	rea-
sons—panted	a	flatterng	pcture	of	the	bSC’s	actvtes.	Whether	and	how	
the	Fbi	lased	wth	the	bSC	s	not	touched	upon,	but	gven	the	Fbi	and	
the	bSC’s	 relatonshp	 they	mght	have	communcated	wth	one	another	
over	the	matter.
	 19.	 Summary	memorandum	re	representatve	hamlton	Fsh,	26	September	1942,	Fbi	
65–29514–33,	pp.	14,	17–20;	memorandum,	assstant	attorney	General	Wendell	berge	to	
hoover,	6	June	1942,	Fbi	65–29514–22;	Chadwn,	The Hawks of World War II,	215.	Unfor-
tunately	the	Fbi	has	wthheld	large	portons	of	the	summary	memorandum	regardng	Fsh	
as	well	as	a	memorandum	sent	to	the	Whte	house	regardng	Fsh	on	FOia	prvacy	grounds,	
resultng	n	an	ncomplete	understandng	of	ther	 nterest.	“Fsh	ad	indcted	as	Perjurer;	
Franked	mal	involved	n	Counts,”	New York Times,	25	October	1941;	“hll	Gets	Prson	on	
Perjury	Charge,”	New York Times,	7	February	1942,	19;	“Fsh	Shouts	‘le’	at	vereck	Tral,”	
New York Times,	21	February	1942,	7.
	 20.	Do	 not	 Fle	 memorandum,	 helen	 Gandy	 to	 hoover,	 28	 October	 1941,	 hoover	
O&C;	memorandum,	Gandy	to	hoover,	28	October	1941,	hoover	O&C.
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	 accordng	to	the	bSC	offcal	hstory,	an	“amercan	frend”	of	brtsh	
ntellgence	had	revealed	 the	 frankng	abuse	 nvolvng	Senators	Wheeler	
and	nye	and	Congressman	Fsh.	The	bSC	does	not	name	ths	“amercan	
frend,”	but	the	relevant	paragraph	leaves	no	doubt	that	the	person	alluded	
to	was	henry	hoke:
For	ths	campagn	[revealng	the	congressonal	frankng	abuse],	the	coop-
eraton	of	an	amercan	frend	was	enlsted.	he	worked	on	hs	own,	n	hs	
own	tme	and	wth	hs	own	money,	whle	bSC	provded	hm	wth	nforma-
ton,	gudance	and	extra	funds.	by	professon	he	was	a	“drect	mal	adver-
tsng	specalst.”	hs	clents	conssted	of	those	commercal	companes	who	
wshed	to	be	told	about	new	and	better	methods	of	advertsng	by	mal.21
	 The	 bSC	 verson	 of	 the	 frankng	 controversy	 has	 t	 that	 after	hoke	
developed	the	frankng	nformaton,	bSC	agents	more	thoroughly	probed	
the	 ssue.	 The	 agents	 supposedly	 had	 learned	 that	 a	 partcular	 type	 of	
letter-addressng	 machne	 was	 used	 and	 they	 dscovered	 malng	 lsts	
orgnatng	 from	 the	 German	 lbrary	 of	 informaton.	 The	 bSC	 hstory	
further	 clams	 that	 t	 was	 bSC	 agents	 who	 had	 uncovered	 George	 hll	
and	George	Sylvester	vereck	as	the	 ndvduals	headng	the	propaganda	
campagn.	Whether	bSC	agents	actually	had	played	a	leadng	role	n	ths	
epsode	remans	unknown,	but	even	f	they	had	t	appears	that	bSC	efforts	
were	mnmal.	hoke,	ndeed,	had	nvestgated	and	pushed	the	ssue—par-
tcularly	wth	Senator	Wheeler—and	even	 the	bSC	hstory	 freely	admts	
that	hoke	had	worked	 “on	hs	 own”	 though	wth,	 perhaps,	 lmted	bSC	
assstance.	 moreover,	 after	 hoke	 had	 publczed	 the	 frankng	 contro-
versy,	the	federal	grand	jury	had	convened	and	Washington Post reporter	
Stokes	began	to	wrte	hs	exposés.	Then,	after	ths,	the	Fght	for	Freedom	
Commttee	began	to	take	up	and	press	the	ssue.
	 everythng	about	the	frankng	controversy	the	bSC	hstory	clams	as	
ts	own,	moreover,	can	be	found	n	the	work	of	hoke,	the	grand	jury,	and	
Stokes.	Ths	suggests	that	the	bSC	hstory	has	exaggerated	ts	role.	yet	such	
an	exaggeraton	should	not	be	consdered	unusual	gven	that	the	bSC	hs-
tory	as	a	whole,	ndeed,	pants	a	rosy	and	sometmes	msleadng	portrat	
of	ts	own	work	n	amerca,	whch	was	more	for	bureaucratc	reasons—to	
justfy	ts	exstence—rather	than	to	preserve	truth.
	 21.	British Security Coordination,	 75.	The	bSC	hstory	 also	notes	 that	 the	 “amercan	
frend”	wrote	an	open	letter	to	Wheeler	about	the	frank,	whch	hoke	had	done.
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in	October	1941,	as	the	brtsh	were	losng	ncreasng	numbers	of	shps	n	
the	ntensfyng	war	n	the	atlantc,	Presdent	roosevelt	asked	Congress	to	
revse	the	neutralty	act	to	allow	both	the	armng	of	amercan	merchant	
shps	and	 to	permt	 those	 shps	 to	dock	at	brtsh	ports.	The	presdent’s	
goal	 was	 to	 ncrease	 the	 ablty	 of	 the	 Unted	 States	 to	 provde	 brtan	
wth	ad-short-of-war.	ant-nterventonsts,	as	hstoran	Wayne	Cole	has	
noted,	decded	at	ths	pont	that	they	could	not	defeat	the	presdent	n	a	
poltcal	battle	where	the	 ssue	was	defned	n	terms	of	ad-short-of-war.	
instead,	they	attempted	to	present	t	as	one	of	war	or	peace.	The	amerca	
Frst	Commttee	urged	the	publc,	and	members	of	the	house	and	Senate,	
to	 regard	 revson	 as	 a	move	 that,	 f	 passed,	would	 result	 n	war	 and,	 f	
rejected,	n	peace.	Whle	the	effort	faled,	the	vctory	over	the	ant-nter-
ventonsts	was	razor	thn	and,	n	part,	confrmed	the	contnung	nfluence	
of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	n	shapng	publc	opnon.
	 The	Senate	voted	for	revson	by	a	margn	of	50	to	37,	and	the	house	by	
a	vote	of	212	to	194.	Stll,	the	debate	over	nterventon	was	far	from	settled.	
as	 roosevelt’s	 speech	 wrter	 robert	 Sherwood	 (and	 later	 chef	 of	 the	
Offce	of	War	informaton)	wrote	concernng	these	tmes,	“[i]solatonst	
sentment	 became	 ever	 more	 strdent	 n	 expresson	 and	 aggressve	 n	
acton,	and	roosevelt	was	relatvely	powerless	to	combat	t.	he	sad	every-
thng	‘short	of	war’	that	could	be	sad.	he	had	no	more	trcks	left.	The	hat	
from	whch	he	had	pulled	so	many	rabbts	was	empty.”22
	 but	Presdent	roosevelt	had,	n	fact,	one	last	rabbt	n	hs	hat.	To	end	
the	stalemate	reflected	n	the	neutralty	act	debate,	roosevelt	opted	for	a	
companon	strategy.	On	17	november—the	same	day	he	sgned	the	revsed	
neutralty	 bll—the	 presdent	 drected	 hs	 attorney	 general	 to	 begn	 “a	
Grand	Jury	nvestgaton	of	the	money	sources	behnd	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee.”	roosevelt	hoped	that	the	convenng	of	a	grand	jury,	wth	ts	
resultant	publcty,	mght	serve	to	dscredt	hs	ant-nterventonst	crtcs.	
he	opted	for	ths	strategy	out	of	hs	frustraton	to	“get	any	acton	out	of	
Congress.”	it	s	mportant	to	reterate,	however,	that	throughout	1941,	Fbi	
Drector	hoover	had	forwarded	to	the	presdent	unsubstantated	reports	
suggestng	that	amerca	Frst	had	questonable	sources	of	fundng.	many	
nterventonsts—both	n	and	out	of	Congress—beleved	that	the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee’s	funds	had	orgnated	from	fascst	sources,	but	n	realty	
	 22.	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	446–53;	robert	Sherwood,	Roosevelt and Hop-
kins: An Intimate History	(new	york:	harper	and	brothers,	1948),	382–83.
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the	commttee	took	careful	steps	to	avod	takng	any	questonable	fundng.	
amerca	Frst	offcals,	for	example,	refused	to	accept	donatons	over	one	
hundred	dollars	unless	the	source	had	been	vetted,	and	they	refused,	once,	
to	accept	a	$4,000	anonymous	donaton	untl	the	contrbutor’s	dentty	was	
verfed.23
	 hoover	 mmedately	 sought	 to	 support	 roosevelt’s	 proposed	 grand	
jury	 nqury.	he	 frst	 forwarded	 to	attorney	General	bddle	 a	 summary	
memorandum	of	all	nformaton	the	Fbi	had	concernng	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee.24	 Fbi	 agents	 also	 pursued	 a	 new	 lead.	 Ths	 lead	 orgnated	
n	a	 sensatonalst	book	 n	press	 at	harper	 and	brothers	Publshers	 that	
clamed	the	German	government	had	secretly	subsdzed	the	commttee.25	
The	 book—orgnally—was	 to	 have	 focused	 only	 on	amerca	 Frst,	 but	
after	Pearl	harbor	t	examned	the	broader	topc	of	ffth	column	actvty.	
The	book	was	mchael	Sayers	and	albert	e.	Kahn’s	Sabotage! The Secret 
War against America	(1942).26
	 in	ther	book,	Sayers	and	Kahn	recount	the	actvtes	of	several	 nd-
vduals	supposedly	assocated	wth	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	who	had	
receved	money	 from	German	sources.	The	authors	specfcally	descrbe	
how	Frank	burch,	a	promnent	Oho	lawyer	and,	accordng	to	the	authors,	
foundng	member	of	the	akron	chapter	of	amerca	Frst,	receved	$10,000	
from	the	German	government	to	dstrbute	pro-naz	lterature.	Sayers	and	
Kahn	also	suggest	that	naz	Germany	had	funded	the	extremst	paper	the 
Herald,	whch	often	advertsed	for	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.27
	 23.	memorandum,	roosevelt	 to	 the	 attorney	 general,	 17	november	 1941,	Presdent’s	
Secretary’s	Fle:	Justce	Department,	FDrl;	Cole,	America First,	117,	126.
	 24.	memorandum,	Tamm	to	ladd,	21	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–230;	memoran-
dum,	hoover	 to	 the	attorney	general,	 22	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–210;	memoran-
dum,	ladd	 to	hoover,	 4	December	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–309;	memorandum	 for	 attorney	
general	re	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	4	December	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–309.
	 25.	memorandum,	Tamm	to	hoover,	21	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–231.
	 26.	 Sayers	and	Kahn,	Sabotage! The Secret War against America.	FOia	redactons	do	not	
reveal	the	authors’	names,	but	other	evdence	proves	that	ths	was	the	book	that	had	nter-
ested	bureau	offcals.	The	names	of	the	authors	are	deleted	n	Fbi	documents,	but	they	do	
reveal	that	the	authors’	nformaton	about	the	sources	of	amerca	Frst’s	funds	was	located	at	
the	offces	of	the	Hour,	a	confdental	newsletter	that	devoted	tself	to	exposng	Ffth	Column	
actvtes.	albert	Kahn,	one	of	the	book’s	authors,	was	the	edtor	of	ths	newsletter.	Despte	
the	redacted	nature	of	the	documents	acqured	by	my	own	FOia	request,	these	names	were	
publcly	released	 n	some	of	 these	 dentcal	documents	released	 to	hstoran	Wayne	Cole.	
letter,	 SaC	new	york	 to	hoover,	 25	aprl	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–344;	 letter,	 Foxworth	 to	
hoover,	2	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–345;	memorandum,	Tamm	to	hoover,	21	november	
1941,	Fbi	100–4712–231.	For	Cole’s	 copes	of	 these	documents	 refer	 to	hs	papers	 at	 the	
herbert	hoover	Presdental	lbrary	n	West	branch,	ia.
	 27.	 Sayers	and	Kahn,	Sabotage!	 235–36.	hstoran	Wayne	Cole	noted	 that	burch	was	
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	 For	 several	 months	 Fbi	 agents	 attempted	 to	 ntervew	 Sayers	 and	
Kahn’s	 edtor—russell	 Davenport—to	 wn	 permsson	 to	 examne	 ther	
research	fle.	Fbi	agents	tred	tme	and	agan	to	arrange	ths	ntervew	but	
were	plagued	by	contnued	schedulng	conflcts	and	delays	untl	hoover	
personally	 stepped	 n	 and	 arranged	 to	 meet	 wth	 Davenport.	 hoover	
beleved	 that	 Sayers	 and	Khan’s	 research	 fle	would	 be	 valuable	 for	 two	
reasons:	“frst,	for	nformatve	purposes	on	the	broad	pcture	of	subversve	
actvtes,	 and	 second,	 from	 the	 prosecutve	 angle.”	 bureau	 and	 Justce	
Department	offcals,	meanwhle,	evaluated	the	evdence	avalable	to	them	
concernng	 ths	 avenue	 of	 nvestgaton.	 eventually,	 though,	 attorney	
General	bddle	met	wth	harper	and	brothers	lawyer,	morrs	ernst.	ernst,	
who	mantaned	close	tes	to	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	and	the	pres-
dent,	 relayed	 to	hoover	 that	 Sayers	 and	Khan’s	 evdence	 about	amerca	
Frst	havng	 receved	 foregn	money	was	 thn,	 but,	he	 stressed,	 “there	 s	
a	good	deal	of	evdence	of	nterlockng	management	whch	mght	be	the	
bass	 of	 regsterng	 under	 the	 [Foregn	agents]	 regstraton	act.”	 ernst	
emphaszed	 that	 f	 nvestgators	 could	prove	amerca	Frst	had	 receved	
any	 foregn	money,	 the	 organzaton	 could	 be	 prosecuted	 for	 falng	 to	
regster	under	the	provsons	of	the	law.28
	 morrs	 ernst	 had	 a	 professonal	 nterest	 n	 dscredtng	 the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee.	he	revealed	some	of	hs	thoughts	months	after	the	nta-
ton	of	the	Sayers	and	Kahn	lead,	but	stll	wthn	the	tme	frame	that	Fbi	
offcals	were	consderng	developng	 nformaton	 for	prosecuton.	On	8	
aprl	1942,	ernst	wrote	Presdent	roosevelt	advsng	hm	of	a	dscusson	
he	had	wth	attorney	General	bddle	suggestng	“aggressve	acton	aganst	
amercan	Ffth	Columnsts	through	the	medum	of	Treasury	Department	
tax	 returns	 of	 nformaton	 from	 amerca	 Frst,	 Coughln,	 et	 al.”	 Then	
on	23	may,	ernst	 sent	 the	presdent	an	extensve	 lst	of	people	who	had	
never	an	offcer	n	the	akron	chapter	and	that	he	dd	not	contrbute	any	money	to	the	organ-
zaton.	See	Cole,	America First,	124;	memorandum,	hoover	to	bddle,	23	December	1941,	
Fbi	100–4712–263.
	 28.	memorandum,	 Tamm	 to	 ladd,	 21	 november	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–230;	 memo-
randum,	hoover	to	Tolson	and	Tamm,	27	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–232;	memoran-
dum,	hoover	to	Tolson	and	Tamm,	21	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–220;	memorandum,	
hoover	to	attorney	general,	22	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–221;	memorandum,	hoover	
to	Tolson	 and	Tamm,	 24	november	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–228;	memorandum,	hoover	 to	
Tolson	and	Tamm,	24	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–216;	memorandum,	hoover	to	Tolson	
and	Tamm,	22	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–217;	memorandum,	hoover	to	Tolson	and	
Tamm,	21	november	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–219.	many	of	these	documents	i	obtaned	va	the	
FOia	contan	redactons.	To	see	unredacted	copes	consult	the	Wayne	S.	Cole	research	fle	
at	the	hoover	Presdental	lbrary.
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contrbuted	money	to	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	that	he	had	secured	
from	“relable”	sources.	When	ernst	later	learned	that	no	one	from	ether	
the	 Justce	 or	 Treasury	 Departments	 was	 serously	 pursung	 the	matter	
(by	1942),	he	urged	roosevelt	to	contnue	the	project.	Despte	ernst’s	sug-
gestons	 for	 “aggressve	 acton,”	 all	 along	 Fbi	 offcals	 were	 reluctant	 to	
undertake	hs	plan	owng	to	ts	publc	nature.29
	 even	 before	 ernst	 voced	 hs	 concerns	 to	 roosevelt,	 assstant	 Fbi	
Drector	Tamm	recommended	on	12	December	1941	that	 the	Fbi	avod	
becomng	nvolved	n	ernst’s	plan	because	t	“obvously	.	 .	 .	[s]	an	effort	
to	 curtal	 exposed	 and	publczed	 facts	 relatng	 to	organzatons	 such	 as	
amerca	Frst—n	fact	that	s	probably	the	organzaton	that	was	specf-
cally	n	hs	mnd.”	nothng	ever	came	of	ernst’s	suggestons,	but	they	llus-
trate	the	latent	desre	of	some	admnstraton	alles	to	dscredt	ther	oppo-
nents	n	the	then	heated	poltcal	atmosphere.	hs	suggestons	also	reveal	
the	hestancy	of	senor	Fbi	offcals	to	become	nvolved	n	any	acton	that	
would	publcly	be	vewed	as	questonable	and,	moreover,	lnked	to	the	Fbi.	
hoover	preferred	to	work	behnd	the	scenes	and	n	secret.30
	 bureau	offcals	nevertheless	were	keenly	nterested	n	the	ntellgence	
offered	n	the	soon-to-be-publshed	book.	after	some	hestaton,	and	stll	
havng	 faled	 to	 obtan	 ntervews	wth	 the	 book’s	 authors	 or	 the	 pres-
dent	of	 the	publshng	company,	 Justce	Department	offcals	decded	 to	
assgn	 the	 case	 to	 the	 Crmnal	Dvson.31	 but	 the	 effort	 was	 too	 lttle,	
too	 late.	Followng	 the	 Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	harbor	on	7	December,	
the	 Justce	 Department	 temporarly	 suspended	 the	 case.32	 The	 bureau’s	
nvestgaton	resumed	wth	the	start	of	the	new	year,	but	Fbi	agents	were	
not	able	to	examne	Sayers	and	Kahn’s	materal	untl	aprl	1942.	by	then	
the	 ant-nterventonsts	 had	dsbanded	 and	Fbi	 offcals	 had	developed	
serous	questons	about	the	relablty	of	both	albert	Kahn—owng	to	hs	
alleged	connectons	wth	the	Communst	party—and	the	ant-Defamaton	
league,	whch	had	offered	the	use	of	ts	fles	n	ths	matter,	because	t	was	
	 29.	 letter,	morrs	ernst	to	roosevelt,	8	aprl	1942,	Presdent’s	Secretary’s	Fle—ernst,	
FDrl;	letter,	ernst	to	roosevelt,	23	may	1942,	PSF—ernst,	FDrl;	letter,	ernst	to	roosevelt,	
10	June	1942,	PSF—ernst,	FDrl;	memorandum,	edward	a.	Tamm	to	hoover,	12	December	
1941,	martn	Des	Folder,	hoover	O&C.
	 30.	 ibd.
	 31.	memorandum,	hoover	to	assstant	attorney	General	berge,	2	December	1941,	Fbi	
100–4712–240;	 memorandum,	 Tamm	 to	 hoover,	 2	 December	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–243;	
memorandum,	 Tamm	 to	 hoover,	 2	 December	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–4712–244;	 memorandum,	
Tamm	to	ladd,	4	December	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–245.
	 32.	memorandum,	lawrence	m.	C.	Smth,	Chef,	Specal	Defense	Unt,	to	hoover,	23	
December	1941,	Fbi	100–4712–264.
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a	leftst	group.	in	any	event,	bureau	offcals	eventually	deemed	ther	long-
sought-after	nformaton	“to	be	largely	worthless.”33
—■■■■■■■—
The	Fbi’s	montorng	of	 the	 ant-nterventonsts	dd	not	 cease	wth	 the	
Unted	States’	entrance	nto	the	war.	Despte	the	questonable	nature	of	the	
assertons	made	by	Sayers	and	Kahn,	and	the	dssoluton	of	the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee,	Fbi	offcals	remaned	focused	on	the	commttee	because	
of	ts	1	December	1941	announcement	about	takng	part	n	the	1942	con-
gressonal	electons.	Ther	plan	was	 to	campagn	 n	an	attempt	 to	 swng	
contested	 electons	 away	 from	 the	 presdent.	 indeed,	 on	 13	 February	
1942	hoover	 nformed	Presdental	 Secretary	edwn	Watson	about	 a	 17	
December	1941	dnner	party	at	whch	Charles	lndbergh	was	present.	in	
addton	 to	 descrbng	 lndbergh’s	 remarks	 at	 the	meetng	 (whch	were	
obtaned	through	an	llegal	wretap	[see	chapter	6]),	hoover	advsed	the	
Whte	house	that	lndbergh	had	“ndcated	.	 .	 .	[that]	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	can	agan	be	a	poltcal	 force;	 that	 there	may	be	a	 tme	soon	
when	the	Commttee	can	advocate	a	negotated	peace.”	hoover	also	pro-
vded	 Watson	 wth	 a	 twenty-one-page	 summary	 memorandum	 on	 the	
“structure,	actvtes,	and	connectons	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	as	
t	was	organzed	pror	to	ts	allegedly	gong	out	of	exstence	followng	our	
entry	nto	war.”34
	 Fbi	agents	then	learned	from	an	nformer	about	the	alleged	post–Pearl	
harbor	secret	actvtes	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.	On	26	February,	
Fbi	assocate	Drector	Clyde	Tolson	reported	to	hoover	that,	whle	at	a	
(dfferent)	dnner	party	n	new	york,	lndbergh	had	allegedly	remarked	
that	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 had	 gone	 underground.	 The	 Fbi’s	
source	clamed	that	lndbergh	beleved	that	“ths	war	hystera	wll	wear	off	
and	we	wll	come	back.”	in	response	to	ths	development,	hoover	advsed	
Tolson	“to	get	to	[the]	bottom	of	ths.”35
	 Then,	 on	 16	march,	 hoover	 ordered	 senor	 Fbi	 offcals	 and	 SaCs	
natonwde	to	contnue	to	nvestgate	the	commttee	and	to	report	wthn	
	 33.	 letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	2	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–345;	letter,	SaC	new	york	
to	hoover,	14	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–342;	memorandum,	Frank	W.	Crocker	to	hoover,	1	
may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–343;	letter,	P.	e.	Foxworth	to	hoover,	2	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–
345.
	 34.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Watson,	13	February	1942,	Offcal	Fle	
10-b,	FDrl.
	 35.	memorandum,	 Clyde	 Tolson	 to	 hoover,	 26	 February	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–302;	
memorandum,	D.	m.	ladd	to	hoover,	5	march	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–302.	
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ffteen	days.	To	ratonalze	contnuaton	of	the	probe,	hoover	cted	lnd-
bergh’s	remark	that	amerca	Frst	had	gone	underground	and	planned	to	
surface	later.	accordng	to	the	Fbi	drector,	the	commttee	kept	tself	actve	
through	 frequent	 “house	 partes	 .	 .	 .	 to	 keep	 alve	 [poltcal]	 contacts.”	
hoover	 ordered	 Fbi	 feld	 offces	 to	 revew	 ther	 fles	 and	 then	 ntate	
nvestgatons	 “for	 background	 nformaton,”	 but	 to	 be	 careful	 to	 make	
them	 “n	 a	 dscreet	manner	 so	 as	 to	 cause	 no	 undue	 publcty.”	hoover	
urged	agents	to	employ	“confdental	nformants”	as	well	as	“sncere	sola-
tonsts,	who	formerly	were	actve	n	ths	Commttee	and	who	now	realze	
the	necessty	for	an	all	out	natonal	defense.”	hoover	further	advsed	that	
agents	“should	be	careful	when	approachng	Commttee	members,	as	they	
mght	be	assocated	wth	the	alleged	underground	secton	of	the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee.”	 The	 Fbi	 drector	 justfed	 ths	 nvestgaton,	 lke	 oth-
ers,	on	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act.	Fbi	agents	were	“to	ascertan	
whether	the	structure	set	up	by	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	s	now	beng	
used	by	foregn	nterests,	or	by	ndvduals	cooperatng	wth	foregn	nter-
ests,	n	such	a	manner	as	to	nterfere	wth	the	natonal	defense	effort.”36
	 Specal	 agents	 n	 charge	 at	 each	 Fbi	 offce	 ntated	 nvestgatons	
n	 ther	 geographc	 areas	 lookng	 nto	 the	 status	 of	 the	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee.	 Some	of	 the	 larger	 feld	offces,	 such	 as	Chcago,	 even	 sub-
mtted	 reports	 on	 smaller	 ctes	 that	 fell	 under	 ther	 jursdcton.	 Fbi	
agents	closely	followed	hoover’s	drectons	and	used	nformers	to	gather	
ther	ntellgence,	and	they	chroncled	the	actvtes	of	local	amerca	Frst	
chapters	datng	from	ther	orgns.	no	SaC,	however,	uncovered	anythng	
to	 suggest	 that	 the	amerca	 Frst	Commttee	 had	 gone	 underground	 n	
antcpaton	 of	 reemergng	 later	 to	 become	 nvolved	 agan	 n	amercan	
poltcs.	 instead,	 each	 Fbi	 feld	 offce	 confrmed	 that	 all	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee	chapters	had	dsbanded.37
	 36.	memorandum,	hoover	to	senor	Fbi	offcals,	16	march	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–320;	
memorandum,	hoover	to	all	SaCs,	16	march	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–320;	telegram,	hoover	to	
all	SaCs,	11	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–349;	telegram,	hoover	to	all	SaCs,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	
100–4712–374;	telegram,	hoover	to	SaCs	Detrot,	mam,	butte,	Phladelpha,	13	June	1942,	
Fbi	100–4712–417.
	 37.	report,	SaC	Cncnnat	to	Fbi	hQ,	25	aprl	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–337;	report,	SaC	
huntngton,	Wv	to	Fbi	hQ,	27	aprl	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–341;	report,	SaC	Phoenx	to	Fbi	
hQ,	28	aprl	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–342;	report,	SaC	Sprngfeld	to	Fbi	hQ,	8	may	1942,	Fbi	
100–4712–346;	report,	SaC	San	Dego	to	Fbi	hQ,	9	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–354;	report,	
SaC	norfolk	to	Fbi	hQ,	12	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–355;	report,	SaC	Seattle	to	Fbi	hQ,	
11	may	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–357;	 report,	 SaC	new	york	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 13	may	 1942,	 Fbi	
100–4712–358;	report,	SaC	Kansas	Cty,	mO	to	Fbi	hQ,	15	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–362;	
report,	SaC	lttle	rock	to	Fbi	hQ,	18	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–363;	report,	SaC	Jackson,	
mS	to	Fbi	hQ,	18	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–364;	report,	SaC	Dallas	to	Fbi	hQ,	18	may	
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in	 late	 December	 1941,	 hoover	 receved	 yet	 another	 unsolcted	 docu-
ment	that	portrayed	Senator	Wheeler	as	a	subversve.	The	document	was	
a	 legal	 bref	 prepared	 by	 lawyers	 n	 the	new	york	 law	 frm	 of	 Phllps,	
nzer,	benjamn,	and	Krm,	and	t	accused	the	senator	of	havng	accepted	
1942,	Fbi	100–4712–365;	report,	SaC	Denver	to	Fbi	hQ,	18	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–367;	
report,	SaC	Grand	rapds	to	Fbi	hQ,	16	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–368;	report,	SaC	inda-
napols	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 17	may	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–369;	 report,	 SaC	memphs	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	
22	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–371;	report,	SaC	Des	mones	to	Fbi	hQ,	22	may	1942,	Fbi	
100–4712–372;	report,	SaC	lousvlle	to	Fbi	hQ,	20	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–373;	report,	
SaC	San	Juan	to	Fbi	hQ,	21	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–375;	report,	SaC	new	haven	to	Fbi	
hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–376;	report,	SaC	Oklahoma	Cty	to	Fbi	hQ,	25	may	1942,	
Fbi	100–4712–377;	report,	SaC	albany	to	Fbi	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–378;	letter,	
SaC	Washngton,	DC	to	Fbi	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–380;	report,	SaC	Salt	lake	
Cty	to	Fbi	hQ,	25	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–382;	report,	SaC	Washngton,	DC	to	Fbi	hQ,	
26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–384;	report,	SaC	baltmore	to	Fbi	hQ,	27	may	1942,	Fbi	100–
4712–385;	report,	SaC	houston	to	FbO	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–386;	report,	SaC	
los	angeles	to	Fbi	hQ,	27	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–387;	report,	SaC	Soux	Falls	to	Fbi	
hQ,	27	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–388;	report,	SaC	Provdence	to	Fbi	hQ,	27	may	1942,	Fbi	
100–4712–389;	report,	SaC	mlwaukee	to	Fbi	hQ,	27	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–391;	report,	
SaC	San	antono	to	Fbi	hQ,	28	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–392;	report,	SaC	Charlotte	to	
Fbi	hQ,	27	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–393;	report,	SaC	new	Orleans	to	Fbi	hQ,	28	may	
1942,	Fbi	100–4712–395;	report,	SaC	Juneau	to	Fbi	hQ,	25	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–396;	
report,	SaC	Chcago	to	Fbi	hQ,	29	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–397;	report,	SaC	San	Fran-
csco	to	Fbi	hQ,	26	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–398;	report	SaC	St.	lous	to	Fbi	hQ,	28	may	
1942,	Fbi	100–4712–404;	report,	SaC	newark	to	Fbi	hQ,	30	may	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–405;	
report,	SaC	el	Paso	 to	Fbi	hQ,	4	 June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–467;	 report,	SaC	rchmond	
to	Fbi	hQ,	2	June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–408;	report,	SaC	Phladelpha	 to	Fbi	hQ,	6	June	
1942,	Fbi	100–4712–409;	report,	SaC	buffalo	to	Fbi	hQ,	2	June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–410;	
report,	 SaC	Omaha	 to	Fbi	hQ,	 12	 June	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–419;	 report,	 SaC	Portland	
to	Fbi	hQ,	5	June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–420;	report,	SaC	butte	to	Fbi	hQ,	13	June	1942,	
Fbi	100–4712–427;	report,	SaC	Kansas	Cty	to	Fbi	hQ,	22	June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–428;	
report,	SaC	Detrot	to	Fbi	hQ,	22	June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–429;	report,	SaC	San	Dego	
to	Fbi	hQ,	25	June	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–432;	report,	SaC	mam	to	Fbi	hQ,	23	June	1942,	
Fbi	 100–4712–433;	 report,	 SaC	mlwaukee	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 6	 July	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–440;	
report,	SaC	baltmore	to	Fbi	hQ,	8	July	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–442;	report,	SaC	new	york	to	
Fbi	hQ,	11	July	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–443;	report,	SaC	Pttsburgh	to	Fbi	hQ,	1	September	
1942,	Fbi	100–4712–458;	report,	SaC	Salt	lake	Cty	to	Fbi	hQ,	12	September	1942,	Fbi	
100–4712–459;	report,	SaC	Des	mones	 to	Fbi	hQ,	Fbi	100–4712–460;	report,	SaC	Salt	
lake	Cty	 to	Fbi	hQ,	22	September	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–462;	report,	SaC	De	mones	 to	
Fbi	hQ,	28	September	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–463;	 report,	SaC	brmngham	to	Fbi	hQ,	1	
October	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–465;	report,	SaC	Cleveland	to	Fbi	hQ,	9	October	1942,	Fbi	
100–4712–466;	 report,	 SaC	 San	Dego	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 3	October	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–4712–467;	
report,	SaC	Soux	Falls	to	Fbi	hQ,	15	October	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–470;	report,	SaC	inda-
napols	to	Fbi	hQ,	14	October	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–471.
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$25,000	from	German	dplomats	to	support	hs	opposton	to	roosevelt’s	
foregn	polcy.	(if	true,	ths	would	mean	that	Wheeler	was	n	volaton	of	
the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act.)	The	bref	also	accused	Wheeler	of	
volatng	 the	 1917	 esponage	 act	 for	 revealng—the	 prevous	 July—the	
government’s	plan	 to	occupy	 iceland.	Fnally,	 the	document	accused	 the	
senator,	as	were	many	people	at	ths	tme,	of	llegally	usng	hs	congresson-	
al	 frankng	 prvlege	 to	 effect	 a	wde	 dstrbuton	 of	 ant-nterventonst	
lterature.	hoover	took	ths	unsolcted	legal	bref	and	forwarded	t	to	the	
Justce	Department.38
	 Whle	the	documentary	evdence	s	murky,	t	appears	that	by	February	
1942	attorney	General	bddle	had	at	least	consdered	the	charges	as	lad	
out	n	the	legal	bref,	especally	the	accusaton	allegng	that	Wheeler	had	
accepted	foregn	funds.	bddle	solcted	hoover’s	opnon	as	to	whether	the	
department	should	“make	a	further	nvestgaton.”	There	s	no	ndcaton	
n	Wheeler’s	Fbi	fle	of	hoover’s	reply,	but	a	28	February	1942	memoran-
dum	 from	hoover	 to	Wendell	 berge—head	 of	 the	 Justce	Department’s	
Crmnal	Dvson—confrms	 that	berge	had	 asked	hoover	whether	 the	
Fbi	made	an	 nvestgaton.	hoover	 repled	 that	 the	bureau	had	not,	but	
the	department’s	 language	 n	 the	document	suggests	 that	admnstraton	
offcals	had	regarded	the	charges	aganst	Wheeler	as,	at	least,	vable	and	
that	they	consdered	pursung	them.39
	 Whle	hoover	 forwarded	 unsolcted	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 reports	 to	
the	Whte	 house	 and	 Justce	 Department,	 n	 at	 least	 one	 nstance	 the	
admnstraton	 requested	 nformaton	 from	 the	 Fbi	 regardng	 Senator	
Wheeler.	 The	 Whte	 house’s	 nterest	 centered	 on	 some	 off-the-record	
remarks	Wheeler	 had	made	 to	Milwaukee Journal	 reporter	 laurence	C.	
eklund	 on	 14	 January	 1942.	Wheeler	 commented	 durng	 hs	 ntervew	
that	 the	 admnstraton	 was	 too	 receptve	 to	 brtsh	 nfluence	 and	 that	
the	Whte	house	had	wthheld	from	the	publc	how	dsastrous	the	Pearl	
harbor	attack	really	was.	Wheeler,	furthermore,	referred	to	navy	Secretary	
Frank	Knox	as	a	“blatherskte.”	because	these	remarks	came	so	soon	after	
the	Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	harbor,	the	reporter	felt	compelled	to	share	
them	wth	the	admnstraton.	but	eklund	was	not	the	Whte	house’s	only	
source	about	these	comments.	Wllam	Donovan,	drector	of	the	Offce	of	
Coordnator	 of	 informaton,	 and	 Frank	Knox	 both	 alerted	roosevelt	 to	
	 38.	memorandum,	hoover	to	attorney	general,	30	December	1941,	Fbi	62–55261–35;	
memorandum	of	Facts,	law	and	exhbts	re	Senator	burton	K.	Wheeler,	Fbi	62–55261–35.
	 39.	memorandum,	attorney	General	Francs	bddle	 to	hoover,	2	February	1942,	Fbi	
62–55261–37;	memorandum,	hoover	to	assstant	attorney	General	Wendell	berge,	28	Feb-
ruary	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–44.
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Wheeler’s	comments.	Knox,	moreover,	edtoralzed	that	Wheeler’s	words	
consttuted	“the	most	shockngly	reckless,	treasonable	talk	that	i	have	ever	
seen.”40
	 Stephen	 early,	 roosevelt’s	 secretary,	 thereupon	 asked	hoover	 on	 26	
January	to	verfy	the	accuracy	of	eklund’s	reportng	and	whether	t	could	
be	corroborated.	early	noted	that	“we	would	lke	very	much	to	know,”	and	
he	asked	that	hoover	send	to	the	Whte	house	an	Fbi	“report.”41	accedng	
to	the	Whte	house	request,	hoover	ordered	Fbi	agents	to	verfy	eklund’s	
account.	 mlwaukee	 Fbi	 agents	 conducted	 several	 ntervews	 and	 Fbi	
assstant	Drector	 ladd	 reported	 to	hoover	 that	 not	 only	 had	 eklund’s	
account	been	verfed,	but	Wheeler	had	“rambled	on	at	great	 length	n	a	
very	btter	manner	aganst	the	Presdent,	Secretary	Knox,	and	england	to	
the	extent	that	eklund	fnally	had	to	termnate	the	ntervew	hmself.”42
	 hoover	 forwarded	 ths	 specfc	 nformaton	 to	 early	 on	 3	 February	
and	 added	 that	 “the	 Senator’s	 feelngs	 [about	 the	 presdent,	 Knox,	 and	
england]	were	apparent	by	hs	 facal	expressons	as	well	as	hs	remarks.”	
What	the	Whte	house	dd	wth	ths	nformaton	s	unclear;	we	can	con-
clude,	however,	that	the	Whte	house	was	nterested	enough	n	Wheeler’s	
comments	to	have	Fbi	agents	verfy	ther	accuracy.	hoover,	n	hs	effort	to	
kowtow	to	roosevelt,	was	more	than	wllng	to	cater	to	such	requests.43
	 The	 best	 way	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 Fbi’s	 montorng	 of	 Senator	
burton	Wheeler	s	to	compare	t	wth	other	promnent	ant-nterventon-
sts.	 Whereas	 the	 Fbi’s	 probe	 of	 Charles	 lndbergh	 was	 extensve	 and	
thorough—owng	 to	hs	popularty	and	many	controversal	publc	 state-
ments—the	 bureau’s	 nvestgaton	 of	 Wheeler	 was	 crcumspect.	 Whle	
Wheeler	was	one	of	the	most	promnent	ant-nterventonsts,	he	was	also	
a	very	powerful	 and	 nfluental	 senator.	Ths	 explans,	 for	 example,	why	
	 40.	 letter,	 rchard	 S.	 Davs,	Milwaukee Journal,	 to	 roosevelt,	 14	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	
62–55261–40;	 ntervew	 memorandum	 of	 laurence	 eklund,	 no	 date,	 Fbi	 62–55261–40;	
memorandum,	Wllam	J.	Donovan	to	roosevelt,	22	January	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–40;	mem-
orandum,	Frank	Knox	to	roosevelt,	23	January	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–40.
	 41.	memorandum,	Stephen	early	to	hoover,	26	January	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–40.
	 42.	 letter,	hoover	to	SaC	mlwaukee,	27	January	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–40;	memoran-
dum,	D.	m.	ladd	to	hoover,	31	January	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–40.
	 43.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	early,	3	February	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–
40;	blnd	memorandum	re	burton	Wheeler,	3	February	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–40;	personal	
and	confdental	letter,	SaC	mlwaukee	to	hoover,	31	January	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–40.	The	
heavly	redacted	documents	 nclude:	memorandum,	lous	b.	nchols	 to	Clyde	Tolson,	12	
February	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–42	(all	text	deleted);	Justce	Department,	Crmnal	Dvson	
document,	 no	 date,	 Fbi	 62–55261–44	 (entre	 document	 wthheld);	memorandum,	 K.	 r.	
mcintre	to	mr.	mumford,	17	October	1942,	Fbi	62–55261–45	(all	text	deleted);	and	four-
teen	pages	of	documents	wthheld	n	ther	entrety,	Fbi	62–55261–45.
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hoover	 only	 thoroughly	 nvestgated	 hs	 actvtes	 wth	 a	Whte	 house	
request.
	 Further	explanng	the	Fbi’s	restrant	n	terms	of	Wheeler	was	hoover’s	
hstory	wth	the	senator.	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Palmer	rads	and	Teapot	
Dome	scandal,	burton	Wheeler	and	other	senators	led	nvestgatons	that	
exposed	llegal	Fbi	and	Justce	Department	actvty.	as	such,	Wheeler	was	
well	acquanted	wth	hoover’s	actvtes	as	head	of	the	General	intellgence	
Dvson	where,	 n	 the	mass	 round-up	of	alleged	radcals,	many	people’s	
cvl	 lbertes	 had	 been	 volated.	 Undoubtedly,	 ths	 hstory	 affected	
hoover’s	probe	nto	Wheeler’s	actvtes,	leadng	hm	to	not	authorze	any	
Fbi	nvestgaton	wthout	pror	consent	from	the	admnstraton.	by	dong	
ths,	f	Fbi	agents’	work	was	exposed,	hoover	would	be	nsulated.
—■■■■■■■—
Whle	hoover	would	only	 ntate	a	 formal Fbi	 nvestgaton	that	delved	
nto	 an	 ant-nterventonst	 congressman’s	 or	 senator’s	 poltcal	 actvtes	
wth	 authorzaton	 from	 the	Whte	house,	 he	 dd	 not	 hestate	 to	move	
forward	wth	Fbi	 nvestgatons	of	 them	for	possble	crmnal	actvty.	a	
perfect	example	 s	 that	of	ant-nterventonst	Senator	Davd	i.	Walsh.	a	
Democrat	from	massachusetts	and	charman	of	the	Senate	Commttee	on	
naval	affars	 from	1937	 to	 1947,	Walsh	 fought	 hard	 aganst	roosevelt’s	
foregn	polcy.	he	tred	to	convnce	amercans	that	ther	country	would	be	
safe	from	any	attack	f	ts	ar	and	sea	approaches	were	adequately	defended.	
but	by	may	of	1942	Walsh	was	named	as	a	possble	consprator	n	a	fraud	
charge.
	 On	4	may	1942,	roosevelt	ally	and	attorney	morrs	ernst	telephoned	
new	york	SaC	Foxworth	allegng	that	Walsh	was	nvolved	n	a	fraudulent	
scheme	to	award	a	$16	mllon	naval	contract	to	one	of	hs	frends.	ernst	
clamed	that	Walsh’s	frend	had	been	ndcted	n	another	matter	and	was,	
therefore,	 not	 elgble	 to	 receve	 the	 contract.	 instead,	 the	 contract	 was	
awarded	 to	 a	 corporaton	 supposedly	 under	 ths	man’s	 control.	 hoover	
advsed	 the	 attorney	 general	 of	 the	 charge	 on	 13	 may,	 whereupon	 he	
authorzed	a	prelmnary	crmnal	nvestgaton.	Fbi	agents	doggedly	pur-
sued	the	matter	that	year,	generatng	a	flurry	of	reports	between	the	Fbi	
and	 attorney	 general,	 but	nothng	was	developed	 to	 ndcate	 that	Walsh	
had	been	nvolved	n	any	crme.	nevertheless,	because	he	had	a	crmnal	
allegaton	hoover	was	 able	 to	pursue	 the	matter	 vgorously	 and	 thereby	
gather	 derogatory	 nformaton	 about	 a	 promnent	 ant-nterventonst	
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senator	wthout	fear	of	publc	exposure.	if	exposed,	hoover	could	rghtly	
clam	the	Fbi	was	merely	followng	up	on	a	crmnal	complant.	moreover,	
due	to	the	nature	of	the	allegaton,	the	records	generated	about	t	were	fled	
n	the	Fbi’s	central	records	system.44
	 What	 s	 more	 tellng	 about	 ths	 ncdent,	 however,	 s	 what	 was	 not	
fled	 n	 the	 “offcal	 fles”	 of	 the	 Fbi,	 but	 n	 hoover’s	 secret	 offce	 fle.	
Sgnfcantly,	ernst	had	also	tpped	Fbi	offcals	off	on	nformaton	“con-
cernng	Senator	Walsh’s	alleged	connecton	wth	the	house	of	degradaton	
operated	 [deleted,	 but	 by	 Gustave	 beekman]	 n	 new	 york	 Cty.”45	 Ths	
“house	of	degradaton”	was	 a	 “male	brothel”	 frequented	by	 solders	 and	
salors	seekng	homosexual	encounters.	The	pro-roosevelt	New York Post	
broke	 ths	 story	 on	 6	may	 clamng	 that	Walsh	 had	 vsted	 the	 brothel,	
addng	 that	 naz	 agents	 routnely	 vsted	 and	 questoned	 the	 brothel’s	
patrons	about	the	“comngs	and	gong	of	ther	shps.”46	Whte	house	off-
cals	knew	about	the	story	before	t	broke,	however,	and	hoover	nformed	
them	that	hs	only	nterest	was	the	esponage	sde	of	the	case.	in	response,	
the	presdent’s	secretary,	marvn	mcintyre,	applauded	hoover’s	clam.	(in	
realty,	Fbi	offcals	were	obsessvely	nterested	n	the	actvtes	of	gay	and	
lesban	amercans,	datng	from	1937	when	Fbi	agents	began	a	systematc	
collecton	of	nformaton	about	gays.)	hoover,	moreover,	provded	Justce	
Department	 offcal	Oscar	Cox	wth	 a	 complete	 Fbi	 report,	whereupon	
he	shared	t	wth	Senator	alben	barkley,	the	Senate	majorty	leader,	who	
revealed	the	Fbi’s	nvestgaton	on	the	floor	of	the	Senate	to	demonstrate	
that	Walsh	 had	 been	 cleared	 of	 any	 wrongdong.47	 ant-nterventonst	
senators	then	publcly	backed	Walsh,	referrng	to	the	homosexual	charge	
as	nothng	but	part	of	a	“dabolcal”	campagn	to	dscredt	every	ant-nter-
ventonst	senator.	because	of	the	senstvty	of	ths	partcular	derogatory	
nformaton,	 hoover	 dd	 not	 fle	 t	 n	 the	 bureau’s	 central	 records	 sys-
tem—as	he	had	wth	the	other	complant	aganst	Walsh—but	n	hs	secret	
offce	fles.48
	 44.	memorandum,	 Foxworth	 to	 hoover,	 4	 may	 1942,	 Fbi	 62–68060–1;	 memoran-
dum,	hoover	to	bddle,	13	may	1942,	Fbi	62–68060–1;	memorandum	re:	Senator	Davd	i.	
Walsh—alleged	Fraud,	7	December	1942,	Fbi	62–68060–32.
	 45.	memorandum,	hoover	to	bddle,	25	may	1942,	Fbi	62–68060–2.
	 46.	Newsweek,	1	June	1942,	30.
	 47.	blnd	memorandum,	27	June	1942,	Folder	153,	Davd	i.	Walsh,	hoover	O&C.
	 48.	 “Fbi	Clears	Walsh,	barkley	asserts,”	New York Times,	21	may	1942,	6;	“Tobey	asks	
inqury	on	Walsh	Charge,”	New York Times,	 22	may	1942,	 10;	 “The	Case	of	 ‘Senator	X,’”	
Time,	1	June	1942,	50;	“Gustav	beekman	Sentenced	on	morals	Charge	 n	brooklyn,”	New 
York Times,	6	October	1942,	16.
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lndbergh,	 Wheeler,	 and	 Walsh	 were	 leadng	 opponents	 of	 roosevelt’s	
foregn	 polcy,	 but	 the	most	 crtczed	 congressonal	 ant-nterventonst	
was	 representatve	 hamlton	 Fsh.	 Durng	 1942,	 Fbi	 agents	montored	
Fsh’s	poltcal	actvty,	tred	to	develop	derogatory	nformaton	about	hm,	
and	forwarded	poltcal	 ntellgence	to	the	Whte	house	that	servced	ts	
nterests.
	 Fsh,	 a	 republcan	 who	 represented	 roosevelt’s	 home	 dstrct	 n	
Congress,	was	n	many	ways	the	presdent’s	nemess.	lke	roosevelt,	Fsh	
came	 from	 a	 dstngushed	 patrcan	 famly	 who	 lved	 n	 the	 hudson	
rver	valley.	Fsh’s	great-grandfather—ncolas	Fsh—was	a	colonel	n	the	
War	for	independence	who	had	alled	hmself	poltcally	wth	alexander	
hamlton.	The	congressman	was	also	the	grandson	of	hs	famous	name-
sake,	who	was	Presdent	Ulysses	Grant’s	secretary	of	state.	lke	roosevelt,	
Fsh	 attended	 harvard	 College	 where	 he	 also	 studed	 law	 (roosevelt	
studed	 law	 brefly	 at	 Columba);	 Fsh	 graduated	 at	 the	 top	 of	 hs	 class	
(roosevelt	dd	not).	Durng	the	Frst	World	War	Fsh	served	as	the	com-
pany	commander	of	an	afrcan	amercan	unt,	whereas	roosevelt	served	
as	Presdent	Wlson’s	assstant	 secretary	of	 the	navy.	Fsh	won	 the	Slver	
Star	and	French	Crox	de	Guerre	for	hs	servce,	whle	roosevelt	went	on	
to	 run—unsuccessfully—for	 the	 vce	 presdency	 n	 1920.	Whle	 havng	
many	common	socal	and	poltcal	 trats,	 n	poltcs	Fsh	the	republcan	
and	roosevelt	the	Democrat	were	at	polar	ends.49
	 in	1919	Fsh	was	elected	to	Congress	and,	partly	as	a	result	of	hs	ser-
vce	 wth	 an	afrcan	amercan	 unt,	 he	 garnered	 some	 support	 among	
mnortes.	Wth	 ths	 consttuency	 Fsh	 supported	 antlynchng	 legsla-
ton	and	helped	 to	erect	monuments	 to	black	 solders,	but	 ths	was	 the	
extent	of	hs	advocacy	for	mnorty	 ssues.	in	a	broader	sense,	however,	
	 49.	 Summary	memorandum	re	representatve	hamlton	Fsh,	26	September	1942,	Fbi	
94–4–3997–33.	On	Fsh’s	background	see	hs	short	and	poltczed	memor	Hamilton Fish: 
Memoir of an American Patriot	(Washngton,	DC:	regnery,	1991),	3–31.	Studes	on	Fsh	are	
scant.	See	rchard	Kay	hanks,	“hamlton	Fsh	and	amercan	isolatonsm,	1920–1944”	(Ph.D.	
dss.,	Unversty	of	Calforna	at	rversde,	1971).	The	poltcal	 rft	between	 the	presdent	
and	Fsh	s	evdenced	by	roosevelt’s	nvocaton	of	Fsh’s	name	durng	the	1940	presdental	
campagn.	roosevelt	stated,	to	the	delght	of	a	crowd	n	new	york	Cty,	that	“Great	brtan	
would	never	have	receved	an	ounce	of	help	from	us	f	the	decson	had	been	left	to	[Con-
gressmen	Joseph]	martn,	[bruce]	barton	and	Fsh.”	a	chant	of	“martn,	barton,	and	Fsh”	
soon	became	a	popular	and	negatve	poltcal	slogan.	Quoted	n	Dors	Kearns	Goodwn,	No 
Ordinary Time, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt: The Home Front in World War II	(new	york:	
Smon	and	Schuster,	1994),	185.
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Fsh	supported	all	veterans	whch	led	hm	to	support	the	amercan	legon	
when	t	was	establshed	followng	the	Frst	World	War.	but	Fsh	was	best	
known	for	charng	a	congressonal	commttee	n	the	1930s,	the	so-called	
Fsh	 Commttee	 that	 had	 nvestgated	 communst	 propaganda	 n	 the	
Unted	 States.	 a	 staunch	 antcommunst,	 Fsh	 opposed	 the	 roosevelt	
admnstraton’s	recognton	of	the	Sovet	Unon.50
	 irrespectve	 of	 Fsh’s	 antcommunsm,	 Fbi	 offcals	 took	 an	 nterest	
n	hm	after	 he	 began	 to	 oppose	roosevelt’s	 foregn	polcy,	 but	 partcu-
larly	 snce	 he	 was	 the	 rankng	mnorty	member	 of	 the	 house	 Foregn	
affars	 Commttee.	When	 t	 came	 to	 supportng	 ether	 antcommunsts	
or	 Presdent	 roosevelt,	 hoover—the	 shrewd	 bureaucrat	 that	 he	 was—
chose	 roosevelt.	 Snce	 1932,	 Fsh	 had	 opposed	 roosevelt	 and	 hs	 new	
Deal	 because	 of	 “ts	 socalst	 nature”	 and	 the	 dangers	 Fsh	 perceved	 n	
roosevelt’s	ncreasngly	centralzed	power—especally	n	foregn	relatons.	
as	the	congressman	later	wrote	n	hs	memor:	“roosevelt,	i	beleved,	was	
startng	us	down	the	road	to	socalsm	and	dctatorshp.”51
	 an	Fbi	summary	memorandum	from	late	1942	confrms	Fbi	offcals’	
nterest	n	Fsh’s	opposton	to	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy.	The	agent	wrt-
ng	the	memo	noted	that	a	revew	of	Fsh’s	congressonal	votes	“reflects	hs	
solatonst	trend	of	thought.”	The	agent	also	took	specal	note	of	the	pos-
tons	Fsh	 took	 n	opposton	 to	 the	presdent:	 from	mltary	 appropra-
tons	n	1938	to	conscrpton	to	lend-lease.	none	of	ths	nformaton	had	
anythng	to	do	wth	a	law	volaton	that	would	justfy	Fbi	nterest.	Of	par-
tcular	concern	to	Fbi	offcals,	accordng	to	ths	memorandum,	was	Fsh’s	
opposton	 to	 lend-lease,	whch	marked	 the	heght	 of	 the	 foregn	polcy	
debate.	The	Fbi	agent	also	noted	Fsh’s	connectons	to	the	Commttee	to	
Keep	amerca	Out	of	Foregn	Wars	and	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	hs	
varous	ant-nterventonst	statements,	and	that	hs	name	was	mentoned	
by	 the	 German-language	 newspaper	Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter	
and	other	radcal	publcatons.	The	memorandum	stands	as	evdence	that	
Fbi	 offcals	 took	 great	 nterest	 n	 ant-nterventonst	 poltcal	 actvty,	
especally	where	 t	 ntersected	wth	 the	poltcal	 efforts	 and	goals	 of	 the	
roosevelt	admnstraton.52
	 50.	 Fsh,	Memoir of a Patriot,	32–39;	summary	memorandum	re	representatve	haml-
ton	Fsh,	26	September	1942,	Fbi	94–4–3997–33,	pp.	3–6.
	 51.	 Fsh,	Memoir of an American Patriot,	56.
	 52.	 Summary	memorandum	re	representatve	hamlton	Fsh,	26	September	1942,	Fbi	
94–4–3997–33.	it	s	mportant	to	note	that	the	summary	memo	surveys	all	nformaton	man-
taned	n	the	“offcal”	fles	of	the	Fbi	and	not	necessarly	all	nformaton	mantaned	on	Fsh	
whch	could	have	been	mantaned	n	one	of	J.	edgar	hoover’s	varous	secret	offce	fles.
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	 by	may	1942—a	congressonal	electon	year	and	a	tme	when	foregn	
polcy	crtcs	stll	concerned	the	admnstraton—the	Whte	house	learned	
of	some	ttllatng	poltcal	gossp	nvolvng	Fsh	whch	led	them	to	request	
an	Fbi	 nvestgaton.	roosevelt’s	appontments	secretary,	edwn	Watson,	
learned	from	new	york	poltcal	sources	that	Fsh	had	allegedly	receved	
and	endorsed	suspcous	checks	amountng	to	several	hundred	thousand	
dollars.	Watson	then	forwarded	ths	nformaton	to	hoover	who	ordered	
an	Fbi	nvestgaton.53
	 in	 ther	 nvestgaton,	Fbi	agents	 ntervewed	mrs.	vanderblt	Webb,	
head	of	the	commttee	opposng	Fsh’s	reelecton,	as	well	as	her	confdant,	
henry	 hoke—who	 had	 ntally	 publczed	 the	 congressonal	 frankng-
prvlege	controversy.	mrs.	Webb	clamed	that	Fsh	had	accepted	two	checks	
totalng	$3,000	from	a	German	cavar	retaler	by	the	name	of	Sturm.	When	
Fbi	 agents	 ntervewed	hoke,	he	 clamed	 that	Fsh	had	 accepted	 checks	
n	1940	 totalng	$2,500	 from	 the	romanoff	Cavar	Company	and,	more	
mportant,	that	the	Treasury	Department	had	possesson	of	the	checks	“n	
connecton	wth	an	ncome	tax	volaton.”54
	 When	 reportng	 these	 developments	 to	 the	 Whte	 house,	 hoover	
noted	that	the	bureau’s	nvestgaton	was	“beng	afforded	vgorous	atten-
ton.”	in	the	meantme,	hoover	relayed	that	G.	F.	hansen-Sturm,	the	cavar	
busnessman,	had	dscussed	neutralty	ssues	wth	Fsh	and	had	requested	
fve	thousand	copes	of	a	Fsh	speech	for	a	busness	assocate.	Gven	Fsh’s	
role	 n	 the	vereck-led	congressonal	 frankng	scandal,	hoover	 regarded	
ths	 partcular	 connecton	 as	 suspcous.	he	 ordered	 an	 nvestgaton	 to	
determne	whether	Fsh	had	volated	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act,	
and	he	 advsed	 the	Whte	house	 that	 f	 any	 nformaton	was	developed	
that	would	“nterest	the	presdent”	he	would	pass	t	along.55
	 Whle	hoover	 had	Fbi	 agents	 lookng	 nto	 Fsh’s	 actvtes,	 the	 con-
gressman	learned	of	the	charges	and	the	Fbi’s	questonng	of	Webb.	Fsh	
also	learned	that	“some	Fbi	man	had	knowledge	of,	or	had	shown	some	
checks”	to	one	of	hs	consttuents,	leadng	hm	to	telephone	assstant	Fbi	
Drector	Tamm.	returnng	Fsh’s	phone	call,	Tamm	clamed	the	Fbi	had	
“no	 nformaton	 about	 any	 such	 checks	 n	 the	 amounts	 or	 any	 smlar	
	 53.	Confdental	memorandum	for	edgar	hoover,	4	may	1942,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	
letter,	Frankln	a.	Schrver	to	Watson,	23	aprl	1942,	Offcal	Fle	300,	FDrl;	personal	and	
confdental	 letter,	hoover	 to	Secretary	 to	 the	Presdent	edwn	m.	Watson,	13	may	1942,	
Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
	 54.	 ibd.
	 55.	Personal	 and	 confdental	 letter,	hoover	 to	 Secretary	 to	 the	 Presdent	 edwn	m.	
Watson,	13	may	1942,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
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amounts”	and	that	the	Fbi	was	“conductng	no	such	nvestgaton.”	Tamm	
suggested	 to	Fsh	 that	 people	 often	 confused	other	 federal	 agences	 and	
ther	 nvestgatons	 wth	 the	 Fbi,	 and	 that	 he	 should	 check	 wth	 those	
agences.	Fsh,	nevertheless,	explaned	 that	“the	check	was	a	 forgery	 f	 t	
exsted,	and	t	was	put	out	for	poltcal	purposes.”56
	 Tamm	mght	have	dened	any	Fbi	 nvestgaton,	but	 just	one	month	
before	Fsh’s	phone	call	hoover	had	provded	the	Whte	house	wth	nfor-
maton	 specfcally	 about	 Fsh’s	 checks.	 Gven	 the	 poltcal	 nature	 (and	
thus	the	senstvty)	of	the	Fbi’s	nterest,	t	s	no	wonder	that	Tamm	made	
blanket	denals	to	Fsh,	especally	as	1942	was	an	electon	year.	but	Fsh’s	
clam	that	an	Fbi	agent	had	shown	checks	to	a	consttuent	led	Tamm	and	
assstant	Drector	ladd	to	look	nto	the	matter.	in	the	nqury	the	albany	
feld	offce	dened	any	knowledge	of	the	ncdent,	but	because	sgnfcant	
portons	 of	 Tamm’s	memorandum	have	 been	 redacted	we	 do	 not	 know	
what	they	dscovered.	in	any	event,	the	ncdent	further	llustrates	the	Fbi’s	
caterng	to	admnstraton	poltcal	nterests	and	ther	concern	wth	keep-
ng	these	efforts	secret.57
—■■■■■■■—
interestngly,	brtsh	Securty	Coordnaton	also	noted	the	matter	of	Fsh	
acceptng	checks	 from	hansen-Sturm.	accordng	 to	 the	brtsh	account,	
bSC	agents	conducted	a	“straghtforward	ntellgence	job”	to	“dscredt”	a	
number	of	“partcular	personaltes,”	ncludng	Fsh.	The	bSC	hstory	gves	
no	detals—whch	 s	 typcal—and	only	notes	 that	 copes	of	 checks	 from	
hansen-Sturm	to	Fsh	“were	obtaned.”	One	mght	logcally	presume	that	
snce	henry	hoke	was	nvolved	n	ths	affar—as	wth	the	frankng	prv-
lege	 controversy—and	 snce	 the	 bSC	 hstory	 clams	 he	 had	 cooperated	
wth	them	regardng	the	congressonal	 frank,	that	he	may	have	been	the	
person	to	share	the	checks	wth	the	bSC.	Whle	ths	concluson	cannot	be	
confrmed	wthout	access	to	closed	brtsh	and	amercan	records,	t	does	
ft	the	bSC	pattern	of	operatons.58
—■■■■■■■—
in	august	1942,	Fbi	offcals	agan	focused	on	Fsh’s	recept	of	money	from	
	 56.	memorandum,	Tamm	to	hoover,	22	June	1942,	Fbi	94–4–3997–3.
	 57.	memorandum,	Tamm	to	ladd,	22	June	1942,	Fbi	65–29514–23;	(second)	memo-
randum,	Tamm	to	ladd,	2	June	1942,	Fbi	65–29514–23.
	 58.	British Security Coordination,	73–74,	75.
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questonable	sources.	Ths	 tme	 the	Fbi’s	 nterest	 followed	a	Washington 
Post	story	publshed	on	6	august	reportng	that	Fsh	had	receved	$25,000	
from	 General	 rafael	 Trujllo,	 the	 rght-wng	 mltary	 dctator	 of	 the	
Domncan	 republc.	 accordng	 to	 the	 artcle,	 Fsh	 had	 receved	 ths	
money	 n	 July	 1939,	 but	 had	 only	 declared	 $22,000	 on	 hs	 ncome	 tax	
return—seemngly	 commttng	 ncome	 tax	 evason	 f	 not	 volatng	 the	
Foregn	agents	regstraton	act.	The	newspaper	further	reported	that	Fsh	
had	receved	some	of	the	money	drectly,	and	some	of	t	from	ol	stocks.59
	 after	the	story	broke,	Fbi	assstant	Drector	ladd	brefed	hoover	that	
the	bureau	had	no	nformaton	concernng	Fsh’s	payment.	he	then	ordered	
an	expedted	and	“complete	survey”	of	all	Fbi	nformaton	about	Fsh,	but	
when	completed	 t	only	confrmed	the	Fbi’s	 gnorance.	meanwhle,	Fsh	
responded	to	the	story	callng	t	a	“poltcal	smear	campagn”	and	clamed	
that	 he	 had	 not	 accepted	 any	 “fee”	 from	 Trujllo.	 instead,	 Fsh	 clamed	
that	he	had	“merely	acted	as	an	agent	for	the	general”	n	handlng	an	ol-
speculaton	deal	whch,	by	law,	dd	not	need	to	be	reported	on	hs	1939	tax	
return.	Fsh	explaned	that	he	had	lost	a	sgnfcant	porton	of	the	general’s	
money	 n	ol	 stocks	and	had	returned	the	remander	 to	hm.	he	further	
clamed	that	the	internal	revenue	bureau	had	never	asked	hm	about	the	
transacton,	 as	 had	 been	 reported.	Whatever	 the	 truth,	 the	 story	 dom-
nated	Fsh’s	reelecton	campagn	and	nterested	Fbi	offcals.60
	 What	 nterested	 the	Fbi	most	was	 the	 relatonshp	between	 the	con-
gressman	 and	 Trujllo.	 Comng	 so	 soon	 after	 the	 vereck-hll	 frankng	
controversy	and	popular	notons	that	ant-nterventonsts—n	partcular	
hamlton	Fsh—were	themselves	fascsts	or	dupes	of	the	nazs,	the	fact	that	
Fsh	had	a	relatonshp	wth	a	rght-wng	foregn	dctator	concerned	some.	
in	 ther	 probe,	 Fbi	 agents	 learned	 that	 Fsh	 had	 vsted	 the	Domncan	
republc	 as	 part	 of	 a	 goodwll	 vst	 n	 march	 1939,	 and	 that	 Trujllo	
returned	the	favor	the	prevous	July	(when	Fsh	had	allegedly	receved	hs	
fee)	by	vstng	new	york	Cty.	Fsh	then	made	favorable	remarks	about	the	
general	at	a	banquet,	sayng	that	he	was	“proud	to	repeat	at	ths	tme	to	a	
Unted	States	audence,	you	wll	go	down	n	the	hstory	of	your	country	
	 59.	 “Secret	$25,000	Fee	Pad	to	hamlton	Fsh	by	Foregn	Power;	U.	S.	investgatng,”	
Washington Post,	6	august	1942;	summary	memorandum	re	representatve	hamlton	Fsh,	
26	September	1942,	Fbi	94–4–3997–33,	p.	15.
	 60.	memorandum,	ladd	 to	hoover,	6	august	1942,	Fbi	65–29514-(llegble);	memo-
randum,	 ladd	 to	hoover,	 8	august	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–29514–25;	 summary	memorandum	 re	
representatve	hamlton	Fsh,	26	September	1942,	Fbi	94–4–3997–33,	p.	16;	“Fsh	Denes	
he	Got	Fee	from	Trujllo,”	New York Times,	7	august	1942,	15.	Fsh	was	reelected	that	year,	
but	was	fnally	defeated	n	1944.
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as	a	bulder	greater	than	all	the	Spansh	Conqustadores	together.”	Though	
made	n	1939,	by	1942	the	comment	took	on	a	new	sgnfcance	n	terms	
of	the	Fbi’s	suspcons	about	Fsh.61
	 Fbi	 offcals	 took	 great	 nterest	 n	 the	 money	 Trujllo	 had	 gven	 to	
Fsh,	but	ther	specfc	nterest,	and	what	they	learned,	s	unknowable	due	
to	redactons	n	Fbi	documents.	hoover	ordered	the	Fbi’s	new	york	feld	
offce	 to	 report	 on	Trujllo’s	 vst	 and	Fsh’s	meetng	wth	hm	 “n	order	
that	any	further	nformaton	n	ths	case	may	be	mmedately	brought	to	
the	attenton	of	the	Whte	house	offcals.”	Whle	the	detals	of	what	Fbi	
agents	had	 learned	and	 reported	 are	murky,	 t	 s	 clear	 that	hoover	kept	
the	Whte	house	 nformed	as	 to	 the	poltcal	actvtes	of	 the	presdent’s	
nemess,	Fsh.62
	 There	s	no	ndcaton	that	the	Whte	house	had	solcted	any	of	ths	
partcular	nformaton	about	Fsh,	but	t	dd	receve	nformaton	about	Fsh	
and	Trujllo	from	Undersecretary		of	State	Sumner	Welles.	The	secretary	
nformed	roosevelt	 about	 the	Fsh-Trujllo	 affar	 before	 the	Washington 
Post	even	broke	the	story,	revealng	that	the	federal	grand	jury	nvestgat-
ng	 the	 frankng	case	had	dscovered	 the	payment	 nformaton.	because	
Trujllo’s	money	allegedly	orgnated	from	a	German	source,	federal	pros-
ecutor	maloney	forwarded	the	nformaton	to	assstant	Secretary	of	State	
berle.	 Whle	 berle	 concluded	 there	 had	 been	 no	 transgresson,	 Welles	
nevertheless	shared	t	wth	roosevelt,	satsfyng	the	presdent’s	nterest	and	
explanng	why	he	had	not	sought	an	Fbi	probe.63
	 interestngly,	 n	 1951	 Fsh	 learned	 that	 the	 Justce	 Department	 had	
consdered	hm	a	fascst	durng	the	1930s	and	1940s.	Concerned	wth	these	
old	allegatons	at	the	heght	of	mcCarthysm,	Fsh,	who	consdered	hmself	
a	 stalwart	 antcommunst,	 vsted	 Fbi	 headquarters	 to	 request	 access	 to	
hs	 Fbi	 fle.	an	 Fbi	 offcal	 advsed	 the	 former	 thrteen-term	 congress-
man	 that	Fbi	 fles	were	confdental	 and	not	open	 to	external	 revew,	at	
whch	pont	Fsh	felt	compelled	to	explan	hs	past	actons	to	set	hs	record	
straght.	accordng	to	Fsh’s	1951	account,	internal	revenue	nvestgators	
	 61.	 Summary	memorandum	re	representatve	hamlton	Fsh,	26	September	1942,	Fbi	
94–4–3997–33,	pp.	16–17.	it	should	be	noted	that	as	part	of	hs	Good	neghbor	Polcy	roos-
evelt	also	met	wth	Trujllo	n	1939	when	he	vsted	the	Unted	States.	When	crtcs	brought	
up	the	fact	that	Trujllo	was	a	dctator,	roosevelt	reportedly	sad:	“he	may	be	an	S.O.b.,	but	
he	s	our	S.O.b.”	Quoted	n	Thomas	G.	Paterson	et	al.,	American Foreign Relations: A History,	
vol.	2,	4th	ed.	(lexngton:	D.	C.	heath,	1995),	188.
	 62.	memorandum,	ladd	to	hoover,	4	September	1942,	Fbi	65–29514–(llegble);	mem-
orandum,	Tamm	to	ladd,	5	September	1942,	Fbi	65–29514–32.
	 63.	 letter	and	enclosure,	Undersecretary	of	State	Sumner	Welles	to	roosevelt,	27	July	
1942,	Presdent’s	Secretary’s	Fle,	Confdental	Fle,	State	Department,	FDrl.
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had	 approached	 hm	 for	 not	 reportng	 the	 questonable	 checks	 on	 hs	
ncome	tax	return,	but	he	convnced	them	that	 the	 ncdent	was	bengn.	
nevertheless,	 Fsh	 beleved	 the	 internal	 revenue	 bureau’s	 nterest	 was	
nothng	but	a	roosevelt	admnstraton	effort	to	“get	hm.”64
	 by	 the	 late	 summer	of	1942,	 the	Whte	house	asked	 the	Fbi	 to	 look	
nto	 one	 last	 matter	 concernng	 Fsh.	 On	 22	 august,	 Colonel	 harman	
beukema—an	 nstructor	 at	 West	 Pont—wrote	 Presdental	 Secretary	
Watson	that	Fsh	possessed	a	photograph	of	roosevelt’s	hyde	Park	lbrary	
showng	 a	 brtsh	 flag	 dsplayed	 above	 an	 amercan	 one.	 accordng	 to	
beukema,	 Fsh	 beleved	he	 could	use	 the	 photo	 to	 “hang	 the	 presdent”	
poltcally.	Senstve	to	ths	report,	roosevelt	drected	another	of	hs	secre-
tares,	marvn	mcintyre,	to	“have	the	F.b.i.	look	nto	ths.”	hoover	repled	
that	the	alleged	photo	was	n	realty	a	sketch	and,	accordng	to	Fsh’s	con-
fdants,	the	congressman	beleved	t	could	be	used	“f	he	wanted	to	cause	a	
lot	of	damage	to	Presdent	roosevelt.”	Fsh,	hoover	reported,	had	decded	
aganst	 usng	 the	 sketch.	as	 compared	 to	 Fsh’s	 other	 actvtes	 ths	 one	
pales	 n	 sgnfcance,	 but	 t	 s	 llustratve	 of	 how	 roosevelt	 often	 reled	
upon	the	Fbi	to	verfy	poltcally	senstve	nformaton	and	how	the	Fbi,	
at	ths	pont,	operated	as	the	ntellgence	arm	of	the	Whte	house.65
	 64.	memorandum,	l.	l.	laughln	to	a.	h.	belmont,	17	February	1951,	Fbi	65–29514–
45.
	 65.	 letter,	herman	beukema	to	Watson,	22	august	1942;	memorandum,	roosevelt	to	
mcintyre,	3	September	1942;	confdental	memorandum,	mcintyre	to	hoover,	4	September	
1942;	personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	hoover	to	mcintyre,	9	September	1942;	per-
sonal	and	confdental	memorandum,	hoover	to	mcintyre,	6	november	1942,	all	n	Offcal	
Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
Retribution
The FBI and the Victory Program Leak
4 December 1941 to Mid-1942
On	 4	 December	 1941,	 the	 Chicago	 Tribune	 and	 ts	 sster	 paper,	 the	
Washington	Times-Herald,	publshed	a	sensatonal	story	that	reverberated	
n	 the	 already	 btter	 and	 deadlocked	 ant-nterventonst/nterventonst	
foregn	polcy	debate.1	Just	three	days	before	the	Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	
harbor,	 the	 two	newspapers	exposed	a	 top-secret	War	Department	con-
tngency	plan	commonly	referred	to	n	government	crcles	as	the	vctory	
Program.	Carred	under	the	banner	headlne	“F.D.r.’S	War	PlanS!”	the	
story	seemed	to	confrm	the	darkest	suspcon	of	the	ant-nterventonsts	
who	saw	the	plan	as	evdence	of	roosevelt’s	duplcty	and	beng	ntent	on	
leadng	the	Unted	States	nto	the	european	war.	interventonsts,	on	the	
other	 hand,	 vewed	 the	 revelaton	 as	 tratorous	 behavor	 on	 the	 part	 of	
roosevelt’s	crtcs.
	 The	 poltcal	 consequences	 of	 ths	 leak	 trggered	 an	 nvestgaton	 to	
dentfy	who	had	provded	the	secret	mltary	plan	to	the	Chicago Tribune.	
as	the	country’s	chef	federal	 law	enforcement	agency,	the	Fbi	was	dele-
gated	the	responsblty,	rather	than	the	mltary,	for	determnng	who	had	
leaked	the	document.	 in	 the	ensung	 nvestgaton,	Fbi	Drector	hoover	
spared	no	effort	and,	ndeed,	the	affar	reflected	hs	pragmatsm	whereby	
n	 return	 for	 placatng	 admnstraton	desres	 he	 ganed	 ncreased	 favor	
among	admnstraton	personnel.	he	lkely	pursued	the	matter	wth	such	
élan	as	some	hgh-rankng	members	of	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	avd-
ly	sought	to	hold	the	ant-nterventonsts	responsble	for	the	leak.	yet	the	
	 1.	robert	mcCormck’s	Chicago Tribune	 was	 loosely	 connected,	 by	 famlal	 tes,	 to	
papers	 of	 smlar	 poltcal	 lk.	 Joseph	 Patterson,	 hs	 cousn,	 founded	 the	New York Daily 
News	and	hs	other	cousn,	Cssy	Patterson,	was	publsher	of	the	Washington Times Herald.	
See	rchard	norton	Smth’s	The Colonel: The Life and Legend of Robert R. McCormick	(new	
york:	houghton	mffln,	1997).
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leak	of	the	plan	was	not	the	natonal	securty	breach	that	some	perceved;	
rather,	as	a	contngency	plan	only,	 ts	revelaton	served	to	embarrass	the	
admnstraton	and	gve	poltcal	 fre	 to	the	ant-nterventonsts.	by	ser-
vcng	admnstraton	 nterests,	hoover	placed	hmself	 n	good	 standng	
wth	leadng	offcals	n	the	admnstraton.
	 The	leak	and	subsequent	nvestgaton	dd	not	have	legs,	however,	as	a	
major	ssue	for	amercans.	because	the	plan	was	revealed	just	days	before	
the	amercan	entrance	nto	the	Second	World	War,	t	was	overshadowed	
quckly	 n	 the	publc	mnd	and	 the	press.	nevertheless,	 the	 ssue	 strred	
deeply	 held	 emotons	 on	 both	 sdes	 of	 the	 foregn	 polcy	 debate,	 even	
extendng	 nto	 1942.	The	 nvestgaton,	moreover,	 reached	 and	 nvolved	
many	 promnent	 members	 of	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 communty	 to	
nclude	one	U.S.	representatve,	two	U.S.	senators,	a	host	of	mltary	off-
cers,	 Charles	 lndbergh,	 henry	 Ford,	 and	 reporters	 and	 staff	 from	 the	
Chicago Tribune.	 Untl	 now,	 the	 Fbi’s	 nvestgaton	 n	 ths	 epsode	 has	
never	before	been	fully	documented.2
	 The	person	most	responsble	for	developng	the	vctory	Program,	and	
the	man	who	became	a	prmary	focus	of	Fbi	nvestgators,	was	army	major	
albert	C.	Wedemeyer.	a	bref	sketch	of	Wedemeyer’s	bography	suggests	
why	he	became	 the	 focus	of	 government	 nvestgators,	why	 some	of	hs	
belefs	 nterested	Fbi	 agents,	 and,	 fnally,	why	he	 acted	 as	he	dd	 n	 the	
face	 of	 an	Fbi	 nvestgaton.	a	natve	nebraskan	of	German	 extracton,	
Wedemeyer	receved	a	Jesut	educaton	steeped	n	deals	of	duty	and	obl-
gaton.	Followng	hs	hgh	school	graduaton,	n	1916	Wedemeyer	won	an	
appontment	 to	 the	Unted	States	mltary	academy	at	West	Pont	 from	
Senator	George	W.	norrs.	Wth	 the	 crss	 of	 the	Great	War	of	 1914–18	
and	amerca’s	late	entrance	nto	that	conflct,	Wedemeyer	was	graduated	
early	from	the	academy	but	never	partcpated	n	any	combat.	Then,	n	the	
mmedate	 postwar	 years,	 as	 a	 newly	mnted	 junor	 offcer,	Wedemeyer	
studed	nfantry	tactcs	and	was	assgned	duty	as	a	mltary	nstructor	and	
later	assumed	command	of	an	artllery	unt.3
	 as	 an	 army	 offcer,	 Wedemeyer	 served	 n	 a	 varety	 of	 capactes	
between	 1923	 and	 1934.	 he	 spent	 three	 years	 n	 the	 Phlppnes	 as	 an	
	 2.	The	leak	of	the	vctory	Program	has	been	referred	to	countless	tmes	n	books	and	
artcles,	but	there	are	two	books	that	descrbe	the	creaton	of	the	plan	tself	(see	below).	The	
only	works	that	descrbe	the	Fbi’s	nvestgaton	are	albert	Wedemeyer’s	memor,	whch	only	
concerns	hs	nvolvement,	and	a	sketchy	and	speculatve	artcle	by	Thomas	Flemng.	See	note	
71.
	 3.	Charles	e.	Krkpatrck,	An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Vic-
tory Plan of 1941	(Washngton,	DC:	Center	for	mltary	hstory,	1990),	6–7.
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nfantry	 offcer,	 and	 then	 became	 a	 staff	 offcer.	 assgned	 staff	 duty	 n	
Washngton,	D.C.,	Chna,	and	the	Phlppnes	(agan),	Wedemeyer	learned	
the	fner	detals	of	army	staff	work.	hs	work	then	won	hm,	n	1934,	an	
appontment	to	the	Command	and	General	Staff	College	n	leavenworth,	
Kansas,	where	he	graduated	wth	honors.	The	college’s	commandant	was	
so	 mpressed	 wth	Wedemeyer’s	 work	 that	 he	 nomnated	 hm	 to	 study	
european	mltary	tactcs	n	Germany	at	the	Kriegsakademie,	the	German	
Staff	College.	So,	n	1936,	Wedemeyer	departed	for	Germany.4
	 Durng	hs	two-year	stnt	n	berln,	Wedemeyer	learned	much	n	the	
way	of	war	makng	and	war	preparaton.	but	hs	trp,	whle	decdedly	use-
ful	n	expandng	hs	understandng	of	mltary	preparedness,	n	later	years	
led	 nvestgators	 to	 queston	 the	 offcer’s	 loyaltes	 amd	popular	 notons	
of	 naz	 ntrgue	 among	 amerca	 Frsters—whch	 ncluded	Wedemeyer.	
addng	 to	 hs	 later	 troubles,	 durng	 hs	 bref	 assgnment	 n	 Germany,	
Wedemeyer	was	afforded	specal	prvleges	not	commonly	granted	foregn	
vstors.	 he	 partcpated	 n	 German	 mltary	 maneuvers	 and	 cultvated	
personal	relatonshps	wth	several	hgh-rankng	members	of	the	German	
mltary,	ncludng	Claus	von	Stauffenberg,	major	Ferdnand	Jodl—broth-
er	to	htler’s	later	army	chef	of	staff—and	the	army	chef	of	staff,	ludwg	
beck.	Wedemeyer	learned	much	about	German	preparedness	and	strategy	
from	hs	German	contacts.	hs	 tour	proved	 to	be	 so	valuable	 that	upon	
ts	concluson	he	submtted	a	report	n	1938	to	General	George	marshall,	
then	 chef	 of	 the	 War	 Plans	 Dvson.	 Undoubtedly	 mpressed	 by	 ths	
report,	marshall	 later	 elevated	Wedemeyer	 to	 the	War	Plans	Dvson	 n	
may	1941,	by	whch	tme	marshall	had	rsen	to	chef	of	staff.5
	 Wedemeyer’s	tme	n	Germany	also	contrbuted	to	hs	later	ant-nter-
ventonsm.	Wrtng	 n	 1958,	Wedemeyer	 stated	 that	 durng	 hs	 stay	 n	
Germany	he	had	“dscerned	a	great	deal	of	truth	about	Communst	ams,	
practces,	and	methods	unknown	or	 gnored	 n	amerca	untl	 recently.”6	
he	had	 also	 come	 to	 regard	naz	Germany	 n	 a	postve	 fashon.	 “[m]y	
two	years	experence	wth	the	German	people	n	general	and	the	mltary	
pedagogy	n	partcular,”	he	wrote	Walter	Trohan,	“had	caused	me	to	ren-
der	 favorable	 reports	 concernng	 them.”7	Wedemeyer,	moreover,	 saw	 n	
naz	Germany	a	bulwark	aganst	Communst	russa.	To	hm	“the	German	
search	 for	Lebensraum	 dd	 not	menace	 the	Western	World	 to	 anythng	
	 4.	 ibd.,	7–9.
	 5.	 ibd.,	9–11.
	 6.	albert	C.	Wedemerer,	Wedemeyer Reports! 4.	
	 7.	 letter,	Wedemeyer	to	Walter	Trohan,	27	november	1953,	Wedemeyer	Papers,	box	
139,	hoover	insttuton	archves	(hereafter	hia),	Stanford	Unversty,	Palo	alto,	Ca.
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lke	 the	 same	 degree	 as	 the	worldwde	Communst	 conspracy	 centered	
n	moscow.”	Wedemeyer’s	vews,	as	 such,	 shared	a	common	thread	wth	
those	 of	 another	 ardent	 ant-nterventonst,	 Charles	 lndbergh.	 both	
Wedemeyer	 and	 lndbergh	 had	 spent	 tme	 n	 naz	 Germany	 between	
1936	and	1938,	and	both	were	mpressed	wth	what	they	had	seen.	both,	
moreover,	wrote	favorable	reports	on	German	progress.	Probably	wth	no	
surprse,	both	men	subsequently	became	targets	of	Fbi	nvestgatons	due,	
n	part,	to	suspcons	cast	by	ther	tme	spent	n	naz	Germany.8
—■■■■■■■—
Followng	 passage	 of	 the	 lend-lease	act	 n	march	 1941,	 the	amercan	
government	 was	 faced	 wth	 the	 task	 of	 arrangng	 procurement	 of	 war-
related	 matérel	 for	 Great	 brtan.	 The	War	 Department	 was	 delegated	
responsblty	 for	determnng	the	projected	needs	of	 lend-lease,	but	was	
gven	 no	 specfc	 drecton	 from	 senor	 admnstraton	 offcals.	 War	
Department	 personnel	 nevertheless	 began	 to	 develop	 varous	 plans	 to	
cope	wth	lend-lease	needs.	Fndng	t	dffcult	to	develop	a	vable	scheme	
wthout	admnstraton	drecton,	Undersecretary	of	War	robert	Patterson	
requested	 from	hs	 superor—Secretary	of	War	Stmson—an	estmate	of	
the	overall	needs	of	a	possble	wartme	amercan	ndustry.	On	18	aprl	he	
requested	“a	decson	as	to	the	ultmate	muntons	producton	requred	by	
the	War	Department	so	that	approprate	plans	can	be	started.”9
	 accordng	 to	 the	 offcal	 hstory	 of	 the	 vctory	 Program,	 Secretary	
Stmson	wholeheartedly	agreed	wth	the	undersecretary’s	desre	for	more	
specfc	drecton.	The	War	Department	contnued	to	fumble	about	devel-
opng	 a	 plan	 for	whch	mltary	 offcals	 had	no	natonal	 strategc	 goals	
or	estmates.	That	 s,	untl	9	 July	1941,	when	Presdent	roosevelt	 fnally	
stepped	n	and	ordered	hs	secretares	of	war	and	navy	to	explore	“at	once	
the	 overall	 producton	 requrements	 requred	 to	 defeat	 our	 potental	
enemes.”	 The	 offcal	 hstory	 suggests	 that	 Undersecretary	 Patterson’s	
executve	offcer,	General	burns,	who	was	the	War	Department’s	lason	to	
the	Whte	house,	had	nfluenced	lend-lease	supervsor	harry	hopkns	to	
	 8.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	10–12;	Wayne	S.	Cole,	Charles A. Lindbergh and 
the Battle against American Intervention in World War II	(new	york:	harcourt	brace	Jova-
novch,	1974),	33–37.
	 9.	memorandum,	Undersecretary	of	War	robert	Patterson	to	Secretary	of	War	henry	
Stmson,	18	aprl	1941,	reprnted	n	mark	Sknner	Watson,	United States Army in World War 
II, the War Department, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations	(Washngton,	DC:	U.S.	
Government	Prntng	Offce,	1950),	332.
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brng	pressure	upon	the	Whte	house	for	drecton.	Whatever	the	manner	
of	events,	roosevelt’s	drectve,	after	a	perod	of	confuson,	put	the	depart-
ment	on	track.10
	 Soon	 thereafter,	 responsblty	 for	drawng	up	a	 global	wartme	 con-
tngency	plan	devolved	from	the	secretary	of	war	to	General	marshall	to	
General	leonard	Gerow	of	the	War	Plans	Dvson—the	unt	responsble	
for	 creatng	mltary	 plans—and	 fnally	 to	major	albert	C.	Wedemeyer.	
as	 Wedemeyer	 later	 ponted	 out,	 never	 before	 had	 amercan	 mltary	
authortes	devsed	such	an	all-encompassng	plan.	“it	meant	travelng	on	
uncharted	seas	wthout	a	compass	toward	a	fatal	Shangr-la,”	Wedemeyer	
wrote,	 “snce	 no	 natonal	 ams	 or	 strategc	 objectves	 were	 gven	 us.”	
Despte	ths	mpedment,	Wedemeyer	coordnated	wth	other	government	
departments	 to	 acqure	 the	 nformaton	he	needed.	Due	 to	 the	project’s	
senstvty,	however,	all	work	was	carred	out	n	secret.	The	navy	concur-
rently	drafted	ts	own	estmates	that	were	subsequently	added	to	the	larger	
plan	War	Department	offcals	had	developed.11
	 Wedemeyer	was	an	ronc	choce	to	develop	a	contngency	plan	desgn-
ed	“to	defeat	our	potental	enemes.”	Whle	beng	selected	to	pece	together	
the	vctory	Program,	albert	Wedemeyer	was	also	a	confrmed	advocate	
of	amercan	solaton	from	foregn	war.	Or,	 n	the	vew	of	 nterventon-
sts,	Wedemeyer	was	an	solatonst.	From	hs	broad	readng	on	war	and	
natonal	 strategc	 plannng,	 Wedemeyer	 was	 convnced	 that	 amercan	
nvolvement	 n	 a	 second	 worldwde	 mltary	 conflct	 would	 lead	 only	
to	 natonal	 devastaton.	 yet,	 despte	 hs	 underlyng	 ant-nterventonst	
poltcal	 vews,	 Wedemeyer’s	 Jesutcal	 and	 mltary	 sense	 of	 duty	 kept	
hm	focused	on	hs	assgned	task.	“it	was	my	job,”	he	wrote	years	later,	“to	
antcpate	developments	and	contnuously	make	plans	so	that	my	country	
would	be	prepared	for	any	contngency	whch	fate,	poltcans,	or	power-
drunk	leaders	mght	precptate.”12
	 Workng	wth	a	staff	of	sx,	Wedemeyer	set	about	developng	a	natonal	
plan	for	wartme	producton	estmates.	but	the	major	stll	lacked	two	key	
peces	of	nformaton	to	create	a	coherent	plan:	a	natonal	wartme	objec-
tve	and	a	mltary	strategy	to	realze	that	objectve.	Wthout	such	drecton	
from	the	admnstraton,	whch	was	never	formally	decded	upon	n	1941,	
	 10.	 letter,	 roosevelt	 to	 Secretares	 of	War	 and	navy,	 9	 July	 1941,	 reprnted	 n	 bd.,	
338–39.
	 11.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	16–17;	blnd	memorandum,	publcaton	 n	Chi-
cago Tribune and	Washington Times-Herald	 of	army	and	navy	estmate	of	Unted	States	
Over-all	Producton	requrements,	5	December	1941,	Fbi	65–39945–23.
	 12.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	14.
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Wedemeyer	could	not	arrve	at	any	useful	fgures.	On	hs	own,	therefore,	
he	drafted	an	assessment	of	natonal	objectves	and	submtted	ths	state-
ment	 to	 Secretary	 of	War	 Stmson	 for	 approval.	 Stmson	 approved	 the	
major’s	statement	after	whch	Wedemeyer	devsed	a	plan	that	was	based	
on	the	assumpton	that	the	Unted	States	would	“elmnate	totaltaransm	
from	europe,”	ally	tself	wth	Great	brtan,	and	“deny	the	Japanese	unds-
puted	control	of	the	western	Pacfc.”13
	 Wedemeyer’s	staff	worked	dlgently	on	the	vctory	Program	through-
out	 the	 summer	of	1941,	 and	 n	a	 relatvely	 short	perod	of	 tme—from	
July,	when	roosevelt	 requested	 a	natonal	 estmate,	 to	 September,	when	
the	army’s	plan	was	submtted—they	completed	ther	task.	a	vast	number	
of	government	resources	were	used	to	create	a	poltco-mltary	plan	of	a	
scale	never	before	seen	n	amercan	hstory.	between	20	and	25	September	
the	 completed	 plan	 was	 dstrbuted	 to	 the	 hghest-rankng	members	 of	
the	War	Department	 and	 later	 gven	 to	 the	 presdent.	 but	Wedemeyer’s	
sense	of	accomplshment	was	quckly	dashed	when,	on	4	December	1941,	
the	fruts	of	hs	top-secret	 labor	receved	banner	headlnes	 n	two	of	the	
naton’s	most	promnent	ant-nterventonst	newspapers.14
—■■■■■■■—
Followng	the	Chicago Tribune’s	and	Washington Times-Herald’s	publshed	
account	 of	 the	 vctory	 Program,	 Wedemeyer’s	 lfe	 became	 markedly	
uncomfortable.	he	vvdly	 recalled	 that	mornng	when	he	 arrved	at	hs	
offce	n	the	muntons	buldng:
i	 sensed	 at	 once	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 exctement.	 Offcers	 were	 mllng	
around	and	there	was	a	buzz	of	conversaton	whch	ceased	abruptly	as	my	
secretary,	n	vsble	agtaton,	handed	me	a	copy	of	the	Washngton	Times-
Herald.	The	room	was	slent	and	all	eyes	were	fxed	upon	me	as	i	read	the	
screamng	banner	headlnes.	.	.	.	i	could	not	have	been	more	appalled	and	
astounded	f	a	bomb	had	been	dropped	on	Washngton.15
	 13.	Krkpatrck,	An Unknown Future,	 60–62;	 ntervew	wth	General	Wedemeyer,	 24	
aprl	1987,	quoted	n	Krkpatrck,	An Unknown Future,	63.
	 14.	blnd	memorandum,	publcaton	 n	Chicago Tribune	 and	Washington Times-Her-
ald	 of	 army	 and	 navy	 estmate	 of	 Unted	 States	 Over-all	 Producton	 requrements,	 5	
December	1941,	Fbi	65–39945–23.	For	detaled	hstores	of	the	complaton	of	the	vctory	
Program,	see	Krkpatrck,	An Unknown Future,	and	Watson,	United States Army in World 
War II.
	 15.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	15–16.
10 Chapter 5
The	 developer	 of	 the	 top-secret	 contngency	 plan	 had	 cause	 to	 be	wor-
red,	for	he	was	responsble,	to	a	large	degree,	for	ts	securty.	The	news-
paper	 story,	 wrtten	 by	 the	 Tribune’s	 Chesly	 manly,	 gave	 detals	 of	 the	
plan,	 ncludng	ts	estmates	for	a	10,000,000-plus-man	combned	armed	
force	consstng	of	a	1,100,000-man	navy,	a	150,000-man	marne	corps,	a	
6,745,000-man	 army,	 and	 a	 2,050,000-man	 army	 ar	 force.	addtonally,	
the	 artcle	 reprnted	 n	 ts	 entrety	 Presdent	 roosevelt’s	 9	 July	 memo-
randum	authorzng	 the	plan	 to	hs	war	 secretares.	Quotng	extensvely	
from	the	vctory	Program,	the	ant-nterventonst	paper	concluded	that	
the	plan	was	proof	that	roosevelt	had	no	ntenton	of	keepng	amercan	
armed	forces	wthn	the	Western	hemsphere,	as	he	had	prevously	prom-
sed.	The	story	became	an	mmedate	poltcal	sensaton.16
	 ant-nterventonsts	 depcted	 the	 revelaton	 as	 a	 smokng	 gun.	 To	
them,	 the	vctory	 Program	was	 clear	 evdence	 that	 roosevelt	 had	 been	
purposefully	 maneuverng	 the	 country	 nto	 war.	 moreover,	 ant-nter-
ventonsts	planned	to	use	the	revelaton	to	ther	advantage.	ruth	Sarles,	
drector	 of	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee’s	 speakers	 bureau,	 advocated	
dstrbutng	the	plan	across	the	country	“n	tens	of	thousands.”	She	hoped	
“that	every	speaker	who	goes	on	the	platform	for	aF	[amerca	Frst]	wll	
denounce	 t	 n	rngng	 terms,	 that	all	wll	hammer	 ‘no	aeF’	 [amercan	
expedtonary	 Force].”17	 One	 republcan	 ant-nterventonst	 congress-
man,	 h.	 Carl	 anderson	 of	 mnnesota,	 remarked	 to	 an	 amerca	 Frst	
representatve	that	the	publcaton	“vndcates	what	we	have	been	sayng	
rght	along.	a	blnd	man	could	see	through	t	all.”	republcan	Dan	reed	
of	new	york	predcted	that	“[w]hen	ths	story	gets	around	to	the	people	t	
wll	strengthen	our	cause	greatly.”18
	 interventonsts,	on	 the	other	hand,	vewed	 the	 leak	 n	 strkngly	df-
ferent	 terms.	Senator	Carter	Glass	of	vrgna,	honorary	charman	of	 the	
rabdly	 nterventonst	 Fght	 for	 Freedom	 Commttee,	 commented	 that	
“the	 freedom	 of	 the	 press	 was	 never	 ntended	 to	 extend	 to	 people	 who	
treasonably	make	publc	army	and	navy	secret	plans.”19	“it	was	a	scandalous	
	 16.	Washington Times-Herald,	4	December	1941.
	 17.	 letter,	ruth	Sarles	to	r.	Douglas	Stuart	Jr.,	6	December	1941,	amerca	Frst	Com-
mttee	Papers,	box	239,	hia.
	 18.	General	report,	Fred	burdck,	4	December	1941,	n	Justus	D.	Doenecke,	ed.,	In Dan-
ger Undaunted:	The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940–1941 as Revealed in the Papers of 
the America First Committee	 (Stanford,	Ca:	hoover	insttuton	Press,	1990),	436–38.	Ths	
complaton	of	documents	 s	an	extremely	useful	 resource.	The	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
papers	are	stll	woefully	unorganzed	and,	thus,	very	dffcult	to	research	wthout	spendng	an	
nordnate	amount	of	tme	sftng	through	hundreds	of	vaguely	marked	boxes	and	folders.
	 19.	 letter,	Senator	Carter	Glass	to	bshop	henry	W.	hobson,	8	December	1941,	Fght	
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thng	to	have	happen,”	Secretary	of	War	Stmson	noted	n	hs	dary,	“and	
was	typcal	of	the	mental	atttude	of	the	solatonsts	at	that	tme.”20	and	
whereas	 the	 ant-nterventonsts	 hoped	 to	 use	 the	 vctory	 Program	 to	
stmulate	opposton	to	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy,	Stmson	had	a	related,	
f	opposng,	objectve:	“The	thng	to	do	s	to	meet	the	matter	head	on	and	
use	ths	occurrence	f	possble	to	shake	our	amercan	people	out	of	ther	
nfernal	apathy	and	gnorance	of	what	ths	war	means.”21
	 The	Whte	house	 also	delberated	over	how	 to	handle	 the	 stuaton.	
On	the	mornng	of	4	December,	accordng	to	Secretary	Stmson’s	account,	
wthout	havng	consulted	wth	the	presdent,	Whte	house	Press	Secretary	
Steven	early	held	a	press	conference.	early	stated	that	no	one	n	the	Whte	
house	 but	 the	 presdent	 had	 knowledge	 of	 the	vctory	Program.	When	
asked	f	there	were	any	conflcts	of	nterest	for	other	newspapers	to	reprnt	
the	manly	story	wthout	volatng	voluntary	censorshp	restrctons,	early	
repled:	“i	don’t	thnk	anyone	would	be	correct	n	prntng	t	unless	they	
got	t	from	a	government	source,	unless	they	attrbuted	t	to	the	paper	that	
bult	the	story.”	he	added,	“i	consder	the	press	s	operatng	as	a	free	press	
and	the	responsblty	n	ths	case	s	more	on	government	than	the	press,	
f	the	story	s	true.”	Ths	awkward	response	prompted	a	further	queston	
as	to	whether	the	Whte	house	consdered	the	publcaton	as	treasonable	
or	unpatrotc.	 “your	 rght	 to	prnt,”	early	 repled,	 “s	unchallenged	and	
unquestoned.”22
	 at	 the	 War	 Department	 that	 mornng,	 Secretary	 of	 War	 Stmson	
recorded	n	hs	dary	that	offcals	there,	such	as	assstant	Secretary	of	War	
John	J.	mcCloy,	had	“very	long	faces.”	To	hm	“nothng	more	unpatrotc	
or	damagng	to	our	plans	for	defense	could	very	well	be	conceved”	than	
that	done	by	the	ant-nterventonst	press.	Concerned	about	early’s	com-
ments	at	hs	press	conference	earler	that	mornng,	Stmson	mmedately	
phoned	roosevelt.	The	secretary	characterzed	early’s	comments	as	feeble	
and,	 accordng	 to	 Stmson,	 roosevelt	 agreed	 wth	 hm.	 moreover,	 the	
whole	ssue	of	the	leak,	Stmson	clamed,	caused	the	presdent	to	be	“full	of	
fght.”	apparently	sensng	roosevelt’s	mood,	Stmson	suggested	prosecut-
ng	 those	 nvolved	 n	 the	 leak	under	 the	esponage	act.	roosevelt	 “was	
for	Freedom	manuscrpts	(hereafter	FFF),	box	10,	Seeley	G.	mudd	lbrary,	Prnceton	Un-
versty.
	 20.	entry	for	24	February	1942,	henry	lews	Stmson	Dares,	37:155	(mcroflm	ed.,	
reel	7),	manuscrpts	and	archves,	yale	Unversty	lbrary,	new	haven,	CT.
	 21.	entry	for	4	December	1941,	Stmson	Dares,	36:74	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	7).
	 22.	notes	of	Stephen	early	press	conference	n	confdental	report,	Joseph	a.	Genau,	15	
January	1942,	Fbi	65–399454–3.
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delghted	 to	 hear	 ths”	 because	 he	 had	 prevously	 been	 advsed	 that	 no	
volaton	of	the	act	had	occurred.	in	the	meantme,	the	presdent	drected	
“that	we	should	not	answer	any	questons	about	t	at	our	press	conferences	
and	that	the	frst	acton	taken	should	be	the	arrest	of	those	responsble	for	
the	dsclosure,	ncludng	f	possble	the	managers	of	the	newspapers.”23
	 after	 further	 delberaton,	 Stmson	 concluded	 that	 the	 presdent’s	
polcy	of	not	speakng	out	on	the	leak	was	wrong.	The	secretary	drafted	a	
statement,	phoned	the	presdent,	and	read	t	to	hm.	advsng	the	presdent	
that	the	War	Department	had	a	scheduled	press	conference	that	mornng	
and	 he	 “ddn’t	 want	 to	 duck	 such	 an	 mportant	matter,”	 Stmson	 asked	
roosevelt	to	allow	hm	to	make	a	publc	statement.	roosevelt	agreed	and	
authorzed	Stmson’s	press	statement.24
	 That	day,	roosevelt	also	had	scheduled	a	press	conference.	Preferrng	
to	allow	hs	war	secretary	to	comment	frst,	Stmson	found	hs	press	room	
“jammed	as	never	before—people	standng	up	all	around	me.”25	The	sec-
retary	offered	reporters	a	forceful	and	postve	statement	followed	by	two	
questons.	he	outlned	the	War	Department’s	responsbltes:
it	does	not	preclude	the	study	of	possble	eventualtes,	one	of	the	prmary	
dutes	and	responsbltes	of	 the	War	Department.	 .	 .	 .	Falures	 to	make	
such	 studes	 would	 consttute	 a	 serous	 derelcton	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
responsble	mltary	authortes.	The	object	of	the	study	referred	to	by	the	
press	was	to	determne	producton	requrements.	.	.	.	We	are	not	preparng	
troops	nor	have	we	asked	for	funds	for	an	a.e.F.
What	 would	 you	 thnk	 of	 an	 amercan	 General	 Staff	 whch	 n	 the	
present	 condton	of	 the	world	dd	not	 nvestgate	and	 study	every	con-
cevable	 type	of	 emergency	whch	may	confront	 ths	 country,	 and	every	
possble	method	of	meetng	 that	 emergency?	What	do	 you	 thnk	of	 the	
patrotsm	of	 a	man	or	newspaper	whch	would	 take	 those	 confdental	
studes	and	make	them	publc	to	the	enemes	of	ths	country?26
	 23.	entry	for	4	December	1941,	Stmson	Dares,	36:73–4	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	7).	On	the	
roosevelt	admnstraton’s	and	Fbi’s	concerns	wth	the	“solatonst”	press,	see	athan	Theo-
hars,	“The	Fbi,	the	roosevelt	admnstraton,	and	the	‘Subversve’	Press,”	Journalism His-
tory	19	(Sprng	1993):	3–10.	For	an	analyss	of	roosevelt’s	use	of	mass	meda	to	advance	hs	
foregn	polcy	agenda,	see	rchard	W.	Steele,	“The	Great	Debate:	roosevelt,	the	meda,	and	
the	Comng	of	the	War,	1940–1941,”	Journal of American History	71	(June	1984):	69–92.
	 24.	entry	for	5	December	1941,	Stmson	Dares,	36:75	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	7).
	 25.	 ibd.
	 26.	 Statement	made	by	Secretary	of	War	Stmson,	5	December	1941,	reprnted	n	Watson,	
United States Army in World War II,	359.
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	 at	a	cabnet	meetng	later	that	day,	roosevelt	explaned	to	hs	depart-
ment	heads	hs	decson	to	permt	Stmson’s	comment.	Whle	most	of	the	
cabnet	supported	the	presdent’s	decson,	not	everyone	agreed	fully	wth	
what	Stmson	had	sad.	harold	 ickes,	 ardent	opponent	of	 the	ant-nter-
ventonsts,	 found	 t	 to	be	“entrely	 too	defensve.”	vce	Presdent	henry	
Wallace	agreed	wth	Stmson	but	objected	to	the	questons	followng	the	
secretary’s	 statement.	 in	 any	 event,	 Stmson	 was	 not	 deterred.	 To	 hm,	
the	“extremely	weak”	comments	of	Press	Secretary	early,	“whch	vrtually	
condoned	the	publcaton	of	the	statement	[vctory	Program]	on	the	bass	
of	Freedom	of	the	Press,”	justfed	hs	acton.27
	 much	of	 the	 cabnet	meetng	was	 spent	 dscussng	whether	 to	 pros-
ecute	 those	 responsble	 for	 the	 vctory	 Program	 leak.	 ickes	 urged	 the	
presdent	 to	 go	 forward	 wth	 prosecutons	 aganst	 the	Chicago Tribune	
and	Washington Times-Herald.	The	queston	over	whether	the	esponage	
act	offered	an	avenue	to	explot	was	settled,	 to	the	cabnet’s	satsfacton,	
when	 attorney	 General	 bddle	 defended	 such	 acton.	 Then,	 followng	
the	meetng,	Stmson	pressed	roosevelt	 to	pursue	charges	of	conspracy	
aganst	those	nvolved.	The	secretary,	moreover,	demanded	that	the	charg-
es	be	broad	 and	not	narrowly	 focused	because,	he	 thought,	 “t	 s	 vtally	
mportant	to	make	.	.	.	a	great	State	prosecuton	to	get	rd	of	ths	nfernal	
dsloyalty	whch	we	now	have	workng	n	the	amerca	Frst	and	n	these	
mcCormck	famly	papers.”	roosevelt	also	met	prvately	wth	bddle,	who	
confdentally	advsed	the	presdent	that	hoover	had	learned	“that	at	least	
one	copy	[of	the	vctory	Program]	had	been	handed	to	a	Senator	and	that	
Wheeler	was	talkng	about	nvestgaton.”	Keenly	nterested	n	ths	nfor-
maton,	roosevelt	promsed	not	to	share	the	detals	wth	any	other	cabnet	
members.	 Gven	 the	 charged	 atmosphere	 created	 wth	 the	 leak,	 bddle	
probably	feared	the	worst	f	unsubstantated	nformaton	was	leaked	from	
the	Whte	house.	in	any	event,	bddle	authorzed	the	Fbi	to	nvestgate.28
	 Fbi	 Drector	 hoover,	 n	 ths	 poltcally	 charged	 atmosphere,	 found	
hmself	front	and	center	n	an	ssue	he	could	use	to	cater	to	the	poltcal	
desres	of	certan	powerful	admnstraton	offcals	who	sought	retrbuton	
aganst	ant-nterventonst	crtcs.	he	brought	to	bear	the	full	resources	of	
the	Fbi.	On	4	December,	hoover,	accompaned	by	Fbi	assstant	Drector	
edward	 Tamm,	met	 wth	 Secretary	 of	 the	navy	 Frank	 Knox	 and	 other	
	 27.	entry	for	5	December	1941,	Stmson	Dares,	36:76	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	7).
	 28.	entry	for	5	December	1941,	Stmson	Dares,	36:76	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	7);	harold	l.	
ickes,	The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes	(new	york:	Smon	and	Schuster,	1954),	3:659;	notes	
on	5	December	1941	Cabnet	meetng,	1941	Cabnet	meetngs	folder,	Francs	bddle	Papers,	
Frankln	D.	roosevelt	lbrary	(hereafter	FDrl),	hyde	Park,	ny.
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hgh-rankng	navy	Department	offcals	 to	dscuss	 the	vctory	Program	
leak,	 the	navy’s	 contrbuton	 to	 t,	 and	how	 the	 report	had	been	dstrb-
uted.	revealng	hs	prorty	to	focus	on	the	admnstraton’s	polcy	crtcs,	
hoover	further	nqured	of	the	navy	offcals	“as	to	whether	any	dssenson	
or	opposton	had	been	expressed	toward	the	plans.”	Other	than	dsagree-
ment	over	whether	the	plan	was	practcal,	the	offcers	could	offer	no	nfor-
maton	on	nternal	opposton	to	the	plan	tself.	navy	offcals	gave	hoover	
a	regstered	copy	of	the	vctory	Program	to	assst	Fbi	nvestgators.29
	 Usng	 ths	 copy	 of	 the	 vctory	 Program,	 Fbi	 agents	 mmedately	
compared	 the	 actual	 contngency	 plan	 wth	 that	 publshed	 by	 the	 ant-
nterventonst	 press.	 in	 so	dong,	 the	Fbi’s	 nvestgators	 focused	on	 the	
thrty-fve	quotatons	made	publc	from	the	vctory	Program.	each	quota-
ton	was	 scrutnzed	and	any	 nconsstency	between	 the	 two	documents	
was	lad	out	n	full	detal.	Whle	Fbi	offcals	found	numerous	mnor	and	
nsgnfcant	 dscrepances—such	 as	 a	 msplaced	 comma	 or	 an	 omtted	
word—they	nevertheless	concluded	that	the	press	ndeed	had	had	access	
to	the	secret	vctory	Program.30
	 Whle	the	Fbi	began	ts	probe,	General	Gerow	nformed	Wedemeyer	
that	the	presdent	had	ordered	an	nvestgaton.	Wedemeyer	repled	that	he	
had	not	leaked	any	documents,	but,	he	later	wrote,	“i	could	not	be	certan	
that	i	had	never	neglected	to	exercse	proper	precautons.”	Gerow,	havng	
worked	 wth	Wedemeyer	 (who	 by	 now	 had	 been	 promoted	 to	 colonel)	
and	havng	known	hm	personally,	expressed	hs	trust	n	the	man.	Gven	
Wedemeyer’s	 known	 ant-nterventonst	 poltcal	 sympathes,	 however,	
and	the	fact	that	he	was	responsble	for	pecng	together	the	plan,	others	
suspected	he	was	gulty.	assstant	Secretary	of	War	 John	 J.	mcCloy,	 stll	
new	n	hs	poston,	ordered	Wedemeyer	to	hs	offce	to	dscuss	the	mat-
ter.	Whle	Colonel	Wedemeyer	 stood	 at	 attenton,	 accordng	 to	hs	 own	
account,	mcCloy	sad	to	hm:	“Wedemeyer,	there	s	blood	on	the	fngers	
of	the	person	who	s	responsble	for	the	release	of	ths	top	secret	war	plan	
to	the	newspapers.”31
	 Shortly	afterward,	on	9	December,	Wedemeyer	was	vsted	not	unex-
pectedly	by	two	Fbi	offcals,	one	of	whom	was	edward	Tamm—hoover’s	
	 29.	memorandum	 (for	 fle),	 author	 unknown,	 4	 December	 1941,	 Fbi	 65–39945–16.	
The	Fbi	has	wthheld	several	pages	of	ths	document	and,	thus,	the	author	cannot	be	deter-
mned.
	 30.	memorandum	(for	fle),	attorney	General	Francs	bddle,	6	December	1941,	bddle	
Papers,	FDrl;	memorandum	for	the	Drector,	Detaled	analyss	of	the	Presdent’s	War	Plan	
as	Quoted	n	newspaper	and	Compared	wth	the	Orgnal,	J.	a.	Cmperman	and	Duane	l.	
Traynor,	4	December	1941,	Fbi	65–39935–17.
	 31.	 	 Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	21;	letter,	albert	C.	Wedemeyer	to	Walter	Tro-
han,	27	november	1953,	Wedemeyer	Papers,	box	139,	hia.
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thrd	 n	 command.	 Wedemeyer	 was	 understandably	 concerned.	 years	
later,	 n	1957,	he	descrbed	the	event	and,	whle	the	passage	of	tme	had	
undoubtedly	 colored	 hs	 memory,	 he	 conveyed	 hs	 lastng	 btterness:	
“When	edgar	hoover	[sic],	Thams	[sic,	Tamm],	Genau	and	other	Fbi	men	
descended	upon	me	n	my	offce,	at	that	tme	n	the	muntons	buldng,	
about	 December	 1	 [sic],	 1941,	 i	 was	 confused,	 worred,	 and	 a	 lttle	 bt	
angry.”	he	descrbed	the	ncdent:	“[Fbi	agents]	descended	upon	me	lke	
vultures	upon	a	prostrate	antelope.”32
	 Despte	 hs	 vvd	 descrpton	 of	 the	 Fbi	 offcals’	 vst,	 Wedemeyer	
descrbed	Tamm	as	“so	courteous	as	 to	be	dsarmng.”	The	Fbi	assstant	
drector	asked	whether	Wedemeyer	knew	how	the	War	Department’s	secu-
rty	protocols	had	been	breached,	 and	how	he	had	 ensured	 the	 securty	
of	the	senstve	documents	under	hs	care.	Wedemeyer	characterzed	ths	
frst	meetng	wth	Fbi	offcals	as	centerng	on	evaluatng	hs	“sncerty	and	
sense	of	responsblty.”	he	conveyed	hs	concern	that	he	may	have	been	
careless	at	some	pont,	but	otherwse	Wedemeyer	clamed	not	to	have	any	
sense	of	gult.33
	 at	a	subsequent	ntervew,	Fbi	agents	asked	how	Wedemeyer	dsposed	
of	the	fnal	copes	of	the	vctory	Program.	at	one	pont	n	the	ntervew,	
he	confused	 the	dates	as	 to	when	he	gave	Secretary	Stmson	hs	copy	of	
the	 plan.	 That	 he	 confused	 the	 dates	was	 a	 red	 flag	 to	 Fbi	 agents.	 The	
confuson	was	not	surprsng,	however,	snce	the	plan	was	completed	on	
10	 September	 but	 not	 fully	 assembled	 (wth	 the	 navy	 porton)	 and	 ds-
trbuted	untl	25	September.	Wedemeyer’s	confuson	reveals	no	mportant	
nconsstency.	To	Fbi	offcals,	who	regarded	the	ant-nterventonst	colo-
nel	as	a	prme	suspect,	however,	ths	slp	was	sgnfcant.	Suspectng	that	
the	vctory	Program	had	been	leaked	durng	ths	September	perod,	Fbi	
agents	concluded:
Colonel	Wedemeyer	was	very	ll	at	ease	durng	ths	ntervew	and	several	
tmes	fell	back	upon	the	old	adage,	“i	could	not	remember,”	and	seemed	
to	be	thnkng	up	excuses	for	hmself	and	hs	actons.	.	.	.	[a]s	t	was	not	
untl	the	mddle	of	October,	1941,	that	Colonel	[rchard]	Scobey	receved	
nstructons	to	fnally	assemble	and	produce	the	entre	document,	Colonel	
Wedemeyer	becomes	responsble	for	any	leakage	up	to	that	date.34
	 32.	 letter,	albert	C.	Wedemeyer	 to	burton	K.	Wheeler,	22	august	1957,	Wedemeyer	
Papers,	box	139,	hia;	letter,	albert	C.	Wedemeyer	to	Chesly	manly,	22	august	1957,	Wede-
meyer	Papers,	box	139,	hia.	hoover	dd	not	attend.
	 33.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	22–23.
	 34.	report,	by	Joseph	a.	Genau,	15	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–3,	pp.	28–30.
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	 in	another	ntervew	Fbi	agent	Joseph	Genau	questoned	Wedemeyer	
about	 hs	 tme	 n	Germany.	Genau	 asked	Wedemeyer	who	 n	Germany	
he	had	befrended,	partcularly	those	n	hgh-rankng	mltary	crcles.	he	
then	 asked	whether	 the	 colonel	 had	mantaned	 a	 correspondence	wth	
any	of	these	German	frends.	Wedemeyer	repled	that	when	the	war	began,	
hs	German	correspondence	had	dwndled.	The	Fbi	agent	also	 nqured	
whether	Wedemeyer	had	attended	any	naz	party	meetngs	between	1936	
and	1938.	Wedemeyer	answered	n	the	negatve,	concedng,	however,	that	
had	he	been	gven	the	opportunty	he	would	have	attended	out	of	“curos-
ty”	to	observe	frsthand	the	“mass	psychoss	and	unusual	spectacle.”35
	 agent	 Genau	 then	 turned	 hs	 questonng	 to	Wedemeyer’s	 contacts	
wth	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 movement.	 he	 asked:	 “Do	 you	 have	 any	
contacts	wth	a	person	or	persons	wthn	the	amerca	Frst	Organzaton	
[sic]?”	 “yes,”	 Wedemeyer	 responded,	 “i	 have	 several	 frends	 connected	
wth	that	organzaton:	mrs.	[robert]	Taft,	John	T.	Flynn,	Senator	Wheeler,	
and	Colonel	lndbergh.	 i	 haven’t	 seen	 them	 for	 some	 tme	because	 i’ve	
been	 too	 busy.”	 When	 asked	 f	 he	 sympathzed	 wth	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee,	Wedemeyer	responded:	“in	many	ways,	yes.”	To	
Fbi	offcals	these	tes	were	a	sgnfcant	nvestgatve	lead	snce	hoover’s	
Fbi	 had	 an	 nterest	 n	 and	hstory	 of	 provdng	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 on	
such	promnent	polcy	crtcs	and,	f	lnked	to	them,	Wedemeyer	must	be	
suspect.36
	 Ths	answer	prompted	further	questons	about	Wedemeyer’s	connec-
tons	 wth	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.	 Genau	 was	 partcularly	 nter-
ested	 n	Wedemeyer’s	 connectons	 to	Charles	lndbergh.	respondng	 to	
a	seres	of	questons,	Wedemeyer	admtted	to	havng	frst	met	lndbergh	
n	Germany	durng	hs	 tour	 there	 n	1938	and	 then	 to	havng	met	wth	
lndbergh	“occasonally”	n	the	Unted	States.	Genau	was	also	nterested	
n	Wedemeyer’s	statement	that	“i	respect	hm	and	agree	wth	many	of	hs	
deas	concernng	our	entrance	nto	the	war.”	Genau	thereupon	nqured	as	
to	when	he	had	met	wth	lndbergh	n	amerca,	the	most	recent	meetng	
only	havng	been,	Wedemeyer	 sad,	 one	month	past.	Wedemeyer	 added	
further	that	hs	vsts	were	purely	socal	and	they	only	dscussed	natonal	
and	nternatonal	poltcs.	nevertheless,	to	Fbi	offcals	Wedemeyer’s	lnk	
wth	lndbergh—the	most	popular	and	nfluental	of	roosevelt’s	crtcs—	
only	served	to	cast	further	suspcons	on	the	colonel.37
	 35.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	32–33.
	 36.	 ibd.,	34–35.
	 37.	Wedemeyer,	Wedemeyer Reports!	40–41.
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On	6	December,	a	day	after	he	brefed	the	attorney	general	on	the	vctory	
Program	nvestgaton	for	the	cabnet	meetng,	hoover	submtted	to	bddle	
a	prelmnary	report.	hoover	advsed	that	because	of	the	way	n	whch	War	
Department	documents	were	handled,	“t	s	mpossble	to	accurately	and	
exactly”	 determne	 who	 had	 leaked	 the	 vctory	 Program.	 Despte	 ths	
concluson,	hoover	ordered	agents	 to	contnue	 to	dg	deeper	 to	 dentfy	
the	perpetrator,	and	he	proposed	two	courses	of	acton	for	bddle.	Frst,	
hoover	suggested	convenng	a	grand	jury	before	whch,	and	under	oath,	
the	suspects	would	be	nterrogated.	The	drawback	to	ths	course,	hoover	
reported,	was	that	t	mght	shed	some	unfavorable	lght	upon	the	roosevelt	
admnstraton.	hoover’s	second	recommendaton,	and	the	one	he	person-
ally	advocated	due	to	the	senstvty	of	 the	matter,	was	“to	de-emphasze	
the	nqury	whch	s	beng	carred	on	concernng	ths	matter,	and	to	have	
t	appear	that	the	nqury	s	n	a	quescent	status.”	Ths,	hoover	counseled,	
would	enable	Fbi	agents	to	locate	the	“offcer	or	person”	who	had	leaked	
the	plan.	bddle,	apparently,	accepted	hoover’s	second	opton,	but	the	frst	
was	consdered	at	a	later	date.38
	 Though	 unable	 to	 specfcally	 dentfy	 the	 leaker,	 hoover	 advsed	
bddle	that	“thoroughly	relable	confdental	nformants”	ndcated	that	a	
hgh-rankng	general	staff	offcer	of	the	War	Department	had	leaked	the	
plan	 “to	 an	 solatonst	 Senator.”	 as	 for	 who	 had	 leaked	 the	 document,	
hoover	noted	that	some	members	of	the	War	Department	“were	not	at	all	
n	sympathy	wth	the	admnstraton’s	apparent	plans	or	preparatons	for	
war.”	moreover,	these	offcers	ndcated	ther	nsubordnaton	by	referrng	
to	ther	superors	as	“boneheads”	whle	holdng	lttle	respect	for	ther	abl-
tes.	another	nformant,	who	was	“closely	assocated	wth	certan	aspects	
of	 the	publcaton	of	 ths	story,”	 nformed	Fbi	agents	 that	 the	ant-nter-
ventonst	press	had	hoped	the	leak	would	spark	an	“nsurrecton”	n	the	
War	Department	 that	would	amount	 to	a	scandal	“of	greater	proporton	
than	the	Dreyfus	case.”39
	 “There	was	 ample	 evdence	 to	 suggest	my	 gult,”	albert	Wedemeyer	
wrote	to	newspaperman	Walter	Trohan	n	1953.40	On	a	prma	face	level,	
	 38.	Personal	 and	 strctly	 confdental	memorandum,	hoover	 to	 bddle,	 6	December	
1941,	Fbi	65–39945–19.
	 39.	 Strctly	personal	and	confdental	blnd	memorandum,	5	December	1941,	Fbi	65–
39945–19.
	 40.	 letter,	 albert	 C.	Wedemeyer	 to	Walter	 Trohan,	 27	november	 1953,	Wedemeyer	
Papers,	box	139,	hia.
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that	a	dsgruntled	“solatonst”	wthn	the	War	Department	had	leaked	the	
vctory	Program	ponted	drectly	to	Wedemeyer.	but	ths	suspcon	could	
not	be	proved,	as	one	Fbi	agent	reported:
The	 facts	 and	 crcumstances	 surroundng	 the	 preparaton	 and	handlng	
of	ths	report	n	the	perod	between	the	date	the	presdent	requested	t	on	
July	9th	and	the	tme	t	was	actually	submtted	to	hm	on	September	25th,	
and	the	comparatvely	wde	dstrbuton	of	35	mmeographed	copes	of	the	
report	subsequent	to	ts	dstrbuton	by	the	Secretary	of	the	Jont	Plannng	
board,	make	 t	 mpossble	 to	 establsh	 any	 evdence	or	manfestaton	of	
gulty	conduct	on	the	part	of	ths	offcer	[Wedemeyer]	at	ths	tme.41
	 Wedemeyer,	nevertheless,	remaned	under	suspcon.	Frst,	Wedemeyer	
remaned	a	suspect	because	of	the	tme	he	had	spent	at	the	Kriegsakademie	
between	1936	and	1938.	Whle	not	suffcent	to	cast	doubt	on	hs	loyalty	to	
the	Unted	States,	nformaton	purportng	that	he	was	“most	pro-German	
n	hs	feelngs,	hs	utterances,	and	hs	sympathes”	along	wth	hs	connec-
tons	 to	Charles	 lndbergh	dd,	 n	 fact,	 lead	Fbi	 offcals	 to	 suspect	 hs	
poltcal	motves.	Ths	was	apparently	confrmed	to	Fbi	offcals	when	they	
learned	Wedemeyer	had	hotly	debated	wth	fellow	offcers	the	ssue	of	“hs	
lack	of	sympathy	wth	the	admnstraton’s	nternatonal	program.”	agents	
learned	 that	Wedemeyer	was	 “opposed	 to	 the	lend-lease	program”	and	
that	he	was	“very	 solatonst	 n	hs	statements	and	sympathes.”	beyond	
hs	 clear	 poltcal	 bases,	 Fbi	 offcals	 took	 note	 as	well	 of	Wedemeyer’s	
access	to	the	department’s	plans	to	send	troops	to	iceland	and	ts	plan	to	
occupy	 the	azores,	both	of	whch	had	been	subject	 to	 leaks	 to	 the	ant-
nterventonst	press.42
	 Then	the	Fbi’s	specal	agent	n	charge	n	Detrot,	John	bugas,	provded	
further	ncrmnatng	evdence	that	ponted,	most	lkely,	to	Wedemeyer.	a	
source	n	Detrot	had	overheard	a	conversaton	between	lndbergh,	henry	
Ford—the	 automoble	 magnate	 and	 fellow	 ant-nterventonst—and	 hs	
drector	of	plant	personnel	and	plant	securty,	harry	bennett.	lndbergh	
allegedly	 sad	 that	 he	 had	 receved	 “consderable	 nformaton”	 from	 an	
offcer	 n	 the	 army.	 Ths	 offcer,	 whom	 lndbergh	 had	 vsted	 whle	 n	
Washngton,	 D.C.,	 n	 addton	 to	 provdng	 lndbergh	 wth	 mltary-
related	 nformaton,	 also	 shared	 the	 avator’s	 poltcal	 sympathes—lke	
Wedemeyer.43
	 41.	 Strctly	personal	and	confdental	blnd	memorandum,	5	December	1941,	Fbi	65–
39945–19,	p.	4.
	 42.	 ibd.,	4–5.
	 43.	memorandum,	D.	mlton	ladd	 to	edward	a.	Tamm,	9	December	1941,	Fbi	62–
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	 Fbi	agents	subsequently	ntervewed	bennett—who	was	probably	ther	
nformant	gven	the	fact	that	agents	had	a	hstory	of	contactng	hm—who	
explaned	that	Ford	had	admonshed	lndbergh	for	speakng	on	mltary	
matters	snce	he	was	not	an	expert.	lndbergh	then	explaned	to	Ford	that	
he	 acqured	 hs	 mltary	 nformaton	 from	 hgh-rankng	 army	 offcers.	
bennett	could	not	recall	the	name	of	ths	offcer,	who	to	Fbi	offcals	was	
lkely	be	ther	leaker,	and	he	also	dd	not	recall	lndbergh	mentonng	the	
vctory	Program.44
	 Snce	 bennett	 could	 not	 produce	 the	 name	 of	 lndbergh’s	 army	
contact,	 Fbi	 assstant	Drector	 Tamm	 beleved	 that	 Ford	 could.	 So	 he	
ordered	the	Detrot	SaC	to	ntervew	Ford	but	to	do	so	n	a	nonconfron-
tatonal	way.	Delghted	wth	 the	progress	 beng	made	 to	 ascertan	who	
had	 leaked	the	vctory	Program,	hoover	 nstructed	hs	subordnates	 to	
“press	ths”	and	“let	me	know	[the]	result.”45	meanwhle,	hoover	brefed	
the	attorney	general,	advsng	 that	 f	Ford	revealed	lndbergh’s	contact,	
“my	dea	s	to	have	two	of	our	best	men	see	lndberg	[sic]	and	call	upon	
hm	to	gve	us	the	nformaton	he	has”	and,	f	he	should	refuse	to	reveal	
hs	 nformaton,	 to	tell	hm	that	Ford	had	already	dentfed	the	offcer.	
hoover	then	postulated	that	“we	could	then	gve	consderaton”	to	sub-
poenang	 lndbergh	 to	 testfy	 before	 a	 grand	 jury	 where	 he	 could	 be	
forced	 to	“ether	 .	 .	 .	put	up	or	 shut	up.”	bddle	agreed,	addng	 that	 the	
effort	mght	permt	the	presdent	to	“clean	out	some	‘brass	hats’”	from	the	
War	Department.46
	 Specal	agent	n	Charge	bugas	ntervewed	Ford,	yet	he	dd	not	know	
the	 name	 of	 lndbergh’s	 War	 Department	 contact.	 hoover’s	 scheme	 to	
locate	the	leak	faled,	but	ths	dd	not	deter	bugas,	who	ntervewed	bennett	
agan.	bennett	sad	he	would	just	ask	lndbergh	who	hs	contact	was,	but	
bugas	advsed	aganst	such	a	blatant	confrontaton—probably	fearng	that	
lndbergh	would	dscover	the	Fbi’s	nterest—and,	nstead,	bennett	dent-
fed	another	offcer	whom	lndbergh	knew,	major	James	hggs,	who	prob-
ably	could	dentfy	lndbergh’s	“prncpal	contact.”47
19253–304.
	 44.	memorandum	for	mr.	Tamm,	by	D.	mlton	ladd,	9	December	1941,	Fbi	62–19253–
304.
	 45.	memorandum,	edward	a.	Tamm	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	11	December	1941,	Fbi	62–
19253–304.
	 46.	memorandum,	 J.	 edgar	 hoover	 to	 Clyde	 Tolson,	 D.	 mlton	 ladd,	 and	 edward	
Tamm,	12	December	1941,	Fbi	65–11449–105.	lndbergh’s	name	was	commonly	msspelled	
by	many	amercans.
	 47.	memorandum,	edward	a.	Tamm	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	13	December	1941,	Fbi	65–
11449–113;	personal	and	confdental	letter,	John	S.	bugas	to	edward	a.	Tamm,	13	Decem-
ber	1941,	Fbi	65–39945–14.	
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	 On	20	December	1941	hggs	was	confronted	by	Fbi	assstant	Drector	
Tamm	and	two	miD	offcers.	hggs,	a	natonal	Guard	offcer	who	worked	
as	a	publc	relatons	expert	n	General	henry	“hap”	arnold’s	offce,	dened	
ever	havng	seen	the	vctory	Program,	an	asserton	Tamm	found	curous	
because	hggs’s	 job	was	 to	 publcze	 the	army	ar	Corps,	whch	meant	
that	he	had	to	have	access	 to	mltary	estmates.	The	major	also	clamed	
to	know	lndbergh	only	formally,	and	not	socally,	whch	Tamm	found	to	
be	nconsstent	snce	hggs	had	referred	to	lndbergh	several	tmes	by	hs	
nckname,	Slm.	yet,	rrespectve	of	the	lengthy	ntervew	and	nconssten-
ces	n	hggs’s	remarks,	Tamm	faled	to	establsh	any	leads	on	the	vctory	
Program	leak.	he	dd	fnd	hggs,	however,	to	be	heavly	nvolved	n	War	
Department	poltcs	and	“sculduggery	[sic].”48
	 Whle	 Fbi	 agents	 worked	 assduously	 to	 confrm	 Wedemeyer	 (or	
someone	 else)	 as	 the	 leaker,	 they	 also	 attempted	 to	 dentfy	whch	 ant-
nterventonst	senator	had	receved	the	plans.	Fbi	agents	focused	on	two	
suspects:	 Senator	 burton	 K.	Wheeler	 of	montana	 and	 Senator	 Davd	 i.	
Walsh	of	massachusetts.	Wheeler	was	 suspect	almost	 mmedately	gven	
hs	promnence	as	an	ant-nterventonst	 (and	Fbi	subject)	and	because	
t	was	he	who	had	publczed	the	mltary	plan	to	send	troops	to	iceland.49	
Walsh	became	a	suspect	n	January	1942	when	an	unnamed	nformant—a	
dsaffected	former	employee	of	the	Washington Times-Herald—had	den-
tfed	hm	as	the	recpent	of	one	of	the	thrty-fve	mmeographed	copes	
of	the	vctory	Program	and	the	one	who	allegedly	had	provded	t	to	the	
Chicago Tribune.	 The	 nformant,	 who	was	 reportedly	 “tckled	 to	 death”	
to	assst	the	Fbi,	beleved	that	Walsh	and	Chesly	manly,	the	author	of	the	
controversal	Tribune	artcle,	enjoyed	a	close	relatonshp.50
	 interestngly,	Fbi	offcals	almost	got	t	rght	n	dentfyng	the	senator	
who	was	gven	the	plan.	They	ntally	beleved	that	Wheeler	was	ther	man	
but	later	focused	on	Walsh	as	ther	prmary	suspect,	probably	because	of	
hs	 connecton	 n	 the	 contract	 fraud	 and	 homosexual	 cases.	 They	were	
	 48.	memorandum,	edward	a.	Tamm	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	27	December	1941,	Fbi	100–
12691	[?].	The	complete	document	number	s	unreadable;	suffce	t	to	say	the	memorandum	
s	ncluded	n	the	fle	on	the	vctory	Program	leak:	fle	65–39945.	Transcrpt	of	hggs	nter-
vew	n	report,	by	Joseph	a.	Genau,	15	January	1941,	Fbi	65–39945–3,	pp.	35–48.
	 49.	Confdental	War	Department	memorandum,	Grenvlle	Clark	to	assstant	Secretary	
of	War	John	J.	mcCloy,	4	December	1941,	Fbi	65–39945–26;	memorandum,	assstant	Drec-
tor	lous	nchols	to	robert	e.	Wck,	25	January	1952,	Fbi	65–39945–62.
	 50.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	assstant	Drector	P.	e.	Foxworth	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	
20	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–35;	memorandum,	D.	mlton	ladd	to	edward	a.	Tamm,	21	
January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945-[?];	personal	and	confdental	 letter,	S.	K.	mcKee	to	J.	edgar	
hoover,	22	January	1942,	Fbi	100–3709-[?].
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wrong.	Senator	Wheeler	had,	n	fact,	been	the	recpent	of	the	plan	and	had	
provded	t	to	Chesly	manly;	Wheeler	publcly	admtted	as	much	n	1962.
	 Wheeler’s	role	n	the	vctory	Program	leak	began	on	8	June	1940,	the	
day	after	he	had	delvered	a	natonally	broadcast	speech	n	whch	he	urged	
amercans	to	reman	calm	n	the	face	of	events	n	europe.	accordng	to	
Wheeler’s	account,	a	captan	n	the	army	ar	Corps	then	vsted	hm	n	hs	
Senate	offce	and	offered	to	provde	the	senator	wth	offcal	mltary	fg-
ures	whle	warnng	the	senator	that	the	amercan	ar	forces	were	no	match	
for	naz	Germany’s.	The	offcer	 further	 stated	 that	anyone	who	clamed	
to	the	contrary	was	lyng.	Wheeler’s	relatonshp	wth	ths	mltary	source	
become	ntmate	and	long-lastng;	the	senator,	moreover,	took	ths	man’s	
name	wth	hm	to	hs	grave.51
	 about	a	year	and	a	half	after	meetng	ths	offcer,	he	nformed	Wheeler	
that	roosevelt	had	ordered	the	creaton	of	a	master	plan	for	an	amercan	
expedtonary	force	to	europe.	Fascnated	by	ths	clam,	n	September	1941	
Wheeler	asked	f	the	captan	could	provde	hm	wth	a	copy.	he	agreed	to	
the	 senator’s	 request	but	was	unable	 to	 secure	a	 copy	untl	 3	December.	
That	 day,	 he	 delvered	 the	vctory	 Program	 “wrapped	 n	 brown	 paper”	
to	Wheeler’s	home.	Wheeler	asked	the	captan	why	he	agreed	to	leak	ths	
plan,	to	whch	he	repled:	“Congress	s	a	branch	of	government.	i	thnk	t	
had	a	rght	to	know	what’s	really	gong	on	n	the	executve	branch	when	t	
concerns	human	lves.”	Wheeler	kept	the	plan	overnght	to	study	t.52
	 “as	 i	 scanned	 ts	 contents,”	Wheeler	 subsequently	wrote,	 “my	 blood	
pressure	rose.”	The	senator	beleved	that	gven	the	way	n	whch	roosevelt	
had	couched	the	neutralty	acts,	lend-lease,	and	the	destroyers-for-bases	
deal	as	defensve	measures	meant	to	ensure	amercan	solaton	from	war,	
revealng	the	vctory	Program	would	undercut	those	seemngly	specous	
arguments.	Wheeler	 wanted	 to	 prove	 to	 amercans	 that	 f	 the	 country	
contnued	on	ts	present	course	 that	war	was	 nevtable;	and	the	vctory	
Program	 only	 underscored	 that	 premse.	 addtonally,	 Wheeler	 dd	
not	beleve	 that	 revealng	 ths	 top-secret	plan	was	a	volaton	of	 the	 law	
because	 t	was	only	 a	 contngency	plan	of	producton	 requrements	 and	
	 51.	burton	K.	Wheeler	wth	Paul	F.	healy,	Yankee from the West	(new	york:	Doubleday,	
1962),	21.
	 52.	as	quoted	n	Wheeler	and	healy,	Yankee from the West,	32.	Wheeler	suspected	that	
a	senor	offcer	n	the	War	Department	had	authorzed	the	vctory	Program’s	release	to	hm.	
accordng	to	newspaperman	Walter	Trohan,	Wheeler	beleved	that	army	ar	Corps	Gen-
eral	henry	arnold—who	was	sympathetc	to	the	ant-nterventonsts—was	at	the	center	of	
the	release.	albert	Wedemeyer,	however,	strongly	dsagreed	wth	Trohan’s	belef.	See	letter,	
Walter	Trohan	to	albert	Wedemeyer,	25	november	1953,	and	letter,	albert	Wedemeyer	to	
Walter	Trohan,	27	november	1953,	Wedemeyer	Papers,	box	139,	hia.
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not	an	operatonal	war	plan.	he	saw	no	 legtmate	reason	not	 to	 nform	
the	publc.53
	 Wheeler	decded	that	the	best	way	to	make	publc	the	vctory	Program	
was	 to	 ensure	 ts	 publcaton	 n	 a	 paper	 sympathetc	 to	 the	 ant-nter-
ventonst	cause.	he	therefore	decded	to	share	t	wth	Chesly	manly,	the	
Chicago Tribune’s	Washngton	correspondent,	because	“i	lked	manly	and	
knew	 hs	 paper	 would	 gve	 the	 plan	 the	 knd	 of	 attenton	 t	 deserved.”	
When	 presented	 wth	 the	 document	 that	 nght,	 accordng	 to	 Wheeler,	
manly	was	 “startled	 and	 fascnated.”	 The	 two	men	 scanned	 the	vctory	
Program	at	Wheeler’s	house	“for	several	hours”	durng	whch	tme	manly	
took	copous	notes.	The	document	was	returned	to	the	War	Department	
n	the	mornng,	and	on	4	December	the	plan	went	publc.54
—■■■■■■■—
havng	 faled	 n	 ther	 ntal	 efforts	 to	 dentfy	 the	 leaker	of	 the	vctory	
Program	 and	 to	 frmly	 establsh	 whch	 ant-nterventonst	 senator	 had	
receved	t,	Fbi	offcals	ncreased	pressure	on	specfc	ndvduals.	in	early	
1942,	Fbi	agents	and	miD	offcers	extensvely	 ntervewed	the	author	of	
the	Tribune	artcle,	Chesly	manly.	They	had	hoped	ther	questonng	would	
reveal	hs	source	as	well	as	further	detals	surroundng	the	leak.	The	Fbi	
and	miD	 nterrogators	 contnually	pressed	manly	 to	 dentfy	hs	 source	
usng	 the	 classc	 nterrogaton	 tactc	 of	 constantly	 rephrasng	 the	 same	
questons.	 but	manly,	 undaunted	 by	 hs	 adversares,	 stuck	 to	 the	 same	
answer:	“i	am	not	at	lberty	to	answer	any	queston	that	goes	to	the	source	
of	my	nformaton.”	Fbi	agent	Joseph	Genau,	the	bureau’s	lead	nvestgator,	
pressured	manly	by	askng	hm	f	hs	source	was	“above	patrotsm?”	The	
journalst	dened	the	matter	had	anythng	to	do	wth	patrotsm.	Changng	
tactcs,	the	nterrogators	asked	manly	whch	numbered	copy	of	the	vctory	
Program	he	had	seen.	Knowng	that	copes	of	the	plan	were	charged	out	
to	specfc	ndvduals,	manly	refused	to	answer.	Fbi	agents	were	also	not	
above	employng	hyperbole	n	ther	questonng:
There	s	.	 .	 .	a	deadly	earnestness	to	get	to	the	bottom	of	ths	and	we	are	
tryng	to	clear	you	and	your	paper	of	ths	esponage.	it	s	defntely,	untl	
you	prove	to	the	contrary,	a	possble	case	of	esponage.	i	can	tell	you	ths,	
that	f	t	ever	got	out	to	the	publc—even	a	rumor—that	there	were	copes	
	 53.	Wheeler	and	healy,	Yankee from the West,	32–33.
	 54.	as	quoted	n	Wheeler	and	healy,	Yankee from the West,	33.
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of	 the	 document	 you	had	 several	week	pror	 to	Pearl	harbor,	 they	 [the	
publc]	would	tear	down	that	buldng	n	Chcago,	and	you	know	t.	That’s	
just	the	type	of	hystera	we	don’t	want	n	ths	case.55
	 Despte	the	agent’s	suggeston	that	the	onus	was	on	manly	to	prove	hs	
own	nnocence,	he	assured	the	agent	 that	no	esponage	had	taken	place.	
Secretary	of	War	Stmson	was	brefed	on	the	ntervew	and	was	told	that	
manly	had	obfuscated	durng	questonng.	Stmson	then	confded	to	hs	
dary,	accurately	determnng	on	hs	own	who	manly’s	 lkely	source	was,	
that	“t	looks	as	f	my	old	frend	Wheeler	was	pretty	close	to	trouble.”56
	 in	order	to	handle	such	a	large	nvestgaton,	Fbi	offcals	reled	upon	
mltary	 ntellgence	 offcers	 to	 ntervew	 the	 publsher	 of	 the	New York 
Daily News,	Joseph	Patterson.	Patterson	was	not	as	cautous	n	hs	answers	
as	manly	had	been	and	so	revealed	that	“[a]	Senator	called	[telephoned]	
mr.	[arthur]	hennng,	manager	of	the	Washngton	Offce	of	the	Chcago	
Trbune	.	.	.	and	through	ths	medum	had	mr.	hennng	ths	story.”	Unable	
to	dentfy	the	senator,	Patterson	nformed	nvestgators	that	mcCormck	
had	 standng	 orders	 to	 fnd	 any	 story	 that	 could	 be	 used	 to	 scoop	 the	
Chicago Sun,	the	rval	newspaper	slated	to	make	ts	debut	on	4	December	
1941.57
	 Wth	ths	lead,	the	Fbi	and	miD	nvestgators	located	and	questoned	
arthur	 hennng	 n	 Washngton,	 D.C.	 hennng	 refused	 to	 dentfy	 the	
source	of	 the	 leak,	but	 commented	about	 scoopng	 the	Sun:	 “Ths	 thng	
just	happened.	it	was	a	provdental	occurrence.	.	.	.	i	receved	no	nstruc-
tons	 from	my	 superors.”	hennng	also	 admtted	 to	havng	 seen	a	 copy	
of	 the	vctory	Program,	 but	 added	 that	 hs	 source	 “had	 a	 legal	 rght	 to	
have	the	plan	n	hs	possesson.”	When	asked	whether	ths	source	was	on	
Captol	hll,	 hennng	 reterated:	 “These	 thngs	may	 be	 dsmssed	 from	
your	mnd.”58
	 Fbi	nvestgators	found	hennng’s	atttude	and	nformaton	of	seemng	
mportance.	Followng	t,	Fbi	agents	ntervewed	mcCormck	and	receved	
from	hm	a	promse	to	ask	hennng	to	assst	the	bureau	wthout	volatng	
the	confdentalty	of	newspaper	sources.	Then	Fbi	agents	rentervewed	
hennng,	prefacng	ther	effort	wth	a	queston	as	to	whether	hennng	had	
spoken	 to	 mcCormck.	 Though	 answerng	 n	 the	 affrmatve,	 hennng	
	 55.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	S.	K.	mcKee	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	Fbi	65–39945–1;	
statement	of	Chesly	manly,	23	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–1.
	 56.	entry	for	24	February	1942,	Stmson	Dares,	37:155	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	7).
	 57.	report,	by	Joseph	a.	Genau,	15	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–3,	pp.	33–34.
	 58.	report,	by	Joseph	a.	Genau,	15	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–3,	pp.	50–52.
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refused	to	dvulge	any	further	nformaton,	commentng	only	that	“[t]he	
ndvdual	who	had	t	got	t	legally	and	properly.	i	must	protect	my	source	
and	wll	not	gve	my	source	away	f	i	can	possbly	help	t.”59
	 yet	agan,	Fbi	agents’	efforts	got	them	nowhere.	Fbi	assstant	Drector	
Tamm	then	advsed	hoover	that	the	bureau	should	drop	the	“kd	gloves”	
and	 subpoena	hennng,	mcCormck,	 and	manly	 before	 a	 federal	 grand	
jury	to	force	them	to	reveal	 ther	source	“or	be	cted	for	perjury	or	ms-
conduct.”	The	Fbi	drector	agreed.	“We	have	ourselves	largely	to	blame,”	he	
commented,	“because	of	unaggressve	handlng	of	[ths]	case	by	our	own	
people.”	Despte	the	fact	that	the	Fbi’s	nvestgatve	strategy	was	devsed	by	
hoover,	he	nevertheless	blamed	Fbi	agents’	work	for	ts	falure.60
	 hoover	then	changed	hs	strategy.	When	advsng	the	attorney	general	
on	27	January	1942,	the	Fbi	drector	noted	that	hundreds	of	people	had	been	
ntervewed,	but	because	the	record	of	War	Department	document	handlng	
was	mprecse	t	was	“mpossble”	to	dentfy	the	leaker.	hoover	ponted	out	
that	at	least	109	people	had	access	to	the	vctory	Program	n	both	the	War	
and	navy	Departments,	 but	 because	 these	people	 regularly	 shared	docu-
ments	wthout	chargng	them	out	the	real	number	“s	legon.”61
	 in	recaptulatng	the	case	for	bddle,	hoover	dsclosed	that	a	popular	
rumor	 suggested	mssour	 congressman	 Phlp	 bennett	 had	 pad	 a	War	
Department	clerk	for	the	plan,	but	Fbi	agents	could	not	corroborate	ths.	
regardng	Charles	lndbergh,	hoover	noted	that	 the	bureau’s	“extensve	
nvestgaton”	had	 faled	 to	 lnk	lndbergh	 through	 “personal	 frends	or	
contacts”	 to	 the	 leak.	 Fnally,	 those	War	Department	 offcers	 who	were	
“ant-brtsh,	ant-admnstraton,	or	otherwse	out	of	sympathy	wth	the	
admnstraton’s	 nternatonal	 polces”	 had	 also	 not	 been	 lnked	 to	 the	
vctory	Program	leak.62
	 because	hs	efforts	had	faled	to	uncover	the	source	of	the	leak,	hoover	
nformed	bddle	that	the	Fbi	would	dscontnue	further	nvestgaton.	he	
recommended,	nstead,	that	the	admnstraton	consder	the	other,	poten-
tally	embarrassng,	nvestgatve	strategy	hoover	had	outlned	mmedate-
ly	after	the	leak:	convenng	of	a	grand	jury.	The	Fbi	drector	then	sngled	
out	hennng	and	manly	as	the	two	most	mportant	wtnesses	to	subpoena	
	 59.	 ibd.,	pp.	52–57.
	 60.	memorandum,	 edward	a.	 Tamm	 to	 J.	 edgar	hoover,	 14	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–
39945–4.
	 61.	Personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	 J.	edgar	hoover	 to	attorney	general,	27	
January	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–39945–26;	 blnd	 memorandum,	 27	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–39945–
26X.
	 62.	blnd	memorandum,	27	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–26X,	p.	4.
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whle	argung	that	ther	source	was	undoubtedly	“a	Congressonal	one.”	if	
hennng	and	manly	revealed	whch	senator	had	obtaned	the	plan,	hoover	
wrote,	then	an	attempt	could	be	made	“to	compel”	the	senator,	before	the	
grand	jury,	to	name	hs	War	Department	source.63
	 Whle	hoover	told	bddle	that	the	Fbi	would	stop	ts	nvestgaton,	n	
realty	t	dd	not.	Fbi	agents	followed	up	any	lead	they	dscovered	after	27	
January	and	contnued	to	 ntervew	numerous	 ndvduals.	 in	the	mean-
tme,	 the	roosevelt	 admnstraton	dragged	 ts	heels	 n	decdng	how	 to	
dspose	of	the	case	because	n	the	days	just	after	Pearl	harbor,	wth	no	frm	
suspects	at	hand,	there	were	more	pressng	ssues	to	address—such	as	what	
to	do	wth	Japanese	amercans	on	the	West	Coast.
	 Whle	the	Fbi’s	nvestgaton	was,	for	all	ntents	and	purposes,	stalled,	
the	matter	was	stll	one	of	concern	on	Captol	hll.	On	13	February	1942,	
after	a	dscusson	wth	Senator	nye,	Tamm	warned	hoover	that	there	was	
a	great	deal	of	suspcon	among	senators	about	what	 the	Fbi	was	dong.	
ant-nterventonst	senators,	moreover,	beleved	that	the	Fbi	was	specf-
cally	targetng	them	as	leak	suspects.	Chesly	manly	was	even	reported	to	
have	 told	Senator	Wheeler	 that	 f	 the	Fbi	contnued	to	 target	ant-nter-
ventonst	senators,	he	would	“expose	the	entre	thng.”	how	hoover	and	
other	senor	Fbi	offcals	responded	to	ths	nformaton	remans	unknown	
because	of	redactons	n	Fbi	documents,	but	t	s	clear	that	the	Fbi’s	nves-
tgaton	never	went	publc	and	the	Fbi	never	dentfed	the	 leaker	or	hs	
senatoral	companon.64
	 For	the	next	two	months	(February	and	march)	Fbi	agents	contnued	to	
wrte	up	nvestgatve	summares	and	conduct	ntervews.	They	seemngly	
explored	every	possble	avenue	avalable	to	them	untl	the	admnstraton	
made	 a	 fnal	 decson	 as	 to	whether	 the	 grand	 jury	would	 be	 employed	
aganst	 those	 nvolved	 n	 the	 leak.	 agents	 ntervewed	 n	 partcular	 the	
thrty-two	mltary	and	cvlan	employees	n	the	offce	of	the	secretary	of	
war,	 ncludng	henry	 Stmson’s	 personal	 secretary.	none	of	 the	 subjects	
could	reveal	any	useful	nformaton	to	nterrogators.65
	 63.	blnd	memorandum,	27	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–26X,	p.	6.	Ths	was	not	the	
frst	tme	that	hoover	suggested	employng	grand	jures	aganst	roosevelt’s	ant-nterven-
tonst	foregn	polcy	crtcs.	he	advocated	use	of	a	grand	jury	when,	for	example,	Charles	
lndbergh	seemed	to	be	a	promsng	lead	n	the	case.
	 64.	memorandum,	 D.	 mlton	 ladd	 to	 J.	 edgar	 hoover,	 13	 February	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–
39945–32.	Wheeler	has	wrtten	that	he	dd	not	beleve	the	Fbi	had	nvestgated	hs	role	n	the	
leak.	Senator	Davd	Walsh,	however,	told	the	montana	senator	that	“he	was	taled	for	several	
days.”	See	Wheeler	and	healy,	Yankee from the West,	36.
	 65.	 For	 these	 ntervews	 see	 the	 218-page	 confdental	 memorandum	 by	 Joseph	 a.	
Genau,	24	march	1942,	Fbi	100–3709.
13 Chapter 5
	 by	may,	 havng	 receved	 no	 drecton	 from	 the	 Justce	 Department,	
hoover	 nqured	 of	 bddle	what	 the	 admnstraton’s	 decson	was	 as	 to	
the	leak	nvestgaton.	he	relayed	that	all	avalable	nformaton	had	been	
submtted	 to	 the	 department’s	 crmnal	 dvson,	 and	 asked	 f	 the	 case	
should	be	closed	or	left	open.	The	attorney	general,	apparently,	chose	not	
to	contnue	to	pursue	the	matter	and	hoover	advsed	hs	subordnates	that	
the	“fle	may	be	closed.”66
	 Ths	 dd	 not,	 however,	 end	 the	 matter.	 by	 June	 the	 admnstraton	
began	 to	 reconsder	 prosecutng	 those	 nvolved	 n	 the	vctory	Program	
leak.	Ths	decson	dd	not	stem	out	of	some	sudden	reconsderaton	of	the	
evdence	or	hoover’s	proposed	tactcs.	instead,	after	the	battle	of	mdway	
n	June	1942,	because	the	Chicago Tribune	had	publshed	a	story	revealng	
the	strength	of	Japanese	naval	forces	n	the	Pacfc	and	because	ths	nfor-
maton	 orgnated	 from	 government	 sources,	 the	 admnstraton	 sought	
to	ndct	the	Tribune	and	the	artcle’s	author,	Stanley	Johnson,	for	prntng	
“sedtous”	materal.	Ultmately,	however,	because	 the	government	could	
not	prove	 that	damage	had	been	done	wth	publcaton	of	 the	 story,	 the	
ndctment	never	materalzed.	but	t	was	the	exctement	generated	from	
ths	partcular	story	that	renewed	the	government’s	consderaton	over	tak-
ng	acton	n	the	vctory	Program	leak.67
	 Wth	a	prosecutoral	sprt	renvgorated	amd	the	fast-movng	events	
of	1942,	assstant	attorney	General	Wendell	berge	requested	an	Fbi	sum-
mary	of	the	case.	in	t,	hoover	outlned	the	evdence	and	how,	n	hs	vew,	
the	esponage	act	could	be	used	aganst	those	nvolved	n	the	leak.	hoover	
suggested	prosecutng	manly,	hennng,	and	the	management	of	both	the	
Chicago Tribune	and	Washington Times-Herald	under	three	sectons	of	the	
law.	One	secton	crmnalzed	the	possesson	of	an	offcal	natonal	defense	
plan	wth	the	ntent	to	dsclose	t	to	an	unauthorzed	person.	manly	and	
hennng	were	supposedly	lable	snce	they	had,	n	hoover’s	vew,	provded	
the	 vctory	 Program	 to	 the	 two	 newspapers;	 and	 the	 newspapers	 were	
lable	 nasmuch	 as	 they	had	made	 the	vctory	Program	 avalable	 to	 the	
general	publc.	a	second	secton	crmnalzed	the	copyng	of	defense	plans	
	 66.	Personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	attorney	general,	2	may	
1942,	Fbi	65–39945–41;	letter,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	Specal	agent	n	Charge,	Washngton,	DC,	
11	may	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–40.
	 67.	memorandum,	 J.	 edgar	 hoover	 to	Wllam	 D.	 mtchell,	 17	 June	 1942,	 Fbi	 65–
39945–42;	memorandum,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	attorney	general,	17	June	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–
47;	memorandum,	Wendell	berge	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	17	June	1942;	memorandum,	J.	edgar	
hoover	to	Wendell	berge,	19	June	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–51;	memorandum,	J.	edgar	hoover	
to	Wendell	berge,	31	July	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–55;	athan	Theohars,	“The	Fbi,	the	roosevelt	
admnstraton,	and	the	‘Subversve’	Press,”	Journalism History	19	(Sprng	1993):	8.
13Retribution: 4 December 1941 to Mid-194
wth	the	ntent	to	use	the	nformaton	to	the	detrment	of	the	Unted	States	
or	to	the	advantage	of	a	foregn	power.	hoover	beleved	the	leak	could	be	
construed	n	a	way	to	argue	such	a	poston.	The	thrd	secton	made	lle-
gal	the	acquston	of	a	defense	plan	whle	knowng	t	was	aganst	the	law.	
hoover	beleved	that	the	best	wtnesses	for	prosecutng	the	case	would	be	
Wedemeyer	and	ffteen	others.68
	 Whle	ther	reason	was	left	unrecorded	n	avalable	documents,	Justce	
Department	 attorneys	 decded	 aganst	 pursung	 the	 case.	Wth	 the	 tde	
of	war	shftng	dramatcally	by	the	mddle	of	1942,	and	wth	more	urgent	
war-related	 matters	 occupyng	 the	 Whte	 house,	 nterest	 n	 the	 case	
seemed	to	have	dsspated.	nevertheless,	Fbi	efforts	to	dscover	the	source	
of	the	leak	and,	f	possble,	develop	evdence	aganst	them	for	prosecuton	
were	 prodgous	 f	 a	 falure.	 more	 mportant,	 however,	 was	 the	 reason	
hoover	 so	 urgently	 pursued	 the	 matter:	 senor	 roosevelt	 admnstra-
ton	offcals	sought	retrbuton	for	the	embarrassng	revelaton	and	they	
wanted	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy	opposton	to	pay.
—■■■■■■■—
One	 clam	 concernng	 bSC	 actvty	 and	 the	 ant-nterventonsts	 that	 s	
bogus	nvolved	the	leak	of	the	vctory	Program	to	the	Chicago Tribune	and	
Washington Times-Herald.	not	mentoned	n	the	offcal	bSC	hstory,	the	
account	of	the	bSC’s	role	n	the	vctory	Program	leak	appeared	n	the	jour-
nalst	Wllam	Stevenson’s	sensatonal	book	about	 the	bSC	head,	A Man 
Called Intrepid	(1976).	Stevenson	wrote	that	Senator	Wheeler	was,	ndeed,	
the	 person	 who	 had	 offered	 the	 vctory	 Program	 to	 the	 ant-nterven-
tonst	press,	belevng	t	 to	be	the	smokng-gun	evdence	that	roosevelt	
ntended	to	lead	amerca	to	war.	yet,	Stevenson	also	clamed,	the	vctory	
Program	was,	 n	 realty,	 part	 of	 a	 ruse	 concocted	 by	 the	 bSC’s	 Poltcal	
Warfare	Dvson	 to	provde	naz	Germany	wth	 a	 “fantastc	 coup.”	The	
vctory	 Program,	 accordng	 to	 Stevenson,	 was	 peced	 together	 “out	 of	
materal	already	known	to	have	reached	the	enemy	n	drbs	and	drabs,	and	
.	.	.	some	msleadng	nformaton.”69
	 68.	memorandum,	D,	mlton	ladd	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	15	June	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–43;	
memorandum	 re	 news	 artcle	 n	Chicago Tribune	 and	Washington Times-Herald,	 author	
unknown,	15	June	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–4[?];	memorandum,	l.	l.	Tyler	to	D.	mlton	ladd,	17	
June	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–50;	blnd	memorandum	re	Pertnent	artcles	n	Chicago Tribune,	
17	June	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–50.
	 69.	Wllam	Stevenson,	A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War	 (new	york:	harcourt	
brace	Jovanovch,	1976),	298.
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	 Wth	the	Unted	States	on	the	verge	of	war	wth	Japan	and	Germany	
(va	the	undeclared	war	n	the	atlantc)	n	late	november	1941,	bSC	alleg-
edly	 slpped	 the	 phony	 vctory	 Program	 to	 Wheeler	 through	 a	 young	
mltary	 offcer.	The	bSC’s	 goal	was	 to	 have	Wheeler	 publcze	 the	 plan	
and	thereby	goad	htler	nto	declarng	war	on	the	Unted	States.	The	faked	
vctory	Program	was	 to	 stand	 as	 evdence,	 once	publshed	 n	 the	press,	
of	 roosevelt’s	 ntenton	 to	wage	war	 on	naz	Germany.	and,	 accordng	
to	Stevenson,	t	was	successful	n	promptng	htler	to	declare	war	on	the	
Unted	States	on	11	December	1941,	four	days	after	the	Japanese	attack	on	
Pearl	harbor.70
	 Ths	 account	 of	 the	 bSC’s	 role	 n	 creatng	 and	 slppng	 the	 vctory	
Program	to	the	unwttng	Wheeler	who,	n	turn,	had	t	publshed,	thereby	
leadng	the	Unted	States	to	war	wth	Germany,	s	erroneous.	as	the	pre-
cedng	Fbi	nvestgaton	demonstrates,	the	vctory	Program	was	a	genune	
contngency	plan	drawn	up	under	Wedemeyer’s	supervson.	but	the	story	
s	llustratve	of	the	persstence	of	the	mythology	surroundng	brtsh	ntel-
lgence	and	ts	actvtes	n	the	Unted	States,	a	mythology	that	s	dffcult	
to	repress	because	of	contnued	(sxty-year-old)	government	restrcton	of	
access	to	records	on	both	sdes	of	the	atlantc.
	 but	some	contnue	to	press	the	noton	that	the	vctory	Program	was	
ntended	to	ncte	htler	nto	declarng	war	on	the	Unted	States.	Thomas	
Flemng,	n	hs	book	The New Dealers’ War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 
War within World War II	 (2001),	 accepts	 that	 the	vctory	Program	was	
genune,	 yet	 he	 beleves	 that	 roosevelt	 ntentonally	 leaked	 the	 vctory	
Program	to	Wheeler.	roosevelt,	sensng	mmnent	war	wth	Japan,	sought	
to	goad	htler	nto	declarng	war	to	acheve	the	realzaton	of	hs	europe-
frst	polcy	of	war.	Concedng	that	“there	s	no	absolute	proof ”	to	support	
hs	clam,	Flemng	nevertheless	beleves	the	charge	“fts	 the	devous	sde	
of	Frankln	roosevelt’s	complex	personalty.”	Flemng	offers	no	verfable	
evdence	whatsoever	to	support	hs	case.71
—■■■■■■■—
The	 vctory	 Program	 leak	 and	 subsequent	 Fbi	 nvestgaton,	 therefore,	
are	best	understood	n	the	context	of	hoover’s	 long	effort	to	cater	to	the	
roosevelt	admnstraton’s	poltcal	nterests	rather	than	as	a	conspratoral	
	 70.	 Stevenson,	A Man Called Intrepid,	299–300.
	 71.	Thomas	Flemng,	The New Dealers’ War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the War within 
World War II	(new	york:	basc	books,	2001),	1–48.	See	also	Flemng’s	artcle	“The	bg	leak,”	
American Heritage	38	(December	1987):	65–71.
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plan	to	goad	naz	Germany	to	declare	war	on	the	Unted	States	or	a	fabr-
caton	of	brtsh	ntellgence	to	brng	the	Unted	States	nto	war,	or	even	as	
an	act	of	treachery.	The	vctory	Program	leak	was	not	the	natonal	securty	
breach	that	some	clamed;	nstead,	as	a	contngency	plan	only,	ts	revelaton	
was	an	embarrassment	that	fanned	the	flames	of	roosevelt’s	ant-nterven-
tonst	opposton.	The	very	nature	of	the	Fbi’s	nvestgaton	confrms	as	
much,	snce	they	focused	on	“solatonsts”	as	 targets	and	regarded	ther	
motves	 as	 beng	 rooted	 not	 n	 treason,	 but	 n	 havng	 no	 sympathy	 for	
roosevelt’s	 foregn	polcy.	Ths	 s	 characterstc	of	 the	domestc	 securty	
state,	and	later	Cold	War,	whereby	foregn	polcy	crtcs	were	targeted	for	
nvestgaton	 and	 retrbuton	 because	 they	 opposed	 offcal	 government	
polcy	or	held	radcal	belefs.	and	such	montorng	dd	not	end	wth	Pearl	
harbor	and	amerca’s	nvolvement	n	the	Second	World	War	because	for-
egn	polcy	crtcs	contnued	to	fall	under	Fbi	scrutny.
Blossoming of the 
Domestic Security State
November 1941 to March 1942
by	the	end	of	1941	the	debate	between	nterventonsts	and	ant-nterven-
tonsts	had	settled	nto	stalemate.	Whle	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	had	
won	passage	 of	many	measures	 to	 assst	 the	 beleaguered	alles,	 yet	 stll	
avod	drect	partcpaton	n	war,	t	could	not	break	the	deadlock	between	
two	rval	and	passonate	foregn	polcy	advocates	and	ther	postons.	The	
vctory	Program	 leak	appeared	 to	be	an	event	 the	admnstraton	could	
use	to	break	the	deadlock	and	fnally	dscredt	the	ant-nterventonsts	as	
consprators	who	llegally	ganed	access	to	secret	government	records	and	
publshed	 them,	but	Fbi	Drector	hoover	was	unable	 to	 fnd	 the	 leaker.	
For	ant-nterventonsts,	on	the	other	hand,	the	leak	only	confrmed	ther	
worst	suspcons	about	roosevelt	and	they	hoped	to	trumph	wth	t.
	 Ths	stalemate,	however,	n	no	way	daunted	the	obsequous	Fbi	drec-
tor.	 by	 the	 dawn	 of	 1942	 Fbi	 agents	 developed	 three	 cases	 that	 proved	
valuable	 n	 hoover’s	 effort	 to	 servce	 Whte	 house	 poltcal	 nterests	
and	to	promote	the	vew	of	 legtmate	crtcs	as	subversve,	exemplfyng	
the	 evoluton	 of	 the	 domestc	 securty	 state.	 each	 case	 reveals,	 n	 part,	
hoover’s	bureaucratc	motves	vs-à-vs		the	roosevelt	admnstraton	and	
hs	 questonable	 nvestgatve	 tactcs	 where	 agents	 consstently	 gnored	
ctzens’	cvl	lbertes.	Fbi	agents,	n	the	frst	case,	developed	a	frutful—f	
llegal—source	 of	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 on	 ant-nterventonst	 poltcal	
actvty	and	some	of	ths	nformaton	made	ts	way	nto	Fbi	reports	shared	
wth	 the	Whte	house	where,	 n	at	 least	one	 nstance,	 t	was	used	 n	an	
attempt	to	dscredt	an	admnstraton	opponent.	in	the	second	case,	Fbi	
offcals	sought	to	develop	nformaton	to	warrant	a	sedton	case	aganst	
one	promnent,	outspoken,	and	otherwse	legtmate	roosevelt	crtc.	and	
n	the	thrd,	Fbi	agents	used	llegal	 technques—wthout	ther	superors’	
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permsson—and	developed	ntellgence	that	saw	the	convcton	of	a	nave	
and	atypcal	ant-nterventonst	whose	case	reflected	Fbi	offcals’	curous	
vew	of	legtmate	foregn	polcy	crtcs	as	subversves.	moreover,	all	three	
examples	llustrate	that	the	domestc	securty	state	was	stll	evolvng	by	the	
dawn	of	1942,	durng	a	perod	of	crss,	whle	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	
ether	averted	ts	gaze	or	remaned	gnorant	as	to	exactly	what	the	Fbi	was	
engaged	n.
	 What	s	partcularly	strkng	about	the	three	Fbi	targets	to	be	analyzed	
here,	however,	 s	 that	 ther	cases	preceded,	and	were	a	clear	step	toward,	
the	much	more	publczed	Great	Sedton	Tral	whch	serves	as	a	marker	
for	the	peak	of	the	domestc	securty	state.	The	tral	nvolved	thrty	alleged	
fascsts	who	n	January	1944	were	charged	wth	a	“plot	to	ncte	mutny	n	
the	 armed	 forces,	 unseat	 the	Government	 and	 set	 up	 a	naz	 regme.”	 in	
other	words,	they	were	charged	wth	volatng	the	Smth	act—advocatng	
the	 volent	 overthrow	of	 the	U.S.	 government.	among	 these	 thrty	were	
the	now	nfamous	but,	at	the	tme,	relatvely	obscure	fgures	of	lawrence	
Denns,	Gerald	Wnrod,	Wllam	Dudley	Pelley,	elzabeth	Dllng,	Joseph	
mcWllams,	 and	 George	 Sylvester	 vereck.1	 roosevelt	 had	 pressed	 hs	
attorney	 general,	 Francs	 bddle,	 by	 1944	 to	 ndct	 these	 rght-wng	 fg-
ures—who	sat	on	the	perphery	of	amercan	poltcs—for	sedton.	in	hs	
1975	 book,	Prophets on the Right,	 ronald	 radosh	 rghtly	 compared	 the	
tral	 of	Denns	 and	 company	 to	 those	 trals	 aganst	 alleged	 communsts	
n	the	1950s.2	What	the	tral	llustrated,	however,	was	the	well-establshed	
domestc	 securty	 state—the	 forerunner	 to	 the	 later	 natonal	 securty	
state—already	 n	 operaton	 n	 1944.	What	 elucdates	 ths	 so-called	 frst	
Denns	Case,	moreover,	s	that	whch	preceded	t;	namely,	the	Fbi’s	nves-
tgatve	 efforts	 aganst	 the	 brgham	 famly	 of	 new	 york,	 the	 revsonst	
hstoran	 harry	 elmer	 barnes,	 and	 the	 avator	 laura	 ingalls.	 The	 Fbi’s	
efforts,	falures,	and	successes	n	these	three	cases	llustrate	that	evoluton-
ary	process	leadng	to	the	Great	Sedton	Tral	whch	created	the	bass	on	
whch	the	natonal	Securty	State	formed.
—■■■■■■■—
The	frst	of	these	partcular	Fbi	targets	was	ethel	brgham	and	her	famly	
	 1.	 “U.S.	 indcts	 30,	 allegng	 naz	 Plot	 to	 incte	mutny	 and	 revoluton,”	New York 
Times,	4	January	1944.
	 2.	ronald	radosh,	Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American 
Globalism	(new	york:	Smon	and	Schuster,	1975),	291.
14 Chapter 
of	new	york	Cty.	The	Fbi’s	nvestgaton	of	ethel—a	vocal	ultraconserva-
tve—and	her	 famly	proved	to	be	a	wndfall	 for	hoover’s	 nterest	 n	 the	
poltcal	actvtes	of	the	ant-nterventonsts	and	n	hs	effort	to	present	
them	 as	 subversve.	The	 prncpal	means	 by	whch	 Fbi	 agents	 collected	
ths	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 was	 a	 wretap	 of	 ethel’s	 telephone.	 Poltcally,	
ethel	 and	 her	 daughter,	 barbara,	 dentfed	 wth	 ant-nterventonsm	
and	were	ntmately	assocated	wth	the	Greenwch	vllage	branch	of	the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee’s	new	york	chapter.	barbara,	 n	fact,	served	as	
ths	branch’s	charperson.
	 not	 frnge	 fgures,	 the	 brghams	 were	 a	 promnent	 famly,	 whch	
stuated	 them	 perfectly	 among	 other	 foregn	 polcy	 crtcs	 whom	 Fbi	
agents	montored.	ethel	was	a	leadng	opera	and	concert	soprano	durng	
the	 1920s	 and	1930s	who	performed	 n	london,	berln,	 and	new	york.	
barbara	was	an	mportant	amerca	Frst	fgure	n	the	Greenwch	chapter,	
whle	her	brother,	Danel,	was	a	foregn	correspondent	for	the	New York 
Times,	based	n	Swtzerland;	ther	teenage	sster,	Constance,	was	an	aspr-
ng	 actress	 who	 performed	 on	 broadway.	 The	 Fbi’s	 montorng	 of	 ths	
promnent	new	york	famly’s	poltcs	corresponds	to	ts	broader	pattern	of	
montorng	roosevelt’s	other	promnent	foregn	polcy	crtcs	for	poltcal	
purposes.	but,	sgnfcantly,	snce	the	brghams	were	not	natonal	fgures,	
Fbi	agents	could	more	ntrusvely	gather	ntellgence	from	them	wth	less	
of	a	chance	of	exposure.3
	 The	 catalyst	 that	 brought	 the	 brghams	 to	 the	 attenton	 of	 Fbi	 off-
cals	 was	 not	 ther	 poltcs	 but	 a	 rumor	 about	 them	 relayed	 to	 the	 vce	
presdent	 of	 the	 Unted	 States,	 henry	 Wallace,	 on	 3	 november	 1941.	
Wallace’s	unnamed	confdant	clamed	to	have	 nformaton	relatng	to	an	
alleged	 assassnaton	plot	 aganst	Presdent	roosevelt	 that	was	 lnked	 to	
the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee.	 Ths	 person	 had	 been	 ntroduced	 to	 the	
brghams	n	Washngton,	D.C.,	and	subsequently	vsted	ethel	and	barbara	
n	new	york,	where,	after	an	evenng	at	the	cnema,	ethel	became	enraged	
over	a	news	report	that	roosevelt	had	placed	the	Coast	Guard	under	navy	
authorty.	Snce	ethel’s	nephew	was	a	Coast	Guard	reservst,	and	was	now	
seemngly	n	danger	of	seeng	combat	n	the	atlantc,	she	exclamed	that	
roosevelt	“ought	to	be	klled	for	takng	such	acton”	and	that	“he	would	be	
klled	before	long.”	Subsequently,	the	nformant	learned	that	the	brghams	
	 3.	 See	ethel	brgham’s	obtuary	n	New York Times,	28	September	1968,	33.	On	the	new	
york	chapter	of	amerca	Frst	see	mchele	Flynn	Stenehjem,	An American First: John T. Flynn 
and the America First Committee	(new	rochelle,	ny:	arlngton	house,	1976).	For	Danel’s	
work	see,	for	example,	hs	page	one	story:	Danel	brgham,	“Pope	has	long	Talk	wth	Taylor;	
move	to	ad	Jews	n	France	Seen,”	New York Times,	20	September	1942.
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allegedly	were	assocated	wth	an	organzaton	dubbed	the	One	Gun	Club	
that	was	sad	to	have	fve	hundred	thousand	members	and	planned	a	revolt	
f	the	Unted	States	entered	the	war.4
	 Upon	recept	of	ths	nformaton,	an	Fbi	offcal	placed	the	brghams	
on	“loose	survellance”	whch	was	to	“be	handled	very	dscreetly.”	hoover	
then	 notfed	 the	 Secret	 Servce,	 whose	 responsblty	 t	 was	 to	 protect	
the	 presdent	 and	 nvestgate	 threats	 made	 to	 hs	 lfe.	 irrespectve	 of	
the	 Secret	 Servce’s	 jursdcton,	 on	 4	november	 1941	hoover	 obtaned	
from	 attorney	 General	 bddle	 authorzaton	 to	 wretap	 the	 brghams’	
telephone.	 Ths	was	 an	 unlawful	 acton.	 Snce	 the	 enactng	 of	 the	 1934	
Federal	Communcatons	act,	the	use	of	wretaps	by	anyone	was	llegal.	in	
1940,	however,	gven	the	sense	of	crss	after	the	naz	nvason	of	western	
europe,	roosevelt	had	secretly	authorzed	 the	 lmted	use	of	wretaps	 n	
natonal	defense	cases	so	long	as	the	attorney	general	approved	of	them.	
bddle	acceded	to	hoover’s	request	and,	on	10	november	1941,	Fbi	agents	
nstalled	a	wretap.5
	 Whle	the	wretap	was	Fbi	offcals’	most	valuable	source	of	nforma-
ton	regardng	the	brghams,	t	was	not	ther	only	source.	To	better	estab-
lsh	 “the	 dentty	 and	 actvtes	 of ”	 the	 famly,	 Fbi	 agents	 contacted	 the	
Credt	bureau	of	Greater	new	york,	the	automoble	regstraton	bureau,	
and	 the	 brghams’	 mal	 carrer.	 in	 so	 dong,	 agents	 learned	 that	 both	
ethel	and	barbara	worked	for	the	local	amerca	Frst	Commttee	chapter,	
whch	 led	 them	 to	 nclude	 that	 chapter	under	 ther	umbrella	of	 survel-
lance.	Fnally,	on	13	november	1941,	agents	establshed	a	mal	 cover—a	
survellance	method	of	recordng	the	names	and	addresses	of	senders	and	
recpents	of	mal—on	the	brgham	household,	but	t	ultmately	proved	to	
be	unproductve.6
	 4.	Confdental	 report,	 SaC	 P.	 e.	 Foxworth,	 new	 york	 Cty,	 15	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	
100–50729–19;	 personal	 and	 confdental	 memorandum,	 hoover	 to	 attorney	 general,	 3	
november	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–1;	memorandum,	edward	a.	Tamm	to	D.	mlton	ladd,	3	
november	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–2;	memorandum,	Tamm	to	hoover,	3	november	1941,	Fbi	
100–50729–3.
	 5.	memorandum,	Kramer	to	ladd,	4	november	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–4;	letter,	hoover	
to	Frank	Wlson,	Chef	of	Secret	Servce,	4	november	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–4;	letter,	Wlson	
to	hoover,	5	november	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–5;	memorandum,	hoover	to	attorney	general,	
4	november	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–4	(there	s	a	notaton	n	brgham’s	Fbi	fle	that	hoover’s	
4	november	memo	to	the	attorney	general	authorzng	the	wretap	had	been	removed	per-
manently	to	the	natonal	Securty	electronc	Survellance	Fle	n	1973);	memorandum,	ladd	
to	hoover,	5	January	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–17.
	 6.	Confdental	 report,	 SaC	 P.	 e.	 Foxworth,	 new	 york	 Cty,	 15	 January	 1942,	 Fbi	
100–50729–19.
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	 after	 Secret	 Servce	 agents	 ntervewed	 ethel	 brgham	 about	 her	
alleged	assassnaton	threat,	a	threat	the	agents	found	not	to	be	nnocuous,	
hoover	advsed	bddle	that	“the	possblty	of	obtanng	addtonal	nfor-
maton,	ether	through	the	techncal	survellance	[wretap]	or	[nformant]	
s	extremely	doubtful.”	hoover	nevertheless	advsed	hs	superor	that	Fbi	
agents	would	contnue	to	develop	nformaton	“as	opportunty	presented.”	
Despte	hoover’s	 doubt	 as	 to	 the	 effcacy	 of	 the	wretap,	 t	 remaned	 n	
place	for	another	month.	it	s	not	clear	whether	bddle	was	aware	that	the	
wretap	was	 contnued,	 but	hoover’s	 language	 seemed	 to	 suggest	 that	 t	
would	not	be.7
	 What	 s	 clear,	 however,	 s	 that	 n	 the	nne	 communcatons	 and	one	
summarzng	report	from	new	york	SaC	Foxworth	to	hoover	concernng	
the	fruts	of	the	brgham	wretap,	all	the	reported	nformaton	concerned	
not	crmnal	actvty	but	the	poltcal	actvty	of	the	famly	and	other	prom-
nent	ant-nterventonsts.	in	hs	reports	to	hoover,	SaC	Foxworth	never	
explctly	mentoned	 the	wretap.	 instead,	 as	was	 common	Fbi	 practce,	
he	 employed	 the	 euphemsm	 “from	a	 confdental	 source	 that	 s	 known	
to	the	bureau”	n	place	of	“wretap”	or	“electronc	survellance.”	by	usng	
word	substtutons,	Foxworth	was	able	to	conceal	the	Fbi’s	use	of	an	llegal	
nvestgatve	tool,	even	f	the	presdent	had	secretly	authorzed	ts	lmted	
use	 wth	 the	 attorney	 general’s	 assent.	 if	 the	 Fbi	 report	 was	 somehow	
compromsed,	a	reader	not	famlar	wth	Fbi	parlance	would	assume	the	
document	referred	not	to	a	wretap	but	a	human	source	of	nformaton.
	 The	real	value	of	the	brgham	wretap	to	Fbi	offcals	s	evdent	wth	
the	 frst	 report	Foxworth	sent	 to	hoover.	 in	a	personal	and	confdental	
letter8	 to	hoover	dated	18	november	1941,	Foxworth	noted	that	no	fur-
ther	nformaton	had	been	developed	regardng	any	assassnaton	plot	or	
other	 llegal	 actvtes,	 but	 he	 dd	 report	 bountful	 poltcal	 ntellgence.	
Ths	 ncluded	the	new	york	amerca	Frst	chapter’s	decson	not	to	 jon	
the	 rght-wng	 group	Women	 Unted	 n	 burnng	 roosevelt’s	 campagn	
pledges	n	protest	because	of	the	negatve	publcty	t	would	engender,	and	
brgham’s	dscusson	of	 the	 chapter’s	plan	 to	 lobby	 congressmen	 to	vote	
aganst	revson	of	the	neutralty	act	(armng	of	merchant	shps).9
	 7.	 Personal	and	confdental	memorandum,	hoover	to	attorney	general,	15	november	
1941,	Fbi	100–50729–7;	memorandum,	ladd	to	hoover,	5	January	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–17.
	 8.	 Fbi	 polcy	 requred	 letters	 to	 hoover	marked	 “personal	 and	 confdental”	 to	 be	
drected	mmedately	to	hs	desk	and	not	drectly	nto	the	bureau’s	central	records	system.	
See	athan	Theohars,	ed.,	From the Secret Files of J. Edgar Hoover	 (Chcago:	 ivan	r.	Dee,	
1991),	2–4.
	 9.	 Personal	and	confdental	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	18	november	1941,	Fbi	100–
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	 all	subsequent	reports	to	hoover	contaned	further	and	more	compel-
lng	poltcal	 ntellgence,	such	as	brgham’s	comment	that	amerca	Frst	
mght	evolve	nto	a	poltcal	party	(the	amercan	party),	that	brgham	had	
made	a	number	of	ant-Semtc	remarks,	that	she	had	sad	“das	st	gut”	on	
the	telephone	whle	speakng	to	someone	wth	a	German	accent,	and	that	
the	aFC	was	lnked	to	congressmen	who	would	ensure	that	there	would	
be	 no	 vote	 on	war.	 brgham	 also	 clamed	 to	 know	 a	man	who	 saw	 the	
presdent	bweekly	and	suggested	that	he	could	be	used	to	delver	messages	
to	the	Whte	house.	Other	reports	related	bngham’s	negatve	opnon	of	
roosevelt,	her	desre	to	“Whoop	t	up”	f	roosevelt’s	sons	were	sent	to	war,	
and	her	 ftful	 remark	after	Pearl	harbor:	 “Where	 s	 that	One-Gun	Club	
that’s	gong	to	do	somethng?”10
	 Fbi	agents	were	even	able	to	use	nformaton	gleaned	from	the	wretap	
n	December	1941	to	cultvate	an	nformant.	The	ncdent	stemmed	from	
a	 heated	 poltcal	 dscusson	ethel	 brgham	had	wth	 a	 houseguest	who	
apparently	 dd	 not	 agree	 wth	 her	 poltcs.	 Fbi	 agents	 recorded	 ethel’s	
ncendary	 comment	 over	 the	 telephone	 that	 “what’s	 botherng	me	now	
s	what	that	lttle	btch	wll	do	to	me,	but	i	swear	by	all	that	s	holy	that	f	
she	does	try	anythng	i	wll	call	up	the	wves	of	the	men	she	has	been	hav-
ng	n	her	room.”	Foxworth	made	arrangements	to	ntervew	ths	woman	
(whose	dentty	s	redacted	n	Fbi	documents)	who	then	became	an	Fbi	
nformer.	She	provded	Foxworth	wth	a	long	lst	of	the	brghams’	frends	
and	acquantances,	a	lst	that	hoover	found	valuable.11
	 in	late	December,	Foxworth	reported	to	hoover	the	last	nformaton	to	
be	developed	from	the	wretap	durng	1941.	it	concerned	two	promnent	
amerca	Frst	 fgures:	laura	ingalls	(to	be	dscussed	below)	and	Charles	
lndbergh.	 barbara	 brgham	 dscussed	 wth	 new	 york	 attorney	 eml	
morosn—whom	Fbi	offcals	beleved	 to	be	 subversve—ingalls’s	arrest	
for	not	regsterng	as	a	foregn	agent	and	the	possblty	of	amerca	Frst	
50729–6.	On	Women	Unted	 and	 other	 rght-wng	women’s	 groups	 see	Glen	 Jeansonne,	
Women of the Far Right: The Mothers Movement and World War II (Chcago:	Unversty	of	
Chcago	Press,	1996).
	 10.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	25	november	1941,	Fbi	100–
50729–8;	Fbi	teletype,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	25	november	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–10;	Specal	
delvery	ar-mal	 letter,	hoover	 to	SaC	new	york,	2	December	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–10;	
personal	and	confdental	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	3	December	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–9;	
personal	and	confdental	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	13	December	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–11;	
personal	and	confdental	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	16	December	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–
14.
	 11.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	13	December	1941,	Fbi	100–
50729–12.
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rasng	 her	 $7,500	 bal	 when	 barbara	 expressed	 concern	 over	 ingalls’s	
arrest	 beng	 “a	 slap”	 for	 the	 commttee.	brgham	also	dscussed,	 sgnf-
cantly,	a	dnner	party	she	attended	wth	lndbergh	on	17	December	1941	
hosted	by	the	secretary	of	the	aFC’s	new	york	chapter,	edwn	S.	Webster.	
in	 a	 telephone	 conversaton,	 brgham	 sad	 that	 lndbergh	 had	 referred	
to	 the	 Japanese	as	a	 “yellow	perl”	 and	had	urged	amerca	Frst	 to	 rally	
behnd	the	war	effort	after	Pearl	harbor,	yet	“seemed	dscouraged	as	the	
govt	has	no	plan	nor	does	t	know	for	what	t	s	fghtng.”12
	 Ths	 partcular	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 concernng	 Charles	 lndbergh,	
gleaned	 llegally	 from	 a	wretap,	made	 ts	way	 to	 the	Whte	house	 and	
was	 then	 used	 by	 interor	 Secretary	 harold	 ickes—one	 of	 lndbergh’s	
fercest	crtcs.	(it	should	be	noted	that	ickes	would	not	have	known	the	
nformaton	 had	 orgnated	 from	 an	 llegal	 survellance	 method.)	 ickes	
kept	an	ndexed	fle	of	all	of	lndbergh’s	speeches	and	wrtngs	because	he	
beleved	hm	to	be	“a	ruthless	and	conscous	fascst,	motvated	by	hatred	
for	you	[roosevelt]	personally	and	a	contempt	for	democracy	n	general.”13	
yet	beyond	hs	ndex,	ickes	had	access	to	Fbi	poltcal	ntellgence	that	he	
receved	ether	drectly	from	hoover	or	from	roosevelt.	in	October	1941,	
for	example,	hoover	provded	the	nteror	secretary	wth	a	blnd	memo-
randum	summarzng	all	Fbi	nformaton	on	Guy	Junemann,	an	assocate	
of	 Joseph	mcWllams	who,	 n	 turn,	 had	 tes	 to	hamlton	 Fsh	 and	 the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee.	 in	another	example,	durng	1943	hoover	had	
used	the	fngerprnt	resources	of	the	Fbi	to	help	ickes	determne	f	a	man	
named	abraham	Jones	was	stealng	chcken	eggs	from	hs	farm.	but	t	was	
the	lndbergh	nformaton	that	ickes	had	found	tantalzng	and,	 ndeed,	
used.14
	 in	December	1941,	ickes	wrote	a	scathng	book	about	Charles	lndbergh	
and	 made	 arrangements	 to	 publsh	 t	 wth	 vanguard	 Press.	 Tentatvely	
ttled	The Strange Case of Mr. Lindbergh or Charles A. Lindbergh: A Failure 
in Americanization, ickes	clamed	“to	trace,	factually	and	objectvely,	ths	
young	man’s	fatal	course.”	Probably	because	the	ant-nterventonsts	had	
	 12.	 Fbi	teletype,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	19	December	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–13;	Fbi	tele-
type,	Foxworth	to	hoover	20	December	1941,	Fbi	100–50729–16.
	 13.	 letter,	harold	ickes	to	Frankln	D.	roosevelt,	30	December	1941,	Presdent’s	Secre-
tary’s	Fle,	Justce	Department,	FDrl.	roosevelt	agreed	“wholeheartedly”	wth	ickes’s	assess-
ment	of	lndbergh.	See	letter,	roosevelt	to	ickes,	30	December	1941,	Presdent’s	Secretary’s	
Fle,	Justce	Department,	FDrl.
	 14.	Personal	and	confdental	letter,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	harold	ickes,	31	October	1941;	
and	blnd	memorandum	re:	Guy	Junemann,	27	October	1941;	and	personal	and	confden-
tal	letter,	hoover	to	ickes,	17	October	1943,	all	n	Justce	Department	folder,	harold	ickes	
Papers,	box	205,	lbrary	of	Congress	(hereafter	lOC),	Washngton,	DC.
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ralled	behnd	the	war	effort	followng	the	Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	harbor,	
and	despte	havng	won	a	contract	 for	 the	book,	 t	was	never	publshed.	
needless	to	say,	the	manuscrpt	confrms	that	at	 least	one	senor	admn-
straton	 offcal	 used	 some	Fbi	 poltcal	 ntellgence	 (that	was	 obtaned	
llegally)	n	an	effort	to	dscredt	roosevelt’s	crtcs.15
	 The	nformaton	ickes	used	orgnated	wth	the	brgham	wretap	and	
appeared	late	n	the	manuscrpt.	ickes	wrote	about	the	dnner	party	edwn	
Webster	 hosted	 at	 whch	 both	 brgham	 and	 lndbergh	 were	 present.	
Ctng	a	New York Mirror	story	that	recounted	the	event,	ickes	noted	that	
lndbergh	blamed	Great	brtan	for	the	outbreak	of	war	and	argued	that	
amerca	Frst	 should	wat	untl	 the	Pearl	harbor	 exctement	ded	down	
before	 attackng	 further	 roosevelt’s	 polces.	 ickes	 also	 clamed	 to	 have	
“from	a	prvate	source”	other	revealng	nformaton.	he	wrote:
The	 party	 was	 held	 n	 the	 home	 of	 edwn	 S.	Webster,	 secretary	 of	 the	
new	 york	 Chapter	 of	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	 on	 December	 17,	
and	50	people	were	present.	lndbergh	addressed	the	gatherng.	he	told	
them	that	the	real	danger	was	not	htler	but	the	yellow	Perl—Chna	and	
Japan.	he	sad	that	f	Germany	had	been	permtted	(by	Great	brtan)	to	
attack	russa	before	1939,	htler	could	have	been	the	bulwark	aganst	the	
yellow	races	and	 the	russans.	he	sad	 that	 the	brtsh	and	 the	“fools	 n	
Washngton”	spoled	ths	plan.	in	concluson	he	nformed	the	group	that	
although	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	could	not	be	actve	at	the	moment,	
t	 should	 take	prompt	 advantage	of	 the	 nevtable	 casualty	 lsts	 to	make	
the	amercan	people	realze	that	they	have	been	betrayed	by	Great	brtan	
and	 the	 roosevelt	 admnstraton.	 The[n],	 he	 sad,	 the	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee	would	 re-enter	 the	 poltcal	 feld	 and	 advocate	 a	 negotated	
peace—favorable	to	htler.16
Ths	passage	s	strkngly	smlar	n	both	specfc	nformaton	and	layout	
to	an	Fbi	report	that	hoover	sent	to	roosevelt	on	13	February	1942.	in	t,	
hoover	descrbed	the	dnner	party	and	lndbergh’s	comments.	hoover’s	
source	of	nformaton,	sgnfcantly,	was	both	the	brgham	wretap	and	a	
report	he	had	receved	from	miD.17
	 15.	harold	ickes,	“Charles	a.	lndbergh:	a	Falure	 n	amercanzaton,”	unpublshed	
book	manuscrpt,	 p.	 4,	Charles	a.	 lndbergh	Folder,	 ickes	Papers,	 lOC;	 correspondence	
and	book	contract	between	harold	ickes	and	vanguard	Press,	December	1941	through	1944,	
ickes	Papers,	lOC.
	 16.	 ickes,	“Charles	a.	lndbergh:	a	Falure	n	amercanzaton,”	207–9.
	 17.	Confdental	report	re	ethel	brgham,	P.	e.	Foxworth,	15	January	1942,	pp.	30–31,	63,	
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	 ickes,	 moreover,	 was	 not	 the	 sole	 recpent	 of	 ths	 nformaton.	 in	
august	1942,	lndbergh	was	subpoenaed	to	testfy	for	the	defense	at	the	
sedton	tral	of	Wllam	Dudley	Pelley,	leader	of	the	Slver	Shrts.	To	assst	
the	 prosecutors	 n	 ther	 cross-examnaton	 of	 lndbergh,	 Fbi	 offcals	
prepared	a	blnd	memorandum	that	 summarzed	 nformaton	 n	bureau	
fles	that	confrmed	the	avator’s	“foregn	or	natonalstc	sympathes.”	Ths	
summary	 ncluded	the	derogatory	 ntellgence	gleaned	 llegally	 from	the	
brgham	wretap.	yet,	because	lndbergh’s	testmony	was	lmted	to	twelve	
mnutes	and	because	he	offered	nothng	mportant	to	the	defendant’s	case,	
Justce	Department	attorneys	dd	not	use	the	nformaton	n	the	Fbi’s	sum-
mary	to	dscredt	hs	testmony.18
—■■■■■■■—
SaC	Foxworth,	of	 the	new	york	offce,	dscontnued	 the	brgham	wre-
tap	on	30	December	1941,	and	 then	prepared	a	 summary	 report	on	 the	
nvestgaton	 for	 hoover.	 in	 the	 eghty-nne-page	 document,	 labeled	
“inTernal	 SeCUriTy-G[ermany],”	 Foxworth	 summarzed	 the	 nne	
reports	he	had	 sent	 to	hoover,	whle	 contnung	 to	 employ	 euphemstc	
language	n	reference	to	the	 llegal	wretap.	a	large	secton	of	the	report	
was	reserved	for	nformaton	gathered	on	promnent	foregn	polcy	crtcs,	
lke	lndbergh,	but	the	Fbi	has	redacted	most	of	t.	The	summary	report	
stands	as	evdence	that	Fbi	offcals	were	most	nterested	not	n	crmnal	
developments	but	n	poltcal	ntellgence	from	the	brgham	wretap.19
	 after	 havng	 receved	 ths	 report,	 hoover	 ordered	 Foxworth	 to	 fol-
low	up	several	loose	ends.	he	stressed	that	the	“possble	exstence”	of	the	
One	Gun	Club	“advocatng	revoluton	be	exhaustvely	 nvestgated.”	 it	 s	
mportant	to	note	that	all	 nformaton	relatve	to	the	so-called	One	Gun	
Club	was	uncorroborated	and	stemmed	from	the	heated	conversatons	of	
ethel	brgham.	Ths	beng	the	case,	hoover	ordered	the	follow-up	to	“be	
Fbi	100–50729–19;	confdental	letter	and	enclosures,	brgader	General	raymond	e.	lee	to	
J.	edgar	hoover,	15	January	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–270;	memorandum	and	attachments,	John	
J.	mcCloy	to	henry	Stmson,	12	January	1942,	henry	Stmson	Papers	(mcroflm	ed.,	reel	
105),	manuscrpts	and	archves,	yale	Unversty,	new	haven,	CT;	personal	and	confdental	
letter,	 J.	edgar	hoover	 to	edwn	m.	Watson,	13	February	1942,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl;	
memorandum,	D.	mlton	ladd	to	J.	edgar	hoover,	13	February	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–334;	
memorandum,	J.	edgar	hoover	to	Francs	bddle,	13	February	1942,	Fbi	100–4712–284.
	 18.	memorandum,	K.	T.	(llegble)	to	mr.	mumford,	5	august	1942,	Fbi	65–11449–152;	
blnd	 and	 undated	memorandum	 re	Charles	a.	 lndbergh	 (ca.	 5	august	 1942),	 Fbi	 65–
11449–152;	Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists,	534.
	 19.	Confdental	report,	Foxworth	to	Fbi	hQ,	15	January	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–19.
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handled	 n	 a	most	dscreet	manner.”	a	 second	 follow-up	 that	 nterested	
hoover	was	 n	 ascertanng	 the	 dentty	 of	 the	 person	barbara	brgham	
clamed	had	vsted	the	Whte	house	bweekly.	regardng	these	two	loose	
ends,	hoover	demanded	mmedate	acton	and	regular	reports.20
	 The	 nformaton	 culled	 from	 the	 brgham	 wretap	 was	 not	 lm-
ted	 to	Fbi	offcals	and	a	memorandum	to	roosevelt	 regardng	Charles	
lndbergh’s	 dnner-party	 chats.	 On	 26	 January	 1942,	 hoover	 provded	
the	Whte	 house	 wth	 detaled	 nformaton	 on	 the	 brghams.	 The	 Fbi	
drector	nformed	roosevelt’s	secretary,	edwn	Watson,	that	a	member	of	
the	brgham	famly	had	threatened	the	lfe	of	the	presdent	and	had	then	
referred	 to	 the	exstence	of	a	One	Gun	Club	as	 “ready	 to	 start	a	 revolu-
ton”	once	 the	Unted	States	was	at	war.	by	 referencng	 these	 two	 tems,	
hoover	 frmly	establshed	the	bona	fdes	of	hs	 nvestgaton,	yet	he	was	
also	 careful	 to	make	 no	menton	 that	 the	 nformaton	 had	 been	 uncor-
roborated	(One	Gun	Club)	or	had	been	dsmssed	months	before	by	the	
Secret	 Servce	 (assassnaton	 threat).	notng	barbara’s	 clam	of	 knowng	
a	person	who	met	roosevelt	bweekly,	yet	hated	hm	“as	much	as	do	the	
brghams,”	hoover	provded	Watson	wth	a	 lst	of	names,	one	of	whch,	
he	 thought,	mght	be	 ths	 contact.	 Some	of	 these	names	Fbi	agents	had	
acqured	from	the	brgham	houseguest-turned-nformer,	a	source	devel-
oped	through	the	course	of	the	llegal	wretap.	hoover	also	relayed	to	the	
Whte	house	some	poltcal	ntellgence	that	orgnated	from	the	wretap,	
ncludng	ethel’s	 comment	 that	her	nephew,	a	Coast	Guardsman,	hated	
wearng	 hs	 unform	 and	 that	 the	 brghams	 were	 assocated	 wth	 the	
recently	arrested	laura	ingalls.	hoover	even	made	an	erroneous	clam	to	
the	Whte	house	that	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	was	somehow	assoc-
ated	wth	the	One	Gun	Club—an	asserton	that	was	never	unearthed	n	
the	brgham	wretap	or	nvestgaton,	but	was	made	by	hoover	because	
ethel	and	barbara	were	supposedly	lnked	and	they	were	members	of	the	
new	york	branch	of	amerca	Frst.	hoover	made	no	menton	as	 to	the	
orgns	of	ths	 nformaton	other	than	that	 t	had	orgnated	“through	a	
confdental	source.”21
	 hoover	dd	not	stop	hs	agents’	montorng	of	the	brghams	wth	ths	
report	to	the	Whte	house.	The	new	york	offce	contnued	to	watch	the	
brghams,	 ostensbly	 to	 determne	 the	 exstence	 of	 the	 One	 Gun	 Club	
	 20.	Confdental	letter,	hoover	to	Foxworth,	24	January	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–19.
	 21.	Personal	and	confdental	letter	and	attached	blnd	memorandum,	hoover	to	Wat-
son,	26	January	1942,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	Frankln	D.	roosevelt	lbrary	(FDrl),	hyde	Park,	
ny;	memorandum	wth	attached	blnd	memorandum,	hoover	to	attorney	general,	26	Janu-
ary	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–20.
150 Chapter 
and	a	possble	plot	aganst	roosevelt,	but	snce	the	brgham	wretap	had	
been	canceled	Fbi	agents	were	forced	to	rely	upon	nformers	and	physcal	
survellance.	and,	agan,	these	sources	revealed	to	Fbi	offcals	no	nfor-
maton	about	a	One	Gun	Club	or	a	nefarous	plot,	but	tantalzng	poltcal	
ntellgence.	 in	 one	 nstance,	 whle	 attendng	 her	 daughter’s	 play	 “The	
land	is	brght,”	ethel	brgham	was	alleged	to	have	made	“a	volent	out-
burst”	aganst	roosevelt	and	hs	foregn	polcy	whch	Fbi	offcals	deemed	
to	be	“un-amercan.”	Ths	nformaton	so	nterested	Fbi	agents	that	they	
located	 and	 ntervewed	 audence	 and	 cast	 members	 to	 confrm	 that	
brgham	was	“a	bosterous	advocate	of	solatonsm	and	strongly	opposed	
to	the	Presdent	and	hs	Foregn	Polcy.”22
	 Whle	agents	n	new	york	recorded	ethel’s	mpetuous	publc	remarks,	
agents	n	Washngton	tred	to	ascertan	her	travel	habts.	Ganng	access	to	
brgham’s	passport	records,	agents	learned	of	her	varous	european	travels	
(part	of	her	muscal	 career)	 as	well	 as	 further	personal	data.	Fbi	 agents	
then	attempted	to	follow	up	a	lead	n	Pennsylvana	that	suggested	brgham	
had	“subversve	tendences,”	but	nothng	of	any	value	was	uncovered.23
	 because	they	were	relyng	on	nformers	and	physcal	survellance,	and	
because	these	sources	had	unearthed	no	valuable	nformaton,	on	4	June	
1942	 assstant	 Fbi	 Drector	 D.	mlton	 ladd	 reauthorzed	 the	 brgham	
wretap.	Sgnfcantly,	nether	ladd	nor	hoover	sought	approval	from	the	
attorney	general	pror	to	renewng	the	wretap.	in	so	dong,	they	volated	
not	only	the	1934	Federal	Communcatons	act	but	roosevelt’s	1940	drec-
tve	that	the	attorney	general	authorze	all	wretaps.	Fbi	offcals	ratonal-
zed	 ther	 acton	 by	 basng	 t	 on	 “the	 orgnal	 authorty	 granted	 by	 the	
attorney	General.”	attorney	General	bddle,	however,	had	authorzed	the	
orgnal	wretap	only	when	presented	wth	 nformaton	about	a	possble	
assassnaton	plot.	The	contnuance	of	ths	wretap,	therefore,	had	nothng	
to	do	wth	a	threat	made	aganst	the	presdent,	suggestng	that	Fbi	offcals	
mght	not	have	been	confdent	that	bddle	would	have	consented.	indeed,	
bddle	wrote	n	1962	that	as	attorney	general	he	had	not	made	t	a	“habt”	
to	consent	 to	wretaps	because	he	vewed	 ther	use	as	a	 “drty	busness.”	
if	so,	and	there	s	no	reason	to	doubt	bddle’s	word,	the	acton	taken	here	
by	senor	Fbi	offcals	demonstrates	that	they	had	ganed	a	not	nsgnf-
cant	level	of	nvestgatve	autonomy	by	1942	because	they	could	authorze	
llegal	wretaps	wth	lttle	or	no	oversght.	Such	nvestgatve	freedom	s	a	
	 22.	report,	SaC	new	york	to	Fbi	hQ,	2	march	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–23;	confdental	
letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	18	may	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–25.
	 23.	report,	SaC	Washngton,	DC	to	Fbi	hQ,	19	may	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–26;	report,	
SaC	Phladelpha	to	Fbi	hQ,	20	may	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–27.
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hallmark	of	the	emergence	of	the	domestc	securty	state,	and	reflects	later	
and	smlar	Fbi	actvty	durng	the	Cold	War.24
	 When	reestablshng	the	wretap	on	24	June,	followng	Fbi	procedure,	
t	was	 assgned	 a	 “symbol	 number”—the	 code-dentfcaton	 for	wretap	
or	mcrophone	 survellance	 targets.	 (The	Fbi	has	wthheld	 the	brgham	
symbol	 number.)	 The	 symbol	 number	 was	 then	 ncorporated	 nto	 the	
Symbol	number	Senstve	Source	index	(now	called	the	natonal	Securty	
electronc	Survellance	Card	Fle),	a	centralzed	fndng	ad	for	Fbi	bugs	
and	wretaps.	by	ctng	the	symbol	number	 n	ther	correspondence	and	
reports,	Fbi	agents	would	not	reveal	ther	source	to	be	a	senstve	one.	in	
the	 case	 of	 brgham,	 Fbi	 agents	 cted	 the	 symbol	 number	 n	 ther	 cor-
respondence	or,	most	often,	referred	to	the	wretap	as	“confdental	nfor-
mant	[symbol	number].”25
	 Wth	the	rensttuton	of	the	brgham	wretap,	SaC	Foxworth	regarded	
ts	fruts	to	be	“of	value.”26	On	a	weekly	bass	he	brefed	hoover	about	the	
wretap,	whch,	yet	agan,	revealed	no	crmnal	or	domestc	securty	threat	
but	 “addtonal	 ant-roosevelt,	 ant-Semtc,	 and	 contnued	 solatonst	
atttude	 on	 the	 part	 of	 ethel	 and	barbara	brgham.”27	and,	 agan,	 some	
of	the	nformaton	obtaned	from	ths	llegal	wretap	was	shared	wth	the	
roosevelt	Whte	house.	in	ths	nstance,	Fbi	agents	ntercepted	a	conver-
saton	between	ethel	and	an	undentfed	ndvdual	suggestng	that	ethel	
had	learned	from	an	“underground	source”	that	brtan	and	Germany	were	
meetng	secretly	n	belgum	and	that	ths	would	result	n	the	Unted	States	
“holdng	 the	bag.”	These	 comments	were	wholly	wthout	 corroboraton,	
and	clearly	 should	not	have	been	regarded	as	 sgnfcant,	but	on	20	 July	
1942	hoover	 forwarded	 the	 nformaton	 to	 the	 attorney	 general,	harry	
hopkns,	miD,	and	adolf	berle.	none	of	these	recpents	were	nformed	
	 24.	 letter	and	accompanyng	memorandum,	Foxworth	 to	hoover,	21	may	1942,	Fbi	
100–50729–28;	memorandum,	 J.	 K.	mumford	 to	 ladd,	 3	 June	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–30;	
memorandum,	hoover	to	Foxworth,	9	June	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–31;	memorandum,	mum-
ford	to	ladd,	3	 June	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–30;	Francs	bddle,	In Brief Authority	 (Garden	
Cty,	ny:	Doubleday,	1962),	166,	168.
	 25.	memorandum,	e.	G.	Ftch	to	ladd,	6	July	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–35;	athan	Theoha-
rs	and	John	Cox,	The Boss: J. Edgar Hoover and the Great American Inquisition	(Phladel-
pha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1988),	9–10.
	 26.	 See	personal	and	confdental	 letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	27	June	1942,	Fbi	100–
50729–33;	letter,	Foxworth	to	hoover,	7	July	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–34;	letter,	Foxworth	to	
hoover,	 14	 July	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–36;	 letter,	 Foxworth	 to	hoover,	 18	 July	 1942,	 Fbi	
100–50729–38.
	 27.	 letter,	hoover	to	Foxworth,	12	august	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–42;	report,	SaC	Fox-
worth	to	Fbi	hQ,	14	July	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–37.
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as	 to	 hoover’s	 source,	 but	 hs	 sharng	 of	 ths	 nformaton	 can	 best	 be	
understood	 as	 part	 of	 hoover’s	 effort	 to	 break	 nto	 the	 feld	 of	 foregn	
ntellgence.	 Snce	 at	 least	 1940,	hoover	 had	 ved	wth	Colonel	Wllam	
Donovan—head	of	the	OSS	durng	the	Second	World	War—for	a	role	n	
foregn	 ntellgence	and	operatons;	and	 ths	bt	of	 nformaton,	no	mat-
ter	how	absurd,	was	part	of	hs	effort	to	prove	hmself	n	ths	area.	it	also	
reflects	hoover’s	use	of	ndrect	targets	to	gather	poltcal	(and	n	ths	case	
foregn)	ntellgence	on	larger	targets	(e.g.,	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
and	ant-nterventonst	movement).28
	 Wth	weekly	approvals	from	senor	Fbi	offcals,	the	new	york	offce	
mantaned	 the	 brgham	 wretap	 untl	 26	 October	 1942.	 Throughout	
1942,	 the	wretap	 yelded	 no	 crmnal	 or	 securty	 nformaton	 and	 only	
more	poltcal	ntellgence,	much	of	t	caustc.	On	17	July,	for	example,	Fbi	
agents	overheard	ethel	state	that	“the	Presdent	s	unable	to	stand	on	hs	
own	feet,	 let	alone	 thnk,	and	 that	he	 s	only	 the	 front	man	for	 the	 Jews	
who	are	desrous	of	gettng	a	rng	around	the	world	and	want	to	smash	the	
Unted	States.”	On	5	august	she	reportedly	referred	to	roosevelt	as	“that	
dot	at	the	helm	of	ths	country.”	On	16	august	she	referred	to	roosevelt’s	
refusal	to	utlze	Charles	lndbergh’s	servces	after	the	Unted	States	had	
entered	 the	 war—n	 aprl	 1941	 lndbergh	 had	 resgned	 hs	 army	 ar	
Corps	 commsson	 as	 a	 colonel—as	 “part	 of	 the	 crookedness	 .	 .	 .	 of	 the	
Presdent.”	These	examples	are	 representatve	of	 the	 type	of	 nformaton	
Fbi	 agents	 developed	 durng	 the	 course	 of	 ths	 wretap.	most	 of	 t	 was	
vtrolc,	emotonal,	and	sometmes	ant-Semtc	and	t	s	compellng	that	
agents	n	ther	reports	were	so	focused	on	reportng	ths	poltcal	ntell-
gence.	Despte	nothng	beng	developed	about	the	One	Gun	Club,	hoover	
contnually	 approved	 the	 wretap’s	 use	 because,	 as	 Foxworth	 repeatedly	
sad	n	hs	wretap	contnuance	requests,	nformaton	“of	value”	had	been	
collected.29
	 28.	 letter,	SaC	new	york	to	Fbi	hQ,	14	July	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–39;	memorandum,	
ladd	to	hoover,	16	July	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–40;	memorandum,	hoover	to	attorney	gen-
eral,	20	July	1942;	personal	and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	hopkns,	20	July	1942;	personal	
and	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	General	Kroner,	20	July	1942;	personal	and	confdental	
letter,	hoover	to	berle,	20	July	1942;	all	n	Fbi	100–50729–40.
	 29.	Confdental	letter,	SaC	Foxworth	to	hoover,	4	September	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–
47;	 confdental	 letter,	SaC	Foxworth	 to	hoover,	22	September	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–49;	
letter,	 SaC	 Foxworth	 to	hoover,	 2	October	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–50;	 confdental	 letter,	
SaC	Foxworth	 to	hoover,	 20	October	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–51;	 confdental	 letter,	 SaC	
Foxworth	 to	hoover,	18	October	1942,	Fbi	100–50729–52;	 report,	SaC	Foxworth	 to	Fbi	
hQ,	 10	 December	 1942,	 Fbi	 100–50729–54.	 it	 s	 nterestng	 to	 note	 that	 followng	 the	
wretap’s	 dscontnuance,	 reports	 regardng	 ethel	 brgham	 were,	 n	 addton	 to	 labeled	
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	 by	1943,	Fbi	offcals’	vew	of	the	brghams	had	changed	sgnfcantly.	
by	that	date,	roosevelt’s	ant-nterventonst	crtcs	were	a	non-ssue	and	
the	brgham	 source	 for	 poltcal	 ntellgence	had	dred	up.	 Fbi	 offcals’	
vew	of	the	brghams	n	1943	reveals	as	much	and	reflects	a	more	objectve	
analyss	as	to	ther	actvtes:
Snce	the	long	nvestgaton	conducted	wth	regard	to	mrs.	ethel	brgham	
and	her	famly	has	not	ndcated	that	they	are	engaged	n	any	un-amercan	
actvtes,	and	snce	ther	rabd	and	vcous	statements	have	been	consd-
ered	harmless	by	unprejudced	amercans	who	have	had	frequent	oppor-
tunty	to	judge	the	background	and	character	of	ths	famly,	the	collateral	
leads	set	out	n	the	above	referenced	report	are	beng	dsregarded	and	ths	
case	s	beng	closed	n	the	new	york	Feld	Offce.30
The	Fbi’s	 nvestgaton	of	ethel	brgham	and	her	 famly	proves	 that	Fbi	
offcals	had,	n	fact,	gathered	poltcal	ntellgence	concernng	ant-nter-
ventonsts	from	an	llegal	wretap	and	then	shared	select	portons	of	t	wth	
the	Whte	house.	The	nvestgaton	and	wretap	may	have	orgnated	n	a	
legtmate	probe	of	a	threat	on	the	presdent’s	lfe	and	rumors	as	to	the	exs-
tence	of	a	group	advocatng	revolt,	but	that	threat	was	not	serous	and	the	
group’s	 exstence	was	unfounded.	nevertheless,	Fbi	offcals	 successfully	
used	these	premses	to	mantan	ther	wretap,	whch	proved,	n	realty,	to	
be	a	valued	source	of	poltcal	survellance	on	promnent	roosevelt	crtcs	
lke	 the	amerca	 Frst	Commttee	 and	Charles	 lndbergh.	 interestngly,	
n	October	1941,	hoover	explctly	dened	to	robert	e.	Wood,	charman	
of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee,	that	the	Fbi	“drectly	or	ndrectly	at	any	
place	 n	the	Unted	States	tapped	the	wres,	 nterfered	wth	the	mals,	or	
checked	the	membershp	lsts	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.”	Whle	ths	
statement	came	just	one	month	pror	to	the	brgham	wretap,	there	were	
other	 wretaps,	 and	 we	 now	 know	 that	 hoover’s	 general	 statement	 was	
untrue	n	all	respects	and	hs	sncerty	suspect.31
“nternal	securty,”	labeled	“custodal	detenton.”	Fbi	offcals	apparently	regarded	brgham	
as	some	type	of	securty	rsk,	placng	her	on	the	Fbi’s	emergency	detenton	lst.	On	custodal	
detenton	see	athan	Theohars,	Spying on Americans: Political Surveillance from Hoover to 
the Huston Plan	(Phladelpha:	Temple	Unversty	Press,	1978),	40–64.
	 30.	report,	SaC	new	york	to	Fbi	hQ,	1	July	1943,	Fbi	100–50729–60.
	 31.	 letter,	hoover	to	Wood,	17	October	1941,	box	60,	amerca	Frst	Commttee	Papers,	
hoover	insttuton,	Stanford	Unversty,	Stanford,	Ca.	For	other	wretaps,	lke	Grunewald’s,	
see	Douglas	m.	Charles,	 “informng	FDr:	Fbi	Poltcal	Survellance	and	 the	 isolatonst–
interventonst	 Foregn	 Polcy	Debate,	 1939–1945,”	Diplomatic History	 24	 (Sprng	 2000):	
219.
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	 The	value	of	ths	llegal	wretap	as	a	source	of	poltcal	ntellgence	s	
further	 demonstrated	 by	 Fbi	 offcals	 contnung	 t	 after	 Secret	 Servce	
agents	had	dsmssed	the	brgham	assassnaton	threat,	and	further	under-
scored	 by	 the	 decson	 of	 senor	 Fbi	 offcals	 not	 to	 seek	 the	 attorney	
general’s	consent	 to	reestablsh	the	wretap	 n	1942.	Ths	was	a	volaton	
of	roosevelt’s	wretap	drectve,	a	volaton	of	 the	 law,	and	demonstrates	
that	Fbi	offcals	were	concerned	wth	losng	a	valuable	source	should	the	
cvl	 lbertaran	bddle	 be	 brefed.	 The	wretap	 s	 also	 llustratve	 of	 the	
domestc	securty	state	nasmuch	as	hoover	clearly	had	a	sgnfcant	level	
of	autonomy	n	authorzng	and	mantanng	llegal	wretaps,	and	t	clearly	
shows	the	Fbi’s	new	role	as	the	Whte	house	ntellgence	arm	n	that	the	
poltcal	ntellgence	he	generated	helped	to	sustan	admnstraton	vews	
of	 ts	 crtcs	as	 subversve—hoover’s	erroneous	clam	 that	amerca	Frst	
was	 lnked	 to	 the	 One	 Gun	 Club,	 for	 nstance,	 and	 that	 amerca	 Frst	
members	wanted	the	presdent	dead.
—■■■■■■■—
Fbi	 offcals	 lost	 nterest	 n	 the	 brghams	 after	 t	 became	 clear	 that	 the	
ant-nterventonsts	were	no	longer	a	threat	to	the	roosevelt	admnstra-
ton’s	foregn	polcy.	The	Fbi’s	self-descrbed	“extensve	nvestgaton”32	of	
lndbergh	also	lost	momentum	once	the	Great	Debate	passed	nto	hstory,	
whch	 s	 yet	 another	 example	 of	 the	 operaton	 of	 the	 domestc	 securty	
state—only	 real	 or	perceved	poltcal	 threats	 receve	 nvestgatve	 atten-
ton;	when	that	passes	all	nterest	n	“domestc	securty”	ssues	ends.	The	
Fbi’s	last	documented	nterest	n	lndbergh,	n	november	1942,	nvolved	
the	curator	of	the	yale	Unversty	lbrary,	who	nformed	hoover	that	hs	
nsttuton	had	acqured	“a	large	collecton	of	mal”	addressed	to	lndbergh	
from	a	varety	of	amercans	and	offered	 the	Fbi	access	 to	 ths	materal.	
(The	yale	 Sterlng	 lbrary	 holds	 the	 stll-sealed	 lndbergh	 papers.)	 Fbi	
offcals	welcomed	the	 nvtaton	“n	vew	of	the	possblty	that	 t	mght	
be	consdered	advsable	 to	examne	lndbergh’s	mal	 n	connecton	wth	
any	of	the	cases	beng	nvestgated	by	the	Fbi.”	hoover	brefed	hs	Justce	
Department	superors,	but	there	s	no	ndcaton	n	extant	Fbi	fles	as	to	
whether	the	records	were	examned.33
	 in	strkng	contrast	to	ths,	by	1944,	Fbi	offcals	had	almost	no	nterest	
n	lndbergh.	That	year,	Frst	lady	eleanor	roosevelt	receved	a	letter	from	
	 32.	blnd	memorandum,	27	January	1942,	Fbi	65–39945–26X,	p.	4.
	 33.	 letter,	r.	h.	Smons	to	hoover,	13	november	1942,	Fbi	65–11449–155;	memoran-
dum,	hoover	to	Smth,	16	December	1942,	Fbi	65–11449–155.
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an	amercan	who	was	 “troubled	 about	 Charles	 lndbergh’s	 .	 .	 .	 where-
abouts.”	Presdent	roosevelt	brought	the	 letter	to	hoover’s	attenton	and	
personally	asked	hm	how	hs	wfe	should	“answer	 ths	one.”	 in	contrast	
to	hoover’s	prevous	responses	to	requests	from	the	presdent	(especally	
personal	 requests)	 where	 he	 would	 demand	 summary	 reports	 from	 hs	
subordnates,	check	Fbi	fles	for	nformaton,	and	dspatch	a	personal	and	
confdental	memorandum	to	the	presdent,	ths	tme	hoover	merely	sug-
gested	that	the	Frst	lady	send	a	letter	of	acknowledgment	and	appreca-
ton.	it	s	not	nsgnfcant	to	the	functonng	and	nature	of	the	domestc	
securty	state	that	forlorn	promnent	crtcs	were	gnored	by	Fbi	offcals	
at	ths	partcular	tme	whle	people	on	the	radcal	frnge—lke	lawrence	
Denns	and	company—were	targeted	for	ndctment.	Promnent	crtcs	are	
good	sources	for	poltcal	ntellgence;	frnge	fgures,	whose	nvestgatons	
do	not	draw	scrutny,	are	prosecuted.34
—■■■■■■■—
another	 vocal	 roosevelt	 admnstraton	 crtc	who	 receved	 specal	 Fbi	
attenton	after	 the	declaraton	of	war	was	 the	promnent	 revsonst	hs-
toran,	socologst,	crmnologst,	and	socal	crtc	harry	elmer	barnes.	a	
Columba	Unversty–educated	hstoran,	barnes	was	well	known	for	hs	
college	textbooks	World Politics in Modern Civilization	(1930),	A History of 
Western Civilization	(1937),	and	An Intellectual and Cultural History of the 
Western World	 (1937).	hs	best-known	work,	however,	was	hs	revson-
st	tract	Genesis of the World War	(1926)	n	whch	barnes	lad	blame	for	
the	Frst	World	War	not	on	Germany	but	on	France	and	russa.	in	total,	
barnes	publshed	over	thrty	books	and	hundreds	of	essays,	so	that	when	
he	fnally	joned	the	chorus	of	ant-nterventonsts	durng	the	late	1930s,	
hs	 scholarly	 reputaton	made	hm	an	artculate	 and	promnent	 crtc	of	
roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy.
	 but	 why	 dd	 the	 poltcally	 lberal	 barnes—an	 early	 new	Deal	 sup-
porter—jon	wth	the	mostly	conservatve	ant-nterventonst	movement?	
The	 explanaton	 for	barnes’s	 defecton	 s	 rooted	 n	 hs	 Frst	World	War	
revsonsm,	whch	evolved	to	underpn	hs	crtcsms	of	new	Deal	dplo-
macy,	especally	n	hs	belef	that	nterventon	was	part	of	amercan	mpe-
ralsm.	he,	 therefore,	was	wllng	 to	 serve	as	a	 speaker	 for	 the	amerca	
Frst	 Commttee	 to	 oppose	 roosevelt’s	 ncreasngly	 un-neutral	 foregn	
	 34.	memorandum,	roosevelt	to	hoover,	3	September	1944,	Fbi	65–11449–158;	letter,	
hoover	to	edwn	m.	Watson,	6	September	1944,	Fbi	65–11449–158.
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polcy.	in	addton,	barnes	served	as	vce	charman	of	the	Keep	Out	of	War	
Congress	and	edted	the	ant-nterventonst	newsletter	Uncensored.
	 barnes’s	 poltcal	 defecton	 was	 not	 unconsdered	 and	 not	 wthout	
personal	and	professonal	consequences.	by	sdng	wth	conservatves	who	
saw	a	threat	n	roosevelt’s	centralzaton	of	power,	barnes	alenated	hmself	
from	hs	publshers.	D.	C.	heath,	for	example,	wrote	barnes	n	1941	advs-
ng	hm	that	because	of	the	“somewhat	hystercal	tmes,”	they	decded	“not	
to	undertake	your	book,	no	matter	how	good.”	effectvely	blackballed,	the	
lberal	barnes	began	to	publsh	wth	conservatve	presses	 to	crtcze	 the	
amercan	entrance	nto	the	Second	World	War	and	the	events	leadng	up	
to	Pearl	harbor.	The	conservatve	Caxton	Press	publshed	hs	revsonst	
Second	World	War	study	Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace	(1953),	whle	
barnes	also	publshed	essays	n	conservatve	perodcals	lke	the	National 
Review.35
	 Whle	Fbi	agents	montored	barnes’s	actvtes	datng	from	1936	(untl	
1944),	ther	survellance	only	ntensfed	when	he	became	a	spokesperson	
for	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 movement.	 hstoran	 roy	 Turnbaugh	 has	
explaned	the	Fbi’s	nterest	n	barnes	as	a	reacton	to	hs	new	Deal	crt-
csms	of	the	bureau—that	t	had	propagandzed	ts	mage	n	the	1930s	and	
was	not	above	reproach.	Turnbaugh	thereby	concluded	that	when	barnes	
became	a	crtc	of	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy,	hoover	used	ths	opportunty	
to	enact	retrbuton.	Whle	on	one	level	ths	assessment	has	mert,	the	Fbi’s	
nterest	n	barnes	s	best	understood	wthn	the	larger	context	of	the	Fbi’s	
wdespread	survellance	of	the	ant-nterventonsts.36
	 in	 February	 1936,	 barnes	 began	 to	 make	 publc	 comments	 about	
the	Fbi	 that	were	not	 n	harmony	wth	hoover’s	 carefully	 crafted	publc	
mage.	as	a	result,	the	Fbi	drector	dspatched	agents	to	montor	barnes’s	
talks.	One	 agent	 attended	 a	 talk	 barnes	 gave	 n	 Scranton,	 Pennsylvana,	
on	 the	 topc	 of	 crme	where	 the	 professor	 sad	 that	 nether	hoover	 nor	
the	attorney	general	had	actually	done	anythng	to	stem	racketeerng.	One	
	 35.	 letter,	Frank	W.	Scott	to	harry	elmer	barnes,	31	January	1941,	harry	elmer	barnes	
Papers,	box	27,	amercan	hertage	Center	(hereafter	ahC),	Unversty	of	Wyomng,	lara-
me,	Wy.	On	barnes	see	Justus	D.	Doenecke,	“harry	elmer	barnes,”	Wisconsin Magazine of 
History	56	(Summer	1973):	311–23;	Doenecke,	“harry	elmer	barnes:	Prophet	of	a	‘Usable’	
Past,”	History Teacher	8	(February	1975):	265–76.	it	should	be	noted	that,	later	n	lfe,	barnes	
dened	German	responsblty	 for	startng	the	Second	World	War	and	he	became	a	holo-
caust	dener.	See	Justce	Doenecke,	The Battle against Intervention, 1939–1941	(malabar,	Fl:	
Kreger,	1997),	22.
	 36.	roy	Turnbaugh,	“The	Fbi	and	harry	elmer	barnes:	1936–1944,”	Historian	42	(may	
1980):	 385–98.	 See	 also	roy	Turnbaugh,	 “The	Quest	 for	Truth	 and	 Justce:	harry	elmer	
barnes”	(Ph.D.	dss.,	Unversty	of	illnos,	1977).
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comment,	n	partcular,	caught	the	attenton	of	the	snoopng	agent.	barnes	
reportedly	 sad	 that	 hoover	 had	 “hoodwnked	 the	 publc	 wth	 a	 lot	 of	
cheap	publcty	 n	 the	 trackng	down	of	 a	 few	 crmnals.”	The	professor	
stated	 further	 that	 vaunted	 crmnals	 lke	 John	Dllnger,	 among	 others,	
were	n	realty	only	nsgnfcant,	small-tme	crooks.	Such	comments	led	
Fbi	agents	to	conclude	that	barnes	had	“Communstc	tendences.”	Whle	
Fbi	agents	mght	have	been	led	to	ths	smplstc	concluson,	barnes	took	
great	pans	to	deny	that	he	was	a	communst.	in	aprl	1941,	for	nstance,	
he	felt	compelled	to	wrte	the	indanapols	branch	of	the	amercan	legon	
to	protest	ther	condemnaton	of	hm	as	a	communst.37
	 barnes’s	 crtcsm	 of	 the	 Fbi	 was	 not	 restrcted	 to	 one	 speech.	 in	
november	 1936,	 whle	 n	 St.	 lous,	 he	 agan	 crtczed	 the	 bureau	 n	 a	
fashon	smlar	 to	hs	prevous	commentary.	he	clamed	that	Fbi	agents	
sought	only	 “small	 fry”	 crmnals	whle	 gnorng	 the	more	 sophstcated	
mobsters,	thereby	throwng	“dust	nto	the	eyes	of	the	publc.”	These	new	
publc	comments	prompted	Fbi	offcal	lous	nchols	to	recommend	on	9	
December	1936:
Whle	t	mght	be	advsable	to	gnore	barnes,	nevertheless	i	feel	that	such	
remarks	as	set	forth	above	should	not	go	unchallenged	as	they	are	deroga-
tory	and	convey	the	mpresson	that	barnes	s	attemptng	to	dscredt	our	
bureau,	 and	 i	 feel	 that	 hs	 hand	 should	 be	 called,	 partcularly	when	 he	
by	 nnuendo	questons	our	honesty.	Therefore,	 t	 s	 suggested	 that	 some	
vgorous	 representatve	of	 the	bureau	 ntervew	barnes	 and	ask	hm	 for	
any	 nformaton	or	evdence	 that	he	has	as	 to	 the	“10,000	most	danger-
ous	crmnals	who	scorn	to	steal	less	than	$10,000	at	a	tme”	whom	“the	
Federal	 Department	 of	 Justce	 does	 not	 choose	 to	 meddle	 wth.”	 Then	
f	 barnes	 s	 unable	 to	 furnsh	 any	 accurate	 nformaton	 regardng	 them	
whch	come	wthn	our	nvestgatve	jursdcton,	t	s	suggested	that	he	be	
summarly	placed	n	hs	proper	place.	it	s	beleved	that	t	would	be	nad-
vsable	to	wrte	hm	a	letter.	however,	f	the	above	course	s	not	deemed	
desrable,	then	i	would	lke	to	suggest	that	the	Drector	consder	the	feas-
blty	of	quotng	barnes	n	some	future	address	as	llustratve	of	the	hoty	
	 37.	 letter,	SaC	Phladelpha	to	hoover,	10	February	1936,	Fbi	100–6715-X;	memoran-
dum,	r.	Joseph	to	Tolson,	14	February	1936,	Fbi	100–6715-X1.	(The	harry	elmer	barnes	
Fbi	fle	can	be	found	n	hs	papers,	box	196,	at	the	amercan	hertage	Center,	Unversty	
of	Wyomng.)	letter,	barnes	to	homer	Challaux,	18	aprl	1941,	barnes	Papers,	ahC;	let-
ter,	Challaux	 to	barnes,	6	may	1941,	barnes	Papers,	ahC.	On	hoover’s	carefully	crafted	
Depresson-era	 mage	see	rchard	Gd	Powers,	G-Men: Hoover’s FBI in American Popular 
Culture	(Carbondale:	Southern	illnos	Unversty	Press,	1983).
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toty	professors	who	are	 so	 mpractcal	and	who	really	are	undermnng	
good	law	enforcement	rather	than	bolsterng	t.38
irrespectve	of	nchols’s	suggeston,	senor	Fbi	offcals	apparently	decded	
not	to	pursue	these	ends.
	 Curously,	barnes	fell	off	the	bureau’s	radar	untl	1940.	in	December	of	
that	year,	whle	perusng	the	fles	of	an	unnamed	left-leanng	group,	Fbi	
agents	 learned	 that	 barnes	 had	 gven	 hs	 endorsement	 to	 the	magazne	
Soviet Russia Today.	agents	also	found	barnes’s	name	lsted	as	a	member	
of	 the	natonal	Commsson	 for	Defense	 of	 Poltcal	 Prsoners	 and	 as	 a	
board	member	of	People’s	lobby,	inc.	Gven	these	fndngs	and	knowledge	
that	barnes	was	connected	to	some	recent	but	unspecfed	“questonable	
actvty”	 n	Washngton,	D.C.,	 Fbi	 agents	 tred	 to	 ascertan	hs	 “present	
whereabouts.”	 Ther	 nterest	 centered	 on	 whether	 barnes	 was	 currently	
“engaged	 n	any	 form	of	un-amercan	actvty.”	For	unspecfed	reasons,	
hoover	ended	ths	specfc	nqury	n	January	1941	but	dd	not	lose	nter-
est	n	barnes	altogether.39
	 barnes	agan	caught	the	attenton	of	Fbi	offcals	durng	the	summer	
of	1941	when	an	nformant	clamed	the	professor	was	a	Ffth	Columnst	
and	naz	mouthpece.	 Then,	 n	 July,	 another	 nformant	 accused	 hm	 of	
beng	 assocated	 wth	 “radcal	 and	 sem-radcal”	 groups	 and	 actvtes	
worldwde.	 as	 evdence,	 the	 nformant	 lsted	 barnes’s	 varous	 jobs	 and	
assocatons,	 whch	 were,	 to	 hm,	 a	 clear	 ndcaton	 of	 communsm.	 at	
year’s	end,	even	the	army’s	ntellgence	apparatus—miD—had	reterated	to	
Fbi	offcals	that	barnes	was	“a	dangerous	man.”	barnes	was	not	gnorant	
of	these	charges,	but	was	puzzled	by	them	because,	as	he	told	a	frend,	“the	
Fbi	 has	 been	 consultng	me	 frequently	 ths	 sprng	 about	 appontments	
to	 ther	 force.”	none	 of	 the	 varous	 charges	 leveled	 aganst	 barnes	were	
substantated,	 nor	 dd	 t	 seem	 to	matter.	 Taken	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 charges	
confrmed	for	Fbi	offcals	(and	others)	that	barnes	was	a	subversve	and,	
thereby,	 a	 domestc	 securty	 threat.	 These	 accusatons,	 whch	 concded	
wth	barnes’s	crtcsms	of	the	roosevelt	admnstraton,	led	Fbi	offcals	
by	1943	to	attempt	to	develop	a	sedton	case	aganst	hm.40
	 38.	memorandum,	lous	nchols	to	mr.	Joseph,	9	December	1936,	Fbi	100–6715-X2.
	 39.	report,	SaC	Washngton	DC	to	Fbi	hQ,	17	December	1940,	Fbi	100–6715–1;	let-
ter,	hoover	to	SaC	Washngton	DC,	7	January	1941,	Fbi	100–6715–1.
	 40.	 letter	and	enclosure,	hoover	to	SaC	Washngton,	DC,	23	June	1941,	Fbi	100–6715–
3;	memorandum,	K.	r.	mcintre	to	mr.	Kramer,	3	July	1941,	Fbi	100–6715–4;	blnd	memo-
randum	re	harry	elmer	barnes,	3	July	1941,	Fbi	100–6715–4;	letter	and	enclosure,	Colonel	
J.	T.	bssell	to	hoover,	5	December	1941	(Fbi	document	number	mssng	but	n	barnes	Fbi	
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	 it	s	curous	that	barnes	dd	not	draw	more	attenton	from	Fbi	agents	
durng	1941	and	1942.	Only	n	1943	dd	Fbi	agents	nvestgate	barnes	n	a	
concerted	effort	to	prosecute	and	thereby	slence	the	rabble-rousng	pro-
fessor.	Ths	can	only	be	understood	n	the	context	of	other	sedton	cases	
of	the	tme—that	durng	wartme	the	government	beleved	t	could	slence	
ts	 more	 outspoken	 crtcs—and,	 moreover,	 that	 the	 domestc	 securty	
state	had	developed	suffcently	wthn	the	Fbi	to	proceed	wth	such	cases.	
Just	pror	to	the	development	of	ts	sedton	case	n	1943,	Fbi	agents	were	
nformed	that	a	professor	at	Kansas	Cty	Unversty,	a	Professor	Trmble	
who	 was	 assocated	 wth	 amerca	 Frst,	 had	 used	 barnes’s	 college	 text,	
Social Institutions,	 n	 1942.	 Snce	 the	 textbook	 was	 publshed	 after	 the	
amercan	entrance	nto	war,	and	because	t	was	crtcal	of	the	government,	
the	nformant	beleved	the	book	was	an	ndrect	attempt	to	dscredt	the	
roosevelt	 admnstraton.	as	 corroboraton,	 a	 Professor	mannhem	was	
quoted	n	reference	to	the	book	that	t	was	“obnoxous	and	.	.	.	not	the	type	
of	lterature	for	college	freshmen.”	Throughout	the	text	of	the	book	barnes	
was	 accused	 of	 usng	 “a	 subtle	 style”	whle	 “cleverly”	 tryng	 to	 turn	 the	
government	toward	fascsm.	Supportng	ths	contenton	was	the	fact	that	
barnes	had	lsted	one	of	George	Sylvester	vereck’s	books	n	hs	bblogra-
phy.	The	Kansas	Cty,	mssour,	feld	offce	offered	to	follow	up	the	matter	
by	collectng	passages	from	the	book	but	hoover	rejected	the	proposal	as	
“unnecessary.”41
	 barnes	 was	 not	 oblvous	 to	 the	 concerns	 voced	 n	 1942	 about	 hs	
textbook	Social Institutions.	hs	edtor	at	Prentce	hall,	S.	e.	Carll,	wrote	
barnes	and	asked	hm	to	revew	carefully	 the	statements	he	made	 n	hs	
book.	 Gven	 Carll’s	 concerns	 wth	 ths	 specfc	 book	 at	 ths	 partcular	
tme,	t	seems	lkely	that	Fbi	agents	ntervewed	or	contacted	hm	n	some	
manner.	in	any	event,	Carll	assured	barnes	that	he	dd	not	thnk	he	was	
gulty	of	 sedton	yet	 admonshed	hm,	probably	not	 concdentally,	 that	
an	mpressonable	student	could	show	the	book	to	hs	or	her	parents,	who,	
not	understandng	the	context	of	barnes’s	wrtng,	mght	“take	excepton	
to	t	and	consder	t	ther	patrotc	duty	to	report	the	book	to	the	Fbi.	Then	
fle);	letter,	barnes	to	ralph	Teje,	6	July	1941,	barnes	Papers,	ahC.	Patrck	Washburn	ds-
cusses	the	government’s	pursut	of	some	of	ts	more	vocal	crtcs	after	1942	for	sedton	n	
“FDr	versus	hs	Own	attorney	General:	The	Struggle	over	Sedton,	1941–42,”	Journalism 
Quarterly	62	(Wnter	1985):	717–24.
	 41.	report,	SaC	Kansas	Cty	 to	Fbi	hQ,	23	December	1942,	Fbi	100–6715–6;	 letter,	
hoover	to	SaC	Kansas	Cty,	2	February	1942,	Fbi	100–6715–6.	See	also	the	Justce	Depart-
ment’s	unredacted	copy	of	ths	report	n	fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	Classfed	Subjects	Fle,	
record	Group	(rG)	60,	natonal	archves	and	records	admnstraton	(nara),	College	
Park,	mD.
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your	trouble	begns.”	Whle	the	edtor	clamed	ths	possblty	was	merely	
“hypothetcal,”	 he	 confded	 that	 “strange	 thngs	 can	 happen	 n	 tmes	 of	
stress.”	moreover,	concern	wth	a	nonconformst	textbook	and	concurrent	
Fbi	 nvestgaton	 for	 sedton,	 reflects	 the	 developng	 domestc	 securty	
state.	Durng	the	Cold	War,	college	textbooks	that	fell	short	of	consensus	
hstory,	 such	as	 those	wrtten	by	Charles	and	mary	beard,	were	roundly	
attacked	and	subsequently	abandoned	by	publshers.	in	fact,	one	leadng	
textbook	author	of	the	Cold	War	era	advsed	students	that	“[t]he	Fbi	urges	
amercans	 to	 report	 drect	 to	 ts	 offces	 any	 suspcons	 they	 may	 have	
about	Communst	 actvty	 on	 the	 part	 of	 ther	 fellow	amercans.”	 Such	
nformng	was	not	unque	to	the	Cold	War,	and	ndeed	was	alve	and	well	
durng	the	era	of	the	domestc	securty	state.42
	 yet	t	was	only	n	1943	that	the	Fbi	and	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	
pursued	barnes	 n	an	effort	 to	prosecute	hm	for	sedton.	as	prevously	
noted,	 he	was	not	 the	 only	 ndvdual	 the	roosevelt	 admnstraton	 tar-
geted	usng	 the	 sedton	 statutes.	 Followng	 the	amercan	 entrance	 nto	
the	Second	World	War,	the	roosevelt	admnstraton	and	Fbi	nvestgated,	
detaned,	 and	 prosecuted	 a	 number	 of	 ndvduals	 for	makng	 allegedly	
sedtous	 statements.	 accordng	 to	 assstant	 attorney	 General	Wendell	
berge,	 the	 government	was	prepared	 to	use	provsons	of	 the	esponage	
and	Smth	acts,	as	well	as	the	sedtous	conspracy	statute	aganst	“dsloyal	
utterance,”	to	slence	vocal	government	crtcs.	berge	stressed	to	attorney	
General	bddle	that	“we	must	remember	that	the	good	common	sense	and	
patrotsm	of	the	amercan	people	are	ther	country’s	greatest	safeguards	
aganst	 dsloyal	 utterance”	 because	 “passers	 of	 spurous	 con	 are	 beng	
recognzed	for	what	they	are”	and	that	ther	vews	“wll	be	rejected.”	Cvl	
lbertes	seemed	not	to	be	an	ssue	wth	berge.43
	 bddle,	 however,	 was	 more	 cvl	 lbertes–mnded	 than	 ether	 berge	
or	roosevelt	and,	 n	fact,	ordered	the	release	of	a	number	of	 ndvduals	
the	government	had	arrested	and	dropped	ther	prosecutons.	The	attor-
ney	general	wanted	to	avod	reckless	prosecutons	 lke	those	carred	out	
durng	the	Frst	World	War	when	amercan	ctzens	crtczed	Presdent	
Wlson’s	polcy.	among	 those	bddle	 released,	 for	 example,	was	ells	O.	
Jones,	 who	 had	 publcly	 advocated	 mpeachng	 roosevelt	 for	 seekng	 a	
	 42.	 letter,	S.	e.	Carll,	edtor,	Prentce	hall,	to	barnes,	25	aprl	1942,	barnes	Papers,	box	
28,	ahC;	ralph	henry	Gabrel	as	quoted	n	Peter	Charles	hoffer,	Past Imperfect: Facts, Fic-
tions, Fraud—American History from Bancroft and Parkman to Ambrose, Bellesiles, Ellis, and 
Goodwin	(new	york:	Publc	affars,	2004),	46.
	 43.	memorandum,	assstant	attorney	General	Wendell	berge	to	bddle,	24	march	1942,	
Francs	bddle	Papers,	FDrl.
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war	declaraton.	bddle	also	prevented	the	admnstraton	from	usng	the	
Smth	act	to	slence	some	members	of	the	press.	yet	despte	ths	restrant,	
others	who	were	more	pronounced	n	ther	opnons	were	sought	and	n	
some	nstances	prosecuted.	These	ncluded	the	thrty	who	were	ndcted	n	
1944.	Fbi	Drector	hoover,	sensng	the	admnstraton’s	nterest	n	polt-
cal	ntellgence	on	ts	crtcs	pror	to	Pearl	harbor	and	ts	desre	to	slence	
some	afterward,	tred	to	develop	nformaton	that	the	Justce	Department	
could	use	to	ssue	ndctments	for	sedton.	harry	elmer	barnes	was	one	
of	the	frst	such	cases	whch	peaked	wth	the	ndctment	of	the	thrty.44
	 by	1943	Fbi	agents	began	actvely	to	develop	nformaton	on	barnes	so	
the	Justce	Department	could	prosecute	hm	“under	the	Sedton	Statutes.”	
The	effort	began	n	albany,	new	york,	where	the	SaC	reported	that	barnes	
was	 “long	 assocated”	 wth	 communst	 front	 groups	 and	 “solatonst	
movements.”	The	agent	recognzed	the	professor	as	“strongly	ant-brtsh	
and	notceably	opposed	to	Presdent	roosevelt	and	[the]	present	admns-
traton,”	and	when	he	read	a	newspaper	artcle	reflectng	ths	he	dspatched	
an	agent	to	ntervew	the	journalst	who	wrote	t.45
	 in	 ther	 efforts	 to	 develop	 a	 sedton	 case,	 Fbi	 agents	 ntervewed	
numerous	people	 to	determne	barnes’s	poltcal	vews.	One	 ntervewee	
n	albany,	named	regne	Kurlander,	volunteered	that	after	she	met	barnes	
n	Cleveland,	she	determned	he	was	“completely	Fascst	and	no	longer	a	
lberal.”	She	sad	barnes	clamed	that	roosevelt	had	maneuvered	the	coun-
try	nto	war	wth	Pearl	harbor,	and	reported	that	he	had	made	dsparagng	
comments	about	Wnston	Churchll	and	Chang	Ka-shek.46
	 by	march,	 the	 Kansas	 Cty,	mssour,	 feld	 offce	 agan	 reported	 on	
barnes	and	hs	textbook,	concludng	that	he	was	a	subversve	and	thereby	
lable	 for	 prosecuton.	 One	 “confdental	 nformant,”	 probably	 a	 profes-
sor	 at	 Kansas	Cty	Unversty,	 crtczed	 barnes	 as	 an	 academc	 because	
he	 “debunks	 and	 crtczes	 everythng	 called	 ‘amercansm.’”	 Ths	 same	
nformant,	who	beleved	barnes	was	not	a	fascst	but	“nclned	to	Socalsm	
and	Communsm,”	also	offered	 the	opnon	 that	he	was	 “a	 short	 sghted	
	 44.	 Francs	 bddle,	 In Brief Authority	 (Garden	 Cty,	 ny:	 Doubleday,	 1962),	 234–35;	
Wayne	 S.	 Cole,	Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–45	 (lncoln:	Unversty	 of	nebraska	
Press,	1983),	533–34;	Washburn,	“FDr	versus	hs	Own	attorney	General,”	717.	On	the	var-
ous	cvl	lbertes	vews	wthn	the	Justce	Department,	see	rchard	W.	Steele,	Free Speech in 
the Good War	(new	york:	St.	martn’s	Press,	1999).
	 45.	report,	 SaC	albany	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 23	 January	 1943,	 Fbi	 100–6715–8;	 report,	 SaC	
albany	to	Fbi	hQ,	23	January	1943,	fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara;	memoran-
dum,	hoover	to	SaC	albany,	2	march	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–8.
	 46.	report,	 SaC	albany	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 23	 January	 1943,	 Fbi	 100–6715–8;	 report,	 SaC	
albany	to	Fbi	hQ,	23	January	1943,	fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara.
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ratonalst	who	would	 go	 so	 far	 as	 anarchy;	 he	 s	 pedagogcally	 danger-
ous.”	The	nformant	agan	resurrected	the	specter	of	barnes’s	book	Social 
Justice,	commentng	that	t	was	“bad	for	students	because	t	presents	a	too	
one-sded	vewpont	and	crtczes	amercan	 deals	and	tradtons	 to	 the	
extreme.”	all	of	ths	suggested	to	Fbi	offcals	that	barnes	was	ndeed	gulty	
of	sedton	or,	possbly,	 they	took	what	 nformaton	they	developed	 rre-
spectve	of	ts	effcacy	to	servce	admnstraton	desres	for	prosecutons.47
	 Fbi	agents	were	then	dspatched	to	barnes’s	hometown	of	Cooperstown,	
new	 york,	 to	 ascertan	more	 specfc	 nformaton	 about	 hm.	 One	 Fbi	
agent	 ntervewed	 the	 Cooperstown	 assstant	 postmaster,	 J.	 Glchrest,	
to	ascertan	f	there	was	anythng	unusual	about	what	barnes	receved	n	
the	mal;	Glchrest	reported	nothng	unusual.	an	agent	also	ntervewed	
the	drector	of	the	Cooperstown	branch	of	the	new	york	State	hstorcal	
assocaton,	who	reported	that	after	barnes	spoke	to	the	group	hs	repu-
taton	 n	 the	 communty	plummeted.	also	offerng	 crtcal	 commentary	
were	the	town	clerk,	vllage	commssoner,	mayor,	and	several	other	nd-
vduals.	To	Fbi	agents,	these	comments,	n	toto,	further	confrmed,	appar-
ently,	that	barnes	was	lable	for	prosecuton	for	sedton.48
	 by	 late	 aprl	 1943,	 wth	 the	 above	 consttutng	 Fbi	 offcals’	 accu-
mulated	nformaton	about	barnes,	Fbi	Drector	hoover	forwarded	t	 to	
Wendell	berge	for	hs	opnon	as	to	“a	volaton	of	the	Sedton	Statutes	and	
f	 you	 beleve	 further	 nvestgaton	 s	warranted.”	The	 assstant	 attorney	
general	 responded	 that	 the	 evdence	 collected	dd	not	warrant	 prosecu-
ton	 and	 he	 suggested	 that	 Fbi	 agents	 dscontnue	 ther	 probe.	hoover,	
therefore,	 advsed	 the	 albany	 feld	 offce	 to	 suspend	 ts	 nvestgaton	
but	advsed	them	that	f	further	nformaton	“of	a	sedtous	nature”	were	
receved,	t	should	be	reported.49
	 Fbi	agents,	ndeed,	contnued	to	collect	ntellgence	on	barnes.	in	may	
an	agent	n	Kansas	Cty,	stll	nterested	n	barnes’s	book	Social Institutions, 
tred	to	ascertan	“the	phraseology	of	certan	passages”	because	they	alleg-
edly	 “ndcated	 the	 subject’s	 ant-amercan	 sentment.”	 The	 agent	 was	
unable	to	complete	hs	task,	however,	because	hs	nformant—a	student—
	 47.	report,	SaC	Kansas	Cty	to	Fbi	hQ,	9	march	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–10;	report,	SaC	
Kansas	Cty	to	Fbi	hQ,	9	march	1943,	fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara.
	 48.	report,	 SaC	albany	 to	 Fbi	hQ,	 30	march	 1943,	 Fbi	 100–6715–12;	 report,	 SaC	
albany	to	Fbi	hQ,	30	march	1943,	Fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara.
	 49.	memorandum,	hoover	to	berge,	19	aprl	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–12;	memorandum,	
berge	to	hoover,	26	aprl	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–14;	memorandum,	hoover	to	SaC	albany,	
14	may	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–14;	memorandum,	hoover	to	berge,	19	aprl	1943,	Fle	146–
28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara;	memorandum,	berge	to	hoover,	26	aprl	1943,	Fle	146–
28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara.
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had	fnshed	the	class	work	and	no	longer	had	a	copy	of	the	book.	(Why	
the	agent	was	unable	to	fnd	hs	own	copy	s	unknown.)	Then,	n	June,	the	
new	york	Cty	specal	agent	n	charge	reported	barnes’s	assocaton	wth	
both	the	amerca	Councl	on	Publc	affars	and	the	natonal	Commttee	
of	internatonal	Jurdcal	assocaton,	and	that	he	was	a	Communst	party	
speaker.	 Ths	 nformaton,	 some	 of	 whch	 was	 purely	 speculatve,	 sug-
gested	to	Fbi	offcals	that	barnes	was	a	sedtonst	not	from	any	evdence	
but	because	he	“expressed	[a]	very	pessmstc	atttude	 toward	[the]	U.S.	
notwthstandng	the	outcome	of	the	war.”50
	 The	 followng	month	 an	Fbi	 agent	 n	albany	 arranged	 an	 ntervew	
wth	one	of	barnes’s	colleagues,	Dr.	Dxon	Fox,	a	hstoran	of	the	Unted	
States	and	presdent	of	Unon	College.	The	agent	asked	Fox	about	barnes’s	
speech	 before	 the	 new	 york	 State	 hstorcal	 assocaton—Fox	 was	 ts	
presdent—and	whether	he	beleved	 t	 to	be	 ndcatve	of	 sedton.	Fox’s	
answers	seem	to	have	tempered	Fbi	offcals’	vew	of	barnes.	he	told	them	
that	n	hs	twenty-fve-year	assocaton	wth	barnes,	he	found	the	professor	
to	hold	some	anglophobc	feelngs	yet	beleved	hm	“to	be	entrely	open.”	
Fox	added	that	barnes	had	the	“dsposton	causng	hm	to	take	the	sde	
of	 the	mnorty	 n	most	dsputes”	and	 t	was	 ths	 that	best	explaned	hs	
behavor.	Ths	ntervew	was	convncng	enough	for	Fbi	offcals,	leadng	
them	to	close	the	sedton	case	aganst	barnes.51
	 The	closure	of	 the	 sedton	case	dd	not	end	Fbi	offcals’	 nterest	 n	
barnes,	 however.	 in	December	 1943,	 barnes	 appled	 to	 be	 a	 consultant	
to	the	Offce	for	emergency	management	(Oem)	of	the	War	Producton	
board,	a	job	requrng	an	Fbi	background	check.	Fbi	agents’	ntal	revew	
resurrected	hs	1936	crtcsms	of	the	bureau	and	hs	promnent	poston	as	
an	ant-nterventonst.	When	hoover	learned	of	barnes’s	desre	to	jon	the	
admnstraton,	he	ordered	hs	subordnates	to	“[s]ee	that	he	s	thoroughly	
nvestgated	as	he	s	obvously	a	foul	ball.”52
	 Gven	barnes’s	past	and	hoover’s	opnon	as	to	hs	qualfcatons	for	the	
Oem	poston,	he	ordered	a	“vgorous”	and	wdespread	nvestgaton	nvolv-
ng	 feld	offces	 n	new	york,	new	 Jersey,	north	Carolna,	Pennsylvana,	
mchgan,	massachusetts,	and	Washngton,	D.C.	each	feld	offce	reported	
	 50.	report,	SaC	Kansas	Cty	to	Fbi	hQ,	13	may	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–15;	report,	SaC	
new	york	Cty	to	Fbi	hQ,	7	June	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–16;	report,	SaC	new	york	Cty	to	Fbi	
hQ,	7	June	1943,	Fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara.
	 51.	report,	SaC	albany	to	Fbi	hQ,	30	July	1943,	Fbi	100–6715–17;	report,	SaC	albany	
to	Fbi	hQ,	30	July	1943,	Fle	146–28–840,	box	103,	rG	60,	nara.
	 52.	 letter,	 Dallas	Dort,	 Offce	 for	 emergency	management,	 to	hoover,	 8	December	
1943,	Fbi	100–6715–17X;	memorandum,	G.	C.	Callan	to	ladd,	19	January	1944,	Fbi	100–
6715–17X.
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n	wth	 nformaton	 that	 only	 reterated	 the	 nformaton	 culled	 from	 the	
prevous	 nvestgatons	 of	 barnes.	 The	 new	 york	 feld	 offce,	 however,	
concluded	on	9	February	1944	that	barnes	was	“a	dangerous	man”	due	to	
hs	“superlatve	egotsm”	and	hs	“flar	for	the	spectacular.”	because	barnes	
allegedly	hated	the	amercan	government,	the	new	york	offce	determned	
that	he	“would	ether	have	some	part	n	our	government	or	go	to	jal.”53
	 Wth	 the	 feld	 offces	 reportng	 n,	hoover	 used	 the	 nformaton	 to	
ensure	 barnes	 was	 not	 apponted	 to	 the	 government	 poston.	 he	 for-
warded	to	George	Gould,	the	assstant	of	nvestgatons	at	Oem,	the	most	
derogatory	 nformaton	 collected	 on	 barnes.	 hoover	 then	 wrote	 Gould	
to	 nform	 hm	 of	 barnes’s	 crtcsm	 of	 the	 Justce	 Department’s	 new	
Deal	 crme	control	program.	he	also	 sad	barnes	 clamed	 that	bg	bus-
ness	had	an	nterest	n	protectng	large	crme	syndcates	whle	the	Justce	
Department	“hoodwnked	the	publc	by	trackng	down	second	rate	crm-
nals	lke	Dllnger,	a	poor	hunted	boy,	who	was	dened	hs	consttutonal	
rght	to	surrender.”54
	 it	s	unclear	whether	hoover	had	succeeded	n	convncng	Gould	not	
to	 hre	 barnes,	 but	 the	 effort	was,	 n	 any	 event,	 fleetng.	hstoran	roy	
Turnbaugh,	who	has	ntmately	studed	barnes’s	lfe,	wrote	that	even	before	
hoover	had	forwarded	hs	nformaton	to	Gould,	the	prson	ndustry	hred	
barnes	 as	 a	 consultant.55	hoover’s	 acton,	 nevertheless,	 s	 demonstratve	
of	hs	 long	effort	 to	serve	the	roosevelt	Whte	house’s	poltcal	 nterests	
and	often	dong	so	wthout	promptng	 from	superors.	 it	also	shows	the	
evoluton	 of	 the	 domestc	 securty	 state	 nasmuch	 as	 wth	 barnes,	 Fbi	
agents	went	from	montorng	foregn	polcy	crtcs,	to	sedtonsts,	to	“un-
amercans”	lke	barnes.
—■■■■■■■—
laura	houghtalng	 ingalls	was	 a	 noted	 female	 avator	 durng	 the	 1930s	
who,	 among	 other	 unusual	 aeronautcal	 achevements,	 won	 $2,500	 n	
	 53.	memorandum,	hoover	 to	 SaC	new	york,	 19	 January	 1944,	 Fbi	 100–6715–17X;	
memorandum,	G.	C.	Callan	to	ladd,	22	February	1944,	Fbi	100–6715–2[5?];	report,	SaC	
new	york	to	Fbi	hQ,	9	February	1944,	Fbi	100–6715–24;	memorandum,	SaC	new	york	to	
hoover,	17	aprl	1944,	Fbi	100–6715–39.	For	the	varous	Fbi	reports	from	the	lsted	feld	
offces,	see	barnes’s	Fbi	fle,	serals	100–6715–18X	to–38.
	 54.	Personal	and	confdental	 letter,	hoover	 to	George	Gould,	26	February	1944,	Fbi	
100–6715–35;	confdental	letter,	hoover	to	George	Gould,	17	march	1944,	Fbi	100–6715–
35;	memorandum,	Tamm	to	hoover,	12	February	1944,	Fbi	100–6715–37;	memorandum,	
ladd	to	hoover,	22	march	1944,	Fbi	100–6715–34.
	 55.	Turnbaugh,	“The	Fbi	and	harry	elmer	barnes,”	397.
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an	ar	race	 from	new	york	to	Calforna.	 in	terms	of	 the	prewar	 foregn	
polcy	debate,	she	had	much	n	common	wth	her	male	flyng	counterpart,	
Charles	lndbergh.	both	were	noted	flers	and	both	were	colorful	and	con-
troversal	speakers	for	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.	but	unlke	lndbergh	
and	 other	 promnent	 amerca	 Frst	members,	 ingalls	 was	 the	 only	 sg-
nfcant	member	 to	 have	 been	 prosecuted	 successfully	 for	 volatng	 the	
Foregn	agents	regstraton	act—the	law	that	Fbi	offcals	employed	tme	
and	 agan	 n	 an	 attempt	 to	 develop	 cases	 aganst	 roosevelt’s	 promnent	
foregn	polcy	crtcs.	her	ndctment	n	December	1941,	and	subsequent	
prosecuton,	became	a	black	mark	on	the	legtmacy	of	the	ant-nterven-
tonst	movement.
	 yet	her	prosecuton	was	an	excepton.	among	sncere	and	manstream	
ant-nterventonsts—those	 dentfed	 n	 the	 amerca	 Frst	 Commttee	
and	not	radcal	frnge	groups—ingalls’s	case	stands	out	n	brght	contrast.56	
Whle	 some	 amerca	 Frst	 members	 ndeed	 held	 controversal	 vews	
regardng	naz	Germany	and	amercan	entrance	nto	the	european	war,	
most	never	acted	upon	them.	What	best	explans	ingalls	as	an	excepton	to	
the	rule	was	her	naveté.	She	admred	alleged	German	“effcency”	and	the	
country’s	efforts	to	rebuld	ts	socety	amd	the	Great	Depresson,	whch,	n	
part,	led	her	to	accept	money	from	a	German	embassy	offcal	to	supple-
ment	expenses	she	ncurred	whle	makng	speeches	for	the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee.	and	whle	 she	had	 ndeed	volated	 the	 letter	of	 the	 law—as	
stpulated	n	the	regstraton	act—her	motves	do	not	appear	to	have	been	
nsdous	nor	was	 there	 any	genune	naz	 nfluence	wthn	 the	amerca	
Frst	Commttee.
	 Ths	 makes	 ingalls’s	 prosecuton	 sgnfcant	 n	 two	 ways.	 Frst,	 t	
reflects	 Fbi	 offcals’	 strategy	 n	 pursung	 roosevelt’s	 promnent,	 and	
legtmate,	foregn	polcy	crtcs.	That	s,	to	develop	nformaton	that	mght	
have	led	to	a	successful	prosecuton	under	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	
act	 (among	 other	 laws),	 whch,	 n	 turn,	 would	 have	 dscredted	 ther	
opposton	efforts.	Second,	her	case	stands	out	as	 llustratve	of	 the	vew	
that	 legtmate	 crtcs	 were	 somehow	 subversve,	 a	 desgnaton	 that	 was	
lght	on	evdence	yet	valuable	n	justfyng	ntense	scrutny.	indeed,	after	
havng	successfully	prosecuted	the	ingalls	case,	Fbi	offcals	had	hoped	to	
use	t	as	a	model	for	future	prosecutons	of	other	manstream	crtcs	but	
especally	those	who	were	assocated	wth	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.
	 56.	 Frnge	crtcs	were	prosecuted	n	the	same	manner	as	ingalls,	but	she	was	not	on	
ther level.	These	nclude	Wllam	Dudley	Pelley,	Frtz	Kuhn,	and	Gerald	l.	K.	Smth,	all	of	
whom	were	confrmed	ant-Semtes	and	leadng	fgures	n	pro-naz	groups.
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	 ingalls	frst	came	under	Fbi	scrutny	not	for	any	controversal	foregn	
polcy	postons,	but	for	her	untoward	nqury	about	workng	for	the	Fbi.	
Shortly	before	the	outbreak	of	the	european	war,	n	august	1939,	ingalls	
found	herself	wthout	 ganful	 employment	 n	 ether	 the	 arlne	 ndustry	
or	the	mltary.	ingalls	then	decded	to	wrte	hoover	askng	to	“work	for	
you	through	the	medum	of	my	arplanes	and	perhaps	serve	my	country	
as	well—somethng	 i	 long	 to	 do;	 even	 though	 i	 am	 a	woman—even	 n	
tmes	 of	 peace.”	hoover	 outrght	 rejected	 ingalls’s	 offer	 but,	 undaunted,	
she	renewed	t,	stressng	that	there	must	be	a	poston	for	a	woman	of	her	
talents.57
	 Frmly	 an	 advocate	 of	 gender-specfc	 roles,	 hoover	 frowned	 upon	
employng	 ingalls.	 The	 employment	 request,	 moreover,	 prompted	 Fbi	
agents	 to	delve	 nto	her	background	where	 they	 found	 nformaton	 that	
besmrched	her	character.	agents	took	notce	of	a	29	September	1939	art-
cle	n	the	New York Times	that	lnked	ingalls	to	Catherne	Curts,58	whom	
Fbi	offcals	regarded	as	“Fascst	n	her	leanngs	and	afflatons,”	nasmuch	
as	the	two	unsuccessfully	had	pettoned	the	Senate	to	hold	hearngs	on	the	
war.	as	a	result	of	the	Senate’s	rejecton,	ingalls	flew	her	arplane	at	a	low	
alttude	between	the	Captol	and	the	Whte	house	whle	droppng	antwar	
pamphlets.	The	ramfcatons	of	ths	were	sgnfcant	for	ingalls	n	that	she	
lost	her	plot’s	lcense	(for	volatng	restrcted	arspace)	and	had	provded	
hoover	a	ratonale—beyond	hs	chauvnsm—n	declnng	ingalls’s	second	
request	for	a	job	wth	the	Fbi.59
	 by	 1941	 ingalls	 became	 a	 promnent	 speaker	 for	 the	 amerca	 Frst	
Commttee—she	 was	 consdered	 lndbergh’s	 female	 counterpart—lead-
ng	Fbi	offcals	to	take	a	renewed	nterest	n	her	actvtes.60	at	the	root	
of	 ther	 nterest	 was,	 unsurprsngly,	 her	 role	 as	 a	 controversal	 foregn	
polcy	 crtc.	 and	 t	 was	 durng	 the	 sprng	 and	 summer	 of	 1941	 when	
Fbi	agents	 frst	 learned	of	 ingalls’s	contact	wth	 the	German	embassy	 n	
	 57.	 letter	and	resumé,	laura	ingalls	to	hoover,	20	august	1939,	Fbi	100–34712–1X2;	
letter,	nathan	to	ingalls,	25	august	1939,	Fbi	100–43712–1X2;	letter,	ingalls	to	nathan,	13	
September	1939,	Fbi	100–43712–1X2.	(The	ingalls	Fbi	fle	can	be	found	n	Wayne	Cole’s	
papers	at	the	herbert	hoover	Presdental	lbrary.)
	 58.	Catherne	Curts	later	became	a	speaker	for	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee.	She	also	
became	head	of	one	of	the	rght-wng	mother’s	organzatons	that	opposed	the	war,	Women	
investors	n	amerca.
	 59.	 letter,	hoover	to	ingalls,	2	October	1939,	Fbi	100–34712–1X2;	blnd	memorandum	
re	laura	ingalls,	9	September	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–8;	“repeal	Foes	Plan	Strategy	for	Fght,”	
New York Times,	29	September	1939,	12.
	 60.	 For	a	contemporary	vew	of	ingalls	see	mchael	Sayers	and	albert	Kahn,	Sabotage! 
The Secret War against America	(new	york:	harper’s,	1942),	209.
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Washngton.	 ingalls,	 qute	 navely,	 beleved	 that	 she—personally—could	
ntate	a	rapprochement	between	the	Unted	States	and	Germany	by	usng	
her	aeronautcal	fame.	Ths	s	what	led	her	to	contact	the	German	mnster	
plenpotentary	and	chargé	d’affares,	hans	Thomsen,	to	obtan	travel	vsas	
to	london	and	ultmately	berln.61
	 as	ingalls	contnued	to	pursue	her	travel	plans,	an	nformant	relayed	to	
Fbi	agents	that	ingalls	had	dscussed	the	possblty	of	flyng	to	Germany	
“on	 a	 good	wll	 tour	 to	 tell	 the	German	 people	 that	 the	amercans	 are	
not	obtanng	the	truth.”	To	arrange	the	tour,	ingalls	contacted	Dr.	hans	
borchers	and	Captan	Frtz	Wedemann,	both	German	consular	offcals	
n	new	york	and	San	Francsco,	respectvely.	The	 nformant	also	related	
to	Fbi	agents	 that	 ingalls	allegedly	beleved	 that	“Germany	 s	buldng	a	
country	[whle]	amerca	s	n	chaos.	The	Germans	have	the	best	brans	n	
the	world	and	are	the	fnest	organzers.	you	wll	be	surprsed	to	see	what	
they	 ntend	to	do	 n	afrca.	They	have	scentfc	mnds	and	there	 sn’t	a	
lazy	bone	n	the	body	of	a	German.”62	Ths	consttuted	the	extent	of	Fbi	
agents	early	montorng	of	ingalls.
	 Durng	august,	ingalls	moved	to	Washngton,	D.C.,	where	her	contact	
wth	 German	 embassy	 offcals	 grew	 closer.	 ingalls	made	 arrangements	
through	 an	 employee	 of	 the	 Dstrct	 of	 Columba,	 Jula	 Kraus,	 to	meet	
German	embassy	offcal	baron	Ulrch	von	Genanth	n	order	to	further	
her	plans	for	a	goodwll	tour.	Then,	n	September,	she	met	hm	twce	and	
on	one	occason	baron	Ulrch	gave	her	a	package	contanng	propaganda	
pamphlets.	Other	than	ths,	the	content	of	the	meetngs	remans	unknown;	
nevertheless,	the	bass	for	her	later	prosecuton	under	the	Foregn	agents	
regstraton	act	was	lad.63
	 ingalls’s	later	trouble	actually	centered	on	her	work	as	a	travelng	speak-
er	 for	amerca	Frst.	her	problem	 lay	 n	 the	 fact	 that	 the	amerca	Frst	
Commttee	 agreed	 only	 to	 pay	 her	 travelng	 expenses,	whch	 left	 her	 n	
fnancal	 strats	 and,	 wthout	 further	 funds,	 unable	 to	 contnue	 speak-
ng.	To	remedy	 ths,	 ingalls	 mprudently	used	her	new	contacts	wth	 the	
German	embassy	to	supplement	the	funds	she	receved	from	amerca	Frst.	
in	October	1941	she	concluded	an	agreement	wth	baron	Ulrch	through	
whch	she	would	receve	$250	per	month	to	supplement	her	travel	expens-
es.	it	was	ingalls	who	came	up	wth	the	dollar	fgure	because,	she	sad,	as	a	
flght	nstructor	she	would	easly	earn	approxmately	$300	per	month.64
	 61.	blnd	memorandum	re	laura	ingalls,	9	September	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–8.
	 62.	 ibd.
	 63.	blnd	memorandum	re	laura	ingalls,	18	December	1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
	 64.	 ibd.
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	 Ths	led	Fbi	offcals,	wth	no	evdence	other	than	her	assocatons	and	
opposton	to	roosevelt’s	foregn	polcy,	to	suspect	that	ingalls	mght	have	
passed	nformaton	about	natonal	defense	ssues	to	the	German	embassy.	
hoover,	therefore,	ordered	an	nvestgaton	of	ingalls	and	notfed	the	state	
department	of	 the	German	embassy	connecton.65	Fbi	agents	montored	
her	movements	but	found	the	effort	unproductve	because	ingalls	restrct-
ed	her	day-to-day	actvtes	to	vstng	the	offces	of	amerca	Frst.	because	
of	the	lmtatons	of	physcal	survellance,	Fbi	agents	employed	an	llegal	
wretap	and	 llegal	break-n	durng	 the	 ingalls	 nvestgaton.	a	report	 n	
her	Fbi	 fle	 states	 that	“most of the information	 n	 the	possesson	of	 the	
bureau	has	been	obtaned	from	hghly	confdental	sources	which are not 
competent evidence	 n	the	event	of	a	 tral.”	Wretaps	were	 llegal	and	any	
nformaton	obtaned	 from	one	or	 an	 llegal	 break-n	 (volatng	 	 Fourth	
amendment	 rghts),	 therefore,	were	 nadmssble	 n	 court.	addtonally,	
as	 the	 brgham	 case	 llustrates,	 Fbi	 agents	 euphemstcally	 referred	 to	
wretaps	 as	 “confdental	 sources.”	 Fbi	 agents	 ether	 wretapped	 ingalls	
or	obtaned	nformaton	about	her	actvtes	from	the	Fbi’s	wretap	of	the	
German	embassy.	The	same	Fbi	report	confrms	the	use	of	a	wretap.	 it	
reads:	“nformaton	developed	today	ndcates	that	laura	ingalls	has	made	
numerous	efforts	to	contact	von	Genanth	by telephone and	has	threatened	
to	come	to	hs	home.	On	one	occason	he hung up the telephone during the 
conversation. . . .”	Knowledge	of	 ths	could	only	have	come	from	a	wre-
tap.66
	 Upon	the	German	declaraton	of	war	aganst	the	Unted	States	on	10	
December,	 baron	 Ulrch	 termnated	 hs	 contact	 wth	 ingalls.	 Fve	 days	
later,	hoover	nqured	wth	hs	Justce	Department	superors	as	to	whether	
ingalls	 “should	 be	 taken	 nto	 custodal	 detenton	 at	 ths	 tme.”	 They	
advsed	hoover	not	to	detan	ingalls.	hoover	then	submtted	reports	to	the	
department’s	crmnal	dvson,	but	he	was	subsequently	advsed	that	suf-
fcent	evdence	dd	not	exst	to	lnk	ingalls	to	the	German	embassy	n	any	
	 65.	Personal	and	confdental	 letter	and	blnd	memorandum,	hoover	to	berle,	9	Sep-
tember	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–8;	letter,	hoover	to	SaC	new	york,	12	September	1941,	Fbi	
100–34712–8X;	letter	and	Fbi	report,	hoover	to	berle,	16	September	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–
9.
	 66.	memorandum,	J.	K.	mumford	to	ladd,	10	October	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–20;	mem-
orandum,	D.	a.	Flnn	to	ladd,	16	December	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–64.	hoover	mght	even	
have	used	nformaton	obtaned	from	a	wretap	and	submtted	t	to	the	Justce	Department	
for	 prosecutoral	 purposes,	 or	 used	wretap	 nformaton	 n	 the	 development	 of	 crmnal	
evdence.	Durng	the	late	1940s	ths	had	happened	wth	the	Judth	Coplon	case,	and	t	was	
deemed	frut	of	the	posonous	tree	and	not	admssble	 n	court.	See	Theohars,	Spying on 
Americans,	100–6.	emphass	added	n	quotes.
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crmnal	matter.	but	a	breakthrough	 n	 the	case	was	made	after	 ingalls’s	
orgnal	 lason	wth	 the	German	 embassy,	 Jula	Kraus,	 confded	 to	 Fbi	
agents	that	baron	Ulrch	had	pad	ingalls	to	supplement	her	speakng	tour.	
Fbi	agents	then	secured	telegrams	sent	to	ingalls	from	Kraus	that	proved	
recept	of	money.	ingalls	was	then	questoned	about	the	money,	the	recept	
of	whch	 she	never	dened,	 for	whch	 she	was	 subsequently	 arrested.	 in	
the	meantme,	hoover	forwarded	a	summary	of	the	ingalls	matter	to	the	
Whte	house.67
	 Snce	ingalls	had	accepted	money	from	a	foregn	power	wthout	hav-
ng	 regstered	herself	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 that	 power,	 the	 Justce	Department	
sought	to	charge	her	wth	volatng	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act.	
U.S.	attorneys	had	planned	to	charge	ingalls	n	two	ways:	frst,	for	falng	to	
regster	as	a	foregn	agent	and,	second,	for	consprng	wth	baron	Ulrch	to	
volate	the	regstraton	act.	Wendell	berge,	head	of	the	crmnal	dvson,	
decded	to	proceed	only	wth	the	frst	charge	snce	t	was	the	safest	route	
to	prosecuton.68
	 On	23	December	1941	a	federal	grand	jury	ndcted	laura	ingalls	for	
falng	to	regster	as	a	pad	agent	of	the	German	government.	accordng	
to	 her	 prosecutors,	 ingalls	 was	 a	 Ffth	 Columnst	 who	 had	 “used	 her	
prestge	aganst	 the	amercan	people	to	dsunte	them	at	the	pad	drec-
ton	of	 the	German	Government.”	 interestngly,	 ingalls’s	 lawyer	used	the	
Fbi’s	rejecton	of	her	servces	as	part	of	her	defense.	The	ingalls	defense	
lamely	clamed	that	after	hoover	had	rejected	ingalls,	he	had	also	publcly	
asked	amercans	to	assst	the	bureau	n	ts	work	(by	offerng	nformaton)	
and	therefore	ingalls	had	decded	“to	engage	 n	counteresponage	work.”	
in	 short,	 ingalls’s	 defense	 was	 that	 she	 had	 used	 her	 contacts	 wth	 the	
Germany	embassy	to	collect	 nformaton	 for	amercan	defense	as	a	self-
styled	“nternatonal	mata	har.”	Ths	partcular	defense	dd	not	mpress	
ether	 the	prosecuton	or	Fbi	Drector	hoover,	who	commented:	“Of	all	
the	slly	clap	trap	ths	takes	the	prze.”69
	 67.	memorandum,	D.	a.	Flnn	to	ladd,	16	December	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–64;	memo-
randum,	ladd	to	hoover,	17	December	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–50;	memorandum,	ladd	to	
hoover,	18	December	1941,	Fbi	100–34712–6?;	personal	and	confdental	letter	and	blnd	
memorandum,	hoover	to	Watson,	18	December	1941,	Offcal	Fle	10-b,	FDrl.
	 68.	memorandum,	 ladd	 to	hoover,	 19	December	 1941,	 Fbi	 100–34712–98;	memo-
randum,	m.	nel	andrews	 to	Wendell	berge,	19	December	1941,	 fle	146–6–162,	rG	60,	
nara.
	 69.	 indctment,	United States v. Laura Ingalls,	23	December	1941,	Washngton,	DC,	Fle	
146–6–162,	rG	60,	nara;	“mss	ingalls	Gets	Prson	Sentence,”	New York Times,	21	Febru-
ary	1942,	 1,	 21;	memorandum,	nchols	 to	Tolson,	 27	 January	1942,	Fbi	100–34712–152;	
memorandum,	Flnn	 to	Kramer,	3	February	1942,	Fbi	100–34712–138;	closng	report	on	
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	 irrespectve	of	Fbi	offcals’	vew	of	the	ingalls	defense,	they	were	con-
cerned	when	n	early	February	1942	they	dscovered	that	Fbi	agents	had	
volated	 ingalls’s	 Fourth	amendment	 rghts	 n	 order	 to	 gather	 evdence	
aganst	her.	Wthout	a	warrant,	Fbi	agents	had	used	a	thrd	party—mrs.	
ralph	revlo—who	was	lookng	after	ingalls’s	los	angeles	resdence	whle	
she	was	 away,	 to	gan	 entrance	 and	 remove	documents.	The	documents	
were	determned	not	to	be	central	to	the	ingalls	prosecuton	and,	therefore,	
were	not	used,	yet	hoover	censured	the	los	angeles	feld	offce	for	pro-
ceedng	wth	an	llegal	search	that	senor	Fbi	offcals	had	not	authorzed.	
Sgnfcantly,	they	were	not	censured	for	usng	llegal	tactcs—the	Fbi	had	
a	long	hstory	of	such	acton—but	for	beng	careless	about	t,	whch	could	
have	led	to	negatve	publcty	for	hoover	and	possbly	have	destroyed	the	
ingalls	prosecuton.	but	wth	no	embarrassment	forthcomng,	the	Ingalls	
case	 proceeded	 between	 9	 and	 13	 February	 and,	 after	 about	 an	 hour’s	
delberaton,	a	verdct	of	gulty	was	returned.	ingalls	was	sentenced	to	a	jal	
term	of	between	eght	months	and	two	years,	of	whch	she	served	twenty	
months.70
	 Followng	her	convcton,	Fbi	offcals	decded	to	use	the	Ingalls	case	
as	a	template	for	possble	prosecuton	of	other	amerca	Frst	Commttee	
members,	 especally	 those	who	 could	 be	 lnked	 to	 ingalls.	 The	 head	 of	
the	 Fbi’s	 Washngton,	 D.C.,	 feld	 offce	 nformed	 hs	 superors	 that	 a	
warranted	 search	 of	 ingalls’s	 Dstrct	 of	 Columba	 apartment	 produced	
a	lst	of	amerca	Frst	members,	speakers,	and	speakng	dates.	The	agent	
also	relayed	that	the	lst	was	beng	retaned	snce	those	on	t	“are	beleved	
to	 be	 proper	 subjects	 for	 nvestgaton.”	moreover,	 n	 the	 event	 that	 the	
bureau	 pursued	 amerca	 Frst,	 the	 nformaton	 obtaned	 “would	 be	 of	
consderable	value.”	hoover	then	ordered	ths	nformaton	to	be	ncluded	
n	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	summary	report,	and	t	appeared	when,	
popularly,	 t	 was	 beleved	 the	 commttee	 planned	 to	 reenter	 amercan	
poltcs.71
	 ingalls’s	 vews	 of	 naz	 Germany	 and	 her	 belef	 she	 could	 prevent	 a	
destructve	war	were,	to	say	the	least,	nave.	She	had	also	volated	the	letter	
of	the	law,	as	defned	n	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act,	and	therefore	
was	gulty—ingalls	eventually	admtted	as	much	though	she	always	dened	
laura	 ingalls	 case,	m.	nel	andrews,	 16	 February	 1942,	 Fle	 146–6–162,	rG	 60,	nara;	
“mss	ingalls	Says	Fbi	rejected	her,”	New York Times,	12	February	1942,	23.
	 70.	 ibd.;	“ingalls	Jury	Gves	verdct	of	Gulty,”	New York Times,	14	February	1942.
	 71.	 letter,	SaC	Washngton,	DC	to	hoover,	11	march	1942,	Fbi	100–34712–175;	letter,	
hoover	to	SaC	Washngton,	DC,	26	march	1942,	Fbi	100–34712–175.
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that	 she	 was	 a	 “conscous”	 agent.72	 even	 so,	 as	 a	 member	 and	 popular	
speaker	 for	amerca	Frst—she	made	over	 ffty	 speeches	 from	 the	 sum-
mer	of	1941	untl	Pearl	harbor—ingalls’s	prosecuton	was	atypcal.	most	
amerca	Frst	members	dd	not	assocate	wth	German	offcals,	let	alone	
accept	money	 from	 them.	 but	 ingalls’s	 case,	 to	 Fbi	 offcals,	 seemed	 to	
typfy	the	nherent	nature	of	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	by	1942.	and	
the	case	seemed	to	prove	that	hoover’s	tactcs	aganst	such	foregn	polcy	
crtcs,	 rrespectve	 of	 llegal	 nvestgatve	 technques	 and	 cvl	 lbertes	
volatons,	were	vald:	tme	and	agan	Fbi	agents	tred	to	develop	nforma-
ton	 to	warrant	prosecutons	under	 the	regstraton	act,	esponage	act,	
sedton	statutes,	or	other	laws.	her	successful	prosecuton,	moreover,	both	
bolstered	the	vew	of	legtmate	crtcs	as	somehow	subversve	and	demon-
strated	clearly	the	evoluton	of	the	domestc	securty	state	that	would	see	
ts	heght	wth	the	Great	Sedton	Tral	of	1944.
—■■■■■■■—
The	 brgham,	 barnes,	 and	 ingalls	 cases	 llustrate	 the	 evoluton	 of	 the	
domestc	securty	state	from	an	evolvng	poltcal	arm	of	the	Whte	house	
before	 Pearl	 harbor	 to	 an	 even	 more	 aggressve	 and	 semautonomous	
agency	 after	 the	 declaraton	 of	 war.	 late	 n	 1941	 Fbi	 offcals	 obtaned	
authorzaton	for	a	wretap	of	brgham,	and	by	1942—wth	the	country	at	
war—reauthorzed	 the	wretap	on	 ther	own	authorty.	The	 fruts	of	 ths	
wretap	nvolved	what	one	Fbi	offcal	regarded	as	“valuable”	nformaton,	
whch	s	to	say,	poltcal	ntellgence	that	was	subsequently	shared	wth	the	
admnstraton	on	more	than	one	occason.	The	Fbi’s	effort	to	develop	a	
sedton	case	aganst	barnes	also	reflects	 the	bureau’s	evoluton	by	1942.	
Fbi	agents	sought	to	slence	ths	promnent	crtc	under	the	sedton	laws	
durng	wartme,	and	they	dd	so	wthout	promptng	from	the	admnstra-
ton.	Fnally,	 the	 ingalls	 case	 llustrates	 an	Fbi	 strategy	 sought	 tme	and	
agan	aganst	polcy	crtcs:	to	lnk	them	to	foregn	governments	and	pros-
ecute	 them	as	unregstered	 foregn	 agents.	Whle	 ingalls	was	 somethng	
of	an	anomaly	among	legtmate	ant-nterventonsts,	her	case	was	to	be	
the	bass	for	proposed	subsequent	prosecutons	of	crtcs.	Whle	the	effort	
ultmately	faled,	t	stands	as	a	steppng-stone	toward	the	more	well-known	
case	of	1944	nvolvng	thrty-three	sedtonsts.
	 72.	 “mss	ingalls	Gets	Prson	Sentence,”	New York Times,	21	February	1942,	1.
a	close	 examnaton	of	 the	 Fbi’s	 survellance	 of	Charles	 lndbergh;	 the	
amerca	Frst	Commttee;	Senators	burton	Wheeler,	Gerald	nye,	and	Davd	
Walsh;	 Congressman	 hamlton	 Fsh;	 those	 assocated	 wth	 the	 vctory	
Program	 nvestgaton;	 the	 brgham	 famly;	harry	 elmer	 barnes;	 laura	
ingalls;	and	others	confrms	the	underlyng	poltcal	nature	of	Fbi	offcals’	
efforts.	Fbi	Drector	J.	edgar	hoover	sought	 n	each	nstance	to	cater	to	
the	 roosevelt	 admnstraton’s	 poltcal	 and	 polcy	 nterests—that	 beng	
to	montor	 the	poltcal	 actvty	 of	 ts	 ant-nterventonst	 foregn	polcy	
crtcs	and,	f	possble,	to	develop	nformaton	that	would	dscredt	them.	
in	the	ingalls	case,	for	nstance,	even	though	Fbi	agents	had	a	responsbl-
ty	to	nvestgate	a	true	volaton	of	the	Foregn	agents	regstraton	act,	
underscorng	ther	efforts	was	a	desre	to	develop	a	successful	prosecuton	
of	not	an	esponage	agent	but	one	of	the	presdent’s	foregn	polcy	crtcs.	
Fbi	agents,	moreover,	went	so	far	as	to	use	llegal	nvestgatve	technques	
(wretappng	and	llegal	trespass)	to	develop	nformaton	“most”	of	whch	
was	“not	competent	evdence”	for	tral.	Further	hghlghtng	the	poltcal	
nature	of	ths	nvestgaton	s	the	fact	that	Fbi	offcals	dd	not	seek	a	sm-
lar	case	aganst	the	nterventonst	Fght	for	Freedom	Commttee	who,	as	
mark	lncoln	Chadwn	has	shown,	smlarly	volated	the	Foregn	agents	
regstraton	act.	The	bureau’s	concern	wth	the	admnstraton’s	poltcal	
nterests	s	further	underscored	n	the	vctory	Program	leak	nvestgaton	
where	 Fbi	 offcals	 focused	 exclusvely	 on	 ant-nterventonst	 crtcs	 to	
satsfy	the	desres	of	some	hgh-level	admnstraton	offcals	to	hold	them	
responsble	and	to	dscredt	ther	arguments.
	 Fbi	 survellance	 efforts	 aganst	 the	 ant-nterventonsts	 were	 wde-
spread,	 thorough,	 and	 responsve	 to	 roosevelt’s	 poltcal	 nterests.	 Fbi	
agents	 employed	 the	 use	 of	 nformers,	 llegal	 wretaps,	 llegal	 trespass,	
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mal	 covers,	 offcal	 nvestgatons;	 perused	 organzatons’	 prvate	 fles;	
collected	 derogatory	 ntellgence;	 provded	 publc	 opnon	 leaders	 wth	
Fbi-obtaned	poltcal	ntellgence	(usng	blnd	memoranda);	lkely	lased	
wth	 brtsh	 ntellgence	 about	 the	 ant-nterventonsts;	 and	 sought	 to	
develop	cases	aganst	them	that	would	have	dscredted	ther	efforts	n	the	
courts.	hoover	also	 recommended	 to	hs	 superors	 the	use	of	 the	grand	
jury	that,	despte	ts	work	beng	techncally	secret,	would	nvarably	draw	
publc	attenton	through	leaks	to	create	pressure	that	would	serve	to	cast	
doubt	on	the	legtmacy	of	the	presdent’s	crtcs.
	 The	 Fbi’s	 survellance	was	 not	 lmted	 or	 “never	 sgnfcantly	mob-
lzed”	and	Presdent	roosevelt’s	purposes	were	also	not	“essentally	benev-
olent,”	as	prevous	studes	 ndcated.1	 instead,	 they	reflected	an	 ntensve	
Fbi	nvestgatve	effort	and	a	callous	dsregard	by	hoover	and	roosevelt	
for	 hs	 legtmate	 poltcal	 opponents’	 cvl	 lbertes.	 more	 specfcally,	
one	can	chart	the	Fbi’s	efforts	wth	the	ntensfcaton	of	the	foregn	pol-
cy	debate.	Durng	1939	and	1940,	Fbi	agents	passvely	montored	ant-	
nterventonst	 neutralty	 advocaton.	 Durng	 the	 frst	 half	 of	 1941	 and	
the	lend-lease	debate,	that	survellance	markedly	ntensfed	when	crtcs	
drectly	crtczed	the	presdent’s	polces,	ncludng	Fbi	efforts	to	develop	
nformaton	 that	 had	 the	 potental	 to	 dscredt	 lndbergh	 and	amerca	
Frst.	but	durng	 the	 second	half	of	1941,	when	 the	Great	Debate	dead-
locked,	 Fbi	 agents	 focused	 on	 congressonal	 ant-nterventonsts	 who	
were	blockng	neutralty	act	revson	and	on	the	aFC’s	fnancal	sources.	
but	after	the	declaraton	of	war,	and	nto	1942,	Fbi	efforts	to	develop	pros-
ecutons	and	use	of	llegal	nvestgatve	technques	sgnfcantly	expanded.	
Wth	war	no	longer	on	the	horzon	but	a	realty,	the	Fbi	reached	the	level	
of	a	domestc	securty	state	freely	pursung	crtcs	wth	less	fear	of	back-
lash	whle	 few	amercans	dared	 crtque	 government	 acton	 to	preserve	
securty.
	 Taken	as	a	whole,	Fbi	survellance	durng	ths	perod	reveals	a	smlar	
pattern	 of	 behavor	 that	 occurred	 durng	 the	Cold	War	 (.e.,	 the	 use	 of	
llegal	 nvestgatve	 technques	wthout	 approval,	 dssemnatng	 poltcal	
ntellgence	to	publc	opnon	leaders,	utlzng	separate	flng	procedures	
to	nsulate	the	collecton	of	senstve	nformaton,	and	extensvely	mon-
torng	Whte	house	crtcs	under	a	securty	ratonale).	Ths	pattern	sug-
gests	that	the	bureau’s	role	and	functonng	as	an	nsttuton	of	the	natonal	
	 1.	Charles	 F.	 Croog,	 “Fbi	 Poltcal	 Survellance	 and	 the	 isolatonst–interventonst	
Debate,	 1939–1941,” Historian	 54	 (Sprng	1992):	 442;	Kenneth	O’relly,	 “a	new	Deal	 for	
the	Fbi:	The	roosevelt	admnstraton,	Crme	Control,	and	natonal	Securty,”	Journal of 
American History	69	(December	1982):	639.
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securty	state	can	be	dated	not	wth	the	onset	of	the	Cold	War	but	to	the	
perod	of	the	Great	Debate.
	 in	 return	 for	 satsfyng	 varous	 admnstraton	 poltcal	 nterests,	
hoover,	an	archconservatve	n	a	lberal	admnstraton,	not	only	preserved	
hs	 bureaucratc	 poston	 as	 Fbi	 drector	 but	 also	 obtaned	 over	 tme	
ncreased	 authorty	 for	 hs	 bureau.	When	 attorney	 General	 Cummngs	
sought	 to	publcze	 the	crme	 ssue	durng	 the	early	new	Deal	 to	ensure	
passage	 of	 hs	 crme	 legslaton,	wth	hoover’s	 enthusastc	 assstance	 he	
was	successful.	Then,	n	1934,	hoover	responded	to	Whte	house	requests	
for	nformaton	about	the	actvtes	of	fascst	groups	n	amerca.	by	1936,	
pleased	wth	hoover’s	reports,	Presdent	roosevelt	stepped	up	Fbi	efforts	
when	he	verbally	authorzed	the	bureau	to	nvestgate	domestc	fascst	and	
communst	movements.	hoover	then	sought	and	won	n	1939	an	executve	
order	establshng	the	Fbi	as	the	sole	domestc	nvestgatve	agency.	after	
the	onset	of	 the	european	War,	 n	1940,	roosevelt	 further	 ncreased	Fbi	
nvestgatve	authorty	by	secretly	authorzng	the	use	of	llegal	wretaps	n	
natonal	defense	cases.	hoover	subsequently	exploted	ths	executve	drec-
tve	 to	develop	a	not	 nsgnfcant	 level	of	 nvestgatve	autonomy	 for	hs	
Fbi	when	 the	attorney	general	 showed	dsnterest	 n	montorng	wretap	
usage.	 amd	 all	 of	 ths,	 hoover	 also	 developed	 or	 revsed	 specal	 flng	
procedures	that	ensured	the	confdentalty	of	senstve	Fbi	operatons	and	
nformaton.	yet	t	s	an	mportant	dstncton	that	all	of	ths	occurred	dur-
ng	a	perod	of	nternatonal	crss	that	resulted	n	a	charged	poltcal	debate	
that	permtted	hoover	to	cater	to	the	admnstraton’s	poltcal	concerns.
	 an	examnaton	of	the	ncreasng	number	of	Fbi	agents	and	the	agen-
cy’s	 annual	 appropratons	datng	 from	1934	 further	 alludes	 to	hoover’s	
success	n	developng	hs	Fbi	durng	ths	perod.	in	1934	the	Fbi	employed	
391	 agents	 and	 a	 support	 staff	 of	 451	 and	was	 approprated	 $2,589,500.	
by	1936,	the	year	roosevelt	ncreased	Fbi	nvestgatve	authorty	to	have	
t	 focus	 on	 ntellgence	 nvestgatons,	 the	 bureau	 had	 nearly	 doubled	
ts	 agents	 to	609	wth	a	 support	 staff	of	971.	 its	1936	appropraton	was	
$5,000,000.	When	the	Great	Debate	began	to	domnate	amercan	poltcs	
by	1941,	the	Fbi	employed	1,596	agents	and	2,677	support	staff	wth	a	bud-
get	of	$14,743,300;	and	n	1942	t	employed	2,987	agents	and	5,000	support	
personnel	and	had	a	budget	of	$24,965,000.	To	round	off	the	ncreases,	by	
the	 fnal	year	of	 the	war	(1945)	 the	Fbi	had	4,370	agents,	7,422	support	
staff,	and	an	appropraton	of	$44,197,146.2
	 The	Fbi’s	secretve	relatonshp	wth	brtsh	ntellgence	also	llustrates	
	 2.	 Fbi	agent,	staff,	and	appropraton	fgures	are	reprnted	n	athan	Theohars	et	al.,	
The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide	(Phoenx,	aZ:	Oryx	Press,	1999),	4–5.
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the	embryonc	orgns	of	the	nsttutonal	sde	of	the	later	natonal	secu-
rty	 state.	a	hallmark	of	 the	Second	World	War,	Cold	War,	 and	War	on	
Terrorsm,	 the	 ntmate	 ntellgence	 relatonshp	 between	 the	 Unted	
States	and	Great	brtan	had	ts	orgns	durng	the	Great	Debate.	The	Fbi’s	
“specal	relatonshp”	wth	brtsh	ntellgence	began	n	1940	and	ncreas-
ngly	became	more	ntmate.	and	whle	we	may	not	be	able	to	defntvely	
ascertan	the	precse	scope	and	nature	of	the	Fbi’s	relatonshp	wth	brtsh	
Securty	Coordnaton,	 both	 sought	 smlar	 goals	 n	 regard	 to	 Presdent	
roosevelt’s	 ant-nterventonst	 foregn	 polcy	 crtcs.	 Together,	 wth	 the	
Fbi	 nvestgatve	 tactcs	 dscussed	 prevously,	 the	 bureau’s	 close	 lason	
wth	foregn	ntellgence	agences	(ncludng	the	royal	Canadan	mounted	
Polce)	further	suggests	(strongly)	that	the	natonal	securty	state’s	orgns	
can	be	dated	to	the	pre–Second	World	War	era.
	 ant-nterventonsts	suspected	that	Fbi	agents	were	montorng	ther	
poltcal	actvtes,	and	whle	 the	bureau’s	efforts	ultmately	 faled	to	ds-
credt	 them,	 t	 nevertheless	 created	 a	 certan	 chllng	 effect.	 lndbergh	
beleved	that	the	Fbi	had	wretapped	hs	telephone	and,	ndeed,	Fbi	agents	
collected	 nformaton	 about	 the	 avator	 ndrectly	 from	 an	 llegal	 wre-
tap	and	shared	 t	wth	 the	Whte	house	and	 the	 federal	prosecutor	who	
was	 to	 queston,	 and	 perhaps	 dscredt,	 lndbergh	 before	 a	 grand	 jury.3	
addtonally,	 harry	 elmer	 barnes,	 Senator	 Wheeler,	 and	 Congressman	
hamlton	Fsh	all	expressed	concerns	durng	the	debate	that	cvl	lbertes	
would	suffer,	whle	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	went	so	far	as	to	obtan	
confrmaton	from	hoover	that	the	Fbi	had	n	no	manner	collected	ntel-
lgence	on	them	through	a	wretap.	yet	Fbi	agents	had,	 n	fact,	gathered	
“valuable”	poltcal	ntellgence	about	the	group	va	the	brgham	wretap.	
Fbi	agents	even	collected	nformaton	from	an	llegal	wretap	and	an	llegal	
trespass	of	laura	ingalls’s	apartment,	and	other	crtcal	comments	about	
the	 admnstraton	 from	a	wretap	on	Grunewald.	 John	T.	 Flynn,	 of	 the	
new	 york	 branch	 of	 amerca	 Frst,	moreover,	 feared	hoover’s	 Fbi	 was	
akn	 to	 the	 Gestapo,	 and	 the	 ant-nterventonst	 perodcal	Uncensored	
accused	the	Fbi	of	montorng	legslators.4
	 3.	Charles	lndbergh,	Wartime Journals	of Charles A. Lindbergh	(new	york:	harcourt,	
brace,	Jovanovch,	1970),	515,	600;	letter,	Charles	a.	lndbergh	to	Frankln	D.	roosevelt,	16	
July	1941,	Presdent’s	Personal	Fle	1080,	FDrl;	“lndbergh	Seeks	roosevelt	inqury,”	New 
York Times,	18	July	1941,	6;	“lndbergh	Fears	loss	of	lbertes,”	Charleston Gazette,	4	Octo-
ber	1941,	n	Fbi	100–4712–164.	hstoran	Wayne	Cole	ntervewed	lndbergh	extensvely	
and	asked	hm	about	Fbi	wretappng.	Cole	reports	that	lndbergh	dd	ndeed	beleve	the	
Fbi	had	tapped	hs	telephone.	letter,	Wayne	S.	Cole	to	author,	12	December	1994;	conversa-
ton	wth	Wayne	S.	Cole,	14	July	1999,	Washngton,	DC.
	 4.	On	ant-nterventonst	concerns	about	beng	montored	see	Justus	Doenecke,	The 
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	 roosevelt	 and	 senor	 admnstraton	offcals	 found	hoover’s	 reports	
to	 be	 valuable.	after	 recevng	 the	 frst	 of	hoover’s	 poltcal	 ntellgence	
reports	n	1940,	roosevelt	thanked	the	Fbi	drector	n	a	personal	letter.	by	
late	1941,	when	the	Great	Debate	became	stalemated	over	neutralty	rev-
son,	roosevelt	drected	 the	attorney	general	 to	have	 the	Fbi	 nvestgate	
the	money	sources	behnd	the	amerca	Frst	Commttee	n	the	hopes	that	
a	grand	jury	probe	would	end	the	mpasse.	Senor	admnstraton	offcals	
also	pressed	 for	 an	Fbi	 nvestgaton	of	 ant-nterventonsts	 n	order	 to	
hold	 them	responsble	 for	 the	vctory	Program	 leak.	but	most	unsubtle	
was	 interor	 Secretary	 ickes’s	 use	 of	 Fbi	 nformaton—whch	 had	 been	
developed	unbeknownst	to	hm	partly	through	an	llegal	wretap—n	hs	
crtcal	 book	 manuscrpt	 on	 lndbergh.	 Clearly,	 senor	 admnstraton	
offcals	 found	hoover’s	 reports	 tantalzng	and,	 n	 some	 nstances,	used	
ths	nformaton.
	 Ths	 study,	 therefore,	 complements	 the	work	of	 hstorans	who	have	
examned	 the	 Fbi,	 ant-nterventonsts,	 and	 the	 natonal	 securty	 state.	
The	Fbi’s	extensve	poltcal	survellance	durng	the	Great	Debate	can	now	
be	understood	as	part	of	the	better-known	hstory	of	the	Fbi’s	poltcal	sur-
vellance	durng	both	the	red	Scare	and	Cold	War	perods.	Ths	book	also	
adds	to	the	work	of	hstorans	of	ant-nterventonsm	who	have	neglected	
t	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 documentaton,	 research	 specalzaton,	 or	 hstorcal	
focus.	and	whle	we	mght	not	be	able	to	understand	defntvely	how	the	
admnstraton	mght	have	used	the	nformaton	provded	by	hoover,	ts	
nterest	s	readly	apparent.	Ths	study	further	broadens	our	apprecaton	
of	the	natonal	securty	state	whch	has	been	analyzed	n	numerous	ways.	
in	terms	of	the	Fbi,	t	was	the	perod	of	the	Great	Debate	when,	for	the	frst	
tme,	the	bureau	extensively and	systematically	montored	admnstraton	
crtcs	whle	seekng	to	undermne	them.	The	Fbi’s	methods	are	strkngly	
smlar	to	those	employed,	though	on	a	much	larger	scale,	durng	the	Cold	
War	and	beyond.
	 in	sum,	the	Fbi	survellance	of	roosevelt’s	ant-nterventonst	foregn	
polcy	crtcs	denotes	the	orgns	of	the	Cold	War	Fbi’s	natonal	securty	
apparatus.	For	the	frst	tme	the	Fbi	extensvely	montored	an	admnstra-
ton’s	legtmate	crtcs	usng	a	“domestc	securty”	ratonale	whle	vewng	
them	as	“subversve”	or	“un-amercan”	to	become	an	ntellgence	arm	of	
the	Whte	house.	Fbi	offcals,	often	usng	ntrusve	and	llegal	technques,	
Battle against Intervention, 1939–1941	(malabar,	Fl:	Kreger	Publshng	Co.,	1997),	84–85;	
Doenecke,	Storm on the Horizon: The Challenge to American Intervention, 1939–1941	(bos-
ton:	rowman	and	lttlefeld,	2000),	270–76.
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recommended	the	ndctment	of	these	crtcs	under	the	Smth	act,	Foregn	
agents	regstraton	act,	esponage	act,	or	conspracy	statues,	a	tactc	they	
would	 employ	 aganst	 domestc	 communsts	 durng	 the	 Cold	War	 and	
eventually	abandon	wth	the	advent	of	the	COinTelPrOs.	These	actons	
volated	the	cvl	lbertes	of	law-abdng	poltcal	opponents	and	contrb-
uted	a	chllng	effect	n	mportant	publc	debate	over	natonal	polcy.	From	
these	orgns	Fbi	Drector	hoover	was	 able	 to	 create	 n	 the	Fbi	 a	more	
ntrusve,	powerful,	and	autonomous	nternal	securty	agency	durng	the	
Cold	War.	but	whle	ths	evoluton	had	ts	bass	durng	the	Great	Debate,	
t	was	not	a	predetermned	fact	that	the	Fbi	would	become	the	Cold	War	
agency	t	dd.	Unque	crcumstances,	such	as	harry	Truman’s	ascendancy	
to	 the	 presdency	 and	 hoover’s	 later	 msrepresentatons	 of	 executve	
orders,	durng	the	Cold	War	era	permtted	hoover	to	develop	the	Fbi	nto	
a	more	ntrusve	and	autonomous	agency.5	nevertheless,	hoover	could	not	
have	accomplshed	ths	wthout	the	bass	lad	durng	the	Great	Debate.
	 5.	 See	athan	Theohars,	“The	Fbi’s	Stretchng	of	Presdental	Drectves,	1936–1953,”	
Political Science Quarterly	91	(Wnter	1976–77):	649–72.
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